mid term exam

[Rafael.Nadal]

mid term
move ahead
good luck

[شكسبير2020]

we don't have (play )this year

[Mr. Bayoumy Ghreeb]

اشكرك على هذا الجهد الرائع

[lanahas lanahas]

بارك الله لك

[mosaadabd460]

THE WAR 's
IN : NORTH AFRICA ,
PART 2
(and the Allied invasion)
COUNTRY
DEPARTMENT OF ART Military Engineering
Military United States ACADEMY
WEST the POINT, NEW YORK
1947
LITTLESTONE

1
3
7

SRLF
DRL17234 754 (v.2)
RESTRICTED
Foreword
This account of operations in North Africa was written from November 8,
1942 to May 13, 1943 for use in the education of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is mostly based on materials provided by the Historical Department and the special staff of the Department of War and other Department of War agencies.
Valuable information has also been obtained from Office of Naval Intelligence publications.
However, in acknowledging the indebtedness to others, it is not
required to hold them responsible for any errors of fact or for any conclusions drawn.
These and other manuals on World War II are constantly revised as additional information becomes available. It would be appreciated if military personnel who note any apparent errors or inconsistencies, or who have comments or suggestions for improving the subject, report them to:
Professor of Military Arts and Engineering,
United States Military Academy,
West Point, NY
March
1 , 1947
USMA PRINT OFFICE - 3-25 -47-2500
3

Restriction of
War in North Africa
Part 2 -
Introduction to the Allied Invasion
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declaration of war against the United States by Germany and Italy plunged that country into the global conflict.
Immediate action was necessary to coordinate with our allies, and especially with Great Britain, the strategy which would govern the future conduct of war and the control over which it should be exercised. In a report to the Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army stated:
On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of
Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived.
In Washington to consult with the president
and US chiefs of staff. From the series of discussions that followed
resulted in agreement not only regarding the immediate strategy for our
joint conduct of the war, but also for
the organization of a method of strategic command and control of
British and American military resources. Perhaps no
other act of the Allies, in the field or otherwise, exercised such a strong influence on the
course of this war as the immediate establishment
of concrete measures for achieving unity of effort through the medium of action
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. under the supervision of
their government leaders .
At this first conference, the President and Prime Minister, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a decision to focus Allied resources first on defeating Germany, the greatest and closest enemy, and then Japan.
In the discussions that followed the conference, an initial target date for an operation across the English Channel was set in the summer of 1943. Some consideration was given to the possibility of an emergency diversion attack earlier if it was necessary to save the situation at the Russian front. With further studies being done, a shortage of landing craft to start a cross-channel operation, and a lack of supplies to maintain it,
opposed putting the plan into action. At the same time, the setbacks suffered by the British in North Africa and con
1

2
need tinued for some converted to Russian assistance brought under consideration the possibility of launching an attack against the French territories in North Africa in 1942, with the consequent postponement ment key to the process through the channels until later date.
Despite the US military opinion in favor of advertising
According to the original plan, the final decision in favor of the invasion of North Africa, as an alternative to the attack across the English Channel, was made in July 1942, after the second visit of Prime Minister Church Eyl to Washington. The landing date is set for September; It was scheduled to take place in November. Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower* was dis*****ed to London in June 1942 as Commander in Chief, European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA). On August 14, 1942, he received a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff who appointed him Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. His task under this mission was to direct joint military operations against French North Africa - Operation Torch - as soon as possible with the aim of gaining, in conjunction with the Allied forces in the Middle East, complete control of North Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. At the same time he retained command of ETOUSA (until February 4, 1943).
Meanwhile, Rommel was making the push that led him to El Alamein and the gates of Alexandria, and other Axis forces were marching across the Don River toward the Caucasus Mountains and the rich oil fields near the Caspian Sea. The Middle East seemed clearly within Hitler's reach, and the situation in the Mediterranean was very bleak. In the Pacific, Japanese forces reached what was supposed to be the highest level of their advance. Attu and Kiska were occupied in the Aleutian Islands; Port Moresby in New Guinea, the starting point for Australia, has been threatened. Burma was invaded. India was under sea and air attack. The tide of Axis aggression was at its height, and the Allies were everywhere on the defensive, struggling to open their important sea communications routes.
But the Allied High Command knew that the large convoys were in
Its way to Egypt and it must arrive in time. These reinforcements were expected to provide General Montgomery not only the means by which to stop Rommel but also to carry out his role in the great Allied Pincer, the western jaw of which would be the British and American forces to be landed. French North Africa. Thus, the battle of Al-Alamy was expected.
* The ranks of the officers as mentioned in this narration were those that were at that time.

3
to divert the attention of the Axis from the newly chosen theater of operations, and thus, the British Eighth Army had to form the eastern jaw of the pincers designed to crush all opposition to the Axis in Africa. Therefore, the invasion plans continued despite the obvious negative situation in Egypt.
Strategic considerations
The following strategic advantages appear to result
from the occupation of French North Africa:
1. The first feature is the removal of the Mediterranean Sea.
supply route. Allied convoys will be able to move along it under the protection of ground aircraft. They could reach Egypt and the Suez Canal by a sea route 2,300 miles long (measured from Gibraltar), or 10,000 miles less than that around the Cape of Good Hope. The distance from the UK to India and to our newly established leadership in the Persian Gulf will also be significantly shortened.
2. The occupation of French North Africa will make the bloc of the Axis Powers almost complete. All shipments of food and other supplies from Africa to Germany and its satellites will stop.
3.
Another possible route to the conquest of continental Europe would be secured, thus forcing the Germans to withdraw troops from the Russian front to defend by this conquest.
4. Allied control of French North Africa will make
Egypt, the Suez Canal and the Middle East are safe from the invasion of the West.
5. Dakar no longer poses a threat to South America.
6. If French North Africa were to be occupied without the bitter agitation of the French forces and authorities in that region, it would be possible to reconstitute the French army in preparation for its forceful return home. However, the Allied forces faced several problems that, if exacerbated, could seriously impair the success of the operation. The reaction of Spain, Vichy France and North African French
Rica itself, will have a vital influence on upcoming events. The pivotal airfields of Sicily and Sardinia enabled the enemy to gain control of this part of the Mediterranean between Tunisia and Italy and supported the successful movement of Allied convoys through this area
known as "Bomb Alley". Since Spain itself was pro-Axis, there was a real danger that the Germans would strike this country

4
Try against Gibraltar. Undoubtedly, the Axis would occupy all of France to prevent an Allied landing on the French Midi coast and to attempt to gain control of the French fleet at Toulon. It is possible that the Germans would attempt to capture Tunisia and Bizerte in order to retain control of the Sicilian Channel, a process that would be relatively easy for them due to the lack of supply lines from their bases in Sicily and southern Italy. Last but not least, due to other commitments around the world, Allied planners faced severe shortages of trained forces, vital supplies and equipment, especially landing and cargo ships, which would certainly limit the scale of the operation.
Quoting an official report:
Thus the strategic concept of sweeping the Axis from the north

summoned Africa, and establishing Allied control from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, an operation on a scale of such magnitude,
once initiated, must be followed with all
The power and charge required by the position.
The main Allied operation will be in 1942 and 1943.
Political background
A clear picture of the military operations in French North Africa cannot be obtained without some understanding of the political events that accompanied, and sometimes overshadowed, the military aspects of the campaign. In general, the French were divided into three groups:
1. General Charles de Gaulle was, in London, the assembly point of the French National Committee. His group was also known as the "Free French" and later the "French Fighters". It consisted of French refugees who fled to England, America or the French colonies instead of accepting German persecution at home and those patriots who remained in France and participated in the activities of the resistance factions, one of de Gaulle's followers, General Leclerc, organized a small force in French Equatorial Africa that carried out raids against the Italian outposts of Fezzan (southern Libya) and her activities later culminated in her thirty-nine day campaign 1,600 miles from Fort Lamy, near Lake Chad, to join General Montgomery's Eighth Army in Tripoli on January 25, 1943.
2. A second group, the French living in North Africa, where open resistance was bringing a sudden German occupation, succeeded in creating a secret "French liberation movement." Although the goal of this group, like the Free French, was the liberation of

5
France, its members were working under German watch, which seemed to lend a touch of cooperation to its activities to the outside world. General Henri Giraud, who had recently escaped from the German regency, was to become the recognized leader of this group that included some French military leaders in North Africa. The clash of personalities was between de Gaulle and Giroud to prevent the union of Free France groups and the French liberation during the North African campaign.
3. The third group was made up of the pro-Vichy French - men clinging to the pathetic loyalty of the old Marshal Petain. This group valued those founding in France and the Axis-controlled territories who believed that cooperation with the Germans was the best way to secure the future of their country. Admiral Jean Darlan, who controlled the French fleet, was Pétain's designated successor.
In laying the groundwork for the conquest of North Africa, the American government based its policy on the view that if the main French in North Africa had armed support, they would be willing to seize the opportunity to free themselves from the yoke of Germany. This policy pushed the United States into a path of detailed negotiations with the French liberation movement in North Africa. Throughout the planning phase of the outbreak, Mr. Robert Murphy, US Consul General in Rabat, maintained close contact with the Allied Forces Headquarters from his North African offices. Since the British had previously committed their support to the Free French de Gaulle, not only were negotiations with the French liberation movement in North Africa to be conducted by the Americans, but it was also desirable that American forces conduct the initial landings.
In another attempt to reach an understanding, a secret date was arranged about fifty miles west of Algiers on the night of October 22-23. Major General Mark W. Clark, Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces (who was ashore from a submarine) met Mr. Murphy and a delegation of French officers headed by General Mast, commander of the French military forces in the Algiers region.
Mast's delegate resented
the liberation movement in that part of North Africa. The meeting was broken up by local police, and the important question of what Darlan and the French fleet would do was left unanswered, although some progress was made with army chiefs in setting up the North African command plan.

6 Plans
for
landings and preparations
were the first of many difficult problems facing
The Allied Forces Command is establishing what has become known as the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ). What made it even more difficult was the lack of historical precedent on which such an organization could be based. In General Eisenhower's words:
I was determined from the beginning to do everything in my power to make this a
truly allied force, with true unity of command and centralization
of administrative responsibility. No
alliances do in the past often more than naming the common enemy, and the "unity of command"
ambitious and pious hides national jealousy
and ambitions and accusations against senior officers, not wishing to do so.
To subordinate themselves or their forces to a commander of
a different nationality or a different service. The
differences inherent in . must be preserved
British and American administrative and logistical systems and in nomenclature and equipment, although all plans and directives must evolve from one common headquarters.
The principle of full integration has been applied in all divisions of the General Staff in
1
The headquarters of the Allied forces, with the best man, regardless of national character, is assigned to each post. In those sections where national practices differed, a dual institution, one American and one British, was created to deal with the interests of each nation. Despite the duality in the sense that in each of these divisions there was an American and British assistant chief of staff, in reality they functioned as separate divisions, with no divided adviser or divergent decision from them. The commander-in-chief insisted on perfect harmony between these American and British "opposing numbers". The wisdom of the common personnel principle was demonstrated during the North African campaign and was used successfully in all post-war joint operations.
By the end of the summer, the AFHQ regulation was a frosted coating. As mentioned, Lieutenant General Eisenhower (USA) was the commanding general of the Navy. Major General Clark (US) was the Acting Deputy Commanding General; Brigadier General Walter B. Smith (US) Chief of Staff. Major General Humphrey M. Gill (Br.) was the chief administrative officer. Lieutenant-General Ken Neth Ann Anderson (Br.) was in command of the British Land Forces; Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham (Br.) Commander of the Navy; Brigadier General James H. Doolittle was commanding the US air units in the expedition, and Air Marshal Sir William L. Welch commands the British air units.

7
With the headquarters of the Allied forces organized, plans for the invasion advanced. The cities of Oran and Algiers on the Mediterranean coast and Casablanca on the Atlantic Ocean were the centers of political control of the French possessions in North Africa and were the main points of the railway system, highways and air communications (Map 1). Tunisia and Bizerte were key to the Sicilian Channel, and control of these cities would put the Allies in a position where, concurrent with the British Eighth Army's advance through Libya, it might be possible to destroy Rommel's army. However, as we have seen, the political situation required all initial landings by American units, and the lack of shipping and trained forces would prevent the immediate realization of all these objectives.
At first it was developed
and two studies of plans: the first, major such as the Soltes at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers, and the small-scale assaults on Philipville and Bony (this plan was modified during its development by eliminating the landing at Casablanca and replacing the land push westward from Oran); Second: the attacks on Casablanca and Oran only. On September 20, 1942, the so-called "Outline" was released, which is a modification of the above plans. This plan abandoned the Phillipville and Bonny landings because shipping and other transshipment sources were not available to support this ambitious undertaking and because these landings would carry the Allies within range of Axis aircraft stationed in Sicily.
Under the approved plan, the Western Task Force was to sail directly from the United States and capture Casablanca. The Center's task force, also entirely American, had to sail from the United Kingdom and capture Oran. Eastern Task Force, American and British,
He was about to set sail from the United Kingdom and capture Algeria and the nearby airports. The Central and Eastern Task Forces will launch their attacks simultaneously, while the Western Task Force will land at the same time as weather conditions permit. After achieving their initial objectives, the Western and Central task forces were to establish and maintain contact between Casablanca and Oran and build an American army and air strike force ready to occupy Spanish Morocco and repel a German attack through Spain if they had to. it is necessary. The Eastern Task Force, having taken its initial objectives, would become the British First Army, under General Anderson, and would rapidly move east to capture Gidley Airport and Buge Port.
You will eventually advance to Tunisia. The organization of the task forces is set out in Appendix 1.

8
In addition to the Naval Escort Forces, the Royal Navy will have
Force H, consisting of two warships, four cruisers, two aircraft carriers, and fifteen destroyers, was to monitor the Vichy Italian and French fleets in the Mediterranean.
As for air support, the initial attacks were to be supported by carrier aircraft of the guard forces. The 12th US Air Force was to form Western Command, headquartered in Oran. One hundred and sixty fighters were to be flown from Gibraltar to both the regions of Casablanca and Oran within three days of the attack. Similarly, the Royal Air Force squadrons were to form Eastern Command, based in Algiers. Ninety of their planes were due to arrive from Gibraltar via D plus 3.
Adding to the plan, developed in early October, provided for the 2nd Battalion of the US 503d Parachute Infantry to capture the Tafrawi and Lasinia airstrips south of Oran. This work entails a flight from England of approximately twelve hours for thirty-nine unarmed aircraft of the 60th US Group of Forces.
In an effort to secure surprise, the information regarding the locations of the proposed landings was, of course, carefully guarded. It was realized that the Germans might know that preparations were underway for some sort of operation; But even if they concluded that an amphibious attack was going to happen somewhere, it was hoped that they would tilt their thinking toward Norway, western France, or Dakar. After the Central and Eastern Task Force passes through the Strait of Gibraltar, the apparent capabilities of the Allies will be even more limited; But the caravan was planned, by the route followed, to create the impression that it was heading to Malta or Suez. During the dark hours preceding the landings, he would turn sharply south and head towards Algiers and Oran.
The headquarters of the Allied Forces will remain in Gibraltar until appropriate communications are established near Algiers. Because of the amphibious nature of the operation, weather conditions will have an important impact on its success. It was to be a day
Victory November 8, 1942. Territories, November 8-11, 1942 (Map 2)
By noon on November 7, Operation Torch was ready to go. Task Force Western had succeeded in crossing 3,000 miles of submerged ocean to reach from their landing area, and Central and Eastern Task Force

9 were going past
Oran and Algiers toward "bomb alley", where the Luftwaffe was waiting for the ***. In each of the three landing zones, tactics were assumed to be generally the same, i.e. landings on either side of each major target as a means of subsequent encirclement.
These were in Oran and Algiers to be completed in front of me as saults on ports in order to seize shipping and port facilities before they were vandalized. Western Mission Force. French in Morocco, mainly galese Sene, Moroccan, and Algerian colonization American forces were stationed along the Atlantic coast in the Casablanca region from Safi to the port of Lyautey, and the American forces were divided into three groups as shown on the map, it was scheduled to be five in the hour 0515 on November 8.
The landing was made at Fedala, fourteen miles northeast of Casablanca, where the aim was to begin operations to capture the last named city from the east; in the port of Safi, 125 miles southwest of Casablanca, where the immediate objective was to smuggle armor and prevent reinforcements at Marrakesh from reaching Casablanca; and finally, at Mahdia, seventy miles northeast of Casablanca, where the aim was to capture the airports of Port Lyautey and protect the northern side of the whole operation.
All three landings yielded a great surprise, and by 1015 hours Safi was captured, after the successful push of the port by two destroyers. At Fedala and Port Lyautey, however, strong opposition was met, both from aircraft and from burials on the shore. The latter was silenced by naval fire, and by 1500 Fadala had fallen. Heavy fighting continued in the port of Lyautey all day, but at nightfall the airfield was still in French hands.
Meanwhile, our navy off Casablanca got its share of activity on November 8th. Early on in appearance, two French commanders and five destroyers sorted and made as if they were attacking our transports. They were shot and forced to retire.
Shortly thereafter, the French light cruiser Primaguet joined the destroyers out of port. With their exit again, the group was immediately engaged by the Augusta, Brooklyn, and cover force ships. With the exception of one ship that managed to return to port, all French ships sank or were ashore. While aiding in the process, the covering force, made up of Massachusetts, Wichita, and the Tuscaloosa, and four destroyers, was also exchanging fire with shore batteries and the French warship Jean Bart, which was moored in port. In order to end this agonizing bloodshed, American officers made several

10 attempts
to contact the French authorities at Casa Blanca to arrange an armistice, but Admiral Micheller refused to receive them.
The fighting continued for the next two days. American forces steadily expanded their bridgeheads and unloaded equipment despite heavy waves that caused losses to the landing craft. On November 10, the airfield at Port Lyautey was captured, and the first American planes landed in the field at 1100. This completed the primary mission of the Mahdia force.
In the south, after capturing Safi on November 8, elements of the 2D Armored Division moved east to intercept French reinforcements advancing from Marrakesh to Casablanca. These French forces were dispersed on the 10th, and on that night the armored vehicles began marching to Casablanca. The 47th Comintal team remained in Safi to protect the port. When the armored force received word of the surrender on November 11, General Aaron obtained the surrender of Mazagan and was continuing to advance to Casablanca, fifty miles to the north.
The forces of the 3D Division advancing on Casablanca from Vidala withstood stiff resistance, but by noon on the tenth day, they had reached the gathering area northeast of Casablanca. That night they made an encirclement movement to the southeast in preparation for a coordinated attack on the city at 0730, 11 November,
but at 0700 the French, on the orders of Admiral Darlan, surrendered.
Center task force. Changing course abruptly during the night, the central task force arrived off Oran and began its landing in Arezio and Andalusia at 0135 hours on November 8. The primary targets were airports and a highway system parallel to the coast. After the French commander of the area decided to cooperate with the American forces, he changed his mind and ordered total resistance. The landing boats were fired upon, and some sank as they approached shore, but they were disembarked at all points chosen.
The Ranger's battalion captured Arze, about thirty miles northeast of Oran, and shortly thereafter the Allied supply ships began loading goods. Several miles east of Arze, Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, landed, and moved southwest to capture the air fields at Tafrawi and Lasinia. The 16th and 18th Fighting Divisions of the 1st Infantry Division were brought ashore near Arzeu and began to advance towards Oran.

11
To the west, the 26th Fighting Regiment, Lieutenant General (1st Infantry Division) landed in Andalusia and struck east towards Oran with orders to capture the dominant heights west of the city. An armored detachment reached the northwest shore of Loremel and moved to capture the airfield at that place.
In an attempted frontal assault, two cutters carrying two companies of American forces and private anti-sabotage parties broke through the cordon and set out for the port of Oran. Here they came under crushing fire from coastal batteries and French warships. They reached their goal, but were burned and hampered. Most crews and troops aboard became casual relationships; The survivors were captured.
At first, other serious opposition to these operations came from a coastal battery over Arzew, but resistance developed rapidly during the day as our forces began to advance towards Oran.
By the night of the eighth, Combat Command B had captured the Tafrawi airfield and moved north towards La Senia. The divisions of the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Combat Regiment advanced eighteen miles from Arzew, encountering increasing resistance as they approached Oran. The 26th Regiment Combat Team moved from Andalusia eastward to the vicinity of Oran after overcoming some opposition. The'airfield is occupied in Lourmel.
The plans for the paratroopers' mission have largely gone astray. The formation became partly scattered by a storm, and those planes that passed through it at widely dispersed points landed on Sabkra, a dry salt marsh. About 300 paratroopers were finally destroyed in the vicinity of Tafrawi, as they ably helped the ground forces secure that airfield.
During November 9, enemy resistance continued to slow the advance at nearly all points. La Senia airport held out even after dark. However, the Tafrawi airfield, which fell on the 8th, was used by aircraft of the 12th Air Force as troops continued to be massed ashore.
As early as the 10th, columns of infantry converged in positions around the outskirts of Oran, and elements of the Armored Combat Command were close to the southern edge of the city. After a coordinated attack by all units at 0737, the armored forces moved into the city, and at 1230 General Fredendahl received the official surrender of the French commander.
Eastern Task Force. - With the development of events, the region of Algiers, which is the most important of the three main objectives, proved to be the easiest to secure. The sea was calm and the surprise was achieved. there was

12
Opposition from naval and coastal defense guns, which continued to fire until silenced by Allied naval and air units, but for the most part the landings were not opposed.
As did the other two forces, the Eastern Task Force reached its target on schedule during the night of November 7-8, and began landings at three beaches. Western Algeria, the 168th Reggae Mental Fugitive Combat Team made their first landing at Cape Veroches.
Friendly French officers, ready to cooperate with the American forces, surrendered the fortress of Sidi Ferroche at 0300 without firing a shot. Armored cars and tanks fell and the advance east towards Algiers began. Three miles from the city, it encountered some opposition from Vichy sympathizers, but by the afternoon the Americans were able to continue their movement towards the city.
Meanwhile, near Castiglione has been landed by
British Commandos, who advanced south and quickly occupied the airfield at Blida. Soon fighters from the British Naval Air Force arrived and began to use the airport. The commandos then moved eastward to cut off the city of Algiers from land communications to the southwest.
While completing the landings west of Algiers, the American 39th Regiment Combat Team, reinforced with a battalion of British commandos, landed on beaches near Ain Taya, fifteen miles east of the city. One column immediately headed for the main target, the large Maison Blanche airport, while another column moved into Algiers. The airfield was taken at 0830, after overcoming some slight resistance at Fort de l'Eau and after brushing with French tanks near the airfield. A little later a flock of Hori sticks, which had left Gibraltar at dawn, landed safely.
Meanwhile, as at Oran, a direct attack on the port to gain
control of port equipment and prevent sabotage was met with violent opposition. Two British and two American coastal shipping destroyers were badly damaged, and although a few commandos were placed ashore, the attempt to capture Algeria by a forward attack was unsuccessful.
By noon on the eighth day, the converging American columns had
completed the encirclement of Algiers and the railroads, highways, and air communications were in the hands of the Allies. During the day, the task force commander, Major General Charles W. Ryder, went ashore to confer with Admiral Darlan's representative. And they came to an agreement that all resistance must cease and that our troops must occupy the city at 1900, 8 November.

13
comments
The capitulation of Casablanca ended the first phase (landing) of operations. Months of preparations and three days of fighting put almost all of French North Africa into the hands of the Allies. The number of victims of Amer Ikan reached about 770 dead and missing, and 1050 wounded. The British lost 240 dead or missing and sixty wounded.
Perhaps the most significant achievement of the operation was organizing a combined force of US and British ground, air, and naval forces under one common crew and moving that force thousands of miles away to conduct simultaneous combat landings at widely dispersed points on a hostile beach. The landings, involving more than 100,000 soldiers, hundreds of aircraft and 258 ships and warships, had truly written a new chapter in amphibious warfare.
The political aspects of the landings, in particular the recognition of Darlan, became the subject of much debate. General Marshall's comments in an official report are pertinent:
General Eisenhower announced that General Giraud would be
responsible for civil and military affairs in North Africa, but
French military officials on the ground were found to be loyal
to Marshal Pétain's government. President Roosevelt's memorandum
to the French head of state had assured Marshal Petain of our desire
to liberate France, but Vichy's answer was disappointing. Our ambassador was handed over his passport on November 9,
and orders from Vichy to the French African units to resist our forces were rescinded.
which by that time had
already accomplished its tasks on the Casablanca front.
Unexpectedly, Admiral Jean Darlan, Pétain's appointed deputy
and commander-in-chief of all French forces, was found,
in Algiers, the capital. . . . He was placed in protective custody, and when the French leaders turned out to be loyal to the Vichy government
, a series of conferences immediately followed with the goal of
stopping French resistance against
General Patton's task force in the vicinity of Casablanca. When, on the morning of
November 11, the Germans invaded unoccupied France
, Admiral Darlan rejected the pseudo-independent Vichy government, assumed
power in North Africa in the name of Marshal Pétain, and
issued an order to all French leaders in North Africa
to cease hostilities. This reached Casablanca a few minutes before the
start of the last American offensive in
the early morning of November 11th.
These events, which occurred after the actual landings on November 8, required quick decisions, the results achieved at last validating the American military leaders. During the North African campaign, the problem of integrating the French into a united and cooperative ally was a heavy burden that fell on

14th
General Eisenhower in addition to his purely military duties. The essence of the commitment signed by Admiral Darlan was that the French were to immediately give the Allies the same amount of active assistance in the capture of Tunisia, which was within their authority. They had to organize the North African government, under Darlan, for effective cooperation, and under General Gero, they had to begin to reorganize the military forces selected to take an active part in the fighting. The way was now cleared to achieve the main goal, which was the occupation of Tunisia and the extermination of German forces in Africa.
The main factors that contributed to the success of the Earth
The events in French North Africa were: (1) a strategic surprise, (2) the lack of organized French resistance, and (3) effective joint naval military planning and execution. Errors occurred in the implementation of plans, but this was expected from the Green Forces. The experience was to serve them well in the future.
By the end of November, there was a definite turning point
In the military situation of the allies as a whole. General Montgomery began chasing the remnants of Rommel's army through Egypt and Libya, the Americans and British successfully landed in French North Africa and began the invasion of Tunisia, and the Russians had begun their winter offensive at Stalingrad. All of these offensive moves gained momentum with each passing month. The initiative had passed on to the Allies, and for the first time during the war the German military situation deteriorated into an imposed strategic defense. The tide turned like wisdom in the Pacific Ocean as the Americans conquered the Solomon Islands in Guadalcanal and secured a lifeline to Australia. Forced out from southeastern New Guinea, the Jap anese had begun their long way back to the Philippines.
Tunisia campaign
The conclusion of the landing phase paved the way for the next operation, the Tunisian campaign (Map 3). This campaign, which was to last six months, will be divided into three phases. The first would cover the race between the Allies and the Axis to build a force in the Bizerte and Tunis region strong enough to deprive the loser of this key region. The Germans had to win this race with a tight mar-gin. The second stage would include the period of the Axis Initiative, during which the Germans had to develop and expand a strong defense perimeter around their possessions in Tunisia. The third stage

15 would include
the decisive period of the campaign: the Allied victory at Mareth, the capture of Bizerte and Tunisia, and the subsequent surrender of all Axis forces in North Africa.
theater of operations
Tunisia varies greatly in both its length and width in terms of terrain and climate. It is five hundred miles long from north to south and 150 miles wide from east to west, and its surface consists of a confluent mountainous region in the north, a region of lower plateaus in the middle, and wide plains in the south that gradually merge into the sands of the Sahara.
The mountains in the north are the eastern end of that chain of the Atlas Mountains that begins in southern Morocco and extends entirely through French North Africa in a northeast direction. It is rocky, sloping and close to Souk Ahras reaching an elevation of more than 4,200 feet.
The easternmost outcrop of these mountains, known as the Grand Dorsal, extends south of Tunis in a vertical "V" shape. From the summit of the 'V', near the Pont du Fahs, the eastern arm, called the Eastern Back, extends south 125 miles to Macnassi, and from there to the southwest near the Catar region. A few passes crossed it - Fondouk, Faid, Maknassy and El Guettar - this eastern dorsal zone, with Chott Djerid (large salt lake), would provide a natural defense of the Allies' right flank against any attacker from the east or south. This terrain was the scene of bitter fighting during the Tunisian campaign.
The western arm of the "V", the western dorsal, extends southwest from the Pont du Fahs and forms a secondary barrier against attack from the east or south. Important passes in this range are Muktar, Sbeiba, Kasserine, Darniyah, and Al-Abyod. Tebessa,
On the western slope of the dormer, it is an important communications center and key to the southern front.
In the north is the abstract river, the most important stream, the northeast wind blows from the mountains to the Gulf of Tunis. The door clipper is the key to this corridor to Tunis. It was to become an important defensive position covering the Allied lines of communication to the west.
There are a few good roads in Tunisia. The main roads are usually hard-ground (roller-paved) but narrow. Secondary roads are sometimes well mineralized, but often they are little more than dirt tracks. After a few hours of rain, many of the so-called roads become practically impassable for motor transport, while rapidly deteriorating in prolonged dry weather. When you pass through the hills, the roads often become

16
unclean over long distances. During military operations, it can be blocked by minefields and covered with fire from heights that drive it from both sides. Thus passes and defilement were destined to become important objectives during the Tunisian campaign.
There are three ways to enter Tunisia from Algeria. The first is the coastal road through Bonn. Another road, via Souk Ahras, forty miles inland, leads into the Tunis-Bizerte region either by way of Souk Arbaa or by the more southerly road through El Kef. Central and southern Tunisia are reached via Tebessa, from this point north-east roads lead to Majz al-Bab and Tunis, from the east through Kasserine to the Fondouk and Fayed corridors, and from the south-east through Gafsa to Sfax and Gabes.
Railways are of particular importance in this few area
Good fasts. However, the deterioration of the sidewalks and the French railway wagon made even this type of transport extremely unreliable. Operating in the coastal plains at the level of Tunisia and southern Tunisia, the enemy would have had the definite advantage of shorter and better communications.
The period of heavy rains begins in late November and lasts
until February. During this season, the lowlands, in particular, become a sea of sticky mud.
Tunis Race, November-December 1942
Having secured the initial goals of Casablanca, Oran and
Algeria, the Allies immediately switched to the next stage, the siege of the bulk of the American, French, Moroccan and Algerian forces in the region of Casablanca and Oran and the advance of the British First Army into Tunisia. According to General Eisenhower:
Our chief hope lies in anticipating the axis in Tunisia in our work
At full speed. In fact, we participated in a race not only
against the build-up of enemy forces in Tunis and Bizerte, but
against the weather as well. The
weather had been mild less than a month ago, and the Axis air and ground forces were
within walking distance of Tunis and Bizerte, less than 100 miles
from these places across the Strait of Sicily. All our breath
was the easternmost power in Algiers, 560 miles west of Tunis. Neces
sarily, therefore, we had to count on rapid advances in very light
forces, understrength in both personnel and equipment.
To make matters worse, the enemy wasted no time in the face of the Allied invasion. On November 9, German air transport began to send its troops to the Bizerte region - Tunisia. Here again the French reaction infuriated the Allies. Admiral Estefa, the French vice president, listened to Vichy and, despite Darlan's directions for an armistice, before

17
cut the way for the German to enter. French forces led by General Berry, loyal to the Allies, were ordered out of Tunis, leaving the city defenseless. Later, General Berry's forces joined the Allies, but in the meantime the Germans found facilities for airfields and docks ready for their use.
On November 9, General Anderson arrived in Algiers to take command of the First British Army. His plan was to capture all the ports and airfields to the east (Bouge, Djidjili, Philipville, Bonny, and La Calle) as quickly as possible and then push his forces forward by motorized transport, landing craft, and troop-carrying aircraft. Buji port and airport in Gedeli were the first two targets.
The floating reserve of the Eastern Task Force, part of the British 78th Division, was still aboard the ships in Algiers. She sailed on the evening of November 10 to take the first targets of the drive east. The capture of Bugey on November 11 was unopposed, but due to poor surf conditions, the force was not able to capture Jid Gil Airport until the 13th. During this temporary lack of adequate ground air cover, the Germans were allowed to bombard the port of Bugey, where they damaged a British aircraft carrier .
Bones was occupied on 12 November by two companies of a British parachute battalion dropped from the C-47 of the US 65th Motors Command and a British commando battalion brought in by water. Axis's only opposition to this move was a violent air raid that night. The mobilization of forces in the bone area is kept as quickly as possible, and air, sea, rail and vehicle transport is used. Advances to the east were pressured, and by November 15 the commanding elements of the 36th Brigade of the 78th Division occupied Tabarka, only eighty miles from Tunis. The British Paratroopers battalion that had been shot down at Suq al-Arbaa on the 16th had moved out of Beja by the 17th, and the forces at Tabarka had advanced to Jebel Abiud.
At the same time the Allies were securing the airfields in the south. On November 15, the 503d Parachute Battalion of Colonel Edson D. Raff, an American unit, is at Yux-les-Bains and two days later occupy Gafsa airport, far to the south. It sent patrols over the entire southern region, encountering only small Italian forces. The Raf force, as it became known, established friendly relations with the French garrison at Tebessa, which soon began cooperating with the Americans in patrolling the area.
Evidence of French cooperation emerged on November 16, when there were reports of clashes between French and German patrols in the Beja-Debejil Abiud-Mater region. Although General Berry had been negotiating with the Germans since their arrival,

18
The Allies in Tunisia had the support of the French forces, and Berri had now agreed that his forces should cover the 78th Division's stationing in the Tabarka-Souq Arbaa region. On November 17, General Anderson issued orders to the 78th to complete its focus and prepare to advance into Tunisia.
At this time the combat power of the Axis was estimated to be about 500 to 1,000 in the Tunis area and about 4,000 in Bizerte, with some tanks and planes all over the place. At the same time, landings were on average more than fifty times a day in Bizerte. The enemy had occupied Mater and pushed west and south.
The Allied reconnaissance force rushing to Tunisia consisted primarily of two brigades of the British 78th Infantry Division and one battalion of the 17th Lancer, reinforced by light tanks from the American 1st Armored Division. It was realized that such a small force, only a few thousand men in total, could not hope to capture Tunis and Bizerte if the Germans succeeded in bringing in heavy reinforcements. Yet at that time it was the greatest strength that could be supplied over the long and difficult course of communication.
Follow-up convoys reached Bonn as quickly as they could, and once the carriage was unloaded, newly arrived elements of the British First Army continued overland to the east (Map 4a). By November 20, British armor, known as the Blade Force, was established in the Souk Arbaa area, and by November 22, the 11th Brigade* group of the 78th Division was concentrated in the Beja area.
Operations in the north were supposed to take place along three clearly defined axes: (1) the road from Tabarka to Mater, (2) the Beja Mater road, and (3) the main highway running from Beja through Majz Al-Bab and Tabarka to Tunis.
While the Allies were desperately trying to build up their advancing units and bring in supplies, the enemy seized the initiative by confronting the French at Majz al-Bab on November 18 and 19. The poorly equipped French were attacked three times by infantry supported by artillery, tanks and grenade launchers, resulting in 25 percent losses in the ranks of the defenders. The French retired until reinforced with British and American armor and artillery, when they counterattacked. At the same time, the lead battalion of the 36th Brigade halted another axis attack on Jabal Abiod.
Although the British were able to restrain the enemy, they were unable to advance, and were ordered to be temporarily delayed until their strength was sufficient to secure a reasonable order.
* A British Brigade group is similar to our Combat Team.

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chance to succeed in driving to Tunisia. Also, the mixing between French and British units that occurred as a result of improvisation after the French decision to work with the Allies had to be reconciled. By November 23, a verbal agreement was reached that all forces north of the Le Kef-Zaghouan line would be under the command of the British First Army, while all units south of this line should be under French command. This was unsatisfactory, but it was the best that could be achieved for the time being, because the French refused to serve under a British commander.
On November 24, General Anderson completed the forward focus of the 78th Division and Blade Force, with the British 6th Armored Division on its way to Tabarsuk and Combat Command B of the U.S. 1st Armored Division on its way to Souk Arbaa as follow-up forces. . The advance was resumed, with blade force penetrating the enemy position to a point halfway between Tabarba and Mater and the 11th Brigade, on the right, advancing down Wadi Mejerda, capturing Mujaz al-Bab on the 25th. The advance was steady for the next three days, as the 11th Brigade moved, Reinforced with American and British armor, he set out on the banks of the river to capture Tebourba on the night of November 26-27. On November 28, our forces reached El Jadida, less than sixteen miles from Tunis.
To the north, the 36th Brigade, despite advancing about ten miles toward Mater, encountered increasing resistance from small enemies and booby traps. At the same time, the Blade Force, on the plains south of Mater, began to experience supply difficulties, which were exacerbated by the first rains. In all divisions, enemy submersible bombers were an important factor in stopping our advance, as our airfields were too far from the stern to provide the necessary cover.
The forward positions were held until 1 December, when the German commander von ar Nimes launched an attack with bombers, tanks, and infantry against the Blade force near Tabarba. After losing forty tanks, the Blade Force was withdrawn and Combat Command B and Eleventh Brigade captured the sector. On December 3 the enemy attacked again, the 11th Brigade suffered greatly in men and equipment. By this time, the 78th Division's battalions numbered fewer than 350 men.
On December 8, General Eisenhower agreed to General Anderson's proposal to withdraw his forces to more defensible areas. However, the important center of the door midges will be held at all costs. The weather proved a serious hindrance to this withdrawal.

20
Combat Command B became poorly overwhelmed and was finally forced to give up the bulk of its equipment, recovering only three of its 18 105 mm caliber. Howitzers, twelve of sixty-two medium tanks, thirty-eight of 122 light tanks. This was a great loss, because the constant fighting and dangerous attrition, along with inadequate rail and highway communications, impeded the formation of reserves. The weather was turning the few airfields we had available into swamps while the Axis aircraft, operating from paved fields, maintained air superiority over the forward areas, compounding the
confusion and obstacles for the Allies.
she was
It is estimated that on November 30, the Germans had 15,500 combat troops, 130 tanks, 60 field guns and 30 anti-tank guns in the Tunis-Bizerte area. By December 18, this force had grown to a total of 42,000 men, including about 25,000 Germans, and reinforced dis*****es still arriving.
During November and early December, southern Tunisia was mostly no man's land, but several hundred Germans reached Gabes, Sfax, and Sousse by troop carrier aircraft and fortified those towns. Enemy patrols consisting of armored cars and light tanks moved westward and occupied the Fahs Bridge.
In the far south, American paratroopers, who had fallen at Yux-les-Bains and joined the French forces in that area, actively patrolled. The task of a few hundred American and French troops in central and southern Tunisia was to make the enemy feel like a whole squad. They rushed up and down the hundred-mile front, and appeared here and there to threaten the Germans along the coast. They had many skirmishes with enemy patrols and effectively protected the southern flank of the First Army.
Unwilling to abandon the race to Tunisia, General Eisenhower decided to launch another offensive in the north around December 20 with Tunisia as the target. But the weather continued to be the most formidable enemy. Vehicle movement on paved roads was possible, and two-thirds of Allied aircraft in the main square, at Souq al-Arba', were out of order due to mud. The supply lines were insufficient to meet the needs for steel mats and equipment to put airfields in good condition or, for that matter, to provide the necessary backlog of general supplies, in particular ammunition.
As the Allies' hope for this last planned attack lay in air power and artillery, the operation was postponed and then, on December 24, finally abandoned.

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General Eisenhower expressed his feelings about the situation with these words:
The abandonment of our immediate offensive plans was
a terrible disappointment which I have suffered thus far, but I was convinced
that an attempt to launch a major offensive under the prevailing conditions in
northern Tunisia would be merely to prosecute disaster. We could not
hope to resume major operations in the north until mid-March, and we had to start the slow work of preparing for
an offensive at the end of that period. The logistics marathon,
which I desperately tried to avoid , had begun .
During the last two months of 1942, there were other events that had some influence on the military situation. When Girmans moved into non-occupied France and toward the naval base at Toulon on November 11, Admiral Darlan ordered the French fleet to sail to Africa. But in the confusion of the situation, the fleet was scuttled instead, and only a few submarines passed to North Africa. Darlan was more successful in his next attempt to help the Allies. He was able to convince M. Poisson, governor of French West Africa, joined the liberation movement and opened Dakar to use as a base for the Allies. When Admiral Darlan was assassinated on December 24, General Giroud took his place. General Yuen, commander of the French military, came.
At this time, the bulk of the American forces (Fifth Army*), along with two divisions of French forces from Morocco and the French division in Oran, were held in the region of Casablanca and Oran to guard communications, to counter any movement that the Germans might make by passing through Spanish Morocco, and conducting Training in preparation for future missions.
comments . The Allied move to seize Tunisia was a necessary step in the continuation of the strategic offensive in North Africa. The efforts of the Axis to thwart the attempt were an equally essential step in carrying out strategic defenses that had been curtailed by their defeat at the Battle of El Alamein.
Two main reasons prompted the Axis leadership to fully defend Tunisia. The first is that only by holding this area can they hope to rid the troops and equipment of Rommel's army from their grave predicament. The second was that it was necessary to delay the Allied attack on Europe as long as possible in order to gain time to prepare the necessary defenses.
* The Fifth Army, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, was activated on January 5, 1943. It was headquartered in Oujda, Morocco. The assigned forces included the 3D, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions, and the 2D Armored Division.

22
Allied strategy in North Africa ceased to be a mystery to Girman once they were notified of the landings, and since then, the element of strategic surprise has ceased to affect them. Surprise contributed greatly to the success of the initial operations, but was completely missing during the early period of the Allied incursion into Tunisia.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the response of
a high-ranking German officer, Field Marshal Kesselring, to an American interrogation in May 1946. Kesselring was asked what intelligence the Germans had about our landings in North Africa. He replied:
We were, in fact, in
possession of very accurate information regarding activity in the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and we had
Fully prepared for a possible landing. I was the only one who believed in the possibility of landing in Algiers. But the German and Italian high command did not share this view. Your broadcasting service is working properly in this regard. It
kept us constantly in a state of excitement and carried on a miraculous form of nerve warfare, so we had to expect
some kind of invasion at any time, and yet we didn't know from what direction to
expect it.
As soon as the facts were evaluated by the Germans, they acted quickly and efficiently. In doing so they won the race for Tunisia, succeeded in delaying the conquest of Italy by six months, and gained time to bolster their continental defenses. But we'll see later the price they paid for it.
The Allied leadership recognized the strategic importance of Tu
nisia; From the beginning, it was known that once Tunis and Bizerte were captured, the whole of Tunisia would fall. We have seen why the initial landing points to the east of Algiers were not chosen. There are only two questions left to be answered: (1) Why was only a small force sent to Tunisia? (2) Why was that
unable to win the race for Tunisia? Both questions have the same answer: the lack of supply facilities for the larger forces, both on the ground and in the air. Handicapped by the lack of transportation and the slowness of the long supply routes, the Allied commander was able to send only a small fighting force to Tunisia. When this force was stopped and then expelled by the enemy, it became necessary to enter the indicated "logistics marathon." General Eisenhower.
Axis Initiative period, January-March 1943
Allied plans and building (Map 4b). - in early January,
The Tony Sian front stretched from Shatt Grid in the south to the Mediterranean in the north, a distance of about 250 miles. Through the

23
desert, south of the area shown on the map, small patrols of the French Camel Corps roamed. American paratroopers took control of the desert, the wilderness around Gafsa, and up to the Fayed Pass. The American 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division began arriving in this area.
Around Pichon and Fondouk and further north, the French XIX Corps occupied positions in the hills and took control of the Ousseltia Valley. * These forces were lightly armed with obsolete weapons and had neither the means of transportation nor the administrative mechanisms for offensive operations. But under the able leadership of the generals Juin and Koeltz they maintained high morale, and by the end of the campaign cooperation with the other allies was excellent.
What remained of the front, north of the sea at Cape Sirat, was under the control of the British First Army, hitherto an army in name only. At this time it consisted only of the Fifth Corps, which consisted of the 6th Armored Battalion, 78th Infantry, and the 139th Brigade. Thus, during early January, a 250-mile front was erected by a horde of three British, part of one American, and three French divisions. weak.
To resist the Allies at this time, General von Arnim appears to have had three German divisions and three Italian divisions. Within about two months, he expanded the bridgeheads of Sousse, Sfax, and Gabes into a more or less continuous coastal pass in order to ensure close communication and cooperation between his forces and Rommel's, and then approached the Mareth position.
With offensive plans in the north for the time being abandoned, the situation on the long front of the Pont de Facility to Gafsa deserves close attention. A successful Axis attack through our weak positions there could move to the Mediterranean coast in the Bone region and completely isolate the British First Army. As a counter plan, the Allies developed the "Sfax Project", a plan for an Allied offensive against Gabes and Sfax to be launched in the Tebessa-Kasserine region. Besides regaining the initiative, this operation, if successful, would cut the communication path between Rommel and von Arnim and secure the southern flank of the British First Army. The prospects for better weather in this area were encouraging,
* led by General Coltz, this corps contained most of the French forces available from Tunisia and Algeria—about three divisions that were composed mostly of local forces.
As already mentioned, General Yuen commanded all the French forces.

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On January 1, 1943, the US 2nd Corps, Major General Frieden Dahl, commander, was separated from the Central Task Force at Oran and sent to Tunisia. The 2nd Corps, which was the nucleus of the US 1st Armored Division, completed its position in the Kasserine-Tebessa region on January 15 and proceeded with plans for the offensive to be launched in 23 days. However, information was received on January 15 that it would be impossible to coordinate this attack with the advance of General Montgomery's army, because Montgomery would not reach Tripoli until last week in January. This caused General Eisenhower to abandon the Sfax offensive for another, as it was now considered too risky. After this change of plan, the 1st Infantry Division, less than the 18th and 26th regiments, was attached to the French Nineteenth Corps, farther north.
The approach of the British Eighth Army made it necessary to plan a large-scale reorganization to achieve unity of command in the Allied land, sea and air forces. At the Casablanca Conference in mid-January, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that this reorganization should take place when the campaign had reached the appropriate stage and when the necessary preparations had been completed. General Eisenhower was appointed to command the new North African Operations Command and relieved of responsibility for the European theater. General Sir Harold R.L. L. Alexander, the British commander-in-chief in the Middle East, was to become Eisenhower's deputy and command the Eighteenth Army Group, consisting of the British 1st and 8th Armies, the American 2nd Corps, and French forces on the Tunisian front. The air units were to be organized into the Mediterranean Air Command, under the command of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was to become the commander in chief of the naval forces in the Mediterranean. As we shall see, another month was due to pass before these arrangements took effect.
By late January, von Arnim's army of 65,000 was receiving about 750 men per day and large amounts of supplies. Therefore, the mobilization of the Allied forces and the interception of the enemy crowds served as the direction and almost the sole objective of the Allied strategy in Tunisia. Steps were taken to improve the Allied supply preparation and to develop air power over Tunisia.
All port and transportation facilities have been brought to their maximum capacity (Map 3). The First Army was based in Beaune and used supply routes through La Calle and Souk Ahras. The supplies of the American 2nd Corps were transported from Oran and Algiers by rail to the depots of the new eastern base division in Constantine and from there

25
to forward supply points in the Tebessa area. The 12th US Air Force was supplied with rail and road from Phillipville.
The Air Force and Navy have collaborated on the dual mission of protecting our supply lines and disrupting the enemy. Fighter elements of the Eastern Air Command were stationed in Souq Al Arbaa as air support for the First Army. Similarly, the 12th Air Support Command was brought to Thelepte and Youks les Bains airfields to support the 2nd Corps. B-17 was collected near Biskra, and the medians were based on Constantine. Both American and British aircraft focused primarily on Tunisian targets but began to range as far as Sicily and Sardinia. Malta-based Beaufighters and Spitfires aided the Allied efforts by striking Tripoli, Tunisia, and Axis air trains over the Sicily Channel. During the first week of January, 520 12th Air Force and 250 RAF aircraft were operational in Northwest Africa.
Contrary to the prevailing impression, it is estimated that 90 percent of the flow of men and supplies through narrower Sicily was transported by sea and only 10 percent was sent by air. This Axis waterway, with its excellent air cover, was less vulnerable than the Allied long coastal route between Bonn and Algiers. Moreover, during the first three months of operations
, Allied ports, in particular Bonn, were subjected to constant and sometimes heavy air raids.
Operations, January 1 - February 14, 1943 (Map 4b). - While the Allies were "cleaning their administrative tail" (a phrase coined by General Montgomery), the Germans kept the initiative unchallenged. The following excerpt from the report of the Allied Forces Headquarters indicates their appreciation of the precarious position of the Allies:
In a captured German document, dated December 16, we find
That Marshal Rommel's "situation estimate",
which underscored all our communication and logistics weaknesses,
emphasized the combined nature of our forces by the clever remark
that such a force "perhaps lacking cohesion and suffering from the weakness inherent in Allied command", in short we
mated in the French sector: "In the face of Gabes and
Sousse are the elements of three French teams, all poorly equipped
and in questionable morale."
From the Kairouan region, the enemy launched an attack on the French position on 2 January. In the hotel, the running son besieged and captured the hotel, and although the Pynchon gap in the Oselteia Valley was threatened, the enemy did not take advantage of his

success.26
The next German impetus came on January 18 at the meeting point of the British and French sectors in the Bou Arada - Pont du Fahs. The initial attacks, in which the new Mark VI tank ("Tiger") appeared, were stopped by the British, but not before the threat of Bou Arada. On the same day the enemy attacked from Pont du Fahs southwest towards Robaa in a campaign that, if successful, would isolate the French in the mountains to the east.
Over the next thirty-six hours, the Allied forces moved in to counter the Axis advance. The British 6th Armored Division regrouped in the Bou Arada area and sent a squadron of tanks and some artillery to aid the French forces while the B Combat Command moved from the American 1st Armored Division to Maktar. US 2nd Corps, to the south, was gathering elements of the 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division near Sbeitla for use as reserves.
On January 19, the British launched a counterattack, advancing nine miles east of Bou Arada and clearing the way north of that city. The enemy continued in the southwest direction unabated, and the quadrant was occupied. Forcing the French forces to withdraw westward,
the British V Corps complied by withdrawing its right flank. Axis forces attacked again on January 20, reaching Ossetia that night and isolating the French units holding out at East Noon.
Over the next few days, the Allied forces began to restore the situation. Elements of the British 6th Armored Division advanced on the Robaa-Pont du Fahs, and combat command B moved to positions at the southern end of the Ostelia Valley, where it managed to drive out isolated French units. At this time additional American forces arrived from the 1st Infantry Division to strengthen the Allied lines.
By January 25, the enemy offensive had exhausted its strength and the positions had stabilized. On that date, General Eisenhower, with the approval of the French, appointed General Anderson to command the British First Army of all allied land forces at Tu Nessia. General Anderson tasked the US 2nd Corps with retaking the strip south of the hotel - where he was operating.
The enemy did not remain silent for long. On January 30, he turned his main effort and attacked the French forces who were holding Faid Pass, the position that checked out the American 1st Division. The Axis force, supported by sixty tanks, captured the town of Fayed and made further breakthroughs to the south and west, although the French retained the junction of the road at Sidi Bou

27
Zaid, a few miles west of Fayed. Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division, at Sbeitla, was immediately ordered east to support. Combat Command D * ordered to relieve enemy pressure on the French with attacks eastward from Gafsa. This force of armor and infantry attacked Amer Ikan Sinead, where it was contained by the enemy. Meanwhile, Combat Command C moved north-east to cut off the Sidi Bou Zeid-Meknassi road. After arriving in Sidi Bouzid on the afternoon of the 31st, I headed south towards Meknassi.
Although the allies succeeded in denying the enemy further gains, the lost ground could not be regained. A combat command attacked Fayed on the morning of 1 February, but after fruitless assaults that continued through the next day, work was halted. to me
Southward, armored units captured Senade but during 3 and 4 February they were withdrawn from the Gafsa area and concentrated with other 2nd Corps units near Sbeitla. General Anderson ordered this action due to the situation at Fayed and the exaggerated reports of enemy concentrations between Ossetia and Kairouan.
As a result of enemy attacks from mid-January to the first days of February, the defensive barrier of the Allies along the eastern back was seriously weakened, and the arrival of Rommel's forces in southern Tunisia made the situation less safe. There was no other alternative but to withdraw ill-equipped French units from the line so that modern weapons could be issued and trained in their use. Forces of the US 34th Infantry Division began capturing parts of the French sector. The front remained calm from February 5 to 14, during which time both sides made strenuous efforts to bring in additional supplies and reinforcements.
During the period from early November 1942 to the end of January 1943, the British Eighth Army is reported to have followed Rommel's army throughout most of Egypt and Libya. On January 23, the Eighth Army entered Tripoli, and this fine port was finally in the hands of the Allies. Rommel continued his retreat towards the Tunisian border, which he crossed on 4 February. In exactly three months, the Eighth Army advanced 1,400 miles from El Alamein, as a result of which its administrative services were stretched to the extreme. Before resuming the offensive operation, the port of Tripoli had to be put into service so that reserves of supplies could be built up. Eight weeks passed after entering Tripoli before Montgomery's army was ready for the opening phase of the Battle of Tripoli.

An interim force consisting primarily of
the 1st Armored Division's artillery headquarters, a battalion of the 168th Infantry (34th Division), an armored battalion, and a battalion of armored artillery.


28
Marth. This was a period of anxiety for the Allied soldiers, as while the Eighth Army was preparing its preparations and the rest of the Allied forces were building their strength, the enemy forces in Tunisia were free to devote their full attention to them. The British First Army and American Second Corps, stretched thinly over a broad front. With Rommel's divisions available, the total Axis force in Tunisia increased to approximately 200,000 combat troops.
Battle of Kasserine Pass, February 14-26, 1943 (Map 5) - During the first two weeks of February, a large-scale regrouping of Allied forces occurred. In the sector of the Second Corps, the advance of the 1st Armored Division, the fewest of detachments, was allotted about fifty miles from
Jabal Tarza, near the hotel, to Jabal Qusira, south of Fayed Pass. Fighting Command B was attached to the British at Maktar. Com bat A command and the 168th Combat Regiment of the 34th Division moved to the Sidi Bouzid region, where the 168 were placed in defensive positions at Jebel Ksira and Jebel Souda (positions that were not supporting each other) to cover Fayed Pass. C combat command was concentrated in Hajeb El-Ayoun, and the rest of the 1st Armored Division was in Sbeitla. The 26th Regiment Combat Team was from the 1st Infantry Division in the Fryana District.
The Germans did not remain idly by for long, for at dawn on February 14 they launched a decisive attack from Fayed in the direction of Sbeitla-Kasserine and made a secondary attack from Meknassi in the south. The enemy forces participating in these initial attacks were the entire 21st Panzer Division, which was with Rommel's army in Tripoli, and elements of the 10th Panzer Division, recently re-equipped in Sfax. The immediate target of the main attack, supported by artillery, motorized infantry, Stuka dive bombers, and combat aircraft, was the road junction about five miles north of Sidi Bouzid.
The enemy first overran a battalion of artillery on the slopes of Jabal al-Sawda near the crossroads, and by 7:15 it had occupied the same crossroads with a force of about twenty tanks. Allied forces in Jabal al-Soudah and al-Qusayrah were threatened with complete encirclement. A battalion of Combat Command A tanks, supported by an artillery battalion, launched a counterattack against the enemy south of Jabal al-Soudah while the rest of Combat Command A withdrew westward to take up a defensive position at a road junction about ten miles. Northwest of Sidi Bouzid.

29
Axle armor continued to flow through the corridor. One column of about fifty tanks and some infantry surrounded Jebel Souda from the north and west and set out at Sidi Bouzid. Suffering heavy losses, the American armored battalion and its artillery broke the engagement, reduced to ineffectiveness, and moved to the west. Forces in Jabal Al-Sawdah and Al-Qusayrah.
Although she was still in combat, she was practically isolated for 1,300 hours. All day, the quadrangle highways of Fayed-Meknassi-Gafsa-Sbeitla were bustling with German armor and infantry. In the south, a single force of about thirty tanks advanced northwest from Meknes and by evening was threatening Sidi Bouzid from the southwest. Another convoy was advancing along the Sneed-Gafsa road. Gafsa, which was in danger of being completely cut off, was evacuated in the evening, and the forces there withdrew to Feriana to protect the important airfields near Thilpet. A new defensive line was planned to protect Feriana and Sbeitla. On the night of February 14-15, Combat Command B was ordered south from Maktar to support the remainder of the 1st Armored Division.
General Fredendahl ordered the 1st Armored Division to counterattack on the morning of February 15. Accordingly, Combat Command G moved south from Hajeb El-Ayoun with elements of Combat Command A and a British Armored Infantry Battalion at about 1600 on 15 February. As the armor of the leading battalion approached the enemy's defensive position, heading north-south through Sidi Bouzid, a formation of German tanks was seen, and within an hour a fierce battle was underway. Although the combat command reported the situation under control,
Appearances proved deceptive, because the frontal action of enemy tanks served only to divert attention from an overwhelming maneuver already underway. British Battalion was following Combat Command C to take advantage of this counterattack success when it suddenly found its right side and stern under the deadly fire of a large German tank force. Then the Allied forces were ordered to rid themselves, and all units fell quickly except for the lead armored battalion, which did not receive the order. The enemy has overrun it. As the British did in Knightsbridge, our tanks rushed blindly into an ambush. The units in Jebel Lisoda and Kisira were now completely isolated, and any thought of going to relief had to be abandoned.
Confusing fighting continued between eastern and southeastern Sbeitla during 16 February, the dive bombers inflicting heavy personnel losses on combat command A. By this time II Corps had suffered serious

30
Equipment losses ninety-eight medium tanks, fifty -seven half-tracks, and twelve 155-mm. Howitzers, seventeen caliber 105 mm. Lost howitzers. There was now no prospect of further counterattacks to hold the four*armored divisions* the enemy was using, let alone reclaim the allies' strategic position.
As this Axis campaign was threatening the position of the French XIX Corps on the eastern back, the commander of the First Army ordered the withdrawal of all forces to the highlands of Western Dor sal and the Feriana-Kasserine-Sbeitla line. An infantry battalion of the 1st Infantry Division and a regiment of combat engineers were assigned the task of organizing a defensive position at the Cas-Serene Pass, six miles northwest of Kasserine.
On February 16, General Fredendahl directed the 1st Armored Battalion to hold Sbeitla at all costs until 1100, February 17, in order to secure time to establish the position at Kasserine. In compliance with this order, the remnants of the A and C Combat Commands south and east of the city were disposed of. They were attacked by the enemy at 0900 on the 17th but held the ground until 15:00 when Combat Command A moved north to the vicinity of Sbeiba and C withdrew along the Sbeitla-Kasserine Road. Fighting Command B, having completed its movement from Maktar, covered the withdrawal. The entire 1st Armored Division was now ordered to concentrate about ten miles southeast of Tebessa as a reserve to counter any enemy attack through the pass defenses west of Dhahrsal - Abyoud, Derniyeh, and Kasserine.
By nightfall, Axis forces had occupied Sbeitla, Kasserine, and Thélpet airfield and had crept into the hills toward the Cas Serene Pass. The loss of the airfield was a serious blow to the allies, but they were able to evacuate most of the aircraft and stores and destroyed what could not be moved.
By broad daylight on February 18, the U.S. 34th Infantry Division (less than the 168th officer) had arrived at Siba to take over the defense of that lane and relieve Combat Command A, which was to join the rest of the 1st Armored Division southeast of Tebessa. Supported by the 18th Combatant Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division and the British Guards Brigade, the 34th Division was subjected to tank and infantry attacks during February 18, 19 and 20 in what was in effect a powerful diversion maneuver to prevent reinforcements from being sent south to Kasserine where the enemy planned to launch their major offensive.
* 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and the Italian 131st Centauro Division.

31
In Kasserine you pass a crossroads. A branch leads north to Tala, the loss of which will open the road to Le Kef and effectively cut II Corps from the other Allied forces to the north; The other branch leads to the northwest to Tebessa, which was the main communications center of the Allied Southern Front and the location of large supply facilities.
Rommel consolidated his position and reinforced his forces in the Kasserine region on February 18. In the 19th century, he aggressively conducted a reconnaissance operation with an infantry battalion backed by tanks, but the attack was not pressed when he met strong resistance, including precision American artillery fire. But during the night, enemy units successfully infiltrated higher ground both in the north and the
south and south sides of the pass and from these excellent points brought effective mortars and light weapons on the defenders. At dawn on the 20th, a decisive attack carried out the pass, forcing the defending forces back towards Tebessa.
Fortunately, the Allies were also active during the night of February 19-20. Brigadier General Dumphy, commander of the 26th British Armored Brigade, organized a special task force of one group of motorized infantry, one squadron of armor, a force of anti-tank guns, a division of motorized artillery, and a battalion of infantry and took up positions on both sides of the road. Thala Road is about ten miles north of the Kasserine Pass. It was this force that bore the brunt of the Axis offensive in the 20th century. The armored squadron lost all its tanks, and the infantry battalion suffered heavy losses, but the force held its own.
During the night of 20-21 February, some additional British forces moved behind the task force to cover the Tala Road, and others were deployed along the road three miles south of Tala. Combat Command B was moved from the 1st Armored Division's concentration area to a position in Jebel El-Hina to cover the road to Tebessa.
And on the 21st, about forty enemy tanks attacked this position, but were repelled.
On the twenty-first, a powerful German force renewed its offensive on the Tala Road. The British continued to incur heavy losses but held the enemy ten miles from Tala. Two field artillery battalions from the US 9th Division and part of the 16th Infantry Regiment (1st Infantry Division) provided material assistance to the defense. *
During the night of February 21-22, the commander of the US 1st Armored Division was appointed to command all
*The artillery of the 9th Division made a spectacular forced march from western Algiers to Tunis. In less than 100 hours it traveled 735 miles, despite the narrow, crowded roads and bitter weather.

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operations in the Thala sector - Kasserine - Jabal El-Hina. Over the past few days, the command of the Allied forces in this area has changed several times, which has caused a lot of confusion.
On February 22, the enemy attacked the north again, and on the Tala road the British engaged about fifty tanks. Some territory was ceded, but counterattacks brought back previous positions. In the afternoon, one battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, which was attached to the combat command B in the sector of Mount Heinrich, launched a counterattack on the German left flank. Launched from the vicinity of Ain Bou Driss and with the support of some artillery from the 9th Division, this attack was quite successful, taking about 400 captives. To a large extent it was the reason for the enemy's decision to retreat through the pass.
During the early stages of the fighting, bad weather hampered air operations, but at this time the atmosphere faded and the Allies were able to deliver brief strikes on the enemy columns. The aircraft of the 12th Air Support Command flew most of the missions, but other elements of the Air Force, reorganized during this period for closer coordination with the Ground Forces, were also very useful.
Early in the morning of February 23 the Germans began to draw across the Kasserine Pass. Well fought minefields and delays prevented the allies from inflicting much damage on them during the pursuit. By 26 February, they had reached the general line of Hajeb El-Ayoun - Sidi Bouzid - Gafsa, where they stayed.
comments. The specific purposes of the Axis attacks during January and February were: (i) to seize the areas controlling the mountain passes and thus expand the long coastal pass in order to protect communications between the armies of von Arnim and Rom Mill; (2) to make their airports in coastal areas safer from Allied interference; and (3) to bring the Allied forces out of balance before any coordinated attack can be launched. Girman's high command felt that Tunisia could be controlled, and the flow of men continued during this phase until 200,000 combat troops, three-fifths of whom were Germans, were available by 1 March.
By mid-February, more than 500,000 Allied troops were in North Africa, and plans were made for a large-scale offensive. Reinforcement of signals for the British First Army and American Second Corps was on the move, and Montgomery's Eighth Army was preparing to implement the Marth Line in full force. But before the Allies were ready to attack, Rommel made his only serious campaign effort when he struck the Fayed Bass on February 14.

33 The initial setbacks that American forces suffered can be attributed to several
factors: (1) confusion across ranks resulting from split units and an impromptu chain of command; (ii) the inexperience of the participating forces; (3) the dispersion of forces on a wide front and the lack of sufficient forces to provide sufficient local reserves for the frontal elements; (4) Unskilled use of terrain and available forces in defence.
Many lessons were learned during the operations of Vid-Kasserine, but perhaps the most valuable was the ancient principle that combat power should be concentrated. Again, it has been shown that so long as the reserves remain available for employment at the right time and in the right place, there is no situation which cannot be fixed, no matter what initial setbacks or the necessity of waiving some cause.
Rommel failed to achieve his goals despite the fragmented nature of the early resistance offered, particularly on the part of the very large shield we had in the Kasserine region. If he thought he could exploit his breakthrough as much as Le Kef and seriously threaten the Allied lines of communications, he quickly proved to be beyond his power. If he merely intended a devastating attack to inflict the most damage on our equipment, he succeeded in inflicting serious casualties without affecting the Allied power more than temporarily. His sands, however, were running low, and the tidal turn of Kasserine was the turn of the tide in all of Tunisia as well.
The Allied Initiative period, March-May 1943
year. The French political situation was no longer a serious factor in military operations, and the diminishing risk of the Axis rushing through Spanish Morocco led to the release of additional Allied forces for the Tunisian front. Despite the setbacks it suffered during January and February, Allied supplies and troop surges continued.
Supply facilities were reinforced in the Tebessa region to support the approaching 2nd Corps and the approaching British Eighth Army. Rain has stopped, roads are improved, railways are rehabilitated, and gasoline pipelines are built. Amer Ikan's forces received a baptism of fire, and, despite their initial setbacks, engaged the best the Germans could offer, they came out of the campaign both tactically wise and effective.
To go back for a moment, the expected reorganization of the Allied leadership took place at the time of the failure of the Kasserine Pass. Air Command's Mediterra

34
nean Air Command, Air Marshal Tedder, became operational on February 19, with Major General Carl Spatz as commander of the Northwest African Air Force. At the age of twenty, Admiral Cunningham was proclaimed commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean and on the same day General Alexander took command of the Eighteenth Army Group.
General Alexander I of the First Order regrouped the Tunisian forces and returned the brigades, regiments, and separate combat divisions to their original formations. The battle area was divided into three national divisions: the British First Army in the north, the French Nineteenth Corps in the center, and the American Second Corps toward the south. Prior to this reorganization, it was necessary to send the cut-off units to the front to take positions on a changing front, and the confusion caused by the accelerated improvisation of combat groups increased to meet the requirements of the rapidly changing situation. Under these conditions, it was impossible to avoid separating the units from their parent commands, and the forces from all three nations became mixed.
The wisdom of the Allied Command Reviews was already evident in the increased effectiveness of the Allied air force during the final stages of the Battle of the Kasserine Pass and in the close cooperation of the ground forces. An example of such effective coordination is particularly important. With Rommel's columns advancing towards Tebessa and Thala after breaching the Kasserine Pass, Alex Ender ordered a strong diversion by the Eighth Army. Montgomery was not prepared to attack the Mareth, but he made a mock preparation for a major attack. This, combined with mounting Allied resistance as he pushed west, led to the German commander's rapid withdrawal. He pulled his tanks out of contact and pushed them south toward what he thought was the most threatening part of his front.
In early March, Lieutenant General Patton, whom we had met
before as a general, took command of the US II Corps.
After the Battle of the Kasserine Pass, the face of the enemy
His main pressure against the British Fifth Corps (Map 6a). During the first week of March, the Al-Bab bomber was the main target, but at this point the Axis attacks were a failure, as were the attempts to capture
*The Northwest African Air Force was organized as follows:
Strategic Air Force - Major General James H. Doolittle.
Air Tactical Marshal of the Air Force, Sir Arthur Cunningham.
Coastal Air Force - Deputy Air Marshal Sir Hugh B Lloyd.
** This gave him command of all Allied naval forces in this region.

35
Bou Arada, far south. To the north, on the coastal road, von Arnim met with some local success and after a fierce struggle forced the V Corps to evacuate Sedjenane. Then he made an unsuccessful attempt to drive the car on the road to Beja. By 17 March these attacks forced the British line into the sector northwest of that city, but further advances were certainly halted by the V Corps.
Battle of Mareth, March 21-29, 1943. - During the first week of March, the command of the Axis undoubtedly learned that General Montgomery's Eighth Army would soon launch a full-scale attack on Mareth. In order to disrupt British preparations and delay the offensive, Rommel took the initiative and attacked on 6 March from the vicinity of Toujan (southwest of Mareth) towards Medenine. This attack was delivered by a powerful armored force - elements of the 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. The British were on alert, and had over 500 anti-tank guns in position around Mede 9, destroying fifty-two enemy tanks during the day while meeting only one squadron of their own, which lost no tanks.
This unsuccessful engagement cost Rommel more than half the armor of his offensive power. He had thrown his armored forces against the protected positions without adequate reconnaissance and before infantry support cleared the way. The time had passed when Rom Mill could ignore basic principles a bit, and the disaster he was courting was inevitable.
From the 6th to the 20th, the Eighth Army continued to gain strength as its rear units rose. By the last date, its main components were as follows:
X Corps: 1, 7th Armored Division and the 4th Indian Di
Vision.
XXX Corps: 50th and 51st Infantry Division and 1 Armored Brigade.
New Zealand Corps (formed specifically for this operation): 2nd New Zealand Division, Armored Brigade, Army
Auto Regiment, Medium Artillery Regiment,
and French Force Leclerc.
At that time, General Montgomery had 600 tanks compared to Rommel's 140. The Axis infantry at the Mareth were estimated at 120,000, outnumbered by the British.
The original plan was for XXX Corps to break through to the left of Mareth's enemy position and capture Gabes. X Corps were to be held in Army Reserves ready to exploit the anticipated breach. Meanwhile, the New Zealand Legion, scrutinized by General Leclerc's French Desert Force, had to make a wide action, swinging around the right side of the position and then moving north and east

36 to
cut the pivotal line of retreat. The 2nd U.S. Corps was to secure Maknassy and contain enemy armor that could be used against the Eighth Army. All available air power in North Africa will be used to support the offensive.
The Americans started first. At dawn on March 16, the Second Corps began its operations in order to implement its share of the plan. The attacking force consisted of the 1st Armored Division and the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions*. Gafsa was occupied unopposed on 17 March, and supply points were set up for the subsequent use of the Eighth Army. American forces moved into and occupied the train area. So far, the Italians, who controlled this part of the front, showed little opposition and carried out a planned withdrawal, but east of the train took a strong defensive position to halt any further advance of the Americans.
In the far north, rain crippled the 1st Armored Division and delayed its assault on Meknassi.
The battle began at Mareth on the night of March 20-21. The XXX Legion's attack on the northern sector of the Marth Line was initially successful. The 50th Division began the offensive and during March 21 gained a foothold in Mareth's defenses, a bridgehead two miles wide beyond deep in the Zigzu Valley, which was the main anti-tank obstacle. Axis counterattacks were postponed for the next two days, but in the face of mounting pressure, the British were forced to withdraw to their original positions on the night of 23-24 March.
Meanwhile, the New Zealand Legion moved through the night of March 19-20. After completing a 150-mile march through trackless mountains and deserts, I made contact with the enemy southwest of Hamma on March 24.
Since the enemy line has not penetrated the left of the general
Eral Montgomery decided to reinforce the New Zealand Legion; So the headquarters of the X Corps and the 1st British Armored Division were sent to join the New Zealanders on the night of 23 days. The combined forces were then assigned X Corps.
This growing threat to Rommel's line of retreat forced him to move most of his German forces from the Mareth position to Hamma, leaving Italian divisions and a few Germans to face XXX Corps. General Montgomery immediately took advantage of the weakening of the Axis line and ordered the 4th Indian Division to drive west to open the Medenine-Pir Sultan Road.
The 7th Armored Division was held behind the south side of the
1st Armored Division.

37
Mareth Line to be in a position to turn around the enemy's right flank and cut off the Mareth-Gabes road. On March 26, the 2d division attacked New Zealand, breaking through the area southwest of Hamma. heavy
The fighting continued all night. In noise and confusion, backed by darkness, the 1st British Armored Division passed straight through the enemy. By the 27th of the last century, the British were on the outskirts of Hamma, where their advance was firmly supported by twenty-two squadrons of the Royal Air Force. At about the same time, the 4th Indian Division opened the Medenine - Pir Sultan road, significantly shortening the line of communication to the Hamma sector. Rommel now saw that Marth's position was untenable and began to withdraw in general.
Meanwhile, Patton's advance eastward from Gafsa was making slow progress. On March 21, his 1st Armored Division captured Sinead against only slight opposition and the next day Mak Nasi was taken, but then the armor was unable to shriek. in the far south
The 1st and 9th American Infantry Divisions, aided by a Ranger unit, broke through the defensive position of an Italian division east of Guettar, but heavy counterattacks by the German 10th Panzer Division prevented further advance eastward. * But the Americans helped the Eighth Army financially by containing the Tenth Tank Division in the vacuum-trained sector.
Farther north, an attack by the American 34th Division on March 25 failed to break through the strong German position southwest of the hotel.
When Montgomery's maneuvers caused Rommel to withdraw from the Mareth Line, XXX Corps advanced along the coast. The New Zealand and British 2nd Armored Division, after their success in the Hamma region, moved into Gabes and entered it on 29 March.
In the extreme northern sector, the British counterattacked V Corps on March 28. Sedginan recaptured on 30 March and advanced beyond Cape Syrat. The enemy withdrew from the salient south of Bou Arada under pressure from other British forces.
Quest for Enfidaville (Map 6b). - Rommel's next position was in the valley of Acaret, an excellent defensive position with the flanks protected by salt marshes and the sea. At this time Alexander's general plan was for the Eighth Army to break the Wadi Akarit position and aid the Second American Legion by threatening Rom. * The series of operations in this area is known as the Battle of Qaytar.

38
background mile. Part of the British 9th Corps, supported by the 34th Infantry Division Amer Ikan, would launch an attack eastward through the Fondouk with the aim of capturing Kairouan and threatening the enemy's withdrawal line. In the far north the British Fifth Corps had to secure positions from which it could lead in the future in Tunisia.
By April 6, General Montgomery had regrouped his army and was ready to attack the enemy in Wadi Akarit. The main offensive, incurred by the XXX Corps and directed towards the center of the enemy line, opened with a 500-gun artillery bombardment. It started at 0415 - in complete darkness. The Axis forces, despite their desperate counterattacks, could not prevent the collapse of their line the next day, and another withdrawal began. The 2nd New Zealand Division and the 1st British Armored Division passed through the gap created by the XXX Corps and sued the retreating Axis forces. Sfax was occupied on 10 April and Sousse two days later. Rommel was evidently surprised by the speed with which the Eighth Army concentrated this attack, for much of its armor had been stripped away to contain American forces in the far north. The number of prisoners detained since March 21 has reached 20,000.
Meanwhile, the Axis forces halted all attempts of the Second Corps to break through their defenses in the area of Meknesi-Send-Train. But after the Wadi Akarit site collapsed on April 7, they were forced to withdraw, and the American patrols contacted the Eighth Army patrols on the Gafsa-Gabes road, forty miles east of the train. .
As the enemy was withdrawing from Wadi Akarit, the 6th Armored Division (plus an infantry brigade group) moved from the British 9th Corps to the Fendok and with the American 34th Division attacked the hotel corridor as planned. This pass, about 1,000 yards wide, is dominated by hills to the north and south. Infan attacks were launched on the night of the 7th against enemy control positions in an attempt to clear a path for the 6th Armored Division. Very little progress was made, but in view of the retreat of the enemy on the coast, the sixth armored vehicle was ordered, on the ninth, to make its way through the gap. The lead regiment encountered a large minefield protected by anti-tank guns mounted on the adjacent hill. A narrow passage was secured by night at the cost of seventy-six Shermans (sixty of which were later recovered), and the next day the armored personnel reached Kairouan. On the eleventh, the Eighth Army was called, which meanwhile made rapid progress after the occupation

39
Sfax. Although the bulk of Rommel's forces were able to escape from the trap, the remnants of nine Italian battalions were assembled. The Eighth Army continued their pursuit and on April 20 moved into Invadaville against increasing Axis resistance. Further attacks against the strong enemy position in the hills north of Enfidaville were met by determined counterattacks that convinced Mont gomery that a regrouping of his army would be necessary before further advances could be made.
During this period, the Fifth Corps, in accordance with its mission, began local attacks in the vicinity of Majz al-Bab on 7 April to secure positions useful for starting future operations. The fighting in this northern region lasted nearly two weeks, and although there was no breakthrough, some
Progress has been made. This put the Fifth Corps in a position to strike at Longstop Hill, which along with the circle of hills east of Medjez prevented further advances. All these dominant heights were firmly under the enemy's control and had to be cleared before any penetration into the valley towards Tunisia.
At this time V Corps did not have the strength for such an operation.
comments . - General Montgomery says of the Eighth Army's operations at this time:
The Battle of Marth Lane was our hardest battle since El Ala
Main, and while the latter was a difficult match,
there was more room in Mareth for strategy and ingenuity. . . As
at El Alamein, Rommel gradually dumped his reserves; And when
the battle began, his armor was -eagled spread - with 10 Panzer
Division in the Gafsa Sector and 15 Tank Division soon engaged on
Coast, 21st Tank Division arriving to the west to support
the switch line
and a salient feature of the battle was air action in cooperation
with the beleaguered forces we kept the initiative the whole time. Even as we lost
our gains on the coastal side, Rommel was kept in motion by
the rapid development of the West's encircling movement.. The
vital considerations (which govern the decision to turn the force into the surrounding force) were first, the speed with which the decisive
!
The strike could be mounted and delivered, and secondly, the necessity of
holding the German reserves in the eastern flank long enough to
pre-vent their assistance to the defenders of the switching lines west of
Hama.
Montgomery clearly demonstrated that an early setback—such as the failure of the XXX Corps to break through the Marth Line—did not necessarily need to lose the initiative provided the plan was flexible and reserves were available.

40
After Mareth, Rommel planned to continue delaying and defending actions only when the terrain favored defense. Although he may have realized that the days of the Axis forces in North Africa were numbered, his task was to delay the end result as long as possible. While he was still fighting at the Battle of Mareth, he had trimmed a strong position behind Wadi Akarit in the Gabes Gap. After Montgomery discovered that it could not be surrounded by forces coming from the south, he quickly broke through - much to the astonishment of the Germans.
After working in the Acariate Valley, Rommel lacked defensive terrain until he reached Enfidaville. While retreating to this place, the Germans faced the difficult problem of being pressured from the west as well as from the south. While the Eighth Army pursued Rommel, the Allies were simultaneously attacking von Arnim's holding forces on the cliffs west of the coastal pass. In the train, the sweeper, and the hotel, the Allied forces threatened to break through the East Noon Passes and drive out to sea through Rommel's retreat line. If von Arnim's men gave way too soon, Rommel would be besieged; If they stay too long, the Eighth Army will cut them off.
Battle of Tunis, April 22 - May 13, 1943. - It now became clear that the Axis forces intended to defend the Nevedaville-Bou Arada-Majz al-Bab line - two prisoners, and General Alexander immediately began preparations for a general offensive to break through this perimeter.
plans and preparations. It was decided to regroup on a large scale the divisions of the allies. Within two weeks, the entire U.S. Second Corps, more than 100,000 men, was moved 150 miles over difficult country—and across the lines of communication for the First Army—to take charge of the British Fifth Corps along the coast in the north. In the process of this regrouping, the US 34th Division at El Fentry and the British 6th Armored Division moved out of the vicinity of Hotels and Kairouan to join their corps. At the same time, the British 1st Armored Division was transferred from the Eighth Army to the IX Corps.
These moves were completed around April 22, at which time Major General Omar Bradley assumed command of the 2nd Corps (Map 7).

41
In its simplest scheme, the Allied plan provided a powerful thrust in the center, heavily backed by armour, with secondary attacks on the flanks to keep the enemy in position and prevent them from focusing to meet the main attack. The main effort was made by two corps of the British First Army in the direction of the Bab al-Bab-Tunisia section. In the area of their attack were two natural passes in the plain of Tunis: the valleys of the Medea Jarda and the Milian. This was the terrain where armored units could best maneuver. The US 2nd Corps, with Frank Afrique's Corps* on the north flank, was attacking to the left of the 1st Army, and its main targets were the high ground southeast of Mater and the highlands in the area north of Jaffna and west. Lake Ashkeel. The American attack was expected to endanger the right flank and rear of the enemy forces in the face of General Anderson's divisions. The British Eighth Army, on the eastern edge of the front, had the role of maintaining pressure on the Axis forces facing it and advancing against the enemy's escape route to Cape Bon Peninsula. The gap between the 1st and 8th armies was filled by the French XIX Corps in the Pont de Examination region. At this final stage of the campaign, General Alexander had more than twenty divisions. The battle line was about 140 miles long. Escape route to Cape Bon Peninsula. The gap between the 1st and 8th armies was filled by the French XIX Corps in the Pont de Examination region. At this final stage of the campaign, General Alexander had more than twenty divisions. The battle line was about 140 miles long. Escape route to Cape Bon Peninsula. The gap between the 1st and 8th armies was filled by the French XIX Corps in the Pont de Examination region. At this final stage of the campaign, General Alexander had more than twenty divisions. The battle line was about 140 miles long.
As the Tunisian campaign developed, strategic air force attacks shifted to transport facilities and ports in Sicily and southern Italy. At the same time, medium bombers and fighters were hitting surface ships and air transports in and over the Strait of Sicily. Tactical Air Force was prepared to support field armies by bombing and shelling enemy rear installations, roads, and convoys. By the opening date of the battle, April 22, the Allied air forces had won air control from the Luftwaffe.
early operations. The offensive began when the V Corps began their campaign on the night of April 21-22. The initial attack was directed at Longstop Hill, which was captured on the 26th after a series of bloody assaults. Advances have been made south of the Medjerda River towards Jebel Bo Akkat.
The French Nineteenth Corps did not participate in these attacks, but to its left the British IX Corps pushed east from the Abu Arada Road, Qubeilat in an attempt to clear a passage for the 1st and 6th Armored Divisions through the mountain gaps that lead to
*a temporary force consisting mainly of two regiments of "Goums," Moroccan fierce highlands who were mountain day and night expert fighters.

42
Easy Quables. Only partial success was achieved when the anti-tank guns from the Axis, deployed forcefully in the rocky hills, brought advertising to a permanent halt.
While the Eighth Army was attacking north from Enfidaville and the First Army northeast from Medjez El Bab, the Second Corps launched its attack on April 23. The main effort was on the right, as he could better support the campaign of the First Army.
The Second Corps held a front of about forty miles from Cape Sirat to the heights adjacent to the left side of Wadi Mejerda. A belt of rugged hills, fifteen to twenty miles deep, lies between the Americans and their initial target, Mater, the enemy communications center as well as the Bizerte key. The hills and hills in this area form a mixed maze, not providing wide paths to progress.
In the area of the 2nd Corps, the 1st Infantry Division*, the 34th** and the 1st Armored Division *** made the main attack. The River Tyne Valley seemed to provide the only proper way forward for a striking armored force, but before it could be used, the high ground on both sides had to be captured. The 1st Infantry Division then attacked in the hills north of the River Tyne while the 6th Infantry Division of the 1st Armored Division (temporarily in the 1st Infantry Division) attacked the enemy in the hills at the southern edge of the valley. The northern flank of the Beja Mater road was covered by a combat team of the 34th Division. The remaining units of the 1st Armored Division and the 34th were initially held in reserve.
By April 26, the 1st Infantry Division had advanced five miles into positions southeast of Sidi Nossir, wresting the hills from the enemy in bloody combat marked by effective use of artillery and successful night attacks. A strong coordinated attack was then launched by the 1st and Thirty-fourth Infantry Divisions with the aim of capturing Hill 609 (Jebel Tahant), the main enemy stronghold that took control of the highway and railway from Beja to Mater. The thirty-fourth attack on the hills overlooking Sidi Nossir, and the first led his attack to the northeast. Launched the thirty-fourth attack on one of the strongest centers of enemy resistance. The Germans held this land for months and organized the many remote hills covering the roads to Hill 609 into a series of mutually supportive strong points. One by one,
Major General Terry de la M. Allen.
** Major General Charles W. Ryder.
*** Major General Ernst N. Harmon.

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attacks, until April 28, continued to advance to the base of the hill 609. During the thirtieth period of the year, General Raider reinforced the attacking force of the hill and, with the support of some medium tanks, succeeded in reaching the summit. At dawn the next day the Germans counterattacked from positions on the northeastern slope. They were allowed to advance to within 200 yards of the American position before a devastating flash fire repelled their efforts to retake the summit. This action solidified the 34th Division's hold on Hill 609. Briefly summarizing these operations, General Bradley wrote: "A strong enemy attack was repulsed. The fighting was fierce and bloody. The enemy engaged bayonets and grenades, and there were many instances of outstanding bravery."
While the 34th Division was launching its attack, the 1st Infantry Division advanced to its right another five miles. With the fall of Hill 609, the 1st Division's initial hill targets became untenable to the enemy, and both teams advanced more rapidly, on the northern and southern sides of the River Tyne.
By May 1, these combined efforts resulted in the capture of all major hill positions in the southern half of the II Corps, and the Tyne Valley was open to an armored batch.
Meanwhile, an attack was launched in the northern part of the Legion's area by the 9th Division* and the French Legion attached to it. The main objective of this attack was the generally higher ground north of Jaffna, where the Germans held positions on the hills dominating the approach to Mater through the Sedgenane Valley.
In carrying out this task, the 9th Division had to contend with the difficulties imposed by both the terrain and the very broad front involved. Expeditionary forces were assigned the task of aggressively patrolling the nine-mile interval between the 9th and 34th Divisions, since the nature of the terrain made it impossible to send large units through this area. The plan stipulated that one combat team of the regiment would launch a secondary attack on the enemy's defenses west of Jaffna, while another (the main effort) was to strike strong points on the high ground north of the city and thus encircle its defenses. . The 3rd Combat Team and the French were to head east against the lighter positions on both sides of the Sedjenane River.
* Major General Manton S. Eddy.

44
perseverance and strength of armies. Communication was so poor that food and ammunition had to be carried by bells over difficult winding paths. However, the attacks were successful, and by May 1, the Germans were back on the eastern slopes of the last hills - those overlooking the Rainy Plain and Lake Ashkelon.
By this date, it was clear that the Germans against the 2nd Legion were in an awkward position. In the south, the main effort opened up the Tyne Valley Pass to Mater, while in the north the enemy threatened to encircle its right flank.
To avoid disaster, the Germans generally withdrew on the night of May 1-2 and the following day. To the south of Lake Ashkelon, they took up a position that protected Tebourba and the plain of Tunis, in case it was taken. Brace yourself north of the lake for one last stop in the hills overlooking the main road to Bizerte.
No time was wasted by the Second Corps in pursuing the Gear Man's withdrawal. The 1st Armored Division was ordered to advance northeast from the Tyne Valley and entered Mater at 1100 on 3 May. This swift movement threatened to disrupt all of Germain's plans. Now an American attack to the east or northeast of Mater would result in a breakthrough that would cut off the Axis
, forces in the Bizerte region from those in the vicinity of Tunis. Enemy aircraft, shields, infantry, and artillery were moved into the threatened sector in an attempt to prevent the 1st Armored Division from advancing behind Mater.
In the fighting until 3 May, the 2nd Corps captured Mater, its first major prize in the campaign, preventing von Arnim from focusing on confronting the British command in the Medjerda Valley, as well as threatening to disrupt the entire Axis
right wing. The stage in the north was prepared for the campaign's final battle.
Final Campaign, 3-13 May 1943. - Since April 22, Allied forces have made limited progress on all fronts, but no breakthrough has ever been achieved. Therefore, it was clear to General Alex Ender that additional large-scale infantry attacks would have to be launched. The best prospects seemed to be in the Medjez region, where successful attacks on Longstop Hill cleared enemy strong points north of the Medjerda River. It was therefore decided not to continue with the armored offensive in the region of Kobeilat, but instead to concentrate all available forces in a final decisive campaign on Tunisia from Majaz al-Bab.

45
Reassembly began as early as April 28. Only the British 1st Armored Division and the 46th Infantry Division were left to contain the enemy's armor east of Jubilat, while the remaining division was from the 9th (Sixth Armored) Corps along with the 7th Armored Division and the 4th Indian Division of the 8th Army. I moved to V Corps work area. At the same time, a large-scale deception was devised to conceal these movements from the enemy and lead him to believe that the next major offensive was to be made by the Eighth Army in the south. Most of the artillery from its separate divisions was left at the Eighth Army's front, and general activity in that sector increased significantly. These tricks achieved their goal of capturing a large part of the enemy.
According to the new plan, General Anderson ordered the 5th Corps to attack on a narrow front and ordered the 9th Corps to prepare to pass through the 5th Corps and capture the internal defenses of Tunisia (Map 8). After capturing that city, the First Army took advantage of the southeast in order to cut off Cape Bon Penn. On the right and left, respectively, the Eighth Army and the Second Corps had to exert maximum pressure to prevent the enemy from strengthening their units in the face of the First Army. The Second Corps was intended to be Bizerte, and the Eighth Army was to advance along the coast to aid the forces of the First Army in their efforts to cut off the axis of retreat to Cape Bon.
V Corps led the First Army's offensive. Jebel Bou Akaz was captured on May 5, and a fine line of staging was established to lead the 9th Corps towards Tunisia. The 9th Corps offensive began at 0300 on the 6th. It was made on a 3,000-yard front by two infantry divisions, supported by tanks and concentrated fire from 600 guns. Behind the assault infantry divisions, the 6th Armored Division, on the right, and the 7th Armored Division, on the left, moved slowly, waiting for the moment to strike. With continuous sorties of more than two hours, the Northwest African Air Force made an important addition to the ground forces' fire support. By 1100 the infantry attack had penetrated the enemy's defenses and opened a gap in front of the armored divisions. Which arrived by evening to the Massey region. The next morning, the armored forces resumed their advance towards Tunisia. Armored cars from both divisions, closely followed by the remainder of the 7th Armored Division, entered the city on the afternoon (7 May).

46
prisoners, while the 6th Armored Division, followed by the British 4th Infantry Division in the engines, was directed southeast toward the neck of the Cape Bon Peninsula.
In the south, the French XIX Corps still encountered strong resistance, but the opposition in the Jubilat region softened slightly. At this point, after a decisive attack, the British 1st Armored Division had broken through and advanced north-east.
The 6th Armored Division continued its southeast movement on the 8th. By the afternoon, he was in contact with the enemy's rear guard, powerful in anti-tank guns, covering the town of Ham Man Lev - in a narrow area between the steep hills south of the city and the sea. After a night attack on the steep cliffs by the regiment's infantry regiment, on the 10th the armor penetrated the city, and some tanks moved along the shore to cordon off the defences. This Hamman Lif victory was undoubtedly a major factor in causing the rapid disintegration of the remaining resistance, for the Sixth Armored could now cut off the Axis routes to escape to Cape Bon Peninsula, which he set out to do. Hammamet, the southern gateway to the peninsula, was also reached on May 10.
Meanwhile, the Second Corps continued its offensive operations in the north with the aim of preventing the enemy from strengthening its units against the British First Army. The heights to the east and west of Choueqi and the city of Bizerte were the legion's specific targets. General Bradley planned to isolate the Axis forces in the northeastern and southeastern regions of Mater in general by fanciful attacks from both sides of the corps and an armored command from the center. To accomplish this task, the French 9th Infantry Division attacked north of Lake Ashkelon while the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions attacked toward Shuigi, and the 1st Armor Division commanded northeast and east of Mater.
The attacks of the Second Corps were in full swing by May 5. In the Southern Action District, the 1st Division encountered strong resistance and was unable to hold onto the slight gains it made. The 34th Division encircled Adkhila from the southwest and moved to Shuigi, which it occupied on the afternoon of the seventh day. Thanks to the penetration of the 1st British Army in the far south, the enemy's resistance in the southern part of the 2nd Legion's area has materially receded.
The only major remaining enemy position north of Lake Ashkelon was Jebel El-Shenety. General Eddy here used tactics similar to those used with great success in capturing Jaffna. The CFA Franc Corps and part of the 9th Division of Secondary School achieved

47
The attack while the remainder of the division surrounded Jabal Al-Sheneti. The operation was completely successful, and by May 7 the enemy had completely withdrawn to Bizerte. Its north wing collapsed. The units of the 9th Division entered Bizerte on the afternoon of the seventh day, and that night they occupied the city's airport.
The 1st Armored Division's attack hit the German line as two roads lead into the Tunis Plain - one from Mater via Ferryville to the Tunis Road - Bizerte motorway and the other east from Mater. General Harmon ordered Combat Command A to attack towards Ferryville and Combat Command B to push east along the Mater-Portville Road. On May 6, Combat Command A made initial gains in the hills south of Ferryville, but lost them during the night as a result of determined German counterattacks. The next day, an offensive was launched to completely drive back the Germans along the Mater-Vereville road. By noon, the armored units of Com bat A command entered Ferryville, finding the enemy in complete retreat to the east. The advance continued on the eighth, and at dawn on the ninth the main road between Tunis and Bizerte was cut off.
While Combat Command A was engaged in these operations, the Kom Bat command moved east towards the Tunis-Bizerte highway. It arrived in Brouteville on the 9th, where contact was made with the British 7th Armored Division. Subsequently, part of the combat command headed north on the road to Bizerte and then swung north-east to occupy Puerto Farina.
German forces in the area of II Corps were in a hopeless situation as a result of American operations from May 6-9. The offensive operations of the 9th Division and Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division left only small enemy groups to be cleared. When Combat Command B met the British 7th Division in Brouteville, a large group of disorganized Germans were captured stranded in the Tabour area. Pressed from the west by the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions and retreating eastward by American and British armored forces, the German Kommand in the area of the 2nd Corps requested terms of surrender on May 9. General Bradley's terms of unconditional surrender were accepted. During the final phase of the campaign, the 2nd Corps captured 42,000 prisoners, among them the leaders of the 5th Panzer Army, 15th Panzer Division, and German Infantry Division.
Meanwhile, the last round of enemy forces still holding out on the Cape Bon Peninsula was underway. Mobile British detachments raced both sides of the peninsula and completed the

48th course
by 11 May. On the 12th, the British 1st Armored Division and the 4th Indian Division joined the French XIX Corps in cover to secure the remaining elements of the German 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions southwest of Grombalia. Von Arnim was captured near Zaghouan on the same day. *
The last isolated resistance of the enemy, mainly by Italian troops and the remnants of the German Panzer Army in Africa, who were facing the Eighth Army, came to a halt on the morning of May 13 as the Allied forces converged on them from all directions. In all, about 248,000 Axis prisoners were captured, along with large amounts of materiel and supplies. This included 1,000 guns, 520 aircraft, and 250 tanks.
The combined action of the Allied naval and air forces prevented escape by sea or air other than a few small detachments.
During the first two days of the Battle of Tunis, the Tactical Air Force made 1,500 sorties. Although the weather conditions stopped most of the Allied aircraft from April 25 to May 5, they were more active during the remainder of the battle, especially on May 6 and 7, when they bombed the enemy in Wadi Majdara and contributed significantly to the penetration of operations The first army.
In a special arrangement for the day, General Alexander addressed the Allied forces with these words:
Today stands the conquerors and heroes of the
shores of North Africa. The world recognizes your victory;
History will cheer your deeds.
British, French and American weapons from these lands swept the last German and Italian invaders.
As a commander in the field, I express my admiration and gratitude to
the United Nations for this great victory, which will
go down in history as one of the decisive battles of all time.
comments . The final defeat of the Axis in Tunisia came through the coordinated action (collective action) of the superior Allied forces on land, air and sea. But the superior forces, though properly coordinated, are not sufficient for a decisive victory. There must be a well-designed plan. As this is the case, it is worthwhile for us to review the final stage plan and the effective implementation of that plan.
It is noteworthy that the first gathering of General Alexander's forces took place by April 22. At that time, the main attack was to be launched along the entire 1st Army front, with great effort by the Fifth Corps down the Mejerda Valley. In the Goubellat sector, the Ninth Corps had to make its way through the mountains in order to pass its armored division to the open plain to the east. Both legions made some progress, but there
*Rommel had returned to Germany at some point before.

49
No penetration. Action would have continued on the same line, with an additional small advance that would gradually compress von Arnim's forces to a smaller circumference, until the Axis forces finally withdrew to defensive positions along the base of the Cape Bon Peninsula. The Axis leadership may have at no time hoped to carry out Dunkirk in the face of Allied control of the sea and complete control of the air, but it is quite clear that they fully expected Bataan to be driven out of Cape Bon.
The first attempt to break through after it failed, Alexander regrouped his forces again. This time he achieved a concentration of enough fighting force not only to penetrate the position of the axis, but also to exploit the success more effectively. The actual breakthrough happened so quickly that the Axis forces were completely surprised and out of balance. Von Arnim was captured just as the French were captured in 1940, with an attack by a crushing striking force moving at great speed.
For use in the event of an evacuation attempt, the Allied Navy developed a plan in close cooperation with the Air Force. Boldly looking back at Norway, Dunkirk, Greece and Crete, the plan was named Operation Retribution. All possible means, in the air and at sea, were organized to prevent any enemy from escaping from Tunisia. It was certain that the evacuation could only be attempted under the cover of the Italian fleet, which might finally have to stand up and fight. And since the high command of the Axis, as it turned out, did not dare to join the cause at sea at a time when its forces on land were in a desperate situation, it was forced to sacrifice a large army and huge amounts of stores and equipment. From a purely military point of view, the Axis proved the folly of flouting the old strategic axiom that sending large ground forces across the sea without sure and continuing control over that sea is potentially a disaster. The uniqueness of the plan is also evidenced by the fact that von Arnim miscalculated the location of the main attack and as a result misallocated his forces. The lack of aerial reconnaissance was largely responsible for this error, but Montgomery's true nodal conversion was also an important factor.
The German high command in Tunisia made the same mistake it made in Russia in November 1942: there were no reserves behind the front. Therefore, when the British armored forces reached the rear hub areas, they encountered slight opposition and were able to disrupt the entire defense by cutting lines of communication, destroying command posts and disrupting supply facilities.

50
The mission of the 2nd American Corps during the final stage was threefold: to protect the left flank of the 18th army group, to prevent the enemy from concentrating in front of the 1st army, and to capture Bizerte. This job was done superbly. During a period of seventeen days, its four divisions made advances from twenty-five to fifty miles. At the beginning of the last phase of the campaign, only 12,000 soldiers from the front line opposed the advance of the corps, but towards the end of the operation there were more than 40,000 enemy troops at its front. She showed that her teams consist of fighting men who have the will and ability to win. It was well supplied, well equipped and well driven. Its losses in the last phase of the campaign amounted to 421 killed, 3136 wounded and 877 missing, while estimates indicate 3000 m*** from the enemy on the front of the Legion. The American teams took 36,000 Germans and 5,900 Italian prisoners.
The following is an excerpt from General Bradley's report on operations:
French units under the command of their efficient commander General Magnan fought
with courage and determination ... in the
mountain rain and suffered many casualties. Some of the 2nd Corps, namely the
1st Infantry Division and elements of the 1st Infantry Division and the 34th Armored Division
, have been fighting in North Africa
almost exclusively since they landed in Oran on 8 November. Other units were operating
in Tunisia for varying periods of time from 18 January
onwards. Practically all units fought the enemy in both
desert and mountains. The Second Corps fought with and without
air superiority. She has suffered setbacks and known victory.
Officers and men alike understand our enemy and his methods. It
No longer underestimate or overestimate his capabilities. Through the common sense of Americans, they have learned that the surest way to live is to
outsmart and overcome those who oppose us. The
soldiers of
the Second Corps, with their practical sense, their understanding of the enemy, their firsthand knowledge of the hardships and dangers of war and, above all, their courage and loyalty, played a major role in the victory of a great ally.
win over.
General Comments on Operations in
North Africa
On 17 May the first convoy passed through the Strait of Gibraltar and nine days later reached Alexandria. The first unopposed convoy since 1940 arrived in Malta on 24 May. After three years of varying fortunes, Africa was cleansed of all the Axis powers; The ports of North Africa were ready to receive ships, equipment, and men

51
who after two months had to invade enemy territory; From its bases in Tunisia, the Allied air forces were bombing airports and ports in southern Europe. General Eisenhower had originally hoped to achieve these results six months ago. Had it been successful, subsequent operations might have been speeded up so that the Allied invasion of Italy could have begun in the spring of 1943 rather than in the fall. With a full summer of fine weather, the Allied forces may have advanced to the Po River by winter. But be that as it may, the means were not available to seize Tunis and Bizerte in 1942.
In addition to the material advantages achieved, there is another residency request that warrants special note. This was the successful establishment of a joint headquarters and the development of the idea of joint power. In an official report, General Eisenhower said:
In the North African theater, even under pressure
Imposed by an alternate partial victory and a stinging tactical defeat, coordination among the chief officers of the entire expeditionary campaign of the objective was
achieved
and a consistent objectivity of view
gradually penetrated to the lower ranks and clearly demonstrated by the fact
that British and American forces of all arms could unite and work
together effectively.
As for the Americans, despite experiencing early setbacks and even tactical defeats, they were able to benefit from the experience. New types of equipment, more realistic and practical training methods and more efficient tactical organizations have been developed. These were lessons that could only be learned in the School of Actual Combat, learned quickly that were proven by the superior performance of the Second Corps during the final phase of the campaign.
The initial failure of the campaign had the unexpected effect of boosting the scale of the Allies' eventual success because the Axis was encouraged to make what proved to be an over-investment in a Tunisian bridgehead. An Axis army of about 320,000 men was destroyed in place of Rommel's original remains of the Afrika Korps. At the same time, the American, British and French forces were given the necessary experience and eventually won the confidence inspired by a crushing victory.
After nearly three years of fighting, North Africa is no longer one of the active theaters of World War II operations. Axis hopes for glory and profit here faded, and with it an estimated 620,000 soldiers intermarried, a third of whom were Germans. British

52
The number of empire losses in North Africa since Italy entered the war in June 1940 is about 220,000 - dead, wounded

and prisoners.
From November 1942 to May 1943, the French lost

about 20,000 people, while the number of American casualties was about 18,500.
By June of 1943, Allied power began to emerge around the world. American production was pouring war materials into all Allied armies at an increasing rate. Allied air power was striking strategic targets in Europe and bombing Japanese bases in the Pacific. The Mediterranean and Middle East were once again safe in the hands of the Allies. Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, is planned and will be launched soon. The Russians drove the Germans out of the Caucasus oil fields and curved the Don River and were ready for a great summer offensive. In the Pacific Ocean, the Japanese were expelled from the Aleuts,
Guadalcanal was an Allied base, the campaign was underway in the Solomon Islands, and General MacArthur had begun his advance up the coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines. Everywhere the Axis was on the defensive, and most importantly, in the hills of Tunisia, an Allied force was born that would eventually advance through Western Europe into the heart of Germany.


53
I APPENDIX
ORGANIZATION ASSAULT FORCE
WESTERN TASK FORCE NAVY ESCORN
(US)
GENERAL PARTNER GEORGE S. PATTON Rear Admiral HENRY K. HEWITT
3D Infantry. Dave. (Renf) 3
CCB battleships plus one arm. Billion Dollars, 2d Armd. Dave. 5 cruisers
RCT 47th, 9th Infantry Division. Dave. 1 aircraft carrier
60th RCT, 9th Inf. Dave. 3 auxiliary carriers
(35,000 men in 29 ships) 1 anti-aircraft
cruiser 34 destroyers

Troop Mission Center (USA) Naval Escort (Br.)
Major General Lloyd R. Friedendale Brigadier General Thomas H. TROUBRIDGE
1st Inf. Dave. 1
CCB battleship , 1st arm. Dave. 2 cruisers
1st Ranger Bn. 1 aircraft carrier
Corps (Corps II) 2 help tankers
(39,000 men in 47 ships) 2 ships anti-aircraft
13 destroyers
east TASK FORCE

forces
*
Navy escort (brother)

Maj . Gen. CHARLES W. Rider 39 RCT, 9TH Infantry. Dave.
168th RCT, 34 Inf. Dave.
11 brig. group, Br. 78 Division. Brigadier General 36. The Group, Br. 78 Division. First Commando Ben. *
6 commando bin. *
(33,000 men in 34 ships)
* American and British boat.
Vice Admiral Sir Harold M. Borough 4 cruisers
1 aircraft
carrier 1 auxiliary carrier
3 anti-aircraft ships
13

prohibited destroyers

[mosaadabd460]

THE WAR 's
IN : NORTH AFRICA ,
PART 2
(and the Allied invasion)
COUNTRY
DEPARTMENT OF ART Military Engineering
Military United States ACADEMY
WEST the POINT, NEW YORK
1947
LITTLESTONE

1
3
7

SRLF
DRL17234 754 (v.2)
RESTRICTED
Foreword
This account of operations in North Africa was written from November 8,
1942 to May 13, 1943 for use in the education of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is mostly based on materials provided by the Historical Department and the special staff of the Department of War and other Department of War agencies.
Valuable information has also been obtained from Office of Naval Intelligence publications.
However, in acknowledging the indebtedness to others, it is not
required to hold them responsible for any errors of fact or for any conclusions drawn.
These and other manuals on World War II are constantly revised as additional information becomes available. It would be appreciated if military personnel who note any apparent errors or inconsistencies, or who have comments or suggestions for improving the subject, report them to:
Professor of Military Arts and Engineering,
United States Military Academy,
West Point, NY
March
1 , 1947
USMA PRINT OFFICE - 3-25 -47-2500
3

Restriction of
War in North Africa
Part 2 -
Introduction to the Allied Invasion
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declaration of war against the United States by Germany and Italy plunged that country into the global conflict.
Immediate action was necessary to coordinate with our allies, and especially with Great Britain, the strategy which would govern the future conduct of war and the control over which it should be exercised. In a report to the Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army stated:
On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of
Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived.
In Washington to consult with the president
and US chiefs of staff. From the series of discussions that followed
resulted in agreement not only regarding the immediate strategy for our
joint conduct of the war, but also for
the organization of a method of strategic command and control of
British and American military resources. Perhaps no
other act of the Allies, in the field or otherwise, exercised such a strong influence on the
course of this war as the immediate establishment
of concrete measures for achieving unity of effort through the medium of action
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. under the supervision of
their government leaders .
At this first conference, the President and Prime Minister, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a decision to focus Allied resources first on defeating Germany, the greatest and closest enemy, and then Japan.
In the discussions that followed the conference, an initial target date for an operation across the English Channel was set in the summer of 1943. Some consideration was given to the possibility of an emergency diversion attack earlier if it was necessary to save the situation at the Russian front. With further studies being done, a shortage of landing craft to start a cross-channel operation, and a lack of supplies to maintain it,
opposed putting the plan into action. At the same time, the setbacks suffered by the British in North Africa and con
1

2
need tinued for some converted to Russian assistance brought under consideration the possibility of launching an attack against the French territories in North Africa in 1942, with the consequent postponement ment key to the process through the channels until later date.
Despite the US military opinion in favor of advertising
According to the original plan, the final decision in favor of the invasion of North Africa, as an alternative to the attack across the English Channel, was made in July 1942, after the second visit of Prime Minister Church Eyl to Washington. The landing date is set for September; It was scheduled to take place in November. Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower* was dis*****ed to London in June 1942 as Commander in Chief, European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA). On August 14, 1942, he received a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff who appointed him Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. His task under this mission was to direct joint military operations against French North Africa - Operation Torch - as soon as possible with the aim of gaining, in conjunction with the Allied forces in the Middle East, complete control of North Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. At the same time he retained command of ETOUSA (until February 4, 1943).
Meanwhile, Rommel was making the push that led him to El Alamein and the gates of Alexandria, and other Axis forces were marching across the Don River toward the Caucasus Mountains and the rich oil fields near the Caspian Sea. The Middle East seemed clearly within Hitler's reach, and the situation in the Mediterranean was very bleak. In the Pacific, Japanese forces reached what was supposed to be the highest level of their advance. Attu and Kiska were occupied in the Aleutian Islands; Port Moresby in New Guinea, the starting point for Australia, has been threatened. Burma was invaded. India was under sea and air attack. The tide of Axis aggression was at its height, and the Allies were everywhere on the defensive, struggling to open their important sea communications routes.
But the Allied High Command knew that the large convoys were in
Its way to Egypt and it must arrive in time. These reinforcements were expected to provide General Montgomery not only the means by which to stop Rommel but also to carry out his role in the great Allied Pincer, the western jaw of which would be the British and American forces to be landed. French North Africa. Thus, the battle of Al-Alamy was expected.
* The ranks of the officers as mentioned in this narration were those that were at that time.

3
to divert the attention of the Axis from the newly chosen theater of operations, and thus, the British Eighth Army had to form the eastern jaw of the pincers designed to crush all opposition to the Axis in Africa. Therefore, the invasion plans continued despite the obvious negative situation in Egypt.
Strategic considerations
The following strategic advantages appear to result
from the occupation of French North Africa:
1. The first feature is the removal of the Mediterranean Sea.
supply route. Allied convoys will be able to move along it under the protection of ground aircraft. They could reach Egypt and the Suez Canal by a sea route 2,300 miles long (measured from Gibraltar), or 10,000 miles less than that around the Cape of Good Hope. The distance from the UK to India and to our newly established leadership in the Persian Gulf will also be significantly shortened.
2. The occupation of French North Africa will make the bloc of the Axis Powers almost complete. All shipments of food and other supplies from Africa to Germany and its satellites will stop.
3.
Another possible route to the conquest of continental Europe would be secured, thus forcing the Germans to withdraw troops from the Russian front to defend by this conquest.
4. Allied control of French North Africa will make
Egypt, the Suez Canal and the Middle East are safe from the invasion of the West.
5. Dakar no longer poses a threat to South America.
6. If French North Africa were to be occupied without the bitter agitation of the French forces and authorities in that region, it would be possible to reconstitute the French army in preparation for its forceful return home. However, the Allied forces faced several problems that, if exacerbated, could seriously impair the success of the operation. The reaction of Spain, Vichy France and North African French
Rica itself, will have a vital influence on upcoming events. The pivotal airfields of Sicily and Sardinia enabled the enemy to gain control of this part of the Mediterranean between Tunisia and Italy and supported the successful movement of Allied convoys through this area
known as "Bomb Alley". Since Spain itself was pro-Axis, there was a real danger that the Germans would strike this country

4
Try against Gibraltar. Undoubtedly, the Axis would occupy all of France to prevent an Allied landing on the French Midi coast and to attempt to gain control of the French fleet at Toulon. It is possible that the Germans would attempt to capture Tunisia and Bizerte in order to retain control of the Sicilian Channel, a process that would be relatively easy for them due to the lack of supply lines from their bases in Sicily and southern Italy. Last but not least, due to other commitments around the world, Allied planners faced severe shortages of trained forces, vital supplies and equipment, especially landing and cargo ships, which would certainly limit the scale of the operation.
Quoting an official report:
Thus the strategic concept of sweeping the Axis from the north

summoned Africa, and establishing Allied control from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, an operation on a scale of such magnitude,
once initiated, must be followed with all
The power and charge required by the position.
The main Allied operation will be in 1942 and 1943.
Political background
A clear picture of the military operations in French North Africa cannot be obtained without some understanding of the political events that accompanied, and sometimes overshadowed, the military aspects of the campaign. In general, the French were divided into three groups:
1. General Charles de Gaulle was, in London, the assembly point of the French National Committee. His group was also known as the "Free French" and later the "French Fighters". It consisted of French refugees who fled to England, America or the French colonies instead of accepting German persecution at home and those patriots who remained in France and participated in the activities of the resistance factions, one of de Gaulle's followers, General Leclerc, organized a small force in French Equatorial Africa that carried out raids against the Italian outposts of Fezzan (southern Libya) and her activities later culminated in her thirty-nine day campaign 1,600 miles from Fort Lamy, near Lake Chad, to join General Montgomery's Eighth Army in Tripoli on January 25, 1943.
2. A second group, the French living in North Africa, where open resistance was bringing a sudden German occupation, succeeded in creating a secret "French liberation movement." Although the goal of this group, like the Free French, was the liberation of

5
France, its members were working under German watch, which seemed to lend a touch of cooperation to its activities to the outside world. General Henri Giraud, who had recently escaped from the German regency, was to become the recognized leader of this group that included some French military leaders in North Africa. The clash of personalities was between de Gaulle and Giroud to prevent the union of Free France groups and the French liberation during the North African campaign.
3. The third group was made up of the pro-Vichy French - men clinging to the pathetic loyalty of the old Marshal Petain. This group valued those founding in France and the Axis-controlled territories who believed that cooperation with the Germans was the best way to secure the future of their country. Admiral Jean Darlan, who controlled the French fleet, was Pétain's designated successor.
In laying the groundwork for the conquest of North Africa, the American government based its policy on the view that if the main French in North Africa had armed support, they would be willing to seize the opportunity to free themselves from the yoke of Germany. This policy pushed the United States into a path of detailed negotiations with the French liberation movement in North Africa. Throughout the planning phase of the outbreak, Mr. Robert Murphy, US Consul General in Rabat, maintained close contact with the Allied Forces Headquarters from his North African offices. Since the British had previously committed their support to the Free French de Gaulle, not only were negotiations with the French liberation movement in North Africa to be conducted by the Americans, but it was also desirable that American forces conduct the initial landings.
In another attempt to reach an understanding, a secret date was arranged about fifty miles west of Algiers on the night of October 22-23. Major General Mark W. Clark, Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces (who was ashore from a submarine) met Mr. Murphy and a delegation of French officers headed by General Mast, commander of the French military forces in the Algiers region.
Mast's delegate resented
the liberation movement in that part of North Africa. The meeting was broken up by local police, and the important question of what Darlan and the French fleet would do was left unanswered, although some progress was made with army chiefs in setting up the North African command plan.

6 Plans
for
landings and preparations
were the first of many difficult problems facing
The Allied Forces Command is establishing what has become known as the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ). What made it even more difficult was the lack of historical precedent on which such an organization could be based. In General Eisenhower's words:
I was determined from the beginning to do everything in my power to make this a
truly allied force, with true unity of command and centralization
of administrative responsibility. No
alliances do in the past often more than naming the common enemy, and the "unity of command"
ambitious and pious hides national jealousy
and ambitions and accusations against senior officers, not wishing to do so.
To subordinate themselves or their forces to a commander of
a different nationality or a different service. The
differences inherent in . must be preserved
British and American administrative and logistical systems and in nomenclature and equipment, although all plans and directives must evolve from one common headquarters.
The principle of full integration has been applied in all divisions of the General Staff in
1
The headquarters of the Allied forces, with the best man, regardless of national character, is assigned to each post. In those sections where national practices differed, a dual institution, one American and one British, was created to deal with the interests of each nation. Despite the duality in the sense that in each of these divisions there was an American and British assistant chief of staff, in reality they functioned as separate divisions, with no divided adviser or divergent decision from them. The commander-in-chief insisted on perfect harmony between these American and British "opposing numbers". The wisdom of the common personnel principle was demonstrated during the North African campaign and was used successfully in all post-war joint operations.
By the end of the summer, the AFHQ regulation was a frosted coating. As mentioned, Lieutenant General Eisenhower (USA) was the commanding general of the Navy. Major General Clark (US) was the Acting Deputy Commanding General; Brigadier General Walter B. Smith (US) Chief of Staff. Major General Humphrey M. Gill (Br.) was the chief administrative officer. Lieutenant-General Ken Neth Ann Anderson (Br.) was in command of the British Land Forces; Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham (Br.) Commander of the Navy; Brigadier General James H. Doolittle was commanding the US air units in the expedition, and Air Marshal Sir William L. Welch commands the British air units.

7
With the headquarters of the Allied forces organized, plans for the invasion advanced. The cities of Oran and Algiers on the Mediterranean coast and Casablanca on the Atlantic Ocean were the centers of political control of the French possessions in North Africa and were the main points of the railway system, highways and air communications (Map 1). Tunisia and Bizerte were key to the Sicilian Channel, and control of these cities would put the Allies in a position where, concurrent with the British Eighth Army's advance through Libya, it might be possible to destroy Rommel's army. However, as we have seen, the political situation required all initial landings by American units, and the lack of shipping and trained forces would prevent the immediate realization of all these objectives.
At first it was developed
and two studies of plans: the first, major such as the Soltes at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers, and the small-scale assaults on Philipville and Bony (this plan was modified during its development by eliminating the landing at Casablanca and replacing the land push westward from Oran); Second: the attacks on Casablanca and Oran only. On September 20, 1942, the so-called "Outline" was released, which is a modification of the above plans. This plan abandoned the Phillipville and Bonny landings because shipping and other transshipment sources were not available to support this ambitious undertaking and because these landings would carry the Allies within range of Axis aircraft stationed in Sicily.
Under the approved plan, the Western Task Force was to sail directly from the United States and capture Casablanca. The Center's task force, also entirely American, had to sail from the United Kingdom and capture Oran. Eastern Task Force, American and British,
He was about to set sail from the United Kingdom and capture Algeria and the nearby airports. The Central and Eastern Task Forces will launch their attacks simultaneously, while the Western Task Force will land at the same time as weather conditions permit. After achieving their initial objectives, the Western and Central task forces were to establish and maintain contact between Casablanca and Oran and build an American army and air strike force ready to occupy Spanish Morocco and repel a German attack through Spain if they had to. it is necessary. The Eastern Task Force, having taken its initial objectives, would become the British First Army, under General Anderson, and would rapidly move east to capture Gidley Airport and Buge Port.
You will eventually advance to Tunisia. The organization of the task forces is set out in Appendix 1.

8
In addition to the Naval Escort Forces, the Royal Navy will have
Force H, consisting of two warships, four cruisers, two aircraft carriers, and fifteen destroyers, was to monitor the Vichy Italian and French fleets in the Mediterranean.
As for air support, the initial attacks were to be supported by carrier aircraft of the guard forces. The 12th US Air Force was to form Western Command, headquartered in Oran. One hundred and sixty fighters were to be flown from Gibraltar to both the regions of Casablanca and Oran within three days of the attack. Similarly, the Royal Air Force squadrons were to form Eastern Command, based in Algiers. Ninety of their planes were due to arrive from Gibraltar via D plus 3.
Adding to the plan, developed in early October, provided for the 2nd Battalion of the US 503d Parachute Infantry to capture the Tafrawi and Lasinia airstrips south of Oran. This work entails a flight from England of approximately twelve hours for thirty-nine unarmed aircraft of the 60th US Group of Forces.
In an effort to secure surprise, the information regarding the locations of the proposed landings was, of course, carefully guarded. It was realized that the Germans might know that preparations were underway for some sort of operation; But even if they concluded that an amphibious attack was going to happen somewhere, it was hoped that they would tilt their thinking toward Norway, western France, or Dakar. After the Central and Eastern Task Force passes through the Strait of Gibraltar, the apparent capabilities of the Allies will be even more limited; But the caravan was planned, by the route followed, to create the impression that it was heading to Malta or Suez. During the dark hours preceding the landings, he would turn sharply south and head towards Algiers and Oran.
The headquarters of the Allied Forces will remain in Gibraltar until appropriate communications are established near Algiers. Because of the amphibious nature of the operation, weather conditions will have an important impact on its success. It was to be a day
Victory November 8, 1942. Territories, November 8-11, 1942 (Map 2)
By noon on November 7, Operation Torch was ready to go. Task Force Western had succeeded in crossing 3,000 miles of submerged ocean to reach from their landing area, and Central and Eastern Task Force

9 were going past
Oran and Algiers toward "bomb alley", where the Luftwaffe was waiting for the ***. In each of the three landing zones, tactics were assumed to be generally the same, i.e. landings on either side of each major target as a means of subsequent encirclement.
These were in Oran and Algiers to be completed in front of me as saults on ports in order to seize shipping and port facilities before they were vandalized. Western Mission Force. French in Morocco, mainly galese Sene, Moroccan, and Algerian colonization American forces were stationed along the Atlantic coast in the Casablanca region from Safi to the port of Lyautey, and the American forces were divided into three groups as shown on the map, it was scheduled to be five in the hour 0515 on November 8.
The landing was made at Fedala, fourteen miles northeast of Casablanca, where the aim was to begin operations to capture the last named city from the east; in the port of Safi, 125 miles southwest of Casablanca, where the immediate objective was to smuggle armor and prevent reinforcements at Marrakesh from reaching Casablanca; and finally, at Mahdia, seventy miles northeast of Casablanca, where the aim was to capture the airports of Port Lyautey and protect the northern side of the whole operation.
All three landings yielded a great surprise, and by 1015 hours Safi was captured, after the successful push of the port by two destroyers. At Fedala and Port Lyautey, however, strong opposition was met, both from aircraft and from burials on the shore. The latter was silenced by naval fire, and by 1500 Fadala had fallen. Heavy fighting continued in the port of Lyautey all day, but at nightfall the airfield was still in French hands.
Meanwhile, our navy off Casablanca got its share of activity on November 8th. Early on in appearance, two French commanders and five destroyers sorted and made as if they were attacking our transports. They were shot and forced to retire.
Shortly thereafter, the French light cruiser Primaguet joined the destroyers out of port. With their exit again, the group was immediately engaged by the Augusta, Brooklyn, and cover force ships. With the exception of one ship that managed to return to port, all French ships sank or were ashore. While aiding in the process, the covering force, made up of Massachusetts, Wichita, and the Tuscaloosa, and four destroyers, was also exchanging fire with shore batteries and the French warship Jean Bart, which was moored in port. In order to end this agonizing bloodshed, American officers made several

10 attempts
to contact the French authorities at Casa Blanca to arrange an armistice, but Admiral Micheller refused to receive them.
The fighting continued for the next two days. American forces steadily expanded their bridgeheads and unloaded equipment despite heavy waves that caused losses to the landing craft. On November 10, the airfield at Port Lyautey was captured, and the first American planes landed in the field at 1100. This completed the primary mission of the Mahdia force.
In the south, after capturing Safi on November 8, elements of the 2D Armored Division moved east to intercept French reinforcements advancing from Marrakesh to Casablanca. These French forces were dispersed on the 10th, and on that night the armored vehicles began marching to Casablanca. The 47th Comintal team remained in Safi to protect the port. When the armored force received word of the surrender on November 11, General Aaron obtained the surrender of Mazagan and was continuing to advance to Casablanca, fifty miles to the north.
The forces of the 3D Division advancing on Casablanca from Vidala withstood stiff resistance, but by noon on the tenth day, they had reached the gathering area northeast of Casablanca. That night they made an encirclement movement to the southeast in preparation for a coordinated attack on the city at 0730, 11 November,
but at 0700 the French, on the orders of Admiral Darlan, surrendered.
Center task force. Changing course abruptly during the night, the central task force arrived off Oran and began its landing in Arezio and Andalusia at 0135 hours on November 8. The primary targets were airports and a highway system parallel to the coast. After the French commander of the area decided to cooperate with the American forces, he changed his mind and ordered total resistance. The landing boats were fired upon, and some sank as they approached shore, but they were disembarked at all points chosen.
The Ranger's battalion captured Arze, about thirty miles northeast of Oran, and shortly thereafter the Allied supply ships began loading goods. Several miles east of Arze, Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, landed, and moved southwest to capture the air fields at Tafrawi and Lasinia. The 16th and 18th Fighting Divisions of the 1st Infantry Division were brought ashore near Arzeu and began to advance towards Oran.

11
To the west, the 26th Fighting Regiment, Lieutenant General (1st Infantry Division) landed in Andalusia and struck east towards Oran with orders to capture the dominant heights west of the city. An armored detachment reached the northwest shore of Loremel and moved to capture the airfield at that place.
In an attempted frontal assault, two cutters carrying two companies of American forces and private anti-sabotage parties broke through the cordon and set out for the port of Oran. Here they came under crushing fire from coastal batteries and French warships. They reached their goal, but were burned and hampered. Most crews and troops aboard became casual relationships; The survivors were captured.
At first, other serious opposition to these operations came from a coastal battery over Arzew, but resistance developed rapidly during the day as our forces began to advance towards Oran.
By the night of the eighth, Combat Command B had captured the Tafrawi airfield and moved north towards La Senia. The divisions of the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Combat Regiment advanced eighteen miles from Arzew, encountering increasing resistance as they approached Oran. The 26th Regiment Combat Team moved from Andalusia eastward to the vicinity of Oran after overcoming some opposition. The'airfield is occupied in Lourmel.
The plans for the paratroopers' mission have largely gone astray. The formation became partly scattered by a storm, and those planes that passed through it at widely dispersed points landed on Sabkra, a dry salt marsh. About 300 paratroopers were finally destroyed in the vicinity of Tafrawi, as they ably helped the ground forces secure that airfield.
During November 9, enemy resistance continued to slow the advance at nearly all points. La Senia airport held out even after dark. However, the Tafrawi airfield, which fell on the 8th, was used by aircraft of the 12th Air Force as troops continued to be massed ashore.
As early as the 10th, columns of infantry converged in positions around the outskirts of Oran, and elements of the Armored Combat Command were close to the southern edge of the city. After a coordinated attack by all units at 0737, the armored forces moved into the city, and at 1230 General Fredendahl received the official surrender of the French commander.
Eastern Task Force. - With the development of events, the region of Algiers, which is the most important of the three main objectives, proved to be the easiest to secure. The sea was calm and the surprise was achieved. there was

12
Opposition from naval and coastal defense guns, which continued to fire until silenced by Allied naval and air units, but for the most part the landings were not opposed.
As did the other two forces, the Eastern Task Force reached its target on schedule during the night of November 7-8, and began landings at three beaches. Western Algeria, the 168th Reggae Mental Fugitive Combat Team made their first landing at Cape Veroches.
Friendly French officers, ready to cooperate with the American forces, surrendered the fortress of Sidi Ferroche at 0300 without firing a shot. Armored cars and tanks fell and the advance east towards Algiers began. Three miles from the city, it encountered some opposition from Vichy sympathizers, but by the afternoon the Americans were able to continue their movement towards the city.
Meanwhile, near Castiglione has been landed by
British Commandos, who advanced south and quickly occupied the airfield at Blida. Soon fighters from the British Naval Air Force arrived and began to use the airport. The commandos then moved eastward to cut off the city of Algiers from land communications to the southwest.
While completing the landings west of Algiers, the American 39th Regiment Combat Team, reinforced with a battalion of British commandos, landed on beaches near Ain Taya, fifteen miles east of the city. One column immediately headed for the main target, the large Maison Blanche airport, while another column moved into Algiers. The airfield was taken at 0830, after overcoming some slight resistance at Fort de l'Eau and after brushing with French tanks near the airfield. A little later a flock of Hori sticks, which had left Gibraltar at dawn, landed safely.
Meanwhile, as at Oran, a direct attack on the port to gain
control of port equipment and prevent sabotage was met with violent opposition. Two British and two American coastal shipping destroyers were badly damaged, and although a few commandos were placed ashore, the attempt to capture Algeria by a forward attack was unsuccessful.
By noon on the eighth day, the converging American columns had
completed the encirclement of Algiers and the railroads, highways, and air communications were in the hands of the Allies. During the day, the task force commander, Major General Charles W. Ryder, went ashore to confer with Admiral Darlan's representative. And they came to an agreement that all resistance must cease and that our troops must occupy the city at 1900, 8 November.

13
comments
The capitulation of Casablanca ended the first phase (landing) of operations. Months of preparations and three days of fighting put almost all of French North Africa into the hands of the Allies. The number of victims of Amer Ikan reached about 770 dead and missing, and 1050 wounded. The British lost 240 dead or missing and sixty wounded.
Perhaps the most significant achievement of the operation was organizing a combined force of US and British ground, air, and naval forces under one common crew and moving that force thousands of miles away to conduct simultaneous combat landings at widely dispersed points on a hostile beach. The landings, involving more than 100,000 soldiers, hundreds of aircraft and 258 ships and warships, had truly written a new chapter in amphibious warfare.
The political aspects of the landings, in particular the recognition of Darlan, became the subject of much debate. General Marshall's comments in an official report are pertinent:
General Eisenhower announced that General Giraud would be
responsible for civil and military affairs in North Africa, but
French military officials on the ground were found to be loyal
to Marshal Pétain's government. President Roosevelt's memorandum
to the French head of state had assured Marshal Petain of our desire
to liberate France, but Vichy's answer was disappointing. Our ambassador was handed over his passport on November 9,
and orders from Vichy to the French African units to resist our forces were rescinded.
which by that time had
already accomplished its tasks on the Casablanca front.
Unexpectedly, Admiral Jean Darlan, Pétain's appointed deputy
and commander-in-chief of all French forces, was found,
in Algiers, the capital. . . . He was placed in protective custody, and when the French leaders turned out to be loyal to the Vichy government
, a series of conferences immediately followed with the goal of
stopping French resistance against
General Patton's task force in the vicinity of Casablanca. When, on the morning of
November 11, the Germans invaded unoccupied France
, Admiral Darlan rejected the pseudo-independent Vichy government, assumed
power in North Africa in the name of Marshal Pétain, and
issued an order to all French leaders in North Africa
to cease hostilities. This reached Casablanca a few minutes before the
start of the last American offensive in
the early morning of November 11th.
These events, which occurred after the actual landings on November 8, required quick decisions, the results achieved at last validating the American military leaders. During the North African campaign, the problem of integrating the French into a united and cooperative ally was a heavy burden that fell on

14th
General Eisenhower in addition to his purely military duties. The essence of the commitment signed by Admiral Darlan was that the French were to immediately give the Allies the same amount of active assistance in the capture of Tunisia, which was within their authority. They had to organize the North African government, under Darlan, for effective cooperation, and under General Gero, they had to begin to reorganize the military forces selected to take an active part in the fighting. The way was now cleared to achieve the main goal, which was the occupation of Tunisia and the extermination of German forces in Africa.
The main factors that contributed to the success of the Earth
The events in French North Africa were: (1) a strategic surprise, (2) the lack of organized French resistance, and (3) effective joint naval military planning and execution. Errors occurred in the implementation of plans, but this was expected from the Green Forces. The experience was to serve them well in the future.
By the end of November, there was a definite turning point
In the military situation of the allies as a whole. General Montgomery began chasing the remnants of Rommel's army through Egypt and Libya, the Americans and British successfully landed in French North Africa and began the invasion of Tunisia, and the Russians had begun their winter offensive at Stalingrad. All of these offensive moves gained momentum with each passing month. The initiative had passed on to the Allies, and for the first time during the war the German military situation deteriorated into an imposed strategic defense. The tide turned like wisdom in the Pacific Ocean as the Americans conquered the Solomon Islands in Guadalcanal and secured a lifeline to Australia. Forced out from southeastern New Guinea, the Jap anese had begun their long way back to the Philippines.
Tunisia campaign
The conclusion of the landing phase paved the way for the next operation, the Tunisian campaign (Map 3). This campaign, which was to last six months, will be divided into three phases. The first would cover the race between the Allies and the Axis to build a force in the Bizerte and Tunis region strong enough to deprive the loser of this key region. The Germans had to win this race with a tight mar-gin. The second stage would include the period of the Axis Initiative, during which the Germans had to develop and expand a strong defense perimeter around their possessions in Tunisia. The third stage

15 would include
the decisive period of the campaign: the Allied victory at Mareth, the capture of Bizerte and Tunisia, and the subsequent surrender of all Axis forces in North Africa.
theater of operations
Tunisia varies greatly in both its length and width in terms of terrain and climate. It is five hundred miles long from north to south and 150 miles wide from east to west, and its surface consists of a confluent mountainous region in the north, a region of lower plateaus in the middle, and wide plains in the south that gradually merge into the sands of the Sahara.
The mountains in the north are the eastern end of that chain of the Atlas Mountains that begins in southern Morocco and extends entirely through French North Africa in a northeast direction. It is rocky, sloping and close to Souk Ahras reaching an elevation of more than 4,200 feet.
The easternmost outcrop of these mountains, known as the Grand Dorsal, extends south of Tunis in a vertical "V" shape. From the summit of the 'V', near the Pont du Fahs, the eastern arm, called the Eastern Back, extends south 125 miles to Macnassi, and from there to the southwest near the Catar region. A few passes crossed it - Fondouk, Faid, Maknassy and El Guettar - this eastern dorsal zone, with Chott Djerid (large salt lake), would provide a natural defense of the Allies' right flank against any attacker from the east or south. This terrain was the scene of bitter fighting during the Tunisian campaign.
The western arm of the "V", the western dorsal, extends southwest from the Pont du Fahs and forms a secondary barrier against attack from the east or south. Important passes in this range are Muktar, Sbeiba, Kasserine, Darniyah, and Al-Abyod. Tebessa,
On the western slope of the dormer, it is an important communications center and key to the southern front.
In the north is the abstract river, the most important stream, the northeast wind blows from the mountains to the Gulf of Tunis. The door clipper is the key to this corridor to Tunis. It was to become an important defensive position covering the Allied lines of communication to the west.
There are a few good roads in Tunisia. The main roads are usually hard-ground (roller-paved) but narrow. Secondary roads are sometimes well mineralized, but often they are little more than dirt tracks. After a few hours of rain, many of the so-called roads become practically impassable for motor transport, while rapidly deteriorating in prolonged dry weather. When you pass through the hills, the roads often become

16
unclean over long distances. During military operations, it can be blocked by minefields and covered with fire from heights that drive it from both sides. Thus passes and defilement were destined to become important objectives during the Tunisian campaign.
There are three ways to enter Tunisia from Algeria. The first is the coastal road through Bonn. Another road, via Souk Ahras, forty miles inland, leads into the Tunis-Bizerte region either by way of Souk Arbaa or by the more southerly road through El Kef. Central and southern Tunisia are reached via Tebessa, from this point north-east roads lead to Majz al-Bab and Tunis, from the east through Kasserine to the Fondouk and Fayed corridors, and from the south-east through Gafsa to Sfax and Gabes.
Railways are of particular importance in this few area
Good fasts. However, the deterioration of the sidewalks and the French railway wagon made even this type of transport extremely unreliable. Operating in the coastal plains at the level of Tunisia and southern Tunisia, the enemy would have had the definite advantage of shorter and better communications.
The period of heavy rains begins in late November and lasts
until February. During this season, the lowlands, in particular, become a sea of sticky mud.
Tunis Race, November-December 1942
Having secured the initial goals of Casablanca, Oran and
Algeria, the Allies immediately switched to the next stage, the siege of the bulk of the American, French, Moroccan and Algerian forces in the region of Casablanca and Oran and the advance of the British First Army into Tunisia. According to General Eisenhower:
Our chief hope lies in anticipating the axis in Tunisia in our work
At full speed. In fact, we participated in a race not only
against the build-up of enemy forces in Tunis and Bizerte, but
against the weather as well. The
weather had been mild less than a month ago, and the Axis air and ground forces were
within walking distance of Tunis and Bizerte, less than 100 miles
from these places across the Strait of Sicily. All our breath
was the easternmost power in Algiers, 560 miles west of Tunis. Neces
sarily, therefore, we had to count on rapid advances in very light
forces, understrength in both personnel and equipment.
To make matters worse, the enemy wasted no time in the face of the Allied invasion. On November 9, German air transport began to send its troops to the Bizerte region - Tunisia. Here again the French reaction infuriated the Allies. Admiral Estefa, the French vice president, listened to Vichy and, despite Darlan's directions for an armistice, before

17
cut the way for the German to enter. French forces led by General Berry, loyal to the Allies, were ordered out of Tunis, leaving the city defenseless. Later, General Berry's forces joined the Allies, but in the meantime the Germans found facilities for airfields and docks ready for their use.
On November 9, General Anderson arrived in Algiers to take command of the First British Army. His plan was to capture all the ports and airfields to the east (Bouge, Djidjili, Philipville, Bonny, and La Calle) as quickly as possible and then push his forces forward by motorized transport, landing craft, and troop-carrying aircraft. Buji port and airport in Gedeli were the first two targets.
The floating reserve of the Eastern Task Force, part of the British 78th Division, was still aboard the ships in Algiers. She sailed on the evening of November 10 to take the first targets of the drive east. The capture of Bugey on November 11 was unopposed, but due to poor surf conditions, the force was not able to capture Jid Gil Airport until the 13th. During this temporary lack of adequate ground air cover, the Germans were allowed to bombard the port of Bugey, where they damaged a British aircraft carrier .
Bones was occupied on 12 November by two companies of a British parachute battalion dropped from the C-47 of the US 65th Motors Command and a British commando battalion brought in by water. Axis's only opposition to this move was a violent air raid that night. The mobilization of forces in the bone area is kept as quickly as possible, and air, sea, rail and vehicle transport is used. Advances to the east were pressured, and by November 15 the commanding elements of the 36th Brigade of the 78th Division occupied Tabarka, only eighty miles from Tunis. The British Paratroopers battalion that had been shot down at Suq al-Arbaa on the 16th had moved out of Beja by the 17th, and the forces at Tabarka had advanced to Jebel Abiud.
At the same time the Allies were securing the airfields in the south. On November 15, the 503d Parachute Battalion of Colonel Edson D. Raff, an American unit, is at Yux-les-Bains and two days later occupy Gafsa airport, far to the south. It sent patrols over the entire southern region, encountering only small Italian forces. The Raf force, as it became known, established friendly relations with the French garrison at Tebessa, which soon began cooperating with the Americans in patrolling the area.
Evidence of French cooperation emerged on November 16, when there were reports of clashes between French and German patrols in the Beja-Debejil Abiud-Mater region. Although General Berry had been negotiating with the Germans since their arrival,

18
The Allies in Tunisia had the support of the French forces, and Berri had now agreed that his forces should cover the 78th Division's stationing in the Tabarka-Souq Arbaa region. On November 17, General Anderson issued orders to the 78th to complete its focus and prepare to advance into Tunisia.
At this time the combat power of the Axis was estimated to be about 500 to 1,000 in the Tunis area and about 4,000 in Bizerte, with some tanks and planes all over the place. At the same time, landings were on average more than fifty times a day in Bizerte. The enemy had occupied Mater and pushed west and south.
The Allied reconnaissance force rushing to Tunisia consisted primarily of two brigades of the British 78th Infantry Division and one battalion of the 17th Lancer, reinforced by light tanks from the American 1st Armored Division. It was realized that such a small force, only a few thousand men in total, could not hope to capture Tunis and Bizerte if the Germans succeeded in bringing in heavy reinforcements. Yet at that time it was the greatest strength that could be supplied over the long and difficult course of communication.
Follow-up convoys reached Bonn as quickly as they could, and once the carriage was unloaded, newly arrived elements of the British First Army continued overland to the east (Map 4a). By November 20, British armor, known as the Blade Force, was established in the Souk Arbaa area, and by November 22, the 11th Brigade* group of the 78th Division was concentrated in the Beja area.
Operations in the north were supposed to take place along three clearly defined axes: (1) the road from Tabarka to Mater, (2) the Beja Mater road, and (3) the main highway running from Beja through Majz Al-Bab and Tabarka to Tunis.
While the Allies were desperately trying to build up their advancing units and bring in supplies, the enemy seized the initiative by confronting the French at Majz al-Bab on November 18 and 19. The poorly equipped French were attacked three times by infantry supported by artillery, tanks and grenade launchers, resulting in 25 percent losses in the ranks of the defenders. The French retired until reinforced with British and American armor and artillery, when they counterattacked. At the same time, the lead battalion of the 36th Brigade halted another axis attack on Jabal Abiod.
Although the British were able to restrain the enemy, they were unable to advance, and were ordered to be temporarily delayed until their strength was sufficient to secure a reasonable order.
* A British Brigade group is similar to our Combat Team.

19
chance to succeed in driving to Tunisia. Also, the mixing between French and British units that occurred as a result of improvisation after the French decision to work with the Allies had to be reconciled. By November 23, a verbal agreement was reached that all forces north of the Le Kef-Zaghouan line would be under the command of the British First Army, while all units south of this line should be under French command. This was unsatisfactory, but it was the best that could be achieved for the time being, because the French refused to serve under a British commander.
On November 24, General Anderson completed the forward focus of the 78th Division and Blade Force, with the British 6th Armored Division on its way to Tabarsuk and Combat Command B of the U.S. 1st Armored Division on its way to Souk Arbaa as follow-up forces. . The advance was resumed, with blade force penetrating the enemy position to a point halfway between Tabarba and Mater and the 11th Brigade, on the right, advancing down Wadi Mejerda, capturing Mujaz al-Bab on the 25th. The advance was steady for the next three days, as the 11th Brigade moved, Reinforced with American and British armor, he set out on the banks of the river to capture Tebourba on the night of November 26-27. On November 28, our forces reached El Jadida, less than sixteen miles from Tunis.
To the north, the 36th Brigade, despite advancing about ten miles toward Mater, encountered increasing resistance from small enemies and booby traps. At the same time, the Blade Force, on the plains south of Mater, began to experience supply difficulties, which were exacerbated by the first rains. In all divisions, enemy submersible bombers were an important factor in stopping our advance, as our airfields were too far from the stern to provide the necessary cover.
The forward positions were held until 1 December, when the German commander von ar Nimes launched an attack with bombers, tanks, and infantry against the Blade force near Tabarba. After losing forty tanks, the Blade Force was withdrawn and Combat Command B and Eleventh Brigade captured the sector. On December 3 the enemy attacked again, the 11th Brigade suffered greatly in men and equipment. By this time, the 78th Division's battalions numbered fewer than 350 men.
On December 8, General Eisenhower agreed to General Anderson's proposal to withdraw his forces to more defensible areas. However, the important center of the door midges will be held at all costs. The weather proved a serious hindrance to this withdrawal.

20
Combat Command B became poorly overwhelmed and was finally forced to give up the bulk of its equipment, recovering only three of its 18 105 mm caliber. Howitzers, twelve of sixty-two medium tanks, thirty-eight of 122 light tanks. This was a great loss, because the constant fighting and dangerous attrition, along with inadequate rail and highway communications, impeded the formation of reserves. The weather was turning the few airfields we had available into swamps while the Axis aircraft, operating from paved fields, maintained air superiority over the forward areas, compounding the
confusion and obstacles for the Allies.
she was
It is estimated that on November 30, the Germans had 15,500 combat troops, 130 tanks, 60 field guns and 30 anti-tank guns in the Tunis-Bizerte area. By December 18, this force had grown to a total of 42,000 men, including about 25,000 Germans, and reinforced dis*****es still arriving.
During November and early December, southern Tunisia was mostly no man's land, but several hundred Germans reached Gabes, Sfax, and Sousse by troop carrier aircraft and fortified those towns. Enemy patrols consisting of armored cars and light tanks moved westward and occupied the Fahs Bridge.
In the far south, American paratroopers, who had fallen at Yux-les-Bains and joined the French forces in that area, actively patrolled. The task of a few hundred American and French troops in central and southern Tunisia was to make the enemy feel like a whole squad. They rushed up and down the hundred-mile front, and appeared here and there to threaten the Germans along the coast. They had many skirmishes with enemy patrols and effectively protected the southern flank of the First Army.
Unwilling to abandon the race to Tunisia, General Eisenhower decided to launch another offensive in the north around December 20 with Tunisia as the target. But the weather continued to be the most formidable enemy. Vehicle movement on paved roads was possible, and two-thirds of Allied aircraft in the main square, at Souq al-Arba', were out of order due to mud. The supply lines were insufficient to meet the needs for steel mats and equipment to put airfields in good condition or, for that matter, to provide the necessary backlog of general supplies, in particular ammunition.
As the Allies' hope for this last planned attack lay in air power and artillery, the operation was postponed and then, on December 24, finally abandoned.

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General Eisenhower expressed his feelings about the situation with these words:
The abandonment of our immediate offensive plans was
a terrible disappointment which I have suffered thus far, but I was convinced
that an attempt to launch a major offensive under the prevailing conditions in
northern Tunisia would be merely to prosecute disaster. We could not
hope to resume major operations in the north until mid-March, and we had to start the slow work of preparing for
an offensive at the end of that period. The logistics marathon,
which I desperately tried to avoid , had begun .
During the last two months of 1942, there were other events that had some influence on the military situation. When Girmans moved into non-occupied France and toward the naval base at Toulon on November 11, Admiral Darlan ordered the French fleet to sail to Africa. But in the confusion of the situation, the fleet was scuttled instead, and only a few submarines passed to North Africa. Darlan was more successful in his next attempt to help the Allies. He was able to convince M. Poisson, governor of French West Africa, joined the liberation movement and opened Dakar to use as a base for the Allies. When Admiral Darlan was assassinated on December 24, General Giroud took his place. General Yuen, commander of the French military, came.
At this time, the bulk of the American forces (Fifth Army*), along with two divisions of French forces from Morocco and the French division in Oran, were held in the region of Casablanca and Oran to guard communications, to counter any movement that the Germans might make by passing through Spanish Morocco, and conducting Training in preparation for future missions.
comments . The Allied move to seize Tunisia was a necessary step in the continuation of the strategic offensive in North Africa. The efforts of the Axis to thwart the attempt were an equally essential step in carrying out strategic defenses that had been curtailed by their defeat at the Battle of El Alamein.
Two main reasons prompted the Axis leadership to fully defend Tunisia. The first is that only by holding this area can they hope to rid the troops and equipment of Rommel's army from their grave predicament. The second was that it was necessary to delay the Allied attack on Europe as long as possible in order to gain time to prepare the necessary defenses.
* The Fifth Army, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, was activated on January 5, 1943. It was headquartered in Oujda, Morocco. The assigned forces included the 3D, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions, and the 2D Armored Division.

22
Allied strategy in North Africa ceased to be a mystery to Girman once they were notified of the landings, and since then, the element of strategic surprise has ceased to affect them. Surprise contributed greatly to the success of the initial operations, but was completely missing during the early period of the Allied incursion into Tunisia.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the response of
a high-ranking German officer, Field Marshal Kesselring, to an American interrogation in May 1946. Kesselring was asked what intelligence the Germans had about our landings in North Africa. He replied:
We were, in fact, in
possession of very accurate information regarding activity in the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and we had
Fully prepared for a possible landing. I was the only one who believed in the possibility of landing in Algiers. But the German and Italian high command did not share this view. Your broadcasting service is working properly in this regard. It
kept us constantly in a state of excitement and carried on a miraculous form of nerve warfare, so we had to expect
some kind of invasion at any time, and yet we didn't know from what direction to
expect it.
As soon as the facts were evaluated by the Germans, they acted quickly and efficiently. In doing so they won the race for Tunisia, succeeded in delaying the conquest of Italy by six months, and gained time to bolster their continental defenses. But we'll see later the price they paid for it.
The Allied leadership recognized the strategic importance of Tu
nisia; From the beginning, it was known that once Tunis and Bizerte were captured, the whole of Tunisia would fall. We have seen why the initial landing points to the east of Algiers were not chosen. There are only two questions left to be answered: (1) Why was only a small force sent to Tunisia? (2) Why was that
unable to win the race for Tunisia? Both questions have the same answer: the lack of supply facilities for the larger forces, both on the ground and in the air. Handicapped by the lack of transportation and the slowness of the long supply routes, the Allied commander was able to send only a small fighting force to Tunisia. When this force was stopped and then expelled by the enemy, it became necessary to enter the indicated "logistics marathon." General Eisenhower.
Axis Initiative period, January-March 1943
Allied plans and building (Map 4b). - in early January,
The Tony Sian front stretched from Shatt Grid in the south to the Mediterranean in the north, a distance of about 250 miles. Through the

23
desert, south of the area shown on the map, small patrols of the French Camel Corps roamed. American paratroopers took control of the desert, the wilderness around Gafsa, and up to the Fayed Pass. The American 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division began arriving in this area.
Around Pichon and Fondouk and further north, the French XIX Corps occupied positions in the hills and took control of the Ousseltia Valley. * These forces were lightly armed with obsolete weapons and had neither the means of transportation nor the administrative mechanisms for offensive operations. But under the able leadership of the generals Juin and Koeltz they maintained high morale, and by the end of the campaign cooperation with the other allies was excellent.
What remained of the front, north of the sea at Cape Sirat, was under the control of the British First Army, hitherto an army in name only. At this time it consisted only of the Fifth Corps, which consisted of the 6th Armored Battalion, 78th Infantry, and the 139th Brigade. Thus, during early January, a 250-mile front was erected by a horde of three British, part of one American, and three French divisions. weak.
To resist the Allies at this time, General von Arnim appears to have had three German divisions and three Italian divisions. Within about two months, he expanded the bridgeheads of Sousse, Sfax, and Gabes into a more or less continuous coastal pass in order to ensure close communication and cooperation between his forces and Rommel's, and then approached the Mareth position.
With offensive plans in the north for the time being abandoned, the situation on the long front of the Pont de Facility to Gafsa deserves close attention. A successful Axis attack through our weak positions there could move to the Mediterranean coast in the Bone region and completely isolate the British First Army. As a counter plan, the Allies developed the "Sfax Project", a plan for an Allied offensive against Gabes and Sfax to be launched in the Tebessa-Kasserine region. Besides regaining the initiative, this operation, if successful, would cut the communication path between Rommel and von Arnim and secure the southern flank of the British First Army. The prospects for better weather in this area were encouraging,
* led by General Coltz, this corps contained most of the French forces available from Tunisia and Algeria—about three divisions that were composed mostly of local forces.
As already mentioned, General Yuen commanded all the French forces.

24
On January 1, 1943, the US 2nd Corps, Major General Frieden Dahl, commander, was separated from the Central Task Force at Oran and sent to Tunisia. The 2nd Corps, which was the nucleus of the US 1st Armored Division, completed its position in the Kasserine-Tebessa region on January 15 and proceeded with plans for the offensive to be launched in 23 days. However, information was received on January 15 that it would be impossible to coordinate this attack with the advance of General Montgomery's army, because Montgomery would not reach Tripoli until last week in January. This caused General Eisenhower to abandon the Sfax offensive for another, as it was now considered too risky. After this change of plan, the 1st Infantry Division, less than the 18th and 26th regiments, was attached to the French Nineteenth Corps, farther north.
The approach of the British Eighth Army made it necessary to plan a large-scale reorganization to achieve unity of command in the Allied land, sea and air forces. At the Casablanca Conference in mid-January, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that this reorganization should take place when the campaign had reached the appropriate stage and when the necessary preparations had been completed. General Eisenhower was appointed to command the new North African Operations Command and relieved of responsibility for the European theater. General Sir Harold R.L. L. Alexander, the British commander-in-chief in the Middle East, was to become Eisenhower's deputy and command the Eighteenth Army Group, consisting of the British 1st and 8th Armies, the American 2nd Corps, and French forces on the Tunisian front. The air units were to be organized into the Mediterranean Air Command, under the command of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was to become the commander in chief of the naval forces in the Mediterranean. As we shall see, another month was due to pass before these arrangements took effect.
By late January, von Arnim's army of 65,000 was receiving about 750 men per day and large amounts of supplies. Therefore, the mobilization of the Allied forces and the interception of the enemy crowds served as the direction and almost the sole objective of the Allied strategy in Tunisia. Steps were taken to improve the Allied supply preparation and to develop air power over Tunisia.
All port and transportation facilities have been brought to their maximum capacity (Map 3). The First Army was based in Beaune and used supply routes through La Calle and Souk Ahras. The supplies of the American 2nd Corps were transported from Oran and Algiers by rail to the depots of the new eastern base division in Constantine and from there

25
to forward supply points in the Tebessa area. The 12th US Air Force was supplied with rail and road from Phillipville.
The Air Force and Navy have collaborated on the dual mission of protecting our supply lines and disrupting the enemy. Fighter elements of the Eastern Air Command were stationed in Souq Al Arbaa as air support for the First Army. Similarly, the 12th Air Support Command was brought to Thelepte and Youks les Bains airfields to support the 2nd Corps. B-17 was collected near Biskra, and the medians were based on Constantine. Both American and British aircraft focused primarily on Tunisian targets but began to range as far as Sicily and Sardinia. Malta-based Beaufighters and Spitfires aided the Allied efforts by striking Tripoli, Tunisia, and Axis air trains over the Sicily Channel. During the first week of January, 520 12th Air Force and 250 RAF aircraft were operational in Northwest Africa.
Contrary to the prevailing impression, it is estimated that 90 percent of the flow of men and supplies through narrower Sicily was transported by sea and only 10 percent was sent by air. This Axis waterway, with its excellent air cover, was less vulnerable than the Allied long coastal route between Bonn and Algiers. Moreover, during the first three months of operations
, Allied ports, in particular Bonn, were subjected to constant and sometimes heavy air raids.
Operations, January 1 - February 14, 1943 (Map 4b). - While the Allies were "cleaning their administrative tail" (a phrase coined by General Montgomery), the Germans kept the initiative unchallenged. The following excerpt from the report of the Allied Forces Headquarters indicates their appreciation of the precarious position of the Allies:
In a captured German document, dated December 16, we find
That Marshal Rommel's "situation estimate",
which underscored all our communication and logistics weaknesses,
emphasized the combined nature of our forces by the clever remark
that such a force "perhaps lacking cohesion and suffering from the weakness inherent in Allied command", in short we
mated in the French sector: "In the face of Gabes and
Sousse are the elements of three French teams, all poorly equipped
and in questionable morale."
From the Kairouan region, the enemy launched an attack on the French position on 2 January. In the hotel, the running son besieged and captured the hotel, and although the Pynchon gap in the Oselteia Valley was threatened, the enemy did not take advantage of his

success.26
The next German impetus came on January 18 at the meeting point of the British and French sectors in the Bou Arada - Pont du Fahs. The initial attacks, in which the new Mark VI tank ("Tiger") appeared, were stopped by the British, but not before the threat of Bou Arada. On the same day the enemy attacked from Pont du Fahs southwest towards Robaa in a campaign that, if successful, would isolate the French in the mountains to the east.
Over the next thirty-six hours, the Allied forces moved in to counter the Axis advance. The British 6th Armored Division regrouped in the Bou Arada area and sent a squadron of tanks and some artillery to aid the French forces while the B Combat Command moved from the American 1st Armored Division to Maktar. US 2nd Corps, to the south, was gathering elements of the 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division near Sbeitla for use as reserves.
On January 19, the British launched a counterattack, advancing nine miles east of Bou Arada and clearing the way north of that city. The enemy continued in the southwest direction unabated, and the quadrant was occupied. Forcing the French forces to withdraw westward,
the British V Corps complied by withdrawing its right flank. Axis forces attacked again on January 20, reaching Ossetia that night and isolating the French units holding out at East Noon.
Over the next few days, the Allied forces began to restore the situation. Elements of the British 6th Armored Division advanced on the Robaa-Pont du Fahs, and combat command B moved to positions at the southern end of the Ostelia Valley, where it managed to drive out isolated French units. At this time additional American forces arrived from the 1st Infantry Division to strengthen the Allied lines.
By January 25, the enemy offensive had exhausted its strength and the positions had stabilized. On that date, General Eisenhower, with the approval of the French, appointed General Anderson to command the British First Army of all allied land forces at Tu Nessia. General Anderson tasked the US 2nd Corps with retaking the strip south of the hotel - where he was operating.
The enemy did not remain silent for long. On January 30, he turned his main effort and attacked the French forces who were holding Faid Pass, the position that checked out the American 1st Division. The Axis force, supported by sixty tanks, captured the town of Fayed and made further breakthroughs to the south and west, although the French retained the junction of the road at Sidi Bou

27
Zaid, a few miles west of Fayed. Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division, at Sbeitla, was immediately ordered east to support. Combat Command D * ordered to relieve enemy pressure on the French with attacks eastward from Gafsa. This force of armor and infantry attacked Amer Ikan Sinead, where it was contained by the enemy. Meanwhile, Combat Command C moved north-east to cut off the Sidi Bou Zeid-Meknassi road. After arriving in Sidi Bouzid on the afternoon of the 31st, I headed south towards Meknassi.
Although the allies succeeded in denying the enemy further gains, the lost ground could not be regained. A combat command attacked Fayed on the morning of 1 February, but after fruitless assaults that continued through the next day, work was halted. to me
Southward, armored units captured Senade but during 3 and 4 February they were withdrawn from the Gafsa area and concentrated with other 2nd Corps units near Sbeitla. General Anderson ordered this action due to the situation at Fayed and the exaggerated reports of enemy concentrations between Ossetia and Kairouan.
As a result of enemy attacks from mid-January to the first days of February, the defensive barrier of the Allies along the eastern back was seriously weakened, and the arrival of Rommel's forces in southern Tunisia made the situation less safe. There was no other alternative but to withdraw ill-equipped French units from the line so that modern weapons could be issued and trained in their use. Forces of the US 34th Infantry Division began capturing parts of the French sector. The front remained calm from February 5 to 14, during which time both sides made strenuous efforts to bring in additional supplies and reinforcements.
During the period from early November 1942 to the end of January 1943, the British Eighth Army is reported to have followed Rommel's army throughout most of Egypt and Libya. On January 23, the Eighth Army entered Tripoli, and this fine port was finally in the hands of the Allies. Rommel continued his retreat towards the Tunisian border, which he crossed on 4 February. In exactly three months, the Eighth Army advanced 1,400 miles from El Alamein, as a result of which its administrative services were stretched to the extreme. Before resuming the offensive operation, the port of Tripoli had to be put into service so that reserves of supplies could be built up. Eight weeks passed after entering Tripoli before Montgomery's army was ready for the opening phase of the Battle of Tripoli.

An interim force consisting primarily of
the 1st Armored Division's artillery headquarters, a battalion of the 168th Infantry (34th Division), an armored battalion, and a battalion of armored artillery.


28
Marth. This was a period of anxiety for the Allied soldiers, as while the Eighth Army was preparing its preparations and the rest of the Allied forces were building their strength, the enemy forces in Tunisia were free to devote their full attention to them. The British First Army and American Second Corps, stretched thinly over a broad front. With Rommel's divisions available, the total Axis force in Tunisia increased to approximately 200,000 combat troops.
Battle of Kasserine Pass, February 14-26, 1943 (Map 5) - During the first two weeks of February, a large-scale regrouping of Allied forces occurred. In the sector of the Second Corps, the advance of the 1st Armored Division, the fewest of detachments, was allotted about fifty miles from
Jabal Tarza, near the hotel, to Jabal Qusira, south of Fayed Pass. Fighting Command B was attached to the British at Maktar. Com bat A command and the 168th Combat Regiment of the 34th Division moved to the Sidi Bouzid region, where the 168 were placed in defensive positions at Jebel Ksira and Jebel Souda (positions that were not supporting each other) to cover Fayed Pass. C combat command was concentrated in Hajeb El-Ayoun, and the rest of the 1st Armored Division was in Sbeitla. The 26th Regiment Combat Team was from the 1st Infantry Division in the Fryana District.
The Germans did not remain idly by for long, for at dawn on February 14 they launched a decisive attack from Fayed in the direction of Sbeitla-Kasserine and made a secondary attack from Meknassi in the south. The enemy forces participating in these initial attacks were the entire 21st Panzer Division, which was with Rommel's army in Tripoli, and elements of the 10th Panzer Division, recently re-equipped in Sfax. The immediate target of the main attack, supported by artillery, motorized infantry, Stuka dive bombers, and combat aircraft, was the road junction about five miles north of Sidi Bouzid.
The enemy first overran a battalion of artillery on the slopes of Jabal al-Sawda near the crossroads, and by 7:15 it had occupied the same crossroads with a force of about twenty tanks. Allied forces in Jabal al-Soudah and al-Qusayrah were threatened with complete encirclement. A battalion of Combat Command A tanks, supported by an artillery battalion, launched a counterattack against the enemy south of Jabal al-Soudah while the rest of Combat Command A withdrew westward to take up a defensive position at a road junction about ten miles. Northwest of Sidi Bouzid.

29
Axle armor continued to flow through the corridor. One column of about fifty tanks and some infantry surrounded Jebel Souda from the north and west and set out at Sidi Bouzid. Suffering heavy losses, the American armored battalion and its artillery broke the engagement, reduced to ineffectiveness, and moved to the west. Forces in Jabal Al-Sawdah and Al-Qusayrah.
Although she was still in combat, she was practically isolated for 1,300 hours. All day, the quadrangle highways of Fayed-Meknassi-Gafsa-Sbeitla were bustling with German armor and infantry. In the south, a single force of about thirty tanks advanced northwest from Meknes and by evening was threatening Sidi Bouzid from the southwest. Another convoy was advancing along the Sneed-Gafsa road. Gafsa, which was in danger of being completely cut off, was evacuated in the evening, and the forces there withdrew to Feriana to protect the important airfields near Thilpet. A new defensive line was planned to protect Feriana and Sbeitla. On the night of February 14-15, Combat Command B was ordered south from Maktar to support the remainder of the 1st Armored Division.
General Fredendahl ordered the 1st Armored Division to counterattack on the morning of February 15. Accordingly, Combat Command G moved south from Hajeb El-Ayoun with elements of Combat Command A and a British Armored Infantry Battalion at about 1600 on 15 February. As the armor of the leading battalion approached the enemy's defensive position, heading north-south through Sidi Bouzid, a formation of German tanks was seen, and within an hour a fierce battle was underway. Although the combat command reported the situation under control,
Appearances proved deceptive, because the frontal action of enemy tanks served only to divert attention from an overwhelming maneuver already underway. British Battalion was following Combat Command C to take advantage of this counterattack success when it suddenly found its right side and stern under the deadly fire of a large German tank force. Then the Allied forces were ordered to rid themselves, and all units fell quickly except for the lead armored battalion, which did not receive the order. The enemy has overrun it. As the British did in Knightsbridge, our tanks rushed blindly into an ambush. The units in Jebel Lisoda and Kisira were now completely isolated, and any thought of going to relief had to be abandoned.
Confusing fighting continued between eastern and southeastern Sbeitla during 16 February, the dive bombers inflicting heavy personnel losses on combat command A. By this time II Corps had suffered serious

30
Equipment losses ninety-eight medium tanks, fifty -seven half-tracks, and twelve 155-mm. Howitzers, seventeen caliber 105 mm. Lost howitzers. There was now no prospect of further counterattacks to hold the four*armored divisions* the enemy was using, let alone reclaim the allies' strategic position.
As this Axis campaign was threatening the position of the French XIX Corps on the eastern back, the commander of the First Army ordered the withdrawal of all forces to the highlands of Western Dor sal and the Feriana-Kasserine-Sbeitla line. An infantry battalion of the 1st Infantry Division and a regiment of combat engineers were assigned the task of organizing a defensive position at the Cas-Serene Pass, six miles northwest of Kasserine.
On February 16, General Fredendahl directed the 1st Armored Battalion to hold Sbeitla at all costs until 1100, February 17, in order to secure time to establish the position at Kasserine. In compliance with this order, the remnants of the A and C Combat Commands south and east of the city were disposed of. They were attacked by the enemy at 0900 on the 17th but held the ground until 15:00 when Combat Command A moved north to the vicinity of Sbeiba and C withdrew along the Sbeitla-Kasserine Road. Fighting Command B, having completed its movement from Maktar, covered the withdrawal. The entire 1st Armored Division was now ordered to concentrate about ten miles southeast of Tebessa as a reserve to counter any enemy attack through the pass defenses west of Dhahrsal - Abyoud, Derniyeh, and Kasserine.
By nightfall, Axis forces had occupied Sbeitla, Kasserine, and Thélpet airfield and had crept into the hills toward the Cas Serene Pass. The loss of the airfield was a serious blow to the allies, but they were able to evacuate most of the aircraft and stores and destroyed what could not be moved.
By broad daylight on February 18, the U.S. 34th Infantry Division (less than the 168th officer) had arrived at Siba to take over the defense of that lane and relieve Combat Command A, which was to join the rest of the 1st Armored Division southeast of Tebessa. Supported by the 18th Combatant Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division and the British Guards Brigade, the 34th Division was subjected to tank and infantry attacks during February 18, 19 and 20 in what was in effect a powerful diversion maneuver to prevent reinforcements from being sent south to Kasserine where the enemy planned to launch their major offensive.
* 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and the Italian 131st Centauro Division.

31
In Kasserine you pass a crossroads. A branch leads north to Tala, the loss of which will open the road to Le Kef and effectively cut II Corps from the other Allied forces to the north; The other branch leads to the northwest to Tebessa, which was the main communications center of the Allied Southern Front and the location of large supply facilities.
Rommel consolidated his position and reinforced his forces in the Kasserine region on February 18. In the 19th century, he aggressively conducted a reconnaissance operation with an infantry battalion backed by tanks, but the attack was not pressed when he met strong resistance, including precision American artillery fire. But during the night, enemy units successfully infiltrated higher ground both in the north and the
south and south sides of the pass and from these excellent points brought effective mortars and light weapons on the defenders. At dawn on the 20th, a decisive attack carried out the pass, forcing the defending forces back towards Tebessa.
Fortunately, the Allies were also active during the night of February 19-20. Brigadier General Dumphy, commander of the 26th British Armored Brigade, organized a special task force of one group of motorized infantry, one squadron of armor, a force of anti-tank guns, a division of motorized artillery, and a battalion of infantry and took up positions on both sides of the road. Thala Road is about ten miles north of the Kasserine Pass. It was this force that bore the brunt of the Axis offensive in the 20th century. The armored squadron lost all its tanks, and the infantry battalion suffered heavy losses, but the force held its own.
During the night of 20-21 February, some additional British forces moved behind the task force to cover the Tala Road, and others were deployed along the road three miles south of Tala. Combat Command B was moved from the 1st Armored Division's concentration area to a position in Jebel El-Hina to cover the road to Tebessa.
And on the 21st, about forty enemy tanks attacked this position, but were repelled.
On the twenty-first, a powerful German force renewed its offensive on the Tala Road. The British continued to incur heavy losses but held the enemy ten miles from Tala. Two field artillery battalions from the US 9th Division and part of the 16th Infantry Regiment (1st Infantry Division) provided material assistance to the defense. *
During the night of February 21-22, the commander of the US 1st Armored Division was appointed to command all
*The artillery of the 9th Division made a spectacular forced march from western Algiers to Tunis. In less than 100 hours it traveled 735 miles, despite the narrow, crowded roads and bitter weather.

32
operations in the Thala sector - Kasserine - Jabal El-Hina. Over the past few days, the command of the Allied forces in this area has changed several times, which has caused a lot of confusion.
On February 22, the enemy attacked the north again, and on the Tala road the British engaged about fifty tanks. Some territory was ceded, but counterattacks brought back previous positions. In the afternoon, one battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, which was attached to the combat command B in the sector of Mount Heinrich, launched a counterattack on the German left flank. Launched from the vicinity of Ain Bou Driss and with the support of some artillery from the 9th Division, this attack was quite successful, taking about 400 captives. To a large extent it was the reason for the enemy's decision to retreat through the pass.
During the early stages of the fighting, bad weather hampered air operations, but at this time the atmosphere faded and the Allies were able to deliver brief strikes on the enemy columns. The aircraft of the 12th Air Support Command flew most of the missions, but other elements of the Air Force, reorganized during this period for closer coordination with the Ground Forces, were also very useful.
Early in the morning of February 23 the Germans began to draw across the Kasserine Pass. Well fought minefields and delays prevented the allies from inflicting much damage on them during the pursuit. By 26 February, they had reached the general line of Hajeb El-Ayoun - Sidi Bouzid - Gafsa, where they stayed.
comments. The specific purposes of the Axis attacks during January and February were: (i) to seize the areas controlling the mountain passes and thus expand the long coastal pass in order to protect communications between the armies of von Arnim and Rom Mill; (2) to make their airports in coastal areas safer from Allied interference; and (3) to bring the Allied forces out of balance before any coordinated attack can be launched. Girman's high command felt that Tunisia could be controlled, and the flow of men continued during this phase until 200,000 combat troops, three-fifths of whom were Germans, were available by 1 March.
By mid-February, more than 500,000 Allied troops were in North Africa, and plans were made for a large-scale offensive. Reinforcement of signals for the British First Army and American Second Corps was on the move, and Montgomery's Eighth Army was preparing to implement the Marth Line in full force. But before the Allies were ready to attack, Rommel made his only serious campaign effort when he struck the Fayed Bass on February 14.

33 The initial setbacks that American forces suffered can be attributed to several
factors: (1) confusion across ranks resulting from split units and an impromptu chain of command; (ii) the inexperience of the participating forces; (3) the dispersion of forces on a wide front and the lack of sufficient forces to provide sufficient local reserves for the frontal elements; (4) Unskilled use of terrain and available forces in defence.
Many lessons were learned during the operations of Vid-Kasserine, but perhaps the most valuable was the ancient principle that combat power should be concentrated. Again, it has been shown that so long as the reserves remain available for employment at the right time and in the right place, there is no situation which cannot be fixed, no matter what initial setbacks or the necessity of waiving some cause.
Rommel failed to achieve his goals despite the fragmented nature of the early resistance offered, particularly on the part of the very large shield we had in the Kasserine region. If he thought he could exploit his breakthrough as much as Le Kef and seriously threaten the Allied lines of communications, he quickly proved to be beyond his power. If he merely intended a devastating attack to inflict the most damage on our equipment, he succeeded in inflicting serious casualties without affecting the Allied power more than temporarily. His sands, however, were running low, and the tidal turn of Kasserine was the turn of the tide in all of Tunisia as well.
The Allied Initiative period, March-May 1943
year. The French political situation was no longer a serious factor in military operations, and the diminishing risk of the Axis rushing through Spanish Morocco led to the release of additional Allied forces for the Tunisian front. Despite the setbacks it suffered during January and February, Allied supplies and troop surges continued.
Supply facilities were reinforced in the Tebessa region to support the approaching 2nd Corps and the approaching British Eighth Army. Rain has stopped, roads are improved, railways are rehabilitated, and gasoline pipelines are built. Amer Ikan's forces received a baptism of fire, and, despite their initial setbacks, engaged the best the Germans could offer, they came out of the campaign both tactically wise and effective.
To go back for a moment, the expected reorganization of the Allied leadership took place at the time of the failure of the Kasserine Pass. Air Command's Mediterra

34
nean Air Command, Air Marshal Tedder, became operational on February 19, with Major General Carl Spatz as commander of the Northwest African Air Force. At the age of twenty, Admiral Cunningham was proclaimed commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean and on the same day General Alexander took command of the Eighteenth Army Group.
General Alexander I of the First Order regrouped the Tunisian forces and returned the brigades, regiments, and separate combat divisions to their original formations. The battle area was divided into three national divisions: the British First Army in the north, the French Nineteenth Corps in the center, and the American Second Corps toward the south. Prior to this reorganization, it was necessary to send the cut-off units to the front to take positions on a changing front, and the confusion caused by the accelerated improvisation of combat groups increased to meet the requirements of the rapidly changing situation. Under these conditions, it was impossible to avoid separating the units from their parent commands, and the forces from all three nations became mixed.
The wisdom of the Allied Command Reviews was already evident in the increased effectiveness of the Allied air force during the final stages of the Battle of the Kasserine Pass and in the close cooperation of the ground forces. An example of such effective coordination is particularly important. With Rommel's columns advancing towards Tebessa and Thala after breaching the Kasserine Pass, Alex Ender ordered a strong diversion by the Eighth Army. Montgomery was not prepared to attack the Mareth, but he made a mock preparation for a major attack. This, combined with mounting Allied resistance as he pushed west, led to the German commander's rapid withdrawal. He pulled his tanks out of contact and pushed them south toward what he thought was the most threatening part of his front.
In early March, Lieutenant General Patton, whom we had met
before as a general, took command of the US II Corps.
After the Battle of the Kasserine Pass, the face of the enemy
His main pressure against the British Fifth Corps (Map 6a). During the first week of March, the Al-Bab bomber was the main target, but at this point the Axis attacks were a failure, as were the attempts to capture
*The Northwest African Air Force was organized as follows:
Strategic Air Force - Major General James H. Doolittle.
Air Tactical Marshal of the Air Force, Sir Arthur Cunningham.
Coastal Air Force - Deputy Air Marshal Sir Hugh B Lloyd.
** This gave him command of all Allied naval forces in this region.

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Bou Arada, far south. To the north, on the coastal road, von Arnim met with some local success and after a fierce struggle forced the V Corps to evacuate Sedjenane. Then he made an unsuccessful attempt to drive the car on the road to Beja. By 17 March these attacks forced the British line into the sector northwest of that city, but further advances were certainly halted by the V Corps.
Battle of Mareth, March 21-29, 1943. - During the first week of March, the command of the Axis undoubtedly learned that General Montgomery's Eighth Army would soon launch a full-scale attack on Mareth. In order to disrupt British preparations and delay the offensive, Rommel took the initiative and attacked on 6 March from the vicinity of Toujan (southwest of Mareth) towards Medenine. This attack was delivered by a powerful armored force - elements of the 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. The British were on alert, and had over 500 anti-tank guns in position around Mede 9, destroying fifty-two enemy tanks during the day while meeting only one squadron of their own, which lost no tanks.
This unsuccessful engagement cost Rommel more than half the armor of his offensive power. He had thrown his armored forces against the protected positions without adequate reconnaissance and before infantry support cleared the way. The time had passed when Rom Mill could ignore basic principles a bit, and the disaster he was courting was inevitable.
From the 6th to the 20th, the Eighth Army continued to gain strength as its rear units rose. By the last date, its main components were as follows:
X Corps: 1, 7th Armored Division and the 4th Indian Di
Vision.
XXX Corps: 50th and 51st Infantry Division and 1 Armored Brigade.
New Zealand Corps (formed specifically for this operation): 2nd New Zealand Division, Armored Brigade, Army
Auto Regiment, Medium Artillery Regiment,
and French Force Leclerc.
At that time, General Montgomery had 600 tanks compared to Rommel's 140. The Axis infantry at the Mareth were estimated at 120,000, outnumbered by the British.
The original plan was for XXX Corps to break through to the left of Mareth's enemy position and capture Gabes. X Corps were to be held in Army Reserves ready to exploit the anticipated breach. Meanwhile, the New Zealand Legion, scrutinized by General Leclerc's French Desert Force, had to make a wide action, swinging around the right side of the position and then moving north and east

36 to
cut the pivotal line of retreat. The 2nd U.S. Corps was to secure Maknassy and contain enemy armor that could be used against the Eighth Army. All available air power in North Africa will be used to support the offensive.
The Americans started first. At dawn on March 16, the Second Corps began its operations in order to implement its share of the plan. The attacking force consisted of the 1st Armored Division and the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions*. Gafsa was occupied unopposed on 17 March, and supply points were set up for the subsequent use of the Eighth Army. American forces moved into and occupied the train area. So far, the Italians, who controlled this part of the front, showed little opposition and carried out a planned withdrawal, but east of the train took a strong defensive position to halt any further advance of the Americans.
In the far north, rain crippled the 1st Armored Division and delayed its assault on Meknassi.
The battle began at Mareth on the night of March 20-21. The XXX Legion's attack on the northern sector of the Marth Line was initially successful. The 50th Division began the offensive and during March 21 gained a foothold in Mareth's defenses, a bridgehead two miles wide beyond deep in the Zigzu Valley, which was the main anti-tank obstacle. Axis counterattacks were postponed for the next two days, but in the face of mounting pressure, the British were forced to withdraw to their original positions on the night of 23-24 March.
Meanwhile, the New Zealand Legion moved through the night of March 19-20. After completing a 150-mile march through trackless mountains and deserts, I made contact with the enemy southwest of Hamma on March 24.
Since the enemy line has not penetrated the left of the general
Eral Montgomery decided to reinforce the New Zealand Legion; So the headquarters of the X Corps and the 1st British Armored Division were sent to join the New Zealanders on the night of 23 days. The combined forces were then assigned X Corps.
This growing threat to Rommel's line of retreat forced him to move most of his German forces from the Mareth position to Hamma, leaving Italian divisions and a few Germans to face XXX Corps. General Montgomery immediately took advantage of the weakening of the Axis line and ordered the 4th Indian Division to drive west to open the Medenine-Pir Sultan Road.
The 7th Armored Division was held behind the south side of the
1st Armored Division.

37
Mareth Line to be in a position to turn around the enemy's right flank and cut off the Mareth-Gabes road. On March 26, the 2d division attacked New Zealand, breaking through the area southwest of Hamma. heavy
The fighting continued all night. In noise and confusion, backed by darkness, the 1st British Armored Division passed straight through the enemy. By the 27th of the last century, the British were on the outskirts of Hamma, where their advance was firmly supported by twenty-two squadrons of the Royal Air Force. At about the same time, the 4th Indian Division opened the Medenine - Pir Sultan road, significantly shortening the line of communication to the Hamma sector. Rommel now saw that Marth's position was untenable and began to withdraw in general.
Meanwhile, Patton's advance eastward from Gafsa was making slow progress. On March 21, his 1st Armored Division captured Sinead against only slight opposition and the next day Mak Nasi was taken, but then the armor was unable to shriek. in the far south
The 1st and 9th American Infantry Divisions, aided by a Ranger unit, broke through the defensive position of an Italian division east of Guettar, but heavy counterattacks by the German 10th Panzer Division prevented further advance eastward. * But the Americans helped the Eighth Army financially by containing the Tenth Tank Division in the vacuum-trained sector.
Farther north, an attack by the American 34th Division on March 25 failed to break through the strong German position southwest of the hotel.
When Montgomery's maneuvers caused Rommel to withdraw from the Mareth Line, XXX Corps advanced along the coast. The New Zealand and British 2nd Armored Division, after their success in the Hamma region, moved into Gabes and entered it on 29 March.
In the extreme northern sector, the British counterattacked V Corps on March 28. Sedginan recaptured on 30 March and advanced beyond Cape Syrat. The enemy withdrew from the salient south of Bou Arada under pressure from other British forces.
Quest for Enfidaville (Map 6b). - Rommel's next position was in the valley of Acaret, an excellent defensive position with the flanks protected by salt marshes and the sea. At this time Alexander's general plan was for the Eighth Army to break the Wadi Akarit position and aid the Second American Legion by threatening Rom. * The series of operations in this area is known as the Battle of Qaytar.

38
background mile. Part of the British 9th Corps, supported by the 34th Infantry Division Amer Ikan, would launch an attack eastward through the Fondouk with the aim of capturing Kairouan and threatening the enemy's withdrawal line. In the far north the British Fifth Corps had to secure positions from which it could lead in the future in Tunisia.
By April 6, General Montgomery had regrouped his army and was ready to attack the enemy in Wadi Akarit. The main offensive, incurred by the XXX Corps and directed towards the center of the enemy line, opened with a 500-gun artillery bombardment. It started at 0415 - in complete darkness. The Axis forces, despite their desperate counterattacks, could not prevent the collapse of their line the next day, and another withdrawal began. The 2nd New Zealand Division and the 1st British Armored Division passed through the gap created by the XXX Corps and sued the retreating Axis forces. Sfax was occupied on 10 April and Sousse two days later. Rommel was evidently surprised by the speed with which the Eighth Army concentrated this attack, for much of its armor had been stripped away to contain American forces in the far north. The number of prisoners detained since March 21 has reached 20,000.
Meanwhile, the Axis forces halted all attempts of the Second Corps to break through their defenses in the area of Meknesi-Send-Train. But after the Wadi Akarit site collapsed on April 7, they were forced to withdraw, and the American patrols contacted the Eighth Army patrols on the Gafsa-Gabes road, forty miles east of the train. .
As the enemy was withdrawing from Wadi Akarit, the 6th Armored Division (plus an infantry brigade group) moved from the British 9th Corps to the Fendok and with the American 34th Division attacked the hotel corridor as planned. This pass, about 1,000 yards wide, is dominated by hills to the north and south. Infan attacks were launched on the night of the 7th against enemy control positions in an attempt to clear a path for the 6th Armored Division. Very little progress was made, but in view of the retreat of the enemy on the coast, the sixth armored vehicle was ordered, on the ninth, to make its way through the gap. The lead regiment encountered a large minefield protected by anti-tank guns mounted on the adjacent hill. A narrow passage was secured by night at the cost of seventy-six Shermans (sixty of which were later recovered), and the next day the armored personnel reached Kairouan. On the eleventh, the Eighth Army was called, which meanwhile made rapid progress after the occupation

39
Sfax. Although the bulk of Rommel's forces were able to escape from the trap, the remnants of nine Italian battalions were assembled. The Eighth Army continued their pursuit and on April 20 moved into Invadaville against increasing Axis resistance. Further attacks against the strong enemy position in the hills north of Enfidaville were met by determined counterattacks that convinced Mont gomery that a regrouping of his army would be necessary before further advances could be made.
During this period, the Fifth Corps, in accordance with its mission, began local attacks in the vicinity of Majz al-Bab on 7 April to secure positions useful for starting future operations. The fighting in this northern region lasted nearly two weeks, and although there was no breakthrough, some
Progress has been made. This put the Fifth Corps in a position to strike at Longstop Hill, which along with the circle of hills east of Medjez prevented further advances. All these dominant heights were firmly under the enemy's control and had to be cleared before any penetration into the valley towards Tunisia.
At this time V Corps did not have the strength for such an operation.
comments . - General Montgomery says of the Eighth Army's operations at this time:
The Battle of Marth Lane was our hardest battle since El Ala
Main, and while the latter was a difficult match,
there was more room in Mareth for strategy and ingenuity. . . As
at El Alamein, Rommel gradually dumped his reserves; And when
the battle began, his armor was -eagled spread - with 10 Panzer
Division in the Gafsa Sector and 15 Tank Division soon engaged on
Coast, 21st Tank Division arriving to the west to support
the switch line
and a salient feature of the battle was air action in cooperation
with the beleaguered forces we kept the initiative the whole time. Even as we lost
our gains on the coastal side, Rommel was kept in motion by
the rapid development of the West's encircling movement.. The
vital considerations (which govern the decision to turn the force into the surrounding force) were first, the speed with which the decisive
!
The strike could be mounted and delivered, and secondly, the necessity of
holding the German reserves in the eastern flank long enough to
pre-vent their assistance to the defenders of the switching lines west of
Hama.
Montgomery clearly demonstrated that an early setback—such as the failure of the XXX Corps to break through the Marth Line—did not necessarily need to lose the initiative provided the plan was flexible and reserves were available.

40
After Mareth, Rommel planned to continue delaying and defending actions only when the terrain favored defense. Although he may have realized that the days of the Axis forces in North Africa were numbered, his task was to delay the end result as long as possible. While he was still fighting at the Battle of Mareth, he had trimmed a strong position behind Wadi Akarit in the Gabes Gap. After Montgomery discovered that it could not be surrounded by forces coming from the south, he quickly broke through - much to the astonishment of the Germans.
After working in the Acariate Valley, Rommel lacked defensive terrain until he reached Enfidaville. While retreating to this place, the Germans faced the difficult problem of being pressured from the west as well as from the south. While the Eighth Army pursued Rommel, the Allies were simultaneously attacking von Arnim's holding forces on the cliffs west of the coastal pass. In the train, the sweeper, and the hotel, the Allied forces threatened to break through the East Noon Passes and drive out to sea through Rommel's retreat line. If von Arnim's men gave way too soon, Rommel would be besieged; If they stay too long, the Eighth Army will cut them off.
Battle of Tunis, April 22 - May 13, 1943. - It now became clear that the Axis forces intended to defend the Nevedaville-Bou Arada-Majz al-Bab line - two prisoners, and General Alexander immediately began preparations for a general offensive to break through this perimeter.
plans and preparations. It was decided to regroup on a large scale the divisions of the allies. Within two weeks, the entire U.S. Second Corps, more than 100,000 men, was moved 150 miles over difficult country—and across the lines of communication for the First Army—to take charge of the British Fifth Corps along the coast in the north. In the process of this regrouping, the US 34th Division at El Fentry and the British 6th Armored Division moved out of the vicinity of Hotels and Kairouan to join their corps. At the same time, the British 1st Armored Division was transferred from the Eighth Army to the IX Corps.
These moves were completed around April 22, at which time Major General Omar Bradley assumed command of the 2nd Corps (Map 7).

41
In its simplest scheme, the Allied plan provided a powerful thrust in the center, heavily backed by armour, with secondary attacks on the flanks to keep the enemy in position and prevent them from focusing to meet the main attack. The main effort was made by two corps of the British First Army in the direction of the Bab al-Bab-Tunisia section. In the area of their attack were two natural passes in the plain of Tunis: the valleys of the Medea Jarda and the Milian. This was the terrain where armored units could best maneuver. The US 2nd Corps, with Frank Afrique's Corps* on the north flank, was attacking to the left of the 1st Army, and its main targets were the high ground southeast of Mater and the highlands in the area north of Jaffna and west. Lake Ashkeel. The American attack was expected to endanger the right flank and rear of the enemy forces in the face of General Anderson's divisions. The British Eighth Army, on the eastern edge of the front, had the role of maintaining pressure on the Axis forces facing it and advancing against the enemy's escape route to Cape Bon Peninsula. The gap between the 1st and 8th armies was filled by the French XIX Corps in the Pont de Examination region. At this final stage of the campaign, General Alexander had more than twenty divisions. The battle line was about 140 miles long. Escape route to Cape Bon Peninsula. The gap between the 1st and 8th armies was filled by the French XIX Corps in the Pont de Examination region. At this final stage of the campaign, General Alexander had more than twenty divisions. The battle line was about 140 miles long. Escape route to Cape Bon Peninsula. The gap between the 1st and 8th armies was filled by the French XIX Corps in the Pont de Examination region. At this final stage of the campaign, General Alexander had more than twenty divisions. The battle line was about 140 miles long.
As the Tunisian campaign developed, strategic air force attacks shifted to transport facilities and ports in Sicily and southern Italy. At the same time, medium bombers and fighters were hitting surface ships and air transports in and over the Strait of Sicily. Tactical Air Force was prepared to support field armies by bombing and shelling enemy rear installations, roads, and convoys. By the opening date of the battle, April 22, the Allied air forces had won air control from the Luftwaffe.
early operations. The offensive began when the V Corps began their campaign on the night of April 21-22. The initial attack was directed at Longstop Hill, which was captured on the 26th after a series of bloody assaults. Advances have been made south of the Medjerda River towards Jebel Bo Akkat.
The French Nineteenth Corps did not participate in these attacks, but to its left the British IX Corps pushed east from the Abu Arada Road, Qubeilat in an attempt to clear a passage for the 1st and 6th Armored Divisions through the mountain gaps that lead to
*a temporary force consisting mainly of two regiments of "Goums," Moroccan fierce highlands who were mountain day and night expert fighters.

42
Easy Quables. Only partial success was achieved when the anti-tank guns from the Axis, deployed forcefully in the rocky hills, brought advertising to a permanent halt.
While the Eighth Army was attacking north from Enfidaville and the First Army northeast from Medjez El Bab, the Second Corps launched its attack on April 23. The main effort was on the right, as he could better support the campaign of the First Army.
The Second Corps held a front of about forty miles from Cape Sirat to the heights adjacent to the left side of Wadi Mejerda. A belt of rugged hills, fifteen to twenty miles deep, lies between the Americans and their initial target, Mater, the enemy communications center as well as the Bizerte key. The hills and hills in this area form a mixed maze, not providing wide paths to progress.
In the area of the 2nd Corps, the 1st Infantry Division*, the 34th** and the 1st Armored Division *** made the main attack. The River Tyne Valley seemed to provide the only proper way forward for a striking armored force, but before it could be used, the high ground on both sides had to be captured. The 1st Infantry Division then attacked in the hills north of the River Tyne while the 6th Infantry Division of the 1st Armored Division (temporarily in the 1st Infantry Division) attacked the enemy in the hills at the southern edge of the valley. The northern flank of the Beja Mater road was covered by a combat team of the 34th Division. The remaining units of the 1st Armored Division and the 34th were initially held in reserve.
By April 26, the 1st Infantry Division had advanced five miles into positions southeast of Sidi Nossir, wresting the hills from the enemy in bloody combat marked by effective use of artillery and successful night attacks. A strong coordinated attack was then launched by the 1st and Thirty-fourth Infantry Divisions with the aim of capturing Hill 609 (Jebel Tahant), the main enemy stronghold that took control of the highway and railway from Beja to Mater. The thirty-fourth attack on the hills overlooking Sidi Nossir, and the first led his attack to the northeast. Launched the thirty-fourth attack on one of the strongest centers of enemy resistance. The Germans held this land for months and organized the many remote hills covering the roads to Hill 609 into a series of mutually supportive strong points. One by one,
Major General Terry de la M. Allen.
** Major General Charles W. Ryder.
*** Major General Ernst N. Harmon.

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attacks, until April 28, continued to advance to the base of the hill 609. During the thirtieth period of the year, General Raider reinforced the attacking force of the hill and, with the support of some medium tanks, succeeded in reaching the summit. At dawn the next day the Germans counterattacked from positions on the northeastern slope. They were allowed to advance to within 200 yards of the American position before a devastating flash fire repelled their efforts to retake the summit. This action solidified the 34th Division's hold on Hill 609. Briefly summarizing these operations, General Bradley wrote: "A strong enemy attack was repulsed. The fighting was fierce and bloody. The enemy engaged bayonets and grenades, and there were many instances of outstanding bravery."
While the 34th Division was launching its attack, the 1st Infantry Division advanced to its right another five miles. With the fall of Hill 609, the 1st Division's initial hill targets became untenable to the enemy, and both teams advanced more rapidly, on the northern and southern sides of the River Tyne.
By May 1, these combined efforts resulted in the capture of all major hill positions in the southern half of the II Corps, and the Tyne Valley was open to an armored batch.
Meanwhile, an attack was launched in the northern part of the Legion's area by the 9th Division* and the French Legion attached to it. The main objective of this attack was the generally higher ground north of Jaffna, where the Germans held positions on the hills dominating the approach to Mater through the Sedgenane Valley.
In carrying out this task, the 9th Division had to contend with the difficulties imposed by both the terrain and the very broad front involved. Expeditionary forces were assigned the task of aggressively patrolling the nine-mile interval between the 9th and 34th Divisions, since the nature of the terrain made it impossible to send large units through this area. The plan stipulated that one combat team of the regiment would launch a secondary attack on the enemy's defenses west of Jaffna, while another (the main effort) was to strike strong points on the high ground north of the city and thus encircle its defenses. . The 3rd Combat Team and the French were to head east against the lighter positions on both sides of the Sedjenane River.
* Major General Manton S. Eddy.

44
perseverance and strength of armies. Communication was so poor that food and ammunition had to be carried by bells over difficult winding paths. However, the attacks were successful, and by May 1, the Germans were back on the eastern slopes of the last hills - those overlooking the Rainy Plain and Lake Ashkelon.
By this date, it was clear that the Germans against the 2nd Legion were in an awkward position. In the south, the main effort opened up the Tyne Valley Pass to Mater, while in the north the enemy threatened to encircle its right flank.
To avoid disaster, the Germans generally withdrew on the night of May 1-2 and the following day. To the south of Lake Ashkelon, they took up a position that protected Tebourba and the plain of Tunis, in case it was taken. Brace yourself north of the lake for one last stop in the hills overlooking the main road to Bizerte.
No time was wasted by the Second Corps in pursuing the Gear Man's withdrawal. The 1st Armored Division was ordered to advance northeast from the Tyne Valley and entered Mater at 1100 on 3 May. This swift movement threatened to disrupt all of Germain's plans. Now an American attack to the east or northeast of Mater would result in a breakthrough that would cut off the Axis
, forces in the Bizerte region from those in the vicinity of Tunis. Enemy aircraft, shields, infantry, and artillery were moved into the threatened sector in an attempt to prevent the 1st Armored Division from advancing behind Mater.
In the fighting until 3 May, the 2nd Corps captured Mater, its first major prize in the campaign, preventing von Arnim from focusing on confronting the British command in the Medjerda Valley, as well as threatening to disrupt the entire Axis
right wing. The stage in the north was prepared for the campaign's final battle.
Final Campaign, 3-13 May 1943. - Since April 22, Allied forces have made limited progress on all fronts, but no breakthrough has ever been achieved. Therefore, it was clear to General Alex Ender that additional large-scale infantry attacks would have to be launched. The best prospects seemed to be in the Medjez region, where successful attacks on Longstop Hill cleared enemy strong points north of the Medjerda River. It was therefore decided not to continue with the armored offensive in the region of Kobeilat, but instead to concentrate all available forces in a final decisive campaign on Tunisia from Majaz al-Bab.

45
Reassembly began as early as April 28. Only the British 1st Armored Division and the 46th Infantry Division were left to contain the enemy's armor east of Jubilat, while the remaining division was from the 9th (Sixth Armored) Corps along with the 7th Armored Division and the 4th Indian Division of the 8th Army. I moved to V Corps work area. At the same time, a large-scale deception was devised to conceal these movements from the enemy and lead him to believe that the next major offensive was to be made by the Eighth Army in the south. Most of the artillery from its separate divisions was left at the Eighth Army's front, and general activity in that sector increased significantly. These tricks achieved their goal of capturing a large part of the enemy.
According to the new plan, General Anderson ordered the 5th Corps to attack on a narrow front and ordered the 9th Corps to prepare to pass through the 5th Corps and capture the internal defenses of Tunisia (Map 8). After capturing that city, the First Army took advantage of the southeast in order to cut off Cape Bon Penn. On the right and left, respectively, the Eighth Army and the Second Corps had to exert maximum pressure to prevent the enemy from strengthening their units in the face of the First Army. The Second Corps was intended to be Bizerte, and the Eighth Army was to advance along the coast to aid the forces of the First Army in their efforts to cut off the axis of retreat to Cape Bon.
V Corps led the First Army's offensive. Jebel Bou Akaz was captured on May 5, and a fine line of staging was established to lead the 9th Corps towards Tunisia. The 9th Corps offensive began at 0300 on the 6th. It was made on a 3,000-yard front by two infantry divisions, supported by tanks and concentrated fire from 600 guns. Behind the assault infantry divisions, the 6th Armored Division, on the right, and the 7th Armored Division, on the left, moved slowly, waiting for the moment to strike. With continuous sorties of more than two hours, the Northwest African Air Force made an important addition to the ground forces' fire support. By 1100 the infantry attack had penetrated the enemy's defenses and opened a gap in front of the armored divisions. Which arrived by evening to the Massey region. The next morning, the armored forces resumed their advance towards Tunisia. Armored cars from both divisions, closely followed by the remainder of the 7th Armored Division, entered the city on the afternoon (7 May).

46
prisoners, while the 6th Armored Division, followed by the British 4th Infantry Division in the engines, was directed southeast toward the neck of the Cape Bon Peninsula.
In the south, the French XIX Corps still encountered strong resistance, but the opposition in the Jubilat region softened slightly. At this point, after a decisive attack, the British 1st Armored Division had broken through and advanced north-east.
The 6th Armored Division continued its southeast movement on the 8th. By the afternoon, he was in contact with the enemy's rear guard, powerful in anti-tank guns, covering the town of Ham Man Lev - in a narrow area between the steep hills south of the city and the sea. After a night attack on the steep cliffs by the regiment's infantry regiment, on the 10th the armor penetrated the city, and some tanks moved along the shore to cordon off the defences. This Hamman Lif victory was undoubtedly a major factor in causing the rapid disintegration of the remaining resistance, for the Sixth Armored could now cut off the Axis routes to escape to Cape Bon Peninsula, which he set out to do. Hammamet, the southern gateway to the peninsula, was also reached on May 10.
Meanwhile, the Second Corps continued its offensive operations in the north with the aim of preventing the enemy from strengthening its units against the British First Army. The heights to the east and west of Choueqi and the city of Bizerte were the legion's specific targets. General Bradley planned to isolate the Axis forces in the northeastern and southeastern regions of Mater in general by fanciful attacks from both sides of the corps and an armored command from the center. To accomplish this task, the French 9th Infantry Division attacked north of Lake Ashkelon while the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions attacked toward Shuigi, and the 1st Armor Division commanded northeast and east of Mater.
The attacks of the Second Corps were in full swing by May 5. In the Southern Action District, the 1st Division encountered strong resistance and was unable to hold onto the slight gains it made. The 34th Division encircled Adkhila from the southwest and moved to Shuigi, which it occupied on the afternoon of the seventh day. Thanks to the penetration of the 1st British Army in the far south, the enemy's resistance in the southern part of the 2nd Legion's area has materially receded.
The only major remaining enemy position north of Lake Ashkelon was Jebel El-Shenety. General Eddy here used tactics similar to those used with great success in capturing Jaffna. The CFA Franc Corps and part of the 9th Division of Secondary School achieved

47
The attack while the remainder of the division surrounded Jabal Al-Sheneti. The operation was completely successful, and by May 7 the enemy had completely withdrawn to Bizerte. Its north wing collapsed. The units of the 9th Division entered Bizerte on the afternoon of the seventh day, and that night they occupied the city's airport.
The 1st Armored Division's attack hit the German line as two roads lead into the Tunis Plain - one from Mater via Ferryville to the Tunis Road - Bizerte motorway and the other east from Mater. General Harmon ordered Combat Command A to attack towards Ferryville and Combat Command B to push east along the Mater-Portville Road. On May 6, Combat Command A made initial gains in the hills south of Ferryville, but lost them during the night as a result of determined German counterattacks. The next day, an offensive was launched to completely drive back the Germans along the Mater-Vereville road. By noon, the armored units of Com bat A command entered Ferryville, finding the enemy in complete retreat to the east. The advance continued on the eighth, and at dawn on the ninth the main road between Tunis and Bizerte was cut off.
While Combat Command A was engaged in these operations, the Kom Bat command moved east towards the Tunis-Bizerte highway. It arrived in Brouteville on the 9th, where contact was made with the British 7th Armored Division. Subsequently, part of the combat command headed north on the road to Bizerte and then swung north-east to occupy Puerto Farina.
German forces in the area of II Corps were in a hopeless situation as a result of American operations from May 6-9. The offensive operations of the 9th Division and Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division left only small enemy groups to be cleared. When Combat Command B met the British 7th Division in Brouteville, a large group of disorganized Germans were captured stranded in the Tabour area. Pressed from the west by the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions and retreating eastward by American and British armored forces, the German Kommand in the area of the 2nd Corps requested terms of surrender on May 9. General Bradley's terms of unconditional surrender were accepted. During the final phase of the campaign, the 2nd Corps captured 42,000 prisoners, among them the leaders of the 5th Panzer Army, 15th Panzer Division, and German Infantry Division.
Meanwhile, the last round of enemy forces still holding out on the Cape Bon Peninsula was underway. Mobile British detachments raced both sides of the peninsula and completed the

48th course
by 11 May. On the 12th, the British 1st Armored Division and the 4th Indian Division joined the French XIX Corps in cover to secure the remaining elements of the German 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions southwest of Grombalia. Von Arnim was captured near Zaghouan on the same day. *
The last isolated resistance of the enemy, mainly by Italian troops and the remnants of the German Panzer Army in Africa, who were facing the Eighth Army, came to a halt on the morning of May 13 as the Allied forces converged on them from all directions. In all, about 248,000 Axis prisoners were captured, along with large amounts of materiel and supplies. This included 1,000 guns, 520 aircraft, and 250 tanks.
The combined action of the Allied naval and air forces prevented escape by sea or air other than a few small detachments.
During the first two days of the Battle of Tunis, the Tactical Air Force made 1,500 sorties. Although the weather conditions stopped most of the Allied aircraft from April 25 to May 5, they were more active during the remainder of the battle, especially on May 6 and 7, when they bombed the enemy in Wadi Majdara and contributed significantly to the penetration of operations The first army.
In a special arrangement for the day, General Alexander addressed the Allied forces with these words:
Today stands the conquerors and heroes of the
shores of North Africa. The world recognizes your victory;
History will cheer your deeds.
British, French and American weapons from these lands swept the last German and Italian invaders.
As a commander in the field, I express my admiration and gratitude to
the United Nations for this great victory, which will
go down in history as one of the decisive battles of all time.
comments . The final defeat of the Axis in Tunisia came through the coordinated action (collective action) of the superior Allied forces on land, air and sea. But the superior forces, though properly coordinated, are not sufficient for a decisive victory. There must be a well-designed plan. As this is the case, it is worthwhile for us to review the final stage plan and the effective implementation of that plan.
It is noteworthy that the first gathering of General Alexander's forces took place by April 22. At that time, the main attack was to be launched along the entire 1st Army front, with great effort by the Fifth Corps down the Mejerda Valley. In the Goubellat sector, the Ninth Corps had to make its way through the mountains in order to pass its armored division to the open plain to the east. Both legions made some progress, but there
*Rommel had returned to Germany at some point before.

49
No penetration. Action would have continued on the same line, with an additional small advance that would gradually compress von Arnim's forces to a smaller circumference, until the Axis forces finally withdrew to defensive positions along the base of the Cape Bon Peninsula. The Axis leadership may have at no time hoped to carry out Dunkirk in the face of Allied control of the sea and complete control of the air, but it is quite clear that they fully expected Bataan to be driven out of Cape Bon.
The first attempt to break through after it failed, Alexander regrouped his forces again. This time he achieved a concentration of enough fighting force not only to penetrate the position of the axis, but also to exploit the success more effectively. The actual breakthrough happened so quickly that the Axis forces were completely surprised and out of balance. Von Arnim was captured just as the French were captured in 1940, with an attack by a crushing striking force moving at great speed.
For use in the event of an evacuation attempt, the Allied Navy developed a plan in close cooperation with the Air Force. Boldly looking back at Norway, Dunkirk, Greece and Crete, the plan was named Operation Retribution. All possible means, in the air and at sea, were organized to prevent any enemy from escaping from Tunisia. It was certain that the evacuation could only be attempted under the cover of the Italian fleet, which might finally have to stand up and fight. And since the high command of the Axis, as it turned out, did not dare to join the cause at sea at a time when its forces on land were in a desperate situation, it was forced to sacrifice a large army and huge amounts of stores and equipment. From a purely military point of view, the Axis proved the folly of flouting the old strategic axiom that sending large ground forces across the sea without sure and continuing control over that sea is potentially a disaster. The uniqueness of the plan is also evidenced by the fact that von Arnim miscalculated the location of the main attack and as a result misallocated his forces. The lack of aerial reconnaissance was largely responsible for this error, but Montgomery's true nodal conversion was also an important factor.
The German high command in Tunisia made the same mistake it made in Russia in November 1942: there were no reserves behind the front. Therefore, when the British armored forces reached the rear hub areas, they encountered slight opposition and were able to disrupt the entire defense by cutting lines of communication, destroying command posts and disrupting supply facilities.

50
The mission of the 2nd American Corps during the final stage was threefold: to protect the left flank of the 18th army group, to prevent the enemy from concentrating in front of the 1st army, and to capture Bizerte. This job was done superbly. During a period of seventeen days, its four divisions made advances from twenty-five to fifty miles. At the beginning of the last phase of the campaign, only 12,000 soldiers from the front line opposed the advance of the corps, but towards the end of the operation there were more than 40,000 enemy troops at its front. She showed that her teams consist of fighting men who have the will and ability to win. It was well supplied, well equipped and well driven. Its losses in the last phase of the campaign amounted to 421 killed, 3136 wounded and 877 missing, while estimates indicate 3000 m*** from the enemy on the front of the Legion. The American teams took 36,000 Germans and 5,900 Italian prisoners.
The following is an excerpt from General Bradley's report on operations:
French units under the command of their efficient commander General Magnan fought
with courage and determination ... in the
mountain rain and suffered many casualties. Some of the 2nd Corps, namely the
1st Infantry Division and elements of the 1st Infantry Division and the 34th Armored Division
, have been fighting in North Africa
almost exclusively since they landed in Oran on 8 November. Other units were operating
in Tunisia for varying periods of time from 18 January
onwards. Practically all units fought the enemy in both
desert and mountains. The Second Corps fought with and without
air superiority. She has suffered setbacks and known victory.
Officers and men alike understand our enemy and his methods. It
No longer underestimate or overestimate his capabilities. Through the common sense of Americans, they have learned that the surest way to live is to
outsmart and overcome those who oppose us. The
soldiers of
the Second Corps, with their practical sense, their understanding of the enemy, their firsthand knowledge of the hardships and dangers of war and, above all, their courage and loyalty, played a major role in the victory of a great ally.
win over.
General Comments on Operations in
North Africa
On 17 May the first convoy passed through the Strait of Gibraltar and nine days later reached Alexandria. The first unopposed convoy since 1940 arrived in Malta on 24 May. After three years of varying fortunes, Africa was cleansed of all the Axis powers; The ports of North Africa were ready to receive ships, equipment, and men

51
who after two months had to invade enemy territory; From its bases in Tunisia, the Allied air forces were bombing airports and ports in southern Europe. General Eisenhower had originally hoped to achieve these results six months ago. Had it been successful, subsequent operations might have been speeded up so that the Allied invasion of Italy could have begun in the spring of 1943 rather than in the fall. With a full summer of fine weather, the Allied forces may have advanced to the Po River by winter. But be that as it may, the means were not available to seize Tunis and Bizerte in 1942.
In addition to the material advantages achieved, there is another residency request that warrants special note. This was the successful establishment of a joint headquarters and the development of the idea of joint power. In an official report, General Eisenhower said:
In the North African theater, even under pressure
Imposed by an alternate partial victory and a stinging tactical defeat, coordination among the chief officers of the entire expeditionary campaign of the objective was
achieved
and a consistent objectivity of view
gradually penetrated to the lower ranks and clearly demonstrated by the fact
that British and American forces of all arms could unite and work
together effectively.
As for the Americans, despite experiencing early setbacks and even tactical defeats, they were able to benefit from the experience. New types of equipment, more realistic and practical training methods and more efficient tactical organizations have been developed. These were lessons that could only be learned in the School of Actual Combat, learned quickly that were proven by the superior performance of the Second Corps during the final phase of the campaign.
The initial failure of the campaign had the unexpected effect of boosting the scale of the Allies' eventual success because the Axis was encouraged to make what proved to be an over-investment in a Tunisian bridgehead. An Axis army of about 320,000 men was destroyed in place of Rommel's original remains of the Afrika Korps. At the same time, the American, British and French forces were given the necessary experience and eventually won the confidence inspired by a crushing victory.
After nearly three years of fighting, North Africa is no longer one of the active theaters of World War II operations. Axis hopes for glory and profit here faded, and with it an estimated 620,000 soldiers intermarried, a third of whom were Germans. British

52
The number of empire losses in North Africa since Italy entered the war in June 1940 is about 220,000 - dead, wounded

and prisoners.
From November 1942 to May 1943, the French lost

about 20,000 people, while the number of American casualties was about 18,500.
By June of 1943, Allied power began to emerge around the world. American production was pouring war materials into all Allied armies at an increasing rate. Allied air power was striking strategic targets in Europe and bombing Japanese bases in the Pacific. The Mediterranean and Middle East were once again safe in the hands of the Allies. Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, is planned and will be launched soon. The Russians drove the Germans out of the Caucasus oil fields and curved the Don River and were ready for a great summer offensive. In the Pacific Ocean, the Japanese were expelled from the Aleuts,
Guadalcanal was an Allied base, the campaign was underway in the Solomon Islands, and General MacArthur had begun his advance up the coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines. Everywhere the Axis was on the defensive, and most importantly, in the hills of Tunisia, an Allied force was born that would eventually advance through Western Europe into the heart of Germany.


53
I APPENDIX
ORGANIZATION ASSAULT FORCE
WESTERN TASK FORCE NAVY ESCORN
(US)
GENERAL PARTNER GEORGE S. PATTON Rear Admiral HENRY K. HEWITT
3D Infantry. Dave. (Renf) 3
CCB battleships plus one arm. Billion Dollars, 2d Armd. Dave. 5 cruisers
RCT 47th, 9th Infantry Division. Dave. 1 aircraft carrier
60th RCT, 9th Inf. Dave. 3 auxiliary carriers
(35,000 men in 29 ships) 1 anti-aircraft
cruiser 34 destroyers

Troop Mission Center (USA) Naval Escort (Br.)
Major General Lloyd R. Friedendale Brigadier General Thomas H. TROUBRIDGE
1st Inf. Dave. 1
CCB battleship , 1st arm. Dave. 2 cruisers
1st Ranger Bn. 1 aircraft carrier
Corps (Corps II) 2 help tankers
(39,000 men in 47 ships) 2 ships anti-aircraft
13 destroyers
east TASK FORCE

forces
*
Navy escort (brother)

Maj . Gen. CHARLES W. Rider 39 RCT, 9TH Infantry. Dave.
168th RCT, 34 Inf. Dave.
11 brig. group, Br. 78 Division. Brigadier General 36. The Group, Br. 78 Division. First Commando Ben. *
6 commando bin. *
(33,000 men in 34 ships)
* American and British boat.
Vice Admiral Sir Harold M. Borough 4 cruisers
1 aircraft
carrier 1 auxiliary carrier
3 anti-aircraft ships
13

prohibited destroyers