rational number

[mosaadabd460]

tary assistance. Libya concluded
a defense agreement with the
United Kingdom , and agreed to
the establishment of Wheelus Air
Force Base outside Tripoli and a
British air base near Tobruk.
Wheelus, because of its ideal cli
matic conditions, became the
principal training base for U.S. fighter aircraft stationed in
Western Europe .
This close relationship , which
was clearly one of Libyan eco
nomic dependence on the United
States and the United Kingdom,
was obviously headed for change
when, in December 1957 , Esso
became the first oil company to
announce it had struck oil . By
1968 , Libya had become one of
the world's leading oil producers
and the per capita GNP of its 1.6
million inhabitants had increased
from about $ 100 at independ
ence to $ 1,640. Reflecting this transformation, assistance
program was ended in 1965 .
In Libya, the United States
faced in a very special way the
problem of identification with a
regime. We had provided substan
tial financial support in the early
days of the kingdom. We enjoyed
the benefits of military facilities.
There was a widespread-but un
founded - belief that the British
and American Ambassadors dic
tated policies to Libyan Govern
ments.
with the lack of progress in the
building of modern institutions.
It is conceivable that the
United States could have had a
significant influence on the
course of events in Libya , but
this must remain in the realm of
speculation. Our aid had helped
launch the country. The King
and many of its leaders felt an
indebtedness to the United
States. Yet, it was clear to
American officials serving in
Libya during those years that the
course of events was in Libyan
hands and would be determined
by Libyans. Neither an earlier
withdrawal of our facilities from
Libya nor the exercise of any
extraordinary influence in that
country could likely have
changed the basic direction of
events.
It was particularly regrettable,
but not at all surprising , that the
leaders of the coup of September
1969 , under Lieutenant ( now
Colonel ) Qadhafi , took power
with deep suspicions of the
United States and with serious
expectations that we would try
to oppose their coup. The matter
was further complicated by the
fact that the new regime , deeply
influenced by the frustration of
the young Arab military officers
over the course of the six - day
war, made the Arab struggle
against Israel a principal tenet of
its foreign policy. Their belief in
our unqualified support for Israel
remains today the chief obstacle
to better relations. Other suspi
cions have, in all probability ,
been modified .
We adapted quickly to the
change in Libya. It was never our
intention to do otherwise . We
agreed to the evacuation of our
air base near Tripoli and our
Coast Guard navigation station in
the Gulf of Sirte . We modified
the nature of our relationship to
meet the new situation .
In Libya today, the greatest
U.S. interests are, in a sense,
beyond the government domain.
The investment and activities of
private American companies in
the development and production
of Libya's vast oil reserves are
essentially matters between the
companies and Libya. Our role
when we have a role-is to seek
to explain wider aspects of inter national relations which may
bear on oil policy . In the 1970
negotiations, for example, our
official effort was confined to
explaining our primary concerns as a government over the conse
quences for the consuming na
tions of any break down in nego
tiations, and to explaining
actions taken by the U.S. Gov
ernment in permitting the com
panies to concert on negotia
tions.
Today the 11 - nation Organiza
tion of Petroleum Exporting
Countries ( OPEC ) , consisting of
Algeria , Iran , Iraq , Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Venezuela , Libya , Qatar,
Abu Dhabi , Indonesia , and
Nigeria , are in a strong position
as a result of the world energy
outlook . Demand for oil and gas
by the developed world is ex
panding by leaps and bounds.
The OPEC countries have that oil
and gas, far in excess of their
own needs. A great amount of
creative diplomacy by govern
ments and business alike is going
to be required if the demands of
the producing countries for in
creasing revenues and for control
of the companies are to be met
without disrupting the industry,
the consumers, and the econo
our
There was much less awareness
of the growing concern of Ameri
can representatives in Libya at
the increasing detachment of the King from events in the country,
the influence of some of those
around the King on policies and ,
what was particularly serious, the
disenchantment of many of the
best young men in the country
7