rational number

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22
Allied strategy in North Africa ceased to be a mystery to the Ger￾mans the moment they were advised that the landings had taken
place, and from that time on the element of strategic surprise ceased
to weigh against them. Surprise had contributed greatly to the
success of the initial operations, but was lacking entirely during
the early period of the Allied thrust into Tunisia.
In this connection it is interesting to note the reply of a high￾ranking German officer, Field Marshal Kesselring, to an American
interrogation in May 1946. Kesselring was asked what intelligence
the Germans had of our landings in North Africa. He replied:
We were, in fact, in possession of very exact information con￾cerning activity in the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and were already
fully prepared for a possible landing. I myself was the only person
who believed in the possibility of a landing in Algiers. The German
and Italian high command, however, did not share this view. Your
radio broadcast service functioned faultlessly in this respect. It
kept us constantly in a state of excitement and carried on an ad￾mirable form of nerve war, so that we were forced to expect some
sort of invasion at any time and yet did not know from which direc￾tion it was to be expected.
Once the facts were appraised by the Germans, they acted with
speed and efficiency. In so doing they won the race for Tunisia,
succeeded in postponing the invasion of Italy for six months, and
gained time in which to strengthen their Continental defenses. But
we shall see later what price they paid for this.
The Allied command recognized the strategic importance of Tu￾nisia. From the very beginning it was known that once Tunis and
Bizerte were captured, all Tunisia would fall. We have seen why
initial landing points farther to the east than Algiers were not
selected. There remain then only two questions to be answered:
(1) Why was only a small force sent to Tunisia? (2) Why was it
unable to win the race to Tunis? Both questions have the same
answer: the lack of supply facilities for larger forces either on the
ground or in the air. Handicapped by lack of transport and slowed
by long supply routes, the Allied commander could send only a small
combat force into Tunisia. When this force was stopped and then
driven back by the enemy, it became necessary to enter the “logistical
marathon” referred to by. General Eisenhower.
PERIOD OF AXIS INITIATIVE-, January-March 1943
Allied Plans and Build-up (Map 4b).—In early January the Tuni￾sian front extended from the Chott Djerid in the south to the Medi￾terranean in the north, a distance of some 250 miles. Through the
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