rational number

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of the widening responsibility being assumed by other na
tions-a trend entirely consistent
with overall AID policy.
Algeria
The United States has enjoyed
15 years of very close relations
with Tunisia and has contributed
a very significant amount of eco
nomic assistance - well over $600
million since 1956. We have no
alliance with Tunisia , no bases
there, and no real strategic inter
est in that country. U.S. invest
ment is minimal ( approximately
$ 12.9 million in FY 1970 ) . Yet
U.S. policy over the years has
been marked by strong support
for Tunisia's economic and polit
ical independence.
The United States was one of
the first governments to recog
nize Tunisia in 1956. Our assist
ance followed the 1961 decision
that Tunisia should be one of the
countries to receive a long-term
commitment since it possessed
the infrastructure, sufficient
economic potential , and political
will to serve as a model for other
developing countries .
was entirely a Tunisian determi
nation.
As a result of the farsighted
reforms of President Bourguiba ,
Tunisia is , in social terms, still
the most advanced of the Arab
states . Its human resources are its
greatest wealth and we will con
tinue to be interested in its de
velopment and well - being.
Tunisia has always had an in
dependent foreign policy. It con
tinues to do so . As its leadership
passes into other hands, we look
for a continuation of our close
relationship, one based essen
tially on a common interest in
Tunisia's development.
In both Morocco and Tunisia ,
however, the basic U.S. role has
changed in the past ten years.
Economic assistance is flowing to
both countries from more
sources and the overall U.S. share
has declined . Tunisia has been
one of the models of the multi
lateral approach in which a Con
sultative Group, under the aegis
of the World Bank , has, for a
number of years , coordinated the
international effort.
French aid to Tunisia has held
Steady in real terms and aid to
Morocco has increased in both
real and proportionate terms.
U.S. aid has declined absolutely
and proportionately in both
countries.
Between 1960 and 1964 , the
U.S. provided two- thirds of all
non-Communist economic aid to
Morocco and Tunisia. Between
1965 and 1969 , this proportion
declined to 42 percent of the aid
flowing to each . In 1970, the
U.S. share dropped still further
as other donors have increased
their share . Our decreasing share
is a reflection of the progress
these countries are making, and
Despite this commitment and
interest in Tunisia's success , we
did not attempt to determine
the path Tunisia chose for de
velopment. It is difficult to con
ceive of a leader of President
Bourguiba's character permitting
such interference if it had been
tried . Tunisian successes and
errors are their own. There were
misgivings within the U.S. Gov
ernment in 1966-1969 during the
period of accelerated expansion
of agricultural cooperatives and
increased state control over the
Tunisian economy. It was agreed ,
however, that the Tunisian ex
periment was worthy of our con
tinued support. Tunisia's ensuing
decision in 1969 to reverse the
course of its economic policy to
give greater emphasis to private
enterprise and free market forces
Our relations with independ
ent Algeria have been quite dif
ferent from those with Morocco
and Tunisia .
If we go back to 1962, U.S.
expectations about the potential
benefits of bilateral relations
with Algeria were probably
higher than with most other
newly independent countries.
They were probably unrealistic
at that time given our inexperi
ence in dealing with each other.
President Kennedy had felt a
special interest in Algeria dating
from his 1957 speech urging that
country's independence. The
Algerian leader, Ben Bella, had
flown back to North Africa, fol
lowing his release by the French ,
in a U.S. Air Force plane. His
first foreign visit as President
after Algerian independence was
to the United Nations and Wash
ington where he was received by
President Kennedy. The fact that
Ben Bella chose to proceed di
rectly from Washington to Cuba
was perhaps an omen of what
was to come.
The Algerians for their part
always held a strong ideological
bias against the United States.
They identified the United States
with France through NATO.
Conversely, they felt a deep
bond of sympathy with those
states which had endorsed and
supported the long, bitter Alger
ian war of independence against
France: North Viet- Nam, Egypt,
the People's Republic of China,
and Cuba-all countries with
5

[mosaadabd460]

puted leader of Algeria . He
focused his government's efforts on domestic economic develop
ment and , in the pursuit of rapid industrialization the Algerians found they wanted the expertise
and technology that private
American enterprise could sup
ply. Many U.S. firms responded
to the indication that they would
be welcome.
which , in varying degrees, the
United States was at odds. In this
environment of suspicion and hostility , and given the instabil
ity and rivalries of the Ben Bella
period , it is not difficult to un
derstand the lack of rapport.
Even the fact that the United
States supplied some $ 165 mil
lion of PL-480 foodstuffs be
tween 1962 and 1967 was re
garded by the Algerians as a
minor recompense for the devas
tation suffered during their in
dependence struggle.
The overthrow of Ben Bella on
June 19, 1965 , by Minister of
Defense Houari Boumedienne re
vived briefly U.S. hopes that
satisfactory relations might be
possible. Boumedienne's serious
approach and his announced in
tention to concentrate on his
country's problems seemed to
augur well for such a develop
ment.
With the six- day war, however,
Algeria broke diplomatic rela
tions, and all U.S. aid to Algeria
ceased by law. At the same time ,
Algeria seized almost all U.S.
firms operating there , principally
oil companies.
In retrospect, the break in
relations proved to have had
some benefits. For one thing it
cleared the air . The romantic
view of the prospects for U.S.
Algerian relations vanished over
night. We recognized that mutual
confidence would not be based
solely on aid programs, however
well- intentioned , nor on public
gestures of support, however sin
cere.
The subsequent upturn in
U.S. - Algerian relations has been
marked by several turning points.
One was the emergence of Presi
dent Boumedienne as the undis
Another major turning point
was the October 1969 agreement
between SONATRACH, the
State oil company, and the El
Paso Natural Gas Company for
the sale of one billion cubic
feet- per- day of natural gas in
liquefied form for importation to
the U.S. east coast. This project
and others like it represent a
natural arrangement between the
United States , with its estimated
annual shortfall in gas supply of
35 trillion cubic feet by 1980 ,
and Algeria with the fourth
largest proven, and largely un committed , gas reserves in the
world- 130 trillion cubic feet.
governments for t development
financing.
During the past two years
both governments have, in a
spirit of businesslike coopera
tion , taken actions to enhance
the possibilities for an early reali
zation of these Liquefied Natural
Gas ( LNG ) projects. Algeria has
upgraded and strengthened its
diplomatic representation in
Washington-still under the flag
of Guinea-and we have done
likewise in Algiers under the
Swiss flag . Algeria has resolved
all but one of its expropriation
disputes with U.S. companies.
The Export- Import Bank has in
formed SONATRACH that it is
prepared to consider favorably
the financing of several hundred million dollars of U.S. exports
for the construction of the neces
sary facilities in Algeria for this
project. The American com
panies will make no investment
in Algeria, but they will finance
the Liquefied Natural Gas
tankers. The final authorization
by the U.S. Federal Power Com
mission-which will set impor
tant precedents for the LNG
industry-is the one remaining
requirement.
Libya
But given the past history
of U.S.- Algerian relations, and
Algeria's treatment of U.S. petro
leum companies, the huge
amounts of capital needed , and
the respective government au
thorizations required , it was clear
even in 1969 that to bring these
projects to fruition would be no
easy task . If they could be imple
mented, however-and there is
cause for optimism that they will
be - they would create the most
significant long- term economic
links between the United States
and North Africa in history .
They would make a substantial
contribution to Algeria's eco
nomic development and reduce
Algeria's dependence on foreign
U.S. relations with Libya over
the past 29 years have gone
through the same radical trans
formations as the country itself .
In the pre - oil , pre- military - coup
period , Libya was considered one
of the most disinherited of the
developing countries and showed
little promise of economic viabil
ity . In the early 1950's, Libya
was dependent on U.S. , U.K. ,
and other foreign aid for its
economic development and mili
6

[mosaadabd460]

tary assistance. Libya concluded
a defense agreement with the
United Kingdom , and agreed to
the establishment of Wheelus Air
Force Base outside Tripoli and a
British air base near Tobruk.
Wheelus, because of its ideal cli
matic conditions, became the
principal training base for U.S. fighter aircraft stationed in
Western Europe .
This close relationship , which
was clearly one of Libyan eco
nomic dependence on the United
States and the United Kingdom,
was obviously headed for change
when, in December 1957 , Esso
became the first oil company to
announce it had struck oil . By
1968 , Libya had become one of
the world's leading oil producers
and the per capita GNP of its 1.6
million inhabitants had increased
from about $ 100 at independ
ence to $ 1,640. Reflecting this transformation, assistance
program was ended in 1965 .
In Libya, the United States
faced in a very special way the
problem of identification with a
regime. We had provided substan
tial financial support in the early
days of the kingdom. We enjoyed
the benefits of military facilities.
There was a widespread-but un
founded - belief that the British
and American Ambassadors dic
tated policies to Libyan Govern
ments.
with the lack of progress in the
building of modern institutions.
It is conceivable that the
United States could have had a
significant influence on the
course of events in Libya , but
this must remain in the realm of
speculation. Our aid had helped
launch the country. The King
and many of its leaders felt an
indebtedness to the United
States. Yet, it was clear to
American officials serving in
Libya during those years that the
course of events was in Libyan
hands and would be determined
by Libyans. Neither an earlier
withdrawal of our facilities from
Libya nor the exercise of any
extraordinary influence in that
country could likely have
changed the basic direction of
events.
It was particularly regrettable,
but not at all surprising , that the
leaders of the coup of September
1969 , under Lieutenant ( now
Colonel ) Qadhafi , took power
with deep suspicions of the
United States and with serious
expectations that we would try
to oppose their coup. The matter
was further complicated by the
fact that the new regime , deeply
influenced by the frustration of
the young Arab military officers
over the course of the six - day
war, made the Arab struggle
against Israel a principal tenet of
its foreign policy. Their belief in
our unqualified support for Israel
remains today the chief obstacle
to better relations. Other suspi
cions have, in all probability ,
been modified .
We adapted quickly to the
change in Libya. It was never our
intention to do otherwise . We
agreed to the evacuation of our
air base near Tripoli and our
Coast Guard navigation station in
the Gulf of Sirte . We modified
the nature of our relationship to
meet the new situation .
In Libya today, the greatest
U.S. interests are, in a sense,
beyond the government domain.
The investment and activities of
private American companies in
the development and production
of Libya's vast oil reserves are
essentially matters between the
companies and Libya. Our role
when we have a role-is to seek
to explain wider aspects of inter national relations which may
bear on oil policy . In the 1970
negotiations, for example, our
official effort was confined to
explaining our primary concerns as a government over the conse
quences for the consuming na
tions of any break down in nego
tiations, and to explaining
actions taken by the U.S. Gov
ernment in permitting the com
panies to concert on negotia
tions.
Today the 11 - nation Organiza
tion of Petroleum Exporting
Countries ( OPEC ) , consisting of
Algeria , Iran , Iraq , Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Venezuela , Libya , Qatar,
Abu Dhabi , Indonesia , and
Nigeria , are in a strong position
as a result of the world energy
outlook . Demand for oil and gas
by the developed world is ex
panding by leaps and bounds.
The OPEC countries have that oil
and gas, far in excess of their
own needs. A great amount of
creative diplomacy by govern
ments and business alike is going
to be required if the demands of
the producing countries for in
creasing revenues and for control
of the companies are to be met
without disrupting the industry,
the consumers, and the econo
our
There was much less awareness
of the growing concern of Ameri
can representatives in Libya at
the increasing detachment of the King from events in the country,
the influence of some of those
around the King on policies and ,
what was particularly serious, the
disenchantment of many of the
best young men in the country
7

[mosaadabd460]

Events have moved. Circum
stances have changed. We have
changed with them . We should
not regret what has gone before,
for that was important to where
we are today . And today's Libya
has a leadership with which we
still have problems, but it is an
independent leadership providing no more of an opportunity to
other non - Arab forces than it
provides to us.
mies of the producing countries
themselves. Libya will be a major
driving force among the OPEC
countries.
It can be asked , in retrospect,
what were the benefits we gained
from our substantial assistance to
Libya in its early days ?
First , we must recall the
strong efforts made by the Soviet
Union in those days to have
established a Soviet trusteeship
over the former Italian colony of
Tripolitania . Our help to Libya
enabled it to emerge and survive
as an independent nation . This
gave us advantages in access to
and the utilization of key facili
ties during critical years fol lowing World War II . It provided
a base on which the Libyans and
private American firms could
build the important petroleum
industry that exists in that
country today.
is an example of the trends and
problems of the developing
world generally.
We have, without forgetting
our friends, adapted to change in
North Africa . We see its nations
as individual entities, each with unique characteristics, deter
mining its own future and its
own policies. We see our rela
tions with them as important to
our own interests . We can pre
serve those interests so long as
we are prepared to continue an
active role in the area and to find
foundations for our relationships
built genuinely on common in
terests.
LONG- RANGE VIEW
North Africa is a significant
area of the world, at the hub
where Europe, Africa , and the
Middle East meet. It lies on our
route of access to southern
Europe and the eastern Mediter
ranean . It is a significant source
of energy for Europe and will
increasingly become so for us. It
Department of State Publication 8622
African Series 51
Released January 1972
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20420 - Price 10 cents
# U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1972 486-391 / 13
UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA
3
1951
D03
563264 J
8

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This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitizedby Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve theinformation in books and make it universally accessible.https://books.google.com
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universalwww.myuniversalop.comprione:1-866-756-4676UWV12113MADEINUSA
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S1116 : 51UNIVERSITY OFMINNESOTA LIBRARYWILSGOVUS 1.1 16:51CURRENTJAN 31'72DOCUMENTSFOREIGN POLICYThe United Statesand North AfricaINTRODUCTIONRecently in the Congress ofthe United States, a crucial debate has been raging. That debateis concerned with some of thefundamentals of our foreign policy over the last three decades,including the question of foreignaid.In this debate, three chargeshave been leveled against theforeign aid program and our policies in the developing world :- that we have looked at theworld solely in Cold War terms;-that we have sought to support only certain kinds of regimes; and-that we have not kept upwith changing world circumstances.as an example, that these assertions are not substantiated .North Africa is, in many ways,a microcosm of the developingworld . Among the four nationsof this area-Morocco, Algeria,Tunisia, and Libya-we find characteristics, problems, reactionsand issues common to most ofthe “ Third World ."The history of our relationshipto this area over the past twodecades demonstrates that ourpolicies have moved and aremoving with the changing tides.They are policies which acceptchange and accept nations asthey are.These states have many characteristics in common : a strongsense of national pride, an underlying belief that the West hasobligations to make up for earlierexploitation, and a keen sensitivity to outside interference. Atthe same time, they are diverse intheirnationalcharacteristics,their forms of government, andtheir resources.Let us go back 20 years - to1951. Only Libya was movingtoward independence, but itsprospects for viability were poor.U.S. POLICY IN AREAThe purpose of this paper is todemonstrate, using North AfricaThis pamphlet is based on a speechby Assistant Secretary of State forAfrican Affairs David D. Newsom atPrinceton University, November 18,1971.DEPARTMENT OF STATEBUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRSOFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES
Page 5
their attitudes toward the Sovietsand the Chinese. We, perhaps,underestimated their ability eventhen to stand up against externalinfluences-from all directions.Today, this has changed. Weand they have adjusted to radically new circumstances.PRESENT SITUATIONIts first annual budget was only$6 million, and few knew wherethat would be found.In the other three countries,France played a dominant role,largely to the exclusion of otheroutside influences. Americans inboth government and the privatesector, nevertheless, were beginning to learn about NorthAfrica. They were beginning tobe aware of its peoples and theirquest for freedom. We realizedearlier than most that independence was coming and comingrapidly.But these were, at that time,side issues. Our concern as anation then was the relationshipof this area to the emergingposition of the Soviet Union andto its containment. Before missiles and long-range bombers, ourStrategic Air Command basesin Morocco were considered vitalforour national security. In1951 , also, we made the decisionto seek to retain, in Libya, animportant training base for ourAir Forces in Europe. We ultimately reached agreement andcommitted ourselves initially topay Libya $4 million a year ineconomic assistance.Ten years later, the situationhad changed dramatically, andwe had changed with it. Moroccoand Tunisia were independent.General De Gaulle had stood inAlgiers and had spoken one ofhistory's great ambiguities, " Jegot you. "(" I have understood you ." ) Libya had begun torealize that its deserts coveredvast resources of oil.In those ten years, U.S. policies had moved, too. PresidentEisenhower had agreed to theevacuation of our air bases inMorocco. Our earlier interest andconfidence in Tunisia was followed by a pledge of long-termdevelopment aid-without conditions or demands for facilities. In1964, we agreed in principle withthe Government of Libya to theevacuation of our military facilities whenever they were notwanted. We were preparing tohelp independent Algeria withsubstantial food and technicalaid.Each of these countries, asthey became independent,looked to us in a special way.They sought alternatives to fulldependence upon the formermetropole. It was not yet fashionable to turn massively to theSoviets or the Chinese.Morocco, because of earlylinks with the United States,encouragement by individualAmericans, and the presence ofour bases, expected special help.Algeria, despite harboring aresentment because of our support for the French, looked to usas an early sympathizer andbenefactor.Tunisia, under the leadershipof Habib Bourguiba, remembered earlier help and encouragement and looked to us.Libya saw in us and the Britishthe primary sources of criticalfinancial help. The Libyan Kingfelt both an indebtedness to usfor our support at the UnitedNations for Libyan independenceandterritorialunitydespiteSoviet opposition, and a dependence upon us.Ten years ago, we were deeplyinvolved. These nations had expectations of us. We expected tofind friends and support, particularly against growing inroads ofSoviet influence. We did tend tojudge nations in those days byEach of the four countries isnow fully independent.Each has, further, demonstrated its independence in policies toward the former metropoles and toward other countries. Each country has diversified its relationships. None is anylonger dependent predominantlyupon a single power, politicallyor economically. Each in its particular way has sought to qualifyas " nonaligned ."The area has seen major politicalupheavalswhichhavechanged the leadership and, inthe case of Libya, the basicreorientation of the country.There has been a dramaticdiscovery and development ofresources, primarily oil and gas,in the last ten years. The directimportance of the area economically to Europe has expanded.All of this has brought a verybasic change in the relationshipbetween North Africa and theUnited States.Except for the use of communications facilities at oneMoroccan base, we no longerhave any military facilities inNorth Africa.The proposition of economicassistance provided by the UnitedStates has steadily declined asEuropean countries have assumeda larger share.U.S. grant military assistance2
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Tand military involvement have declined substantially.Our relationship with theleadership is changing. The generation has passed or is passingwhich recalls our initial help tothe newly independent countries.This change happened early inAlgeria where the original leadersof the FLN ( National LiberationFront) whom we had knownwere replaced by those we didnot know. In Libya, those whorecognized and welcomed ourhelp to that country in its earlyyears have been replaced; boththe present prosperity and thechanged circumstances have obliterated recollections of thatearlier relationship.Where there has been an abrupt change in a country inwhich we had close relationswith the previous regime, wehave had the added element ofsuspicions regarding our intentions on the part of the newleaders. Only time can overcomesuch feelings.The last decade, further, hasseen climactic events in the NearEast which have affected ourown relationships. Algeria brokediplomatic relations with us; relations with the other three nations of the area became difficultin the months immediately following the 1967 war. The beliefthat we had helped Israel to winthe six-day war died hard . Whilethese nations may not have beendirectly involved in the fighting,they were committed as Arabsand shared the feelings of humiliation and bitterness over theseevents. The Near Eastern issuesremain a serious, but not insurmountable, problem in our relations with North African countries.In 1971 , we have new interestsand requirements. For the firsttime in our peacetime history,we face shortages of significantresources. One of them is naturalgas. In Washington, D.C., early inNovember 1971 , the local gasutility announced it could take nomore new commercial customers;there was simply not enough gas.North Africa-and particularlyAlgeria- has large gas reserves.U.S. POLICY TOWARDNORTH AFRICAOur approach to North Africain these circumstances is basedon certain clear assumptions:- First, North Africa remainsimportant to us as an area. We20 °0 °209ROMANIA100FRANCEYUGOSLAVIAU.S.S.R.ITALYATLANTI CBLACK SEABULGARIAOCEANALBANIA40PORTUGALSPAINWITH 1GREECETURKEYAnnabooSkikdoConstantineBizerte€ALGIE RSTUNISTangierOranRMALTATUNISIA9 SafaqisAsΝ. IFCYPRUSSYRIARABATFesCasablancaMeknesMOROCCOMarrak echBecharLeabsukhayrahLEBANONTRIPOLIBEMIRAQGhardai aOuarglaISRAELBENGHAZITobrukGULF OFCIDERMarsaalBurayqahJORDANCAIROALGERIAZillahTind outInAmenasSAUDIARABIAPEL AAUNSPANISH SAHARASobha .LIBYAEGYPTAlJawtºREDSEAMAURITANIAMALI202NORTH AFRICAOil fieldA Gas fieldOil pipelineGas pipelineNIGERCHADSUDAN200400800O person600Miles200400600800KilometersKHARTOUMBounda ry representation isnot necessarily authoritative2003
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pawns in an international game,but as independent, sovereignnations. We seek relations withthem based on mutual interest,independent of their relationswith others. We recognize andrespect the variety among thenations. The Cold War is overunless others choose to continueit. As the President said in hisreport to the Congress on foreignpolicyinFebruary1970,“ United States Foreign Policyfor the 70's," one of our twomajor concerns in Africa is " thatthe continent be free of greatpower rivalry or conflict in anyform.This is evenmore inAfrica's interest than ours."given us neither the right nor thecapability to determine thecourse of Moroccan political oreconomic life, even if we haddesired to do so.In foreign policy, too, KingHassan has followed an independent course. He has, over theyears, improved his relationswith Europe and has establishedfriendly relations with the SovietUnion. He has taken an activerole in Arab affairs and has frequently used his relationshipwith us to bring to our attentionArab concerns.Neither in Morocco-nor inany other developing countrydo we seek to further or supportany particular system or foreignpolicy. We feel that both are theresponsibility of the peoples ofthe country.We have established a mutually beneficial relationship withMorocco, despite the differentnature of our systems of government. We find a common interestin continuing Moroccan economic growth and the continuedabsence in Morocco of influenceshostile to our basic concerns. Inthe area of economic development, we have no magic formulae to guarantee growth eitherfor ourselves or for the Moroccans. Only the Moroccans, themselves, can assuretheir ownprogress - political, economic, andsocial . We believe, however, thatour assistance has improved theirability to make such progress.BILATERAL RELATIONShave a keen interest in the freedom of the Mediterranean and inthe continued access for all tothat sea and to the nationsaround it. The establishment ofdominant foreign influences adversely affecting these interestson the southern shore of theMediterranean would be a matterof grave concern to us.-Secondly, the orderly development of these nations andtheir resources is important tothem, to Europe, and to us.While there are, and will continue to be, differing views onwhat constitutes a reasonablebasis for access to these resources, there is agreement thatsuch access is important to all.- Thirdly, we shall remain animportant source of the capitaland technology required for thedevelopment of this area. Thenatureof arrangements maychange, but the U.S. private roleis likely to continue.- Fourthly, the nations ofNorth Africa, despite policiesshaped by different histories andinfluences, will all stoutly resistdomination byby any outsidepower. They will defy simplecategorization in any East-Westlineup.- Finally, events in NorthAfrica, as in many other parts ofthe world, will move today withfar less concern over the role ofthe United States and referenceto us than in years past. If wehave interests there, it is our taskto preserve them, whether it bein investment, in trade, or insecurity. We cannot assume thatothers will do it for us.Against the background ofthese assumptions, what is ourapproach to these nations today?We regard them, first, not asMoroccoWe have had particularly closeties with Morocco and Tunisia.Despite the withdrawal of military facilities from Morocco, oureconomic and strategic intereststhere remain substantial. We retain important Voice of Americafacilities. We have growing tradewith Morocco and our investment there is also increasing. Wevalue the presence of this friendat the southern side of the gateway to the Mediterranean.Morocco has, since independence, faced severeeconomicproblems. We have helped in thedevelopment of its agricultureand in meeting problems of employment.King Hassan, thrust suddenlyinto power in 1961 , has ledMorocco skillfully through critical years and critical problems.We have both benefited fromcooperation. Our relationshipwith Morocco, however, hasTunisiaTunisia exemplifies a smallercountry, ably governed by responsible leadership possessinginfluence beyond its borders, butendowed with modest naturalresources.4
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of the widening responsibilitybeing assumed by other nations-a trend entirely consistentwith overall AID policy.AlgeriaThe United States has enjoyed15 years of very close relationswith Tunisia and has contributeda very significant amount of economic assistance - well over $600million since 1956. We have noalliance with Tunisia, no basesthere, and no real strategic interest in that country. U.S. investment is minimal (approximately$12.9 million in FY 1970) . YetU.S. policy over the years hasbeen marked by strong supportfor Tunisia's economic and political independence.The United States was one ofthe first governments to recognize Tunisia in 1956. Our assistance followed the 1961 decisionthat Tunisia should be one of thecountries to receive a long-termcommitment since it possessedtheinfrastructure,sufficienteconomic potential, and politicalwill to serve as a model for otherdeveloping countries.was entirely a Tunisian determination.As a result of the farsightedreforms of President Bourguiba,Tunisia is, in social terms, stillthe most advanced of the Arabstates. Its human resources are itsgreatest wealth and we will continue to be interested in its development and well-being.Tunisia has always had an independent foreign policy. It continues to do so. As its leadershippasses into other hands, we lookfor a continuation of our closerelationship, one based essentially on a common interest inTunisia's development.In both Morocco and Tunisia,however, the basic U.S. role haschanged in the past ten years.Economic assistance is flowing tobothcountriesfrommoresources and the overall U.S. sharehas declined. Tunisia has beenone of the models of the multilateral approach in which a Consultative Group, under the aegisof the World Bank, has, for anumber of years, coordinated theinternational effort.French aid to Tunisia has heldSteady in real terms and aid toMorocco has increased in bothreal and proportionate terms.U.S. aid has declined absolutelyand proportionately in bothcountries.Between 1960 and 1964, theU.S. provided two-thirds of allnon-Communist economic aid toMorocco and Tunisia. Between1965 and 1969, this proportiondeclined to 42 percent of the aidflowing to each. In 1970, theU.S. share dropped still furtheras other donors have increasedtheir share. Our decreasing shareis a reflection of the progressthese countries are making, andDespite this commitment andinterest in Tunisia's success, wedid not attempt to determinethe path Tunisia chose for development. It is difficult to conceive of a leader of PresidentBourguiba's character permittingsuch interference if it had beentried. Tunisian successes anderrors are their own. There weremisgivings within the U.S. Government in 1966-1969 during theperiod of accelerated expansionof agricultural cooperatives andincreased state control over theTunisian economy. It was agreed,however, that the Tunisian experiment was worthy of our continued support. Tunisia's ensuingdecision in 1969 to reverse thecourse of its economic policy togive greater emphasis to privateenterprise and free market forcesOur relations with independent Algeria have been quite different from those with Moroccoand Tunisia .If we go back to 1962, U.S.expectations about the potentialbenefits of bilateral relationswithAlgeriawereprobablyhigher than with most othernewlyindependent countries.They were probably unrealisticat that time given our inexperience in dealing with each other.President Kennedy had felt aspecial interest in Algeria datingfrom his 1957 speech urging thatcountry's independence. TheAlgerian leader, Ben Bella, hadflown back to North Africa, following his release by the French,in a U.S. Air Force plane. Hisfirst foreign visit as Presidentafter Algerian independence wasto the United Nations and Washington where he was received byPresident Kennedy. The fact thatBen Bella chose to proceed byrectly from Washington to Cubawas perhaps an omen of whatwas to come.The Algerians for their partalways held a strong ideologicalbias against the United States.They identified the United Stateswith France through NATO.Conversely, they felt a deepbond of sympathy with thosestates which had endorsed andsupported the long, bitter Algerian war of independence againstFrance: North Viet-Nam, Egypt,the People's Republic of China,and Cuba-all countries with5
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puted leader of Algeria. Hefocused his government's effortson domestic economic development and, in the pursuit of rapidindustrialization the Algeriansfound they wanted the expertiseand technology that privateAmerican enterprise could supply. Many U.S. firms respondedto the indication that they wouldbe welcome.which, in varying degrees, theUnited States was at odds. In thisenvironment of suspicion andhostility, and given the instability and rivalries of the Ben Bellaperiod, it is not difficult to understand the lack of rapport.Even the fact that the UnitedStates supplied some $165 million of PL-480 foodstuffs between 1962 and 1967 was regarded by the Algerians as aminor recompense for the devastation suffered during their independence struggle.The overthrow of Ben Bella onJune 19, 1965, by Minister ofDefense Houari Boumedienne revived briefly U.S. hopes thatsatisfactory relations might bepossible. Boumedienne's seriousapproach and his announced intention to concentrate on hiscountry's problems seemed toaugur well for such a development.With the six-day war, however,Algeria broke diplomatic relations, and all U.S. aid to Algeriaceased by law. At the same time,Algeria seized almost all U.S.firms operating there, principallyoil companies.In retrospect, the break inrelations proved to have hadsome benefits. For one thing itcleared the air. The romanticview of the prospects for U.S.Algerian relations vanished overnight. We recognized that mutualconfidence would not be basedsolely on aid programs, howeverwell-intentioned, nor on publicgestures of support, however sinask.The subsequent upturn inU.S.-Algerian relations has beenmarked by several turning points.One was the emergence of President Boumedienne as the undisAnother major turning pointwas the October 1969 agreementbetween SONATRACH , theState oil company, and the ElPaso Natural Gas Company forthe sale of one billion cubicfeet-per-day of natural gas inliquefied form for importation tothe U.S. east coast. This projectand others like it represent anatural arrangement between theUnited States, with its estimatedannual shortfall in gas supply of35 trillion cubic feet by 1980,and Algeria with the fourthlargest proven, and largely uncommitted, gas reserves in theworld- 130 trillion cubic feet.governments fortor developmentfinancing.During the past two yearsboth governments have, in aspirit of businesslike cooperation, taken actions to enhancethe possibilities for an early realization of these Liquefied NaturalGas ( LNG ) projects. Algeria hasupgraded and strengthened itsdiplomaticrepresentationinWashington-still under the flagof Guinea-and we have donelikewise in Algiers under theSwiss flag. Algeria has resolvedall but one of its expropriationdisputes with U.S. companies.The Export-Import Bank has informed SONATRACH that it isprepared to consider favorablythe financing of several hundredmillion dollars of U.S. exportsfor the construction of the necessary facilities in Algeria for thisproject. The American companies will make no investmentin Algeria, but they will financetheLiquefiedNaturalGastankers. The final authorizationby the U.S. Federal Power Commission-which will set important precedents for the LNGindustry-is the one remainingrequirement.LibyaBut given the past historyof U.S.-Algerian relations, andAlgeria's treatment of U.S. petroleum companies, the hugeamounts of capital needed, andthe respective government authorizations required, it was cleareven in 1969 that to bring theseprojects to fruition would be noeasy task . If they could be implemented, however-and there iscause for optimism that they willbe - they would create the mostsignificant long-term economiclinks between the United Statesand North Africa in history.They would make a substantialcontribution to Algeria's economic development and reduceAlgeria's dependence on foreignU.S. relations with Libya overthe past 29 years have gonethrough the same radical transformations as the country itself.In the pre-oil, pre-military-coupperiod, Libya was considered oneof the most disinherited of thedeveloping countries and showedlittle promise of economic viability. In the early 1950's, Libyawas dependent on U.S., U.K.,and other foreign aid for itseconomic development and mili6
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tary assistance. Libya concludeda defense agreement with theUnited Kingdom , and agreed tothe establishment of Wheelus AirForce Base outside Tripoli and aBritish air base near Tobruk.Wheelus, because of its ideal climatic conditions, became theprincipal training base for U.S.fighter aircraftstationedinWestern Europe.This close relationship, whichwas clearly one of Libyan economic dependence on the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom,was obviously headed for changewhen, in December 1957, Essobecame the first oil company toannounce it had struck oil. By1968, Libya had become one ofthe world's leading oil producersand the per capita GNP of its 1.6million inhabitants had increasedfrom about $100 at independence to $1,640. Reflecting thistransformation,assistanceprogram was ended in 1965.In Libya, the United Statesfaced in a very special way theproblem of identification with aregime. We had provided substantial financial support in the earlydays of the kingdom. We enjoyedthe benefits of military facilities.There was a widespread-but unfounded - belief that the Britishand American Ambassadors dictated policies to Libyan Governments.with the lack of progress in thebuilding of modern institutions.It is conceivable that theUnited States could have had asignificantinfluenceonthecourse of events in Libya, butthis must remain in the realm ofspeculation. Our aid had helpedlaunch the country. The Kingand many of its leaders felt anindebtednesstotheUnitedStates. Yet, it was clear toAmerican officials serving inLibya during those years that thecourse of events was in Libyanhands and would be determinedby Libyans. Neither an earlierwithdrawal of our facilities fromLibya nor the exercise of anyextraordinary influence in thatcountrycouldlikelyhavechanged the basic direction ofevents.It was particularly regrettable,but not at all surprising, that theleaders of the coup of September1969, under Lieutenant (nowColonel ) Qadhafi , took powerwith deep suspicions of theUnited States and with seriou***pectations that we would tryto oppose their coup. The matterwas further complicated by thefact that the new regime, deeplyinfluenced by the frustration ofthe young Arab military officersover the course of the six-daywar, made the Arab struggleagainst Israel a principal tenet ofits foreign policy. Their belief inour unqualified support for Israelremains today the chief obstacleto better relations. Other suspicions have, in all probability,been modified.We adapted quickly to thechange in Libya. It was never ourintention to do otherwise. Weagreed to the evacuation of ourair base near Tripoli and ourCoast Guard navigation station inthe Gulf of Sirte. We modifiedthe nature of our relationship tomeet the new situation.In Libya today, the greatestU.S. interests are, in a sense,beyond the government domain.The investment and activities ofprivate American companies inthe development and productionof Libya's vast oil reserves areessentially matters between thecompanies and Libya. Our rolewhen we have a role-is to seekto explain wider aspects of international relations which maybear on oil policy. In the 1970negotiations, for example, ourofficial effort was confined toexplaining our primary concernsas a government over the consequences for the consuming nations of any break down in negotiations,andtoexplainingactions taken by the U.S. Government in permitting the companies to concert on negotiations.Today the 11 -nation Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC ) , consisting ofAlgeria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia,Kuwait, Venezuela, Libya, Qatar,AbuDhabi,Indonesia, andNigeria, are in a strong positionas a result of the world energyoutlook. Demand for oil and gasby the developed world is expanding by leaps and bounds.The OPEC countries have that oiland gas, far in excess of theirown needs. A great amount ofcreative diplomacy by governments and business alike is goingto be required if the demands ofthe producing countries for increasing revenues and for controlof the companies are to be metwithout disrupting the industry,the consumers, and the econoourThere was much less awarenessof the growing concern of American representatives in Libya atthe increasing detachment of theKing from events in the country,the influence of some of thosearound the King on policies and,what was particularly serious, thedisenchantment of many of thebest young men in the country7
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Events have moved. Circumstances have changed. We havechanged with them. We shouldnot regret what has gone before,for that was important to wherewe are today. And today's Libyahas a leadership with which westill have problems, but it is anindependent leadership providingno more of an opportunity toother non-Arab forces than itprovides to us.mies of the producing countriesthemselves. Libya will be a majordriving force among the OPECcountries.It can be asked, in retrospect,what were the benefits we gainedfrom our substantial assistance toLibya in its early days?First, we mustrecallthestrong efforts made by the SovietUnion in those days to haveestablished a Soviet trusteeshipover the former Italian colony ofTripolitania. Our help to Libyaenabled it to emerge and surviveas an independent nation. Thisgave us advantages in access toand the utilization of key facilities during critical years following World War II. It provideda base on which the Libyans andprivate American firms couldbuild the important petroleumindustry that exists in thatcountry today.is an example of the trends andproblems of the developingworld generally.We have, without forgettingour friends, adapted to change inNorth Africa. We see its nationsas individual entities, each withuniquecharacteristics,determining its own future and itsown policies. We see our relations with them as important toour own interests. We can preserve those interests so long aswe are prepared to continue anactive role in the area and to findfoundations for our relationshipsbuilt genuinely on common interests.LONG- RANGE VIEWNorth Africa is a significantarea of the world, at the hubwhere Europe, Africa, and theMiddle East meet. It lies on ourroute of access to southernEurope and the eastern Mediterranean. It is a significant sourceof energy for Europe and willincreasingly become so for us. ItDepartment of State Publication 8622African Series 51Released January 1972For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office,Washington, D.C. 20420 - Price 10 cents# U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1972486-391 / 13UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA3 1951 D03 563264 J8
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THE WAR
IN NORTH AFRICA
PART 2
( The Allied Invasion )
COUNTRY
DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK
1947
LITTLESTONE

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FOREWORD
This account of the operations in North Africa from 8 November
1942 to 13 May 1943 has been written for use in the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is based for the most part on material furnished by the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, and other War Department agencies.
Valuable information has also been obtained from the publications of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
However, in acknowledging indebtedness to others it is not de
sired to place on them the responsibility for any factual errors or for any conclusions drawn.
This and other pamphlets on World War II are constantly being revised as additional information becomes available. It will be appreciated if military personnel who note any apparent errors or discrepancies, or who have comments or suggestions for the im provement of the subject matter, will communicate them to :
The Professor of Military Art and Engineering,
U. S. Military Academy,
West Point, N. Y.
March 1947
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THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
PART 2 - THE ALLIED INVASION
INTRODUCTION
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declara tion of war against the United States by Germany and Italy brought this country into the world conflict.
Immediate action was necessary to coordinate with our allies, and especially with Great Britain, the strategy that would.govern the future conduct of the war and the control that should be exercised over it. In a report to the Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, stated :
On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of
Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived
in Washington to confer with the President and the American
Chiefs of Staff . Out of the series of discussions which then followed
resulted an agreement not only regarding the immediate strategy
for our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization
of a method for the strategical command and control of British and
American military resources. Probably no other Allied action, in
the field or otherwise, has exerted as powerful an effect on the con
duct of this war as the prompt establishment of a prescribed pro
cedure for achieving unity of effort through the medium of the Com
bined Chiefs of Staff acting under the direction of the leaders of
their respective governments.
At this first conference the President and the Prime Minister, with the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, made the decision that Allied resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany, the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan.
In discussions following the conference a tentative target date for an operation across the English Channel was set for the summer of 1943. Some consideration was given to the possibility of an emergency diversionary assault at a much earlier date if this became necessary to save the situation on the Russian front. As further studies were made, shortage of landing craft for launching a cross Channel operation, and shortage of supplies for maintaining one,
militated against putting the plan into effect. At the same time, the reverses suffered by the British in North Africa and the con
1

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tinued need for some diversion to assist the Russians brought under consideration the possibility of mounting an assault against the French territory in North Africa in 1942, with consequent postpone ment of a major cross- Channel operation until a later date.
Despite considerable American military opinion in favor of ad
hering to the original plan, the final decision in favor of the invasion of North Africa, as an alternative to an attack across the English Channel, was made in July 1942, following Prime Minister Church ill's second visit to Washington . The date for the landings was fixed in September ; they were to take place in November. Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower * had been sent to London in June 1942 as Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army ( ETOUSA) . On 14 August 1942 he received a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff which appointed him Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force. His mission under this assignment was to direct combined military operations against French North Africa - Operation Torch — as early as prac ticable with a view to gaining, in conjunction with Allied forces in the Middle East, complete control of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. At the same time he retained command of ETOUSA ( until 4 February 1943 ) .
Meanwhile Rommel was making the drive that took him to El Alamein and the gates of Alexandria, and other Axis forces were driving across the Don River toward the Caucasus Mountains and the rich oil fields near the Caspian Sea. The Middle East seemed clearly within Hitler's grasp, and the situation in the Mediterranean was exceedingly dark. In the Pacific , Japanese forces had reached what was to be the high-water mark of their advance. Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands had been occupied ; Port Moresby in New Guinea, the jumping -off point for Australia, was threatened ; Burma had been overrun ; and India was under sea and air attack. The tide of Axis aggression was at its height, and the Allies were everywhere on the defensive, struggling to hold open their important sea routes of communication.
But the Allied high command knew that large convoys were on
the way to Egypt and should arrive in time. These reinforcements for General Montgomery were expected to provide him not only with the means with which to stop Rommel but also to carry out his part of a great Allied pincers operation, the western jaw of which would be the British and American forces to be landed in French North Africa. Thus the Battle of El Alameiņ was expected
* The ranks of officers as given throughout this narrative were those held at the time.

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to divert Axis attention from the newly selected theater of opera tions, and, subsequently, the British Eighth Army was to constitute the eastern jaw of the pincers designed to crush all Axis opposition in Africa. So the plans for the invasion were continued despite the apparently adverse situation in Egypt.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
It appeared that the following strategic advantages would accrue
from the occupation of French North Africa :
1. The first advantage would be the clearing of the Mediterranean
supply route. Allied convoys would be able to move along it under the protection of land-based aircraft. They could reach Egypt and the Suez Canal by a sea route that is 2300 miles long ( measured from Gibraltar ) , or 10,000 miles less than that around the Cape of Good Hope. The distance from the United Kingdom to India and to our newly established Persian Gulf Command would also be greatly shortened.
2. The occupation of French North Africa would make the block ade of the Axis powers virtually complete. All shipments of food and other supplies from Africa to Germany and her satellites would cease.
3. Another possible route for the invasion of continental Europe
would be secured, thereby forcing the Germans to withdraw troops from the Russian front to defend this invasion route.
4. The control of French North Africa by the Allies would make
Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Middle East safe from an invasion from the west.
5. Dakar would no longer be a threat to South America.
6. If the occupation of French North Africa could be carried out without fatally embittering the French troops and authorities in that region , it would make possible the reconstitution of the French Army in preparation for its return in force to the homeland . However, the Allied forces were faced with many problems which , if aggravated, might seriously impair the success of the operation. The reaction of Spain and Vichy France, and of French North Af
rica itself, would have a vital bearing on coming events. Axis air fields in Sicily and Sardinia enabled the enemy to dominate that section of the Mediterranean between Tunisia and Italy and pro hibited the successful movement of Allied convoys through this area,
known as " bomb alley." Since Spain herself was pro-Axis, there was a real danger that the Germans would strike through that coun

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try against Gibraltar. Undoubtedly the Axis would occupy the whole of France to forestall an Allied landing on the French Medi terranean coast and to attempt to gain control of the French fleet at Toulon. The Germans would probably try to seize Tunis and Bizerte in order to retain control of the Sicilian channel, an opera tion that would be relatively easy for them because of the short supply lines from their bases in Sicily and southern Italy. Last, but not least, because of other commitments throughout the world Allied planners were faced with a critical shortage of trained troops and vital supplies and equipment, particularly landing craft and shipping, which would definitely limit the size of the operation.
Quoting from an official report :
Thus the strategic conception of sweeping the Axis from North
Africa, and establishing Allied control from the Atlantic to the Red
Sea, necessitated an operation on a scale of such magnitude that,
once initiated, it would have to be followed through with all the
force and shipping that the situation demanded. It would be the
major Allied operation of 1942 and 1943.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
No clear picture of the military operations in French North Africa can be obtained without some understanding of the political events that accompanied, and sometimes even overshadowed, the military aspects of the campaign. In general, Frenchmen were divided into three groups :
1. General Charles de Gaulle, in London, was the rallying point for the French National Committee. His group was also known as the " Free French " and later as the " Fighting French . ” It comprised French refugees who had escaped to England, America, or the French colonies rather than accept German oppression at home and those patriots who remained in France and took part in the activities of the resistance groups. One of de Gaulle's followers, General Leclerc, had organized a small force in French Equatorial Africa that conducted raids against Italian outposts in the Fezzan (South ern Libya ) and later crowned its activities with a campaign which in thirty - nine days carried it 1600 miles from Fort Lamy, near Lake Chad, to join with General Montgomery's Eighth Army at Tripoli on 25 January 1943.
2. A second group, Frenchmen living in North Africa, where open resistance would have brought sudden German occupation, succeeded in establishing an underground " French Liberation Movement.” Although the aim of this group, like the Free French, was to liberate

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France, its members were operating under German surveillance, which to the outside world seemed to give a collaborationist tinge to their activities . General Henri Giraud, who had recently escaped from German custody, was to become the recognized leader of this group, which included some of the French military leaders in North Africa. The clash of personalities between de Gaulle and Giraud was to prevent a union of the Free French and the French Liberation groups during the North African campaign.
3. The third group was made up of pro-Vichy French - men cling ing with pathetic loyalty to old Marshal Pétain. This group com prised those unfortunates in France and Axis-dominated territories who believed that collaboration with the Germans was the best method of insuring the future of their country. Admiral Jean Darlan, who controlled the French fleet, was Pétain's designated successor.
In laying the groundwork for the North African invasion, the American Government based its policy on the view that if the lead ing Frenchmen in North Africa were given armed support they would be ready to seize the opportunity of liberating themselves from the German yoke. This policy embarked the United States on a course of detailed negotiations with the French Liberation Move ment in North Africa. Throughout the planning stage of the in vasion Mr. Robert Murphy, the American Consul General at Rabat, maintained close liaison with Allied Force Headquarters from his offices in North Africa. Since the British had previously committed their support to de Gaulle's Free French, not only did negotiations with the French Liberation Movement in North Africa have to be conducted by Americans, but it was also deemed desirable to have the initial landings made by American troops. Since, to maintain secrecy, detailed Allied plans could not be communicated to the French, and because their allegiances in North Africa were divided, positive support from them could not be assured.
In a further effort to reach an understanding, a secret rendezvous was arranged about fifty miles west of Algiers on the night of 22-23 October. Major General Mark W. Clark, Deputy Commander, Allied Force, ( who was put ashore from a submarine ) met Mr. Murphy and a delegation of French officers headed by General Mast, com mander of French military forces in the Algiers area.
Mast rep
resented the Liberation Movement in that part of North Africa . The meeting was broken up by the local police, and the important question of what Darlan and the French fleet would do was left un answered, although some progress was made with the Army leaders in setting up a plan of command in North Africa.

6
LANDING OPERATIONS
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS
The first of the many difficult problems facing the Allied com
mander was the establishment of what came to be known as Allied Force Headquarters ( AFHQ) . This was made more difficult by the fact that there was no historical precedent upon which to base such an organization. In General Eisenhower's words :
I was determined from the first to do all in my power to make this
a truly Allied Force, with real unity of command and centralization
of administrative responsibility. Alliances in the past have often
done no more than to name the common foe, and " unity of command”
has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies,
ambitions, and recriminations of high-ranking officers, unwilling
to subordinate themselves or their forces to a commander of differ
ent nationality or different service.
Inherent differences in British and American administrative
and logistical systems and in nomenclature and equipment would have to be preserved, although all plans and directives must evolve from a single combined headquarters. The principle of complete
integration was applied throughout the general staff sections of
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Allied Force Headquarters, with the best man, irrespective of na tionality, being assigned to each job. In those sections where na tional practices differed, a dual establishment was set up, one Amer ican and one British, to handle the interests of each nation . Although dual in the sense that there was in each of these sections an American and a British assistant chief of staff, in reality they acted as single sections, since no divided counsel or divergent decision ever ema nated from them. Complete harmony between these American and British " opposite numbers " was insisted upon by the Commander in Chief. The wisdom of the combined -staff principle was proved dur ing the North African campaign and was successfully used in all subsequent combined operations of the war.
By the end of the summer the organization of AFHQ was crystal lizing. As stated, Lieutenant General Eisenhower ( U.S. ) was Com mander in Chief ; Major General Clark ( U.S. ) was Acting Deputy Commander in Chief ; Brigadier General Walter B. Smith ( U.S. ) was appointed Chief of Staff ; Major General Humfrey M. Gale ( Br. ) was Chief Administrative Officer. Lieutenant General Ken neth A. N. Anderson ( Br. ) was to be in command of British ground forces; Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham ( Br. ) was appointed Naval Commander in Chief ; Brigadier General James H. Doolittle was to command the American air units in the expedition, and Air Marshal Sir William L. Welch was to command the British air units.

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With the organization of Allied Force Headquarters, plans for the invasion progressed. The cities of Oran and Algiers on the Mediterranean coast and Casablanca on the Atlantic were the cen ters of political control of the French possessions in North Africa and were the key points of the system of rail, highway, and air com munications (Map 1 ) . Tunis and Bizerte were keys to the Sicilian channel, and control of these cities would place the Allies in such a position that, in conjunction with the British Eighth Army advanc ing through Libya, annihilation of Rommel's army might be possible. However, as we have seen, the political situation required all initial landings to be made by American units, and lack of shipping and trained troops would prohibit the immediate attainment of all these objectives.
Initially two plans were developed and studied : first, major as
saults on Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers and small- scale assaults on Philippeville and Bone ( this plan was modified during its evolution by eliminating a landing at Casablanca and substituting a westward overland thrust from Oran ) ; second, assaults on Casablanca and Oran only. On 20 September 1942 the so-called “ Outline Plan,” an adaptation of the above plans, was issued. This plan abandoned the Philippeville and Bone landings because shipping and other re sources were not available to support so ambitious an undertaking and because such landings would carry the Allies within range of Axis planes based in Sicily.
Under the adopted plan the Western Task Force was to sail direct from the United States and capture Casablanca. The Center Task Force, also entirely American, was to sail from the United Kingdom and capture Oran. The Eastern Task Force, American and British,
was to sail from the United Kingdom and capture Algiers and nearby airfields. The Center and Eastern Task Forces would make their assaults simultaneously, while the Western Task Force would land as near the same time as weather conditions permitted. After at taining their initial objectives, the Western and Center Task Forces were to establish and maintain communication between Casablanca and Oran and build up an American army and an air striking force ready to occupy Spanish Morocco and repel a German attack through Spain if this should be necessary. The Eastern Task Force, after taking its initial objectives, would become the British First Army, under the command of General Anderson, and would thrust rapidly eastward to capture the airfield at Djidjelli and the port of Bougie.
It would ultimately advance into Tunisia. The organization of the task forces is given in Appendix 1 .

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In addition to the naval escort forces, the Royal Navy would have
Force H, consisting of two battleships, four cruisers, two aircraft carriers, and fifteen destroyers, to keep watch over the Italian and Vichy French fleets in the Mediterranean.
As for air support, the initial assaults were to be supported by carrier -based aircraft of the escort forces. The American Twelfth Air Force was to form the Western Command, with headquarters at Oran. One hundred and sixty fighters were to be flown from Gibraltar to each of the Casablanca and Oran areas within three days of the attack . Similarly the Royal Air Force squadrons were to form the Eastern Command, with headquarters at Algiers. Ninety of their planes were to arrive from Gibraltar by D plus 3.
An addition to the plan , developed early in October, provided for the 2d Battalion of the American 503d Parachute Infantry to seize the airfields of Tafaraoui and La Senia, south of Oran. This opera tion would entail a flight from England of some twelve hours for thirty-nine unarmed aircraft of the American 60th Troop- Carrier Group
In the endeavor to secure surprise, information as to the sites of the proposed landings was, of course, carefully guarded. It was realized that the Germans would probably learn that preparations were being made for some kind of an operation ; but even if they should conclude that an amphibious assault was to be made some where, it was hoped that in their thinking they would lean towards Norway, western France, or Dakar. After the Central and Eastern Task Forces had passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, the apparent capabilities of the Allies would be more limited ; but it was planned that the convoy should, by the route followed , create the impression it was headed for Malta or the Suez. During the hours of darkness just preceding the landings, it would turn sharply to the south and make for Algiers and Oran .
Allied Force Headquarters would remain at Gibraltar until ade quate communications were established near Algiers. Because of the amphibious nature of the operation, weather conditions would have a most important bearing on its success. D-day was to be 8 November 1942.
THE LANDINGS, 8-11 November 1942 (Map 2 )
By the afternoon of 7 November Operation Torch was ready to be launched. The Western Task Force had successfully crossed 3,000 miles of submarine-infested ocean to arrive off its landing area, and the Center and Eastern Task Forces were steaming past

9
Oran and Algiers toward “ bomb alley," where the Luftwaffe was expectantly waiting to make the kill . In each of the three landing areas the tactics were to be generally the same, landings on both sides of each main objective as a means of subsequent encirclement.
At Oran and Algiers these were to be supplemented by frontal as saults on the ports in order to seize shipping and harbor facilities before they could be sabotaged. Western Task Force.-French forces in Morocco, principally Sene galese, Moroccan, and Algerian colonial troops, were located along the Atlantic coast in the Casablanca area from Safi to Port Lyautey. American forces were divided into three groups, as indicated on the map. H-hour was to be at 0515, 8 November.
Landings were made at Fedala, fourteen miles to the northeast of Casablanca, where the purpose was to initiate operations for the capture of the latter -named city from the east ; in the harbor of Safi, 125 miles to the southwest of Casablanca, where the immediate aim was to land armor and to prevent reinforcements at Marrakech from reaching Casablanca ; and, finally , at Mehdia, seventy miles to the northeast of Casablanca, where the object was to seize the Port Lyautey airfields and protect the north flank of the entire operation.
All three landings achieved considerable surprise, and by 1015 hours Safi had been captured, following a successful rushing of the harbor by two destroyers. At Fedala and Port Lyautey, however, strong opposition was met, both from aircraft and from shore bat teries. The latter were silenced by naval gunfire, and by 1500 hours Fedala had fallen. At Port Lyautey fierce fighting continued throughout the day, but at nightfall the airfield was still in French hands.
Meanwhile our naval forces off Casablanca had their share of activity on 8 November. Early in the forenoon two French de stroyer-leaders and five destroyers sortied and made as if to attack our transports. They were taken under fire and forced to retire.
Shortly afterward the French light cruiser Primaguet joined the destroyers outside the harbor. As it moved out again, the group was promptly engaged by the Augusta and Brooklyn and vessels of the covering force. With the exception of one vessel, which managed to get back to the harbor, all French ships were either sunk or beached. While it was assisting in this operation, the covering force, consistingof the Massachusetts, Wichita, Tuscaloosa , and four destroyers, was also exchanging fire with the shore batteries and the French battleship Jean Bart, which was moored in the harbor. In order to end this distressing bloodshed, several attempts were

10
made by American officers to contact the French authorities in Casa blanca for the arrangement of an armistice, but Admiral Michelier refused to receive them.
Fighting continued throughout the next two days. The American forces steadily enlarged their beachheads and unloaded equipment despite a heavy surf which took toll of the landing craft. On 10 November the airfield at Port Lyautey was captured, the first Amer ican planes landing on the field at 1100 hours. This completed the primary mission of the Mehdia force.
In the south, after the capture of Safi on 8 November, elements of the 2d Armored Division moved eastward to intercept French reinforcements that were advancing from Marrakech to Casablanca. These French forces were dispersed on the 10th , and that night the armor began the march to Casablanca. The 47th Regimental Com bat Team remained at Safi to protect the port. When the armored force received word of the surrender on 11 November, General Har mon had obtained the surrender of Mazagan and was continuing the advance to Casablanca, fifty miles to the north.
The 3d Division troops advancing on Casablanca from Fedala were held up by stiff resistance, but by the afternoon of the 10th they had reached an assembly area northeast of Casablanca. That night they made an encircling movement to the southeast in prepara tion for a concerted attack on the city at 0730 hours, 11 November,
but at 0700 the French, acting upon orders from Admiral Darlan , capitulated.
Center Task Force. -Changing course abruptly during the night, the Center Task Force arrived off Oran and began its landings at Arzeu and Les Andalouses at 0135 hours on 8 November. The initial objectives were airports and the highway system paralleling the coast. The French commander of the area, after deciding to co operate with the American forces, changed his mind and ordered full resistance. Landing barges were fired on, and some were sunk as they neared the shore, but the landings were carried out at all points that had been selected.
A Ranger battalion captured Arzeu, about thirty miles northeast of Oran, and shortly afterward Allied supply ships commenced un loading cargo . Several miles east of Arzeu, Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, landed and moved southwest to seize the air fields at Tafaraoui and La Senia. The 16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams from the 1st Infantry Division were brought ashore near Arzeu and started an advance toward Oran .

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To the west the 26th Regimental Combat, Team ( 1st Infantry Division ) landed at Les Andalouses and struck eastward toward Oran under orders to seize the dominating heights west of the city. An armored detachment came ashore northwest of Lourmel and moved to take the airfield at that place.
In an attempted frontal assault, two cutters carrying two com panies of American troops and special antisabotage parties broke through the booms and dashed into the harbor of Oran. Here they came under an overwhelming fire from shore batteries and French warcraft. They reached their objective, but were set ablaze and disabled. Most of the crews and the troops aboard became casual ties ; the survivors were captured.
Initially the only other serious opposition to these operations came from a coastal battery above Arzeu, but resistance developed apace during the day as our troops began to advance on Oran.
By nightfall of the 8th, Combat Command B had captured the airfield at Tafaraoui and had moved northward toward La Senia. The 16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams had advanced a dis tance of eighteen miles from Arzeu, meeting increasing resistance as they neared Oran. The 26th Regimental Combat Team from Les Andalouses had moved eastward to the vicinity of Oran after over coming some opposition. The'airfield at Lourmel had been occupied.
The plans for the paratroop mission went largely astray. The formation became partially scattered by a storm, and those planes that did get through landed at widely separated points on the Sebkra, a dried- up salt marsh. About 300 paratroopers were finally assem bled in the vicinity of Tafaraoui, where they ably assisted the ground troops in securing that airfield .
During 9 November enemy resistance continued to slow the ad vance at almost all points. La Senia airfield held out until after dark. However, Tafaraoui airfield , which had fallen on the 8th, was being used by aircraft from the Twelfth Air Force as the build-up of the forces ashore continued.
Early on the 10th the converging infantry colums were in position around the outskirts of Oran, and elements of the armored combat command were close to the southern edge of the city. Following a coordinated attack by all units at 0737 hours, the armored troops penetrated into the city, and at 1230 General Fredendall received the formal capitulation of the French commander.
Eastern Task Force.- As events developed, the Algiers area, the most important of the three major objectives, proved to be the easiest to secure. The sea was calm, and surprise was achieved. There

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was some opposition from naval and coast-defense guns, which con tinued to fire until silenced by Allied naval and air units, but for the most part the landings were unopposed.
As had the other two forces, the Eastern Task Force arrived off its objective on schedule during the night of 7-8 November, and land ings proceeded at three beaches. West of Algiers the 168th Regi mental Combat Team made the initial landing at Cape Ferruch.
Friendly French officers, who were prepared to cooperate with the American forces, surrendered Fort Sidi Ferruch at 0300 hours with out firing a shot. Armored cars and tanks were landed, and the advance eastward toward Algiers commenced. Three miles from the city some opposition from Vichy sympathizers was encountered, but by early afternoon the Americans were able to continue their movement toward the city.
Meanwhile a landing was made near Castiglione by British Com
mando troops, who advanced southward and quickly occupied the airfield at Blida. Soon fighters from the British naval air force arrived and began to use the airfield . The Commandos then moved eastward to cut off the city of Algiers from land communication to the southwest.
While the landings west of Algiers were being accomplished, the American 39th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced by a battalion of British Commandos, landed on beaches near Ain Taya, fifteen miles east of the city. One column immediately headed for the chief objective, the big Maison Blanche airdrome, while another moved on Algiers. The airdrome was taken at 0830 hours, after some slight resistance was overcome at Fort de l'Eau and after a brush with French tanks near the airfield . A little later a squadron of Hurri canes, which had left Gibraltar at dawn, landed safely.
In the meantime, as at Oran, a direct attack on the harbor to gain
control of harbor equipment and prevent sabotage met with violent opposition. Two British destroyers and two American coastal load ers were severly damaged, and although a few Commandos were put ashore, the attempt to take Algiers by frontal assault failed.
By the afternoon of the 8th the converging American columns had
completed the encirclement of Algiers and the rail, highway, and air communications were in Allied hands. During the day the task force commander, Major General Charles W. Ryder, went ashore to confer with a representative of Admiral Darlan. They reached an agree ment that all resistance should cease and that our forces should occupy the city at 1900 hours, 8 November.

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COMMENTS
The surrender of Casablanca ended the initial ( landing ) phase of the operations. Months of preparation and three days of fighting had placed almost all French North Africa in Allied hands. Amer ican casualties totaled about 770 killed or missing and 1050 wounded. The British lost 240 killed or missing and sixty wounded.
Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of the operation was the organization of a combined force of American and British ground, air, and naval forces under one combined staff and the move ment of this force thousands of miles to make simultaneous combat landings at widely separated points on a hostile shore. The landings, involving over 100,000 troops, hundreds of airplanes, and 258 ships and war vessels, had truly written a new chapter in amphibious warfare.
The political aspects of the landings, particularly the recognition of Darlan, became a subject of much discussion. The comments of General Marshall in an official report are most pertinent :
General Eisenhower had announced that General Giraud would
be responsible for civil and military affairs in North Africa, but
the French military officials on the ground were found to be loyal
to Marshal Pétain's government. President Roosevelt's note to the
French Chief of State had assured Marshal Pétain of our desire for
a liberated France, but the Vichy answer was disappointing. Our ambassador was handed his passport on 9 November, and orders
were dis*****ed from Vichy to French African units to resist our
forces, which by then had already accomplished their missions ex
cepte on the Casablanca front.
Unexpectedly , Admiral Jean Darlan, Pétain's designated suc
cessor and commander in chief of all French forces, was found to be
in Algiers. . . . He was taken into protective custody, and when it was found that the French leaders stood loyal to the Vichy govern
ment, a series of conferences immediately followed with the purpose
of calling a halt to the French resistance against General Patton's
task force in the vicinity of Casablanca. When, on the morning of
11 November, the Germans invaded unoccupied France, Admiral
Darlan rejected the pseudo-independent Vichy government, assumed
authority in North Africa in the name of Marshal Pétain, and pro
mulgated an order to all French commanders in North Africa to
cease hostilities . This order reached Casablanca a few minutes be
fore the final American assault was to be launched on the early
morning of 11 November.
These events, which transpired subsequent to the actual landings on 8 November, required quick decisions, and the results finally achieved fully vindicated the American military leaders. Through out the North African campaign the problem of welding the French into a united and cooperative ally was a heavy burden which fell to

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General Eisenhower in addition to his purely military duties. The gist of the commitment signed by Admiral Darlan was that the French were to give the Allies immediately as much active assistance in the seizure of Tunisia as lay within their powers. They were to organize the government of North Africa, under Darlan, for effec tive cooperation and, under General Giraud's leadership, were to begin the reorganization of selected military forces for active par ticipation in the fighting. The way was now paved toward attaining the principal objective, the occupation of Tunisia and the annihila tion of German forces in Africa.
The principal factors that contributed to the success of the land
ings in French North Africa were : ( 1 ) strategic surprise, ( 2 ) lack of organized French resistance, and ( 3 ) effective joint military naval planning and execution. Errors were made in the execution of the plans, but these were to be expected from green troops. The experience was to serve them in good stead in the future.
By the end of November there had been a definite turning point
in the Allied military situation as a whole. General Montgomery had commenced the pursuit of the remnants of Rommel's army across Egypt and Libya, the Americans and British had landed successfully in French North Africa and had started the invasion of Tunisia, and the Russians had begun their winter offensive at Stalingrad. All of these offensive steps gathered momentum with each passing month. The initiative had passed to the Allies, and for the first time during the war the German military situation had deteriorated to an enforced strategic defensive. The tide had like wise turned in the Pacific Americans had invaded the Solomons at Guadalcanal and had secured the lifeline to Australia. The Jap anese were being forced from southeastern New Guinea, and the Allies had started on the long road back to the Philippines.
TUNISIAN CAMPAIGN
The conclusion of the landing phase paved the way for the next operation, the Tunisian campaign ( Map 3 ) . This campaign, which was to last six months, will be divided into three phases. The first will cover the race between the Allies and the Axis to build up a force in the Bizerte-Tunis area strong enough to deny the loser this key terrain. The Germans were to win this race by a narrow mar gin. The second phase will comprise the period of Axis initiative, during which time the Germans were to develop and expand a strong perimeter defense around their holdings in Tunisia. The third phase

15
will include the decisive period of the campaign : the Allied victory at Mareth, the capture of Bizerte and Tunis, and the subsequent surrender of all Axis forces in North Africa.
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Over its whole length and breadth Tunisia varies greatly both in terrain and climate. Five hundred miles long from north to south and 150 miles wide from east to west, its surface consists of a con fused mountainous zone in the north, an area of lower plateaus in the center, and broad plains in the south gradually merging into the sands of the Sahara Desert.
The mountains in the north are the eastern extremity of that chain of the Atlas Mountains that begins in southern Morocco and runs entirely across French North Africa in a northeasterly direction. They are rocky and steep and near Souk Ahras reach an altitude of over 4200 feet.
The extreme eastern spurs of these mountains, known as the Grand Dorsal, extend to the south of Tunis in the shape of an in verted “ V ” . From the apex of the “ V ” , near Pont du Fahs, the eastern arm, called the Eastern Dorsal, runs south 125 miles to Mak nassy, thence southwest to the vicinity of El Guettar. Crossed by few passes - Fondouk, Faid, Maknassy, and El Guettar — this East ern Dorsal would, with Chott Djerid ( a large salt lake ) , provide a natural defense of the Allied right flank against any attacker from the east or south. This terrain was to be the scene of much bitter fighting during the Tunisian campaign.
The western arm of the “ V ” , the Western Dorsal, extends south west from Pont du Fahs and forms a secondary barrier against attack from the east or south. The important passes through this range are Maktar, Sbiba, Kasserine, Dernia, and El Abiod. Tebessa,
on the western slope of the dorsal, is an important communications center and a key to the southern front.
In the north the Medjerda River, the most important stream, winds northeast from the mountains to the Gulf of Tunis. Medjez el Bab is the key to this corridor to Tunis. It was to become an important defensive position covering Allied lines of communication to the west.
There are few good roads in Tunisia. The main roads are usually hard -surfaced ( tarred ) but narrow. Secondary roads are sometimes well metalled, but more often are little more than dirt tracks. After a few hours of rain many so-called roads become practically impass able for motor transport, while in prolonged dry weather they de teriorate rapidly. Where they pass through the hills, the roads often

16
become defiles for long distances. During military operations they can be blocked with mine fields and covered by fire from the high ground commanding them on either side. Thus the defiles and passes were to become important objectives during the Tunisian campaign .
There are three routes of entry into Tunisia from Algeria. First is the coast road through Bone. Another route, through Souk Ahras, some forty miles inland, leads to the Tunis - Bizerte area either by way of Souk el Arba or by the more southerly road through Le Kef. Access to central and southern Tunisia is through Tebessa, from which point roads lead northeastward to Medjez el Bab and Tunis, eastward through Kasserine to the passes at Fondouk and Faid, and southeastward through Gafsa to Sfax and Gabes.
The railroads are of especial importance in this region of few
good highways. However, the deterioration of the roadbeds and the French rolling stock was to make even this form of transporta tion extremely unreliable. Operating in the level coastal plains of Tunis and southern Tunisia, the enemy was to have the definite advantage of shorter and better communications.
The period of heaviest rains begins in late November and continues
through February. During this season the lowlands, particularly, become a glutinous sea of mud.
THE RACE FOR TUNISIA , November - December 1942
Having secured the initial objectives of Casablanca, Oran, and
Algiers, the Allies turned immediately to the next phase, the concen tration of the bulk of American and French Moroccan and Algerian forces in the Casablanca-Oran area and the advance of the British First Army to Tunisia. According to General Eisenhower :
Our chief hope of anticipating the Axis in Tunisia lay in our act
ing with utmost speed. Indeed, we were involved in a race not only
against the building up of enemy forces at Tunis and Bizerte, but
against the weather as well. There was less than a month of fair
weather ahead, and Axis air and ground forces were within easy
striking distance of Tunis and Bizerte, less than 100 miles away
from these places across the Sicilian narrows. All the same, our
easternmost force was at Algiers, 560 miles west of Tunis. Neces
sarily, therefore, we had to rely on a rapid advance of very light
forces, understrength in both personnel and equipment.
To make matters worse, the enemy lost no time in meeting the Allied invasion. On 9 November German air transports began fly ing troops into the Bizerte - Tunis area. Here again the French reaction exasperated the Allies. Admiral Esteva, the French Resi dent, listened to Vichy and, despite Darlan's armistice directive, pre

17
pared the way for the German entry. French troops under General Barre, who was pro-Ally, were ordered out of Tunis, and the city was left defenseless. Later General Barre's forces joined the Allies, but in the meantime the Germans found airfield and dock facilities ready for their use.
On 9 November General Anderson arrived at Algiers to take over command of the British First Army. His plan was to seize all ports and airfields to the east ( Bougie, Djidjelli, Philippeville, Bone, and La Calle) as rapidly as possible and then to rush his forces forward by motor transport, landing craft, and troop-carrying aircraft. The port of Bougie and the airfield at Djidjelli were the first objectives.
The floating reserve of the Eastern Task Force, part of the British 78th Division, was still aboard ships at Algiers. It sailed on the evening of 10 November to take the first objectives of the eastward drive. The capture of Bougie on 11 November was unopposed, but because of bad surf conditions the force was unable to take the Djid jelli airfield until the 13th. During this interim lack of adequate land-based air cover permitted the Germans to bomb Bougie harbor, where they damaged a British aircraft carrier.
Bone was occupied on 12 November by two companies of a British parachute battalion dropped from C-47's of the American 65th Car rier Command and a British Commando battalion brought in by water. The only Axis opposition to this move was a heavy raid on the airfield that night. The build -up of troops in the Bone area con tinued as rapidly as possible, air, sea, rail, and vehicular transpor tation being utilized. The advance to the east was pressed, and by 15 November leading elements of the 36th Brigade of the 78th Divi sion had occupied Tabarka, only eighty miles from Tunis. A British paratroop battalion which had been dropped at Souk el Arba on the 16th had moved beyond Beja by the 17th, and the troops at Tabarka had advanced to Djebel Abiod.
At the same time the Allies were securing airfields to the south. On 15 November Colonel Edson D. Raff's 503d Parachute Battalion, an American unit, dropped at Youks les Bains and two days later occupied the Gafsa airfield , far to the south. It sent patrols over the entire southern area , meeting only small Italian forces. Raff Force, as it came to be known, established cordial relations with the French garrison at Tebessa, which promptly began cooperating with the Americans in patrolling the area.
Evidence of French cooperation appeared on 16 November, when reports were received of French and German patrols clashing in the Beja -- Debjel Abiod-Mateur area. Although General Barre had been negotiating with the Germans since their arrival, the advance of the

18
Allies into Tunisia had won the support of the French forces, and Barre now agreed that his troops would cover the concentration of the 78th Division in the Tabarka - Souk el Arba area. On 17 Novem ber General Anderson issued orders to the 78th to complete its con centration and prepare for an advance on Tunis.
About this time the Axis fighting strength was estimated at 500 to 1000 in the Tunis area and about 4000 at Bizerte, with some tanks and aircraft at each place. At the same time JU- 52's were averaging more than fifty landings a day at Bizerte. The enemy had occupied Mateur and had pushed out west and south .
The Allied expeditionary force that had rushed into Tunisia was formed principally of two brigades of the British 78th Infantry Di vision and one battalion of the 17th Lancers, reinforced by light tanks from the American 1st Armored Division. It was realized that such a small force, only a few thousand men in all, could not hope to take Tunis and Bizerte if the Germans succeeded in bringing in heavy reinforcements. Yet at the time it was the largest force that could be supplied over the long and difficult line of communica tion.
Follow-up convoys arrived at Bone as rapidly as possible, and as soon as transportation was unloaded, the newly arrived elements of the British First Army continued overland to the east ( Map 4a ) . By 20 November British armor, known as Blade Force, was established in the Souk el Arba area, and by 22 November the 11th Brigade Group * of the 78th Division was concentrated in the Beja area.
Operations in the north were now to take place along three clearly defined axes : ( 1 ) the road from Tabarka to Mateur, ( 2) the Beja Mateur road, and ( 3 ) the main highway running from Beja through Medjez el Bab and Tebourba to Tunis.
While the Allies were desperately trying to build up their advance units and bring up supplies, the enemy seized the initiative by at tacking the French at Medjez el Bab on 18 and 19 November. The ill-equipped French were assailed three times by infantry supported by artillery, tanks, and dive bombers, which inflicted casualties of 25 per cent on the defenders. The French retired until reinforced by British and American armor and artillery, when they counter attacked . At the same time another Axis attack at Djebel Abiod was stopped by the leading battalion of the 36th Brigade.
Although the British had been able to hold the enemy in check , they were themselves unable to advance, and were ordered to delay temporarily until their strength was sufficient to insure a reasonable
* A British brigade group is similar to our regimental combat team.

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chance of success in the drive to Tunis. Also, the intermixture of French and British units that had occurred as a result of improvisa tion following the French decision to act with the Allies had to be straightened out. By 23 November a verbal agreement had been reached whereby all troops north of the line Le Kef - Zaghouan should be under command of the British First Army, while all units south of that line should be subject to French command. This was unsatisfactory, but it was the best that could be achieved at the moment, since the French had refused to serve under a British commander.
On 24 November General Anderson had completed the forward concentration of the 78th Division and Blade Force, with the British 6th Armored Division en route to Teboursouk and Combat Com mand B of the American 1st Armored Division en route to Souk el Arba as follow - up troops. The advance was resumed, Blade Force penetrating the enemy outpost position to a point midway between Tebourba and Mateur and the 11th Brigade, on the right, advancing down the Medjerda valley, where it captured Medjez el Bab on the 25th . Progress was steady for the next three days, with the 11th Brigade, reinforced by American and British armor, moving astride the river to take Tebourba the night of 26-27 November. On 28 No vember our forces reached Djedeida, less than sixteen miles from Tunis. This proved to be the farthest advance toward Tunis until the final drive of the campaign , six months later.
To the north the 36th Brigade, although advancing about ten miles toward Mateur, met increasing resistance from enemy minés and booby traps. At the same time Blade Force, in the plains south of Mateur, began to meet supply difficulties, which were aggravated by the first rains . In all sections the enemy's dive bombers were an important factor in stopping our advance, since our airfields were too far to the rear to provide the necessary cover.
The forward positions were held until 1 December, when von Ar nim, the German commander, launched an attack with dive bombers, tanks, and infantry against Blade Force near Tebourba. After los ing forty tanks, Blade Force was withdrawn, and the sector was taken over by Combat Command B and the 11th Brigade. On 3 December the enemy attacked again , the 11th Brigade suffering heavily both in men and equipment. By this time several battalions of the 78th Division had less than 350 men.
On 8 December General Eisenhower approved General Anderson's proposal to withdraw his forces to more defensible ground. How ever, the important center of Medjez el Bab was to be held at all costs. The weather proved a serious handicap to this withdrawal.

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Combat Command B became badly mired and was finally forced to abandon the larger part of its equipment, retrieving only three of its eighteen 105-mm. howitzers, twelve of its sixty-two medium tanks, and thirty -eight of its 122 light tanks. This was a serious loss, since the continual fighting and serious attrition, together with the inadequate rail and highway communications, had hindered the build-up of reserves. The weather was turning our few available airfields into quagmires while the Axis planes, operating from paved fields, maintained air supremacy over the forward areas, compound
ing the confusion and handicaps confronting the Allies.
It was
estimated that on 30 November the Germans had 15,500 combat troops, 130 tanks, sixty field guns, and thirty antitank guns in the Tunis-Bizerte area. By 18 December this force had grown to a total of 42,000 men, of whom about 25,000 were Germans, and reinforce ments were still arriving.
During November and early December southern Tunisia was al most a no man's land, but several hundred Germans arrived in Gabes, Sfax, and Sousse by troop-carrier planes and garrisoned those towns. Enemy patrols of armored cars and light tanks pressed westward and occupied Pont du Fahs.
Farther south the American paratroops, who had dropped at Youks les Bains and had joined with French forces in that area, patrolled actively. The mission of the few hundred American and French troops in central and southern Tunisia was to make the enemy be lieve that they were a whole division. They rushed up and down their hundred-mile front, appearing here and there to threaten the Germans along the coast. They fought numerous skirmishes with enemy patrols and effectively protected the southern flank of the First Army.
Unwilling to give up the race for Tunisia, General Eisenhower decided to launch another attack in the north about 20 December with Tunis as the objective. But the weather continued to be a most formidable enemy. Vehicular movement off paved roads was im possible, and two thirds of the Allied aircraft at the principal field , at Souk el Arba, were inoperative because of mud. The supply lines were inadequate to meet the needs for steel matting and equipment to place the airfields in condition or, for that matter, to provide the required build-up of general supplies, particularly ammunition.
Since the Allied hope in this last planned offensive lay in air power and artillery, the operation was postponed and then, on 24 Decem ber, finally abandoned.

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General Eisenhower has expressed his feelings on the situation in these words :
The abandonment of our immediate offensive plans was the bit
terest disappointment that I had yet suffered, but I was convinced
that to attempt a major attack under prevailing conditions in
northern Tunisia would be merely to court disaster. We could not
hope to resume major operations in the north until the middle of March, and we had to set about the slow business of building up
for an attack at the end of that period. The logistic marathon,
which I had desperately tried to avoid, had begun .
During these last two months of 1942 other events which had some bearing on the military situation were transpiring. When the Ger mans moved into unoccupied France and toward the naval base at Toulon on 11 November, Admiral Darlan ordered the French fleet to sail for Africa. But in the confusion of the situation the fleet was scuttled instead, only a few submarines getting through to North Africa. Darlan was more successful in his next attempt to aid the Allies. He was able to persuade M. Boisson, the governor of French West Africa, to join the Liberation Movement and to open Dakar for use as an Allied base. When Admiral Darlan was assassinated on 24 December, General Giraud took his place. General Juin be came the commander of the French military forces.
At this time the bulk of the American forces (the Fifth Army * ) , along with two divisions of French troops from Morocco and the French division in Oran, were being held in the Casablanca-Oran area to guard communications, to counter any drive the Germans might make through Spanish Morocco, and to conduct training in preparation for future missions.
Comments . — The Allied move to seize Tunisia was a necessary step in the continuation of the strategic offensive in North Africa. Axis efforts to thwart the attempt were an equally essential step in carrying out the strategic defensive to which they had been reduced by their defeat in the Battle of El Alamein.
Two main reasons impelled the Axis command to an all-out defense of Tunisia. The first was that only by holding that area could they hope to extricate the troops and equipment of Rommel's army from their serious predicament. The second was that it was imperative to delay the Allied attack against Europe for as long a period as possible in order to gain time to prepare the necessary defenses.
* The Fifth Army, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark commanding, was acti vated on 5 January 1943. Its headquarters was at Oujda, Morocco. The troops assigned included the 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored Division.

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Allied strategy in North Africa ceased to be a mystery to the Ger mans the moment they were advised that the landings had taken place, and from that time on the element of strategic surprise ceased to weigh against them . Surprise had contributed greatly to the success of the initial operations, but was lacking entirely during the early period of the Allied thrust into Tunisia.
In this connection it is interesting to note the reply of a high
ranking German officer, Field Marshal Kesselring, to an American interrogation in May 1946. Kesselring was asked what intelligence the Germans had of our landings in North Africa . He replied :
We were, in fact, in possession of very exact information con
cerning activity in the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and were already
fully prepared for a possible landing. I myself was the only person who believed in the possibility of a landing in Algiers. The German and Italian high command, however, did not share this view . Your radio broadcast service functioned faultlessly in this respect. It
kept us constantly in a state of excitement and carried on an ad mirable form of nerve war, so that we were forced to expect some
sort of invasion at any time and yet did not know from which direc
tion it was to be expected.
Once the facts were appraised by the Germans, they acted with speed and efficiency. In so doing they won the race for Tunisia, succeeded in postponing the invasion of Italy for six months, and gained time in which to strengthen their Continental defenses. But we shall see later what price they paid for this.
The Allied command recognized the strategic importance of Tu
nisia. From the very beginning it was known that once Tunis and Bizerte were captured, all Tunisia would fall. We have seen why initial landing points farther to the east than Algiers were not selected . There remain then only two questions to be answered : ( 1 ) Why was only a small force sent to Tunisia ? ( 2 ) Why was it
unable to win the race to Tunis ? Both questions have the same answer : the lack of supply facilities for larger forces either on the ground or in the air. Handicapped by lack of transport and slowed by long supply routes, the Allied commander could send only a small combat force into Tunisia. When this force was stopped and then driven back by the enemy, it became necessary to enter the “ logistical marathon” referred to by . General Eisenhower.
PERIOD OF AXIS INITIATIVE, January - March 1943
Allied Plans and Build- up ( Map 4b ) .-In early January the Tuni
sian front extended from the Chott Djerid in the south to the Medi terranean in the north, a distance of some 250 miles. Through the

23
Sahara, south of the area shown on the map, roamed small patrols of the French Camel Corps. The American paratroops held the desert and wasteland area around Gafsa and up to Faid Pass. Ele ments of the American 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions were beginning to arrive in this area.
Around Pichon and Fondouk and farther north the French XIX Corps held positions in the hills and controlled the Ousseltia valley. * These forces were lightly armed with obsolete weapons and had neither the transport nor the administrative machinery for offensive operations. But under the able leadership of Generals Juin and Koeltz they maintained high morale, and by the end of the campaign cooperation with the other Allies was excellent.
The remainder of the front, north to the sea at Cape Serrat, was held by the British First Army, as yet an army in name only. At this time it consisted of only the V Corps, which was composed of the 6th Armored and the 78th Infantry Divisions and the 139th Brigade. Thus during early January a front of 250 miles was held by the *****alent of three British, part of one American, and three weak French divisions.
To oppose the Allies at this time, General von Arnim appears to have had three German and three Italian divisions. In approxi mately two months he had expanded the beachheads of Sousse, Sfax, and Gabes into a more or less continuous coastal corridor in order to insure communication and close cooperation between his own forces and those of Rommel, then approaching the Mareth position.
With the abandonment for the time being of offensive plans in the north, the situation on the long stretch of front from Pont du Fahs to Gafsa deserved close attention. A successful Axis attack through our weakly held positions there could carry through to the Mediter ranean coast in the Bone area and completely isolate the British First Army. As a counterplan the Allies developed the " Sfax Project,” a plan for an Allied offensive against Gabes and Sfax which would be mounted in the Tebessa - Kasserine area. Besides regain ing the initiative, this operation, if successful, would interrupt the line of communication between Rommel and von Arnim and secure the south flank of the British First Army. The prospects of better weather in this area were encouraging, but it would be difficult to find the troops for the operation and more difficult to supply them .
* Commanded by General Koeltz, this corps contained most of the available French forces from Tunisia and Algeria—about three divisions that consisted mostly of native troops.
As previously stated, General Juin had command of all the French forces.

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On 1 January 1943 the American II Corps, Major General Freden dall commanding, was detached from the Center Task Force at Oran and sent to Tunisia. The II Corps, which had as a nucleus the American 1st Armored Division, completed its concentration in the Kasserine-Tebessa area on 15 January and proceeded with plans for the attack to be launched on the 23d. However, information was received on 15 January that it would be impossible to coordinate this attack with the advance of General Montgomery's army, since Montgomery would not reach Tripoli until the last week in January. This caused General Eisenhower to abandon the Sfax offensive alto gether, it now being considered too risky. After this change of plan the 1st Infantry Division, less the 18th and 26th Regimental Combat Teams, was attached to the French XIX Corps, farther north.
The approach of the British Eighth Army made it necessary to plan an extensive reorganization to achieve unity of command in the Allied land, sea, and air forces. At the Casablanca conference in mid-January President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that such a reorganization should take place when the campaign had reached the proper stage and when the necessary preparations had been completed. General Eisenhower was placed in command of the new North African The ater of Operations and relieved of responsibility for the European Theater. General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, British comman der in chief in the Middle East, was to become Eisenhower's deputy and was to command the Eighteenth Army Group, consisting of the British First and Eighth Armies, the American II Corps, and the French troops on the Tunisian front. Air units were to be organized into the Mediterranean Air Command, under Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was to become naval commander in chief in the Mediterranean. As we shall see, it was to be another month before these arrangements could be put into effect.
By late January von Arnim's army of 65,000 was receiving about 750 men per day and large quantities of supplies. Therefore, to build up the Allied forces and to interdict the enemy's build-up be came the guiding and virtually the sole aim of Allied strategy in Tunisia. Steps were taken to improve the Allied supply setup and to develop air strength over Tunisia.
All port and transportation facilities were geared to maximum capacity ( Map 3 ) . The First Army was based at Bone and used the supply roads through La Calle and Souk Ahras. The supplies for the American II Corps were moved from Oran and Algiers by rail to the new Eastern Base Section depots at Constantine and from

25
there to advanced supply points in the vicinity of Tebessa. The American Twelfth Air Force was supplied by rail and road from Philippeville.
Air and naval forces cooperated in the twofold task of protecting our supply lines and disrupting the enemy's. Fighter elements of the Eastern Air Command were based at Souk el Arba as air support for the First Army. Similarly the XII Air Support Command was brought up to the Thelepte and Youks les Bains airfields for the support of the II Corps. B- 17's were grouped near Biskra, and the mediums were based on Constantine. Both American and British planes concentrated primarily on Tunisian targets but began to range as far as Sicily and Sardinia. Malta -based Beaufighters and Spitfires aided Allied efforts by striking at Tripolitania and Tunisia and at Axis air trains over the Sicilian channel. During the first week of January 520 operational planes of the Twelfth Air Force and 250 of the Royal Air Force were in Northwest Africa.
Contrary to popular impression , it was estimated that 90 per cent of the flow of men and supplies across the Sicilian narrows was sea borne and that only 10 per cent was sent in by air. This Axis water route with its excellent air cover was much less vulnerable than the long coastal route of the Allies between Bone and Algiers. More over, during the first three months of operations the Allied ports,
particularly Bone, were subject to constant and sometimes heavy air raids.
Operations, 1 January - 14 February 1943 ( Map 4b ) .- While the Allies were " cleaning up their administrative tail" ( a phrase coined by General Montgomery ) , the Germans held undisputed possession of the initiative. That they appreciated the precarious position of the Allies is indicated by the following extract from an Allied Force Headquarters report :
In a captured German document, dated December 16th, we found
set forth Field Marshal Rommel's “ Appreciation of Situation , ”
which underlined all our weaknesses of communication and supply,
stressed the conglomerate nature of our forces by a shrewd observa
tion that such a force " probably lacks cohesion and suffers from the inherent weakness of an Allied command ," and succinctly sum
marized our pr em in the French sector : “ Facing Gabes and
Sousse are the elements of three French divisions , all ill-equipped
and of doubtful morale."
Operating from the Kairouan area, the enemy on 2 January launched an attack on the French position at Fondouk. The garri son was surrounded and Fondouk captured. Although the Pinchon gap into the Ousseltia valley was threatened , the enemy did not exploit his success.

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The next German thrust came on 18 January at the junction point of the British and French sectors in the Bou Arada - Pont du Fahs area . The initial attacks, in which the new Mark VI ( " Tiger " ) tank made its debut, were stopped by the British, but not before Bou Arada was threatened. The same day the enemy attacked from Pont du Fahs southwest toward Robaa in a drive that if successful would isolate the French in the mountains to the east.
During the next thirty - six hours Allied forces moved to meet the Axis advance. The British 6th Armored Division regrouped in the Bou Arada area and sent a squadron of tanks and some artillery to help the French troops while Combat Command B of the American 1st Armored Division moved up to Maktar. The American II Corps, to the south, was assembling elements of the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions in the vicinity of Sbeitla for use as a reserve.
On 19 January the British counterattacked , advancing nine miles east of Bou Arada and clearing the road north of that town. Never theless, the enemy drive to the southwest continued, and Robaa was occupied. This forced the French forces to withdraw to the west,
the British V Corps conforming by pulling back its right flank . Axis troops attacked again on 20 January, reaching Ousseltia that night and isolating French units that had been holding out in the Eastern Dorsal.
During the next few days the Allied forces began to restore the situation. Elements of the British 6th Armored Division advanced on the Robaa-Pont du Fahs road, and Combat Command B moved into positions at the south end of the Ousseltia valley, where it was able to extricate the isolated French units. At this time additional American forces from the 1st Infantry Division arrived to strengthen the Allied lines.
By 25 January the enemy's attack had spent its force, and the positions became stabilized. On that date General Eisenhower, with the concurrence of the French, appointed General Anderson of the British First Army commander of all Allied ground forces in Tu nisia. General Anderson assigned the American II Corps the re sponsibility for the sector south of Fondouk—where it had been operating.
The enemy did not remain quiet for long. On 30 January he shifted his main effort and attacked the French troops that were holding Faid Pass, a position that screened the American 1st Ar mored Division. Supported by sixty tanks, the Axis force captured the town of Faid and made further penetrations to the south and west, although the French retained the road junction at Sidi Bou

27
Zid, a few miles west of Faid. Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division, at Sbeitla, was at once ordered east in support. Combat Command D * was ordered to relieve enemy pressure on the French by attacks eastward from Gafsa. This force of Amer ican armor and infantry attacked Sened, where it was contained by the enemy. Meanwhile Combat Command C moved northeast to cut the Sidi bou Zid-Maknassy road. After reaching Sidi bou Zid on the afternoon of the 31st, it turned south toward Maknassy.
Although the Allies succeeded in denying the enemy further gains, the ground lost could not be retaken. Combat Command A attacked Faid on the morning of 1 February, but after fruitless assaults that continued during the next day the action was broken off. To the
south the armored units captured Sened but during 3 and 4 February were withdrawn from the Gafsa area and concentrated with other II Corps units near Sbeitla. This move was ordered by General Anderson because of the situation at Faid and exaggerated reports of enemy concentrations between Ousseltia and Kairouan.
As a result of the enemy attacks from the middle of January to the early days of February the Allied defensive barrier along the Eastern Dorsal had been seriously weakened , and the arrival of Rommel's forces in southern Tunisia had made the situation even less secure. There was no other alternative but to withdraw the poorly equipped French units from the line so that they could be issued modern weapons and trained in their use. Troops of the American 34th Infantry Division began to take over portions of the French sector. The front remained quiet from 5 to 14 February, during which time both sides made strenuous efforts to bring up additional supplies and reinforcements.
During the period from early November 1942 to the end of Jan uary 1943 the British Eighth Army, it will be recalled, had pursued Rommel's army across most of Egypt and Libya. On 23 January the Eighth Army had entered Tripoli, and that fine port was at last in Allied hands. Rommel continued his retreat toward the Tunisian frontier, which he crossed on 4 February. In exactly three months the Eighth Army had advanced 1400 miles from El Alamein, and as a result its administrative services were stretched to the limit. Before offensive operation could be resumed, the port of Tripoli had to be placed in service so that reserves of supplies could be built up. Eight weeks were to pass after the entry into Tripoli before Mont gomery's army was ready for the opening phase of the Battle of

A provisional force made up principally of the 1st Armored Division's artil *
lery headquarters, a battalion of the 168th Infantry ( 34th Division ) , an armored battalion, and a battalion of armored artillery.


28
Mareth. This was to be a period of some anxiety to the Allied com manders, for while the Eighth Army was making its preparations and the remainder of the Allied forces were building up their strength , the enemy troops in Tunisia were free to devote their full attention to the British First Army and the American II Corps, thinly stretched out over a wide front. With Rommel's divisions available, the total Axis strength in Tunisia had increased to approxi mately 200,000 combat troops.
Battle of Kasserine Pass, 14-26 February 1943 ( Map 5 ) .—During the first two weeks of February an extensive regrouping of Allied forces took place. In the II Corps sector the 1st Armored Division, less detachments, was assigned a front of about fifty miles from
Djebel Trozza, near Fondouk, to Djebel Ksaira, south of Faid Pass. Combat Command B was attached to the British at Maktar. Com bat Command A and the 168th Regimental Combat Team of the 34th Division moved into the Sidi Bou Zid area, where the 168th was placed in defensive positions on Djebel Ksaira and Djebel Lessouda ( positions that were not mutually supporting) to cover Faid Pass. Combat Command C was concentrated at Hadjeb el Aioun, and the remainder of the 1st Armored Division was at Sbeitla. The 26th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division was in the Feriana area.
The Germans did not remain passive for long, for at dawn on 14 February they launched a determined attack from Faid in the direction of Sbeitla - Kasserine and made a secondary attack from Maknassy, in the south. The enemy forces involved in these initial attacks were the entire 21st Panzer Division , which had been with drawn from Rommel's army in Tripolitania, and elements of the 10th Panzer Division, which had recently been re -equipped at Sfax. The immediate objective of the main attack, which was supported by artillery, motorized infantry, Stuka dive bombers, and fighter planes, was the road junction about five miles north of Sidi Bou Zid.
The enemy first overran a battalion of armored artillery on the slopes of Djebel Lessouda, near the road junction, and by 0715 hours had occupied the road junction itself with a force that included some twenty tanks. Allied forces on Djebels Lessouda and Ksaira were threatened with complete encirclement. One battalion of tanks of Combat Command A, supported by a battalion of artillery, launched a counterattack against the enemy south of Djebel Lessouda while the remainder of Combat Command A withdrew to the west to take up a defensive position at a road junction about ten miles northwest of Sidi Bou Zid.

29
Axis armor continued to pour through the pass. One column of about fifty tanks and some infantry flanked Djebel Lessouda from the north and west and drove on Sidi Bou Zid. After suffering very heavy losses, the American armored battalion and its artillery broke off the engagement and, reduced to the point of ineffectiveness, es caped to the west. The troops on Djebels Lessouda and Ksaira,
although still in fighting condition, were practically isolated by 1300 hours. Throughout the day the highways in the quadrangle Faid - Maknassy -Gafsa - Sbeitla swarmed with German armor and infantry. In the south one force of about thirty tanks had advanced northwest from Maknassy and by evening was threatening Sidi Bou Zid from the southwest. Another column was advancing along the Sened-Gafsa road. Gafsa, in danger of being cut off entirely, was evacuated in the evening, the troops there withdrawing to Feriana to protect the important airfields near Thelepte. A new defensive line was planned for the protection of Feriana and Sbeitla. During the night of 14-15 February Combat Command B was ordered south from Maktar to support the remainder of the 1st Armored Division.
General Fredendall ordered the 1st Armored Division to counter attack on the morning of 15 February. Accordingly Combat Com mand C moved south from Hadjeb el Aioun and with elements of Combat Command A and a British armored infantry battalion at tacked about 1600 hours on 15 February. As the leading battalion's armor approached the enemy defensive position, running north south through Sidi Bou Zid, a formation of German tanks was sighted , and within an hour a fierce running battle was in progress. Although the combat command reported the situation under control ,
appearances proved deceptive, for the frontal action of the enemy's tanks merely served to divert attention from a sweeping flanking maneuver already under way. The British battalion was following Combat Command C to exploit such success as the counterattack might achieve when suddenly it found both its right flank and rear under the deadly fire of a large German tank force. The Allied troops were then ordered to extricate themselves, and all units fell back rapidly except the leading armored battalion, which had not received the order. It was engulfed by the enemy. As the British had done at Knightsbridge, our tanks had charged blindly into an ambuscade. The units on Djebels Lessouda and Ksaira were now completely cut off, and any thought of going to their relief had to be abandoned.
Confused fighting continued east and southeast of Sbeitla during 16 February, dive bombers inflicting heavy personnel casualties on Combat Command A. By this time the II Corps had suffered serious

30
losses in equipment, ninety-eight medium tanks, fifty -seven half tracks, twelve 155-mm. howitzers, and seventeen 105-mm. howitzers having been lost. There was now no possibility of further counter attacks to hold the four armored divisions * that the enemy was employing, much less to restore the Allied strategic position.
Since this Axis drive endangered the position of the French XIX Corps on the Eastern Dorsal, the First Army commander ordered the withdrawal of all forces to the high ground of the Western Dor sal and the line Feriana - Kasserine - Sbeitla . A battalion of infantry from the 1st Infantry Division and a regiment of combat engineers were assigned the task of organizing a defensive position in Kas serine Pass, about six miles northwest of the town of Kasserine.
On 16 February General Fredendall directed the 1st Armored Division to hold Sbeitla at all costs until 1100 hours, 17 February, in order to secure time to establish the position at Kasserine. In compliance with this order the remnants of Combat Commands A and C were disposed south and east of the town. They were attacked by the enemy at 0900 hours on the 17th, but held their ground until 1500 hours, when Combat Command A moved north to the vicinity of Sbiba and C withdrew along the Sbeitla - Kasserine road. Combat Command B, having completed its movement from Maktar, covered the withdrawal. The entire 1st Armored Division was now ordered to concentrate about ten miles southeast of Tebessa as a reserve to meet any enemy drive through the defenses of the passes in the Western Dorsal-El Abiod, Dernia, and Kasserine.
By nightfall the Axis forces had occupied Sbeitla, Kasserine, and the Thelepte airfield and had infiltrated into the hills toward Kas serine Pass. The loss of the airfield was a serious blow to the Allies, but they had managed to evacuate most of the planes and stores and had destroyed what could not be moved.
By daylight of 18 February the American 34th Infantry Division ( less the 168th RCT) arrived at Sbiba to take over the defense of that pass and relieve Combat Command A, which was to join the rest of the 1st Armored Division southeast of Tebessa. Supported by the 18th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division and a British Guards brigade, the 34th Division sustained attacks by tanks and infantry during 18, 19, and 20 February in what was actually a strong diversionary maneuver to prevent reinforcements being sent south to Kasserine, where the enemy planned to make his major attack .
* The 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions and the Italian 131st Centauro Division.

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In Kasserine Pass the highway forks. One branch leads north to Thala, the loss of which would open the road to Le Kef and effec tively cut off the II Corps from other Allied forces to the north ; the other branch leads northwest to Tebessa, which was the key com munications center of the Allied southern front and the location of large supply installations.
Rommel consolidated his position and strengthened his forces in the Kasserine area on 18 February. On the 19th he made a recon naissance in force with a battalion of infantry supported by tanks, but the attack was not pressed when it met stout resistance, includ ing accurate American artillery fire. During the night, however, enemy units successfully infiltrated to high ground on both the north
ern and southern sides of the pass and from these vantage points brought effective mortar and small-arms fire on the defenders. At daybreak on the 20th a determined attack carried the pass, forcing the defending troops back toward Tebessa .
Fortunately the Allies had also been active during the night of 19-20 February. Brigadier Dumphie, commander of the British 26th Armored Brigade, organized a special task force of one com pany of motorized infantry, one armored squadron, one troop of antitank guns, a troop of motorized artillery, and a battalion of infantry and took position astride the Thala road about ten miles north of Kasserine Pass. It was this force that bore the brunt of the Axis attack on the 20th. The armored squadron lost all of its tanks, and the infantry battalion also suffered severe losses, but the force held grimly to its position.
During the night of 20-21 February some additional British forces moved up behind the task force to cover the Thala road, and others were posted astride the road three miles south of Thala. Combat Command B' was moved from the 1st Armored Division concentra tion area to a position on Djebel Hainra to cover the road to Tebessa.
On the 21st about forty enemy tanks attacked this position, but they were repulsed.
On the 21st a strong German force renewed the attack on the Thala road. The British continued to suffer heavy losses but held the enemy ten miles from Thala. Two field artillery battalions from the American 9th Division and part of the 16th Infantry Regiment ( 1st Infantry Division ) lent material assistance to the defense. *
During the night of 21-22 February the commanding general of the American 1st Armored Division was placed in command of all
* The 9th Division artillery made a spectacular forced march from west of Algiers to Tunisia. In less than 100 hours it covered 735 miles, despite narrow, congested roads and bitter weather.

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operations in the Thala - Kasserine - Djebel el Hainra sector. During the preceding few days command of the Allied troops in this area had changed several times, with much resultant confusion.
On 22 February the enemy again attacked north, the British on the Thala road being engaged by about fifty tanks. Some ground was yielded, but counterattacks restored the former positions. Dur ing the afternoon one battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, which had been attached to Combat Command B in the Djebel el Hainra sector, counterattacked against the German left flank. Launched from the vicinity of Ain Bou Dries and supported by some artillery from the 9th Division, this attack was completely successful, about 400 prisoners being captured . In large measure it was the cause of the enemy's decision to withdraw through the pass.
During the early phases of the fighting bad weather had hampered air operations, but at this time the skies cleared and the Allies were able to strike telling blows on the enemy columns. Aircraft of the XII Air Support Command flew most of the missions, but other ele ments of the air forces, reorganized during this period for closer coordination with the ground troops, were also of great assistance.
Early on the morning of 23 February the Germans began to with draw through Kasserine Pass. Mine fields and well-fought delaying actions prevented the Allies from doing them much damage during the pursuit. By 26 February they had reached the general line Hadjeb el Aioun - Sidi Bou Zid -Gafsa, where they remained .
Comments. The specific purposes of the Axis attacks during Jan uary and February were : ( 1 ) to capture the areas commanding the mountain passes and thus broaden the long coastal corridor in order to safeguard the communications between von Arnim's and Rom mel's armies ; ( 2 ) to make their airfields in the coastal areas safer from Allied interference ; and ( 3 ) to throw the Allied forces off balance before any coordinated attack could be launched. The Ger man high command felt that Tunisia could be held and during this phase continued to pour in men until 200,000 combat troops, three fifths of them German, were available by 1 March.
By mid-February over 500,000 Allied troops were in North Africa, and plans were being made for a large-scale offensive. Reinforce ments for the British First Army and the American II Corps were moving up, and Montgomery's Eighth Army was preparing to ap proach the Mareth Line in full force . But before the Allies were ready to strike, Rommel made his only really dangerous effort of the campaign when he struck at Faid Pass on 14 February. The initial reverses suffered by the American troops can be attributed to several

33
factors : ( 1 ) confusion in all ranks resulting from divided units and an improvised chain of command ; ( 2 ) inexperience of troops engaged ; ( 3 ) dispersion of forces over a wide front and lack of sufficient troops to provide adequate local reserves for the forward elements ; ( 4 ) unskillful use of terrain and available forces in the defense.
Many lessons were learned during the Faid-Kasserine operations, but probably the most valuable one was the age-old principle of the necessity for concentration of combat power. Once again it was demonstrated that so long as reserves remain available for employ ment in time and at the proper place, no situation is beyond repair, regardless of initial setbacks or the necessity for surrendering some ground.
Rommel failed in his objectives in spite of the piecemeal nature of the early resistance offered , particularly on the part of the very considerable armor we had in the Kasserine area. If he had thought he could exploit his breakthrough as far as Le Kef and seriously threaten the Allied communication lines, that quickly proved to be beyond his strength. If he intended merely a spoiling attack to do maximum damage to our equipment, he had succeeded in inflicting serious wounds without, however, affecting Allied strength more than temporarily. In any event, his sands were running out, and the turn of the tide at Kasserine proved to be the turn of the tide in all of Tunisia as well.
PERIOD OF ALLIED INITIATIVE, March-May 1943
General. — The French political situation was no longer a serious factor in military operations, and the diminishing threat of an Axis drive through Spanish Morocco released additional Allied troops for the Tunisian front. In spite of the reverses suffered during January and February, the Allied supply and troop build-up had continued.
The supply installations in the Tebessa area had been augmented to support the II Corps and the approaching British Eighth Army. The rains had ceased, roads had been improved, railroads had been rehabilitated , and gasoline pipelines had been constructed . Amer ican troops had received their baptism of fire, and in spite of the initial reverses suffered in clashing with the best the Germans had to offer, they had come out of the campaign battle-wise and tacti cally efficient.
To go back for a moment, the projected reorganization of the Allied command took place just at the time of the unsuccessful de fense of Kasserine Pass. Air Chief Marshal Tedder's Mediterra

34
nean Air Command became operational on 19 February, with Major General Carl Spaatz as commander of the subordinate Northwest African Air Force . * On the 20th Admiral Cunningham was an nounced as Commander in Chief, Mediterranean , ** and on the same day General Alexander assumed command of the Eighteenth Army Group.
General Alexander's first order regrouped the Tunisian forces and returned detached brigades, regiments, and combat teams to their original formations. The battle area was divided into three national sectors : the British First Army in the north, the French XIX Corps in the center, and the American II Corps toward the south . Prior to this reorganization units had of necessity been sent forward piece meal to take positions on a shifting front, and the resulting confusion had been increased by the hasty improvisation of battle groups to meet the demands of a rapidly changing situation . Under these circumstances it had been impossible to avoid the separation of units from their parent commands, and troops of all three nation alities had become intermingled.
The wisdom of the Allied command revisions had already been apparent in the increased effectiveness of Allied air power during the final stages of the Battle of Kasserine Pass and in closer coopera tion of the ground forces. One example of this effective coordina tion is of special interest. As Rommel's columns advanced toward Tebessa and Thala after breaking through Kasserine Pass, Alex ander ordered a strong diversion by the Eighth Army. Montgomery was not ready to attack at Mareth, but he staged a mock preparation for a large assault. This, together with mounting Allied resistance as he pushed westward, caused the German commander to make a hasty withdrawal. He pulled his tanks out of contact and rushed them back to the south toward what he thought was the most threat ened part of his front.
Early in March Lieutenant General Patton, whom we have met
before as a major general, took over command of the American II Corps.
After the Battle of Kasserine Pass the enemy directed his main
pressure against the British V Corps ( Map 6a) . During the first week in March, Medjez el Bab was the chief objective, but the Axis attacks at this point were a failure, as were the attempts to take
* The Northwest African Air Force was organized as follows :
Strategic Air Force—Major General James H. Doolittle.
Tactical Air Force Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham.
Coastal Air Force - Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd.
** This gave him command of all Allied naval forces in this area.

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Bou Arada, farther south. To the north, on the coastal road, von Arnim met with some local success and after a fierce struggle forced the V Corps to evacuate Sedjenane. He then made an unsuccessful attempt to drive down the road to Beja. By 17 March these attacks had forced back the British line in the sector northwest of that town, but further advances were then definitely halted by the V Corps.
Battle of Mareth , 21-29 March 1943. - During the first week in March the Axis command undoubtedly knew that General Mont gomery's Eighth Army would shortly stage a full - scale attack upon Mareth. In order to disrupt the British preparations and postpone the attack , Rommel took the initiative and on 6 March attacked from the vicinity of Toujane ( southwest of Mareth ) toward Medenine. This attack was delivered by a strong armored force - elements of the 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. The British were on the alert and, having over 500 antitank guns in position around Mede nine, knocked out fifty -two enemy tanks during the day while com mitting only one squadron of their own armor, which lost no tanks.
This unsuccessful engagement cost Rommel over half the armor in his attacking force. He had thrown his armored troops against defended localities without adequate reconnaissance and before the supporting infantry had cleared a path. The time when even Rom mel could lightly disregard basic principles had passed, and the disaster that he courted was inevitable.
From the 6th until the 20th the Eighth Army continued to gain strength as its rear units came up. By the latter date its main components were as follows:
X Corps : 1st and 7th Armored Divisions and 4th Indian Di
vision.
XXX Corps : 50th and 51st Infantry Divisions and one armored brigade.
New Zealand Corps ( especially formed for this operation ) : 2d New Zealand Division, an armored brigade, an ar
mored car regiment, a medium artillery regiment,
and Leclerc's French force.
At this time General Montgomery had 600 tanks to Rommel's 140. The Axis foot troops at Mareth were estimated at 120,000, and these too were outnumbered by the British.
The original plan was for the XXX Corps to penetrate the left of the enemy's Mareth position and capture Gabes. The X Corps was to be held in army reserve ready to exploit the anticipated break through . Meanwhile the New Zealand Corps, screened by General Leclerc's French Desert Force, was to make a wide , swing around the right flank of the position and was then to move north and east

36
to cut the Axis line of retreat. The American II Corps was to secure Maknassy and contain enemy armor which would otherwise be avail able for use against the Eighth Army. All available air power in North Africa would be used to support the attack .
The Americans started first. At dawn on 16 March operations were launched by the II Corps in order to carry out its part of the plan . The attacking force consisted of the 1st Armored Division and the 1st and 9th * Infantry Divisions. Gafsa was occupied with out opposition on 17 March, and supply points were established for the later use of the Eighth Army. The American troops pushed on and occupied El Guettar. So far the Italians, who were holding this part of the front, had offered little opposition and had executed a planned withdrawal, but east of El Guettar they took up a strong defensive position to halt any further advance of the Americans.
Farther north , rains immobilized the 1st Armored Division and delayed its attack on Maknassy.
The battle began at Mareth on the night of 20-21 March. The XXX Corps' attack against the north sector of the Mareth Line was at first successful. The 50th Division began the assault and during 21 March gained a foothold in the Mareth defenses, a bridgehead two miles wide beyond the deep Wadi Zigzaou, which was the chief antitank obstacle . Axis counterattacks were held off for the next two days, but in the face of increasing pressure the British had to withdraw to their original positions on the night of 23-24 March.
Meanwhile the New Zealand Corps had moved out during the night of 19-20 March. After completing a 150-mile march across trackless mountains and deserts, it made contact with the enemy southwest of El Hamma on 24 March.
In view of the failure to penetrate the left of the enemy line, Gen
eral Montgomery decided to reinforce the New Zealand Corps ; so the X Corps headquarters and the British 1st Armored Division were sent to join the New Zealanders on the night of the 23d. The combined forces were then designated the X Corps.
This increasing threat to Rommel's line of retreat forced him to transfer most of his German troops from the Mareth position to El Hamma, leaving the Italian divisions and a few Germans to face the XXX Corps. General Montgomery immediately took advantage of this weakening of the Axis line and ordered the 4th Indian Divi sion to drive to the west to open up the Medenine - Bir Soltane road.
The 7th Armored Division was held behind the south flank of the
* One regimental combat team of the 9th was attached to the 1st Armored Division.

37
Mareth Line so as to be in position to go around the enemy's right flank and cut the Mareth - Gabes road. On 26 March the 2d New Zealand Division attacked and broke through the strongly held defile southwest of El Hamma. Heavy
fighting continued throughout the night. In the noise and confusion, and aided by the darkness, the British 1st Armored Division passed straight through the enemy. By the 27th the British were at the outskirts of El Hamma, their advance having been strongly sup ported by twenty-two squadrons of the Royal Air Force. About the same time the 4th Indian Division opened the Medenine- Bir Soltane road, which greatly shortened the line of communication to the El Hamma sector. Rommel now saw that the Mareth position was untenable and commenced a general withdrawal.
In the meantime Patton's advance eastward from Gafsa was mak ing slow progress. On 21 March his 1st Armored Division captured Sened against only slight opposition and on the following day Mak nassy was taken, but beyond there the armor was unable to pene trate. Farther south the American 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions,
with the help of a Ranger unit, broke through the defensive position of an Italian division east of El Guettar, but heavy counterattacks by the German 10th Panzer Division barred further advance to the east. * However, the Americans materially aided the Eighth Army by containing the 10th Panzer Division in the El Guettar -Maknassy sector.
Farther north an attack by the American 34th Division on 25 March failed to break through the strong German position south west of Fondouk.
When Montgomery's maneuvers caused Rommel to withdraw from the Mareth Line, the XXX Corps advanced along the coast. The 2d New Zealand and British 1st Armored Divisions, after their suc cess in the El Hamma area, pushed on to Gabes, which they entered on 29 March.
In the extreme northern sector the British V Corps counter attacked on 28 March. It recaptured Sedjenane on 30 March and penetrated beyond to Cape Serrat. The enemy withdrew from the salient south of Bou Arada under pressure of other British forces.
Pursuit to Enfidaville ( Map 6b ) .- Rommel's next stand was on the Wadi Akarit, an excellent defensive position with the flanks protected by the salt marshes and the sea . At this time Alexander's general plan was for the Eighth Army to break the Wadi Akarit position and the American II Corps to assist by threatening Rom * The series of actions in this area is known as the Battle of El Guettar.

38
mel's rear. A part of the British IX Corps, supported by the Amer ican 34th Infantry Division, would launch an attack eastward through Fondouk with the mission of capturing Kairouan and threatening the enemy's line of retreat. Farther north the British V Corps was to secure positions from which a future drive could be made on Tunis.
By 6 April General Montgomery had regrouped his army and was ready to attack the enemy at Wadi Akarit. The main assault, de livered by the XXX Corps and directed at the center of the enemy line, opened with a 500-gun artillery bombardment. It began at 0415 hours — in total darkness. The Axis troops, in spite of their desperate counterattacks, could not prevent the collapse of their line on the following day, and another withdrawal commenced. The 2d New Zealand Division and the British 1st Armored Division passed through the gap created by the XXX Corps and closely pur sued the retreating Axis troops. Sfax was occupied on 10 April and Sousse two days later. Rommel had clearly been surprised by the speed with which the Eighth Army had concentrated for this attack , for a considerable portion of his armor had been dis*****ed to contain the American forces farther north . Prisoners taken since 21 March numbered 20,000.
Meanwhile Axis troops had held off all attempts by the II Corps to break through their defenses in the Maknassy - Sened - El Guettar area. However, after the collapse of the Wadi Akarit position on 7 April they were forced to withdraw , and American patrols made contact with Eighth Army patrols on the Gafsa -Gabes road, forty miles east of El Guettar. .
While the enemy was retreating from the Wadi Akarit, the 6th Armored Division ( plus an infantry brigade group) of the British IX Corps moved to the Fondouk area and with the American 34th Division attacked Fondouk Pass, as planned. This pass, about 1000 yards wide, is dominated by the hills to the north and south. Infan try attacks were launched during the night of the 7th against the controlling positions of the enemy in an effort to clear a route for the 6th Armored Division. Very little progress was made, but in view of the enemy retreat up the coast the 6th Armored was ordered, on the 9th, to force its way through the gap. The leading regiment encountered an extensive mine field protected by antitank guns posted on the flanking hill . A narrow passage was secured by nightfall at a cost of seventy-six Sherman tanks ( sixty of which were later recovered ), and on the next day armored elements reached Kairouan. On the 11th contact was made with the Eighth Army, which meanwhile had made rapid progress after occupying

39
Sfax. Although the bulk of Rommel's forces had been able to escape the trap, the remnants of nine Italian battalions were rounded up. The Eighth Army continued the pursuit and on 20 April drove into Enfidaville against increasing Axis resistance. Further attacks against the strong enemy position in the hills north of Enfidaville were met by determined counterattacks which convinced Mont gomery that a regrouping of his army would be necessary before further progress could be made.
During this period the V Corps, in accordance with its mission, started local attacks in the vicinity of Medjez el Bab on 7 April to secure advantageous positions from which to launch future opera tions. The fighting in this northern area was continuous for almost two weeks, and although a breakthrough was not achieved, some
progress was made. This placed the V Corps in a position to strike at Longstop Hill, which together with the circle of hills east of Medjez blocked further progress. All of these dominating heights were strongly held by the enemy and would have to be cleared before any breakthrough down the valley toward Tunis could be made.
At this time the V Corps did not have the strength for such an operation .
Comments . - General Montgomery says of the Eighth Army op erations at this time :
The Battle of the Mareth Line was our toughest fight since El Ala
mein, and whereas the latter was a hard slogging match, at Mareth
there had been greater scope for strategems and subtlety . . . As
at El Alamein, Rommel cast in his reserves piecemeal ; and when
the battle started , his armour was spread -eagled — with 10 Panzer
Division in the Gafsa sector, 15 Panzer Division soon involved on
the coast, and 21 Panzer Division arriving in the west to back up
the switch line
The outstanding feature of the battle was the air action in co
operation with the outflanking forces We retained the initiative throughout. Even when we lost our
gains on the coastal flank, Rommel was kept on the move by the
speedy development of the western outflanking movement ..
Vital considerations ( governing the decision to shift strength to the enveloping force ) were, first, the speed with which the decisive
!
blow could be mounted and delivered and, secondly, the necessity to
hold the German reserves on the eastern flank long enough to pre
vent their assisting the defenders of the switch lines west of El
Hamma.
Montgomery clearly proved that an early setback — such as the failure of the XXX Corps to penetrate the Mareth Line-need not necessarily cause a loss of the initiative provided the plan is flexible and reserves are available.

40
After Mareth, Rommel planned to continue his delaying action and to defend only when the terrain favored the defense. Although he probably realized that the days of the Axis forces in North Africa were numbered, his mission was to delay the final outcome as long as possible. While still fighting the Battle of Mareth , he had pre pared a strong position behind the Wadi Akarit in the Gabes gap . Finding that it could not be enveloped by forces advancing from the south, Montgomery quickly penetrated it-much to the surprise of the Germans.
After the action at the Wadi Akarit, Rommel lacked defensive terrain until he reached Enfidaville. During the retreat to this place the Germans were faced with the difficult problem of with drawing under pressure from the west as well as from the south. While the Eighth Army was pursuing Rommel, the Allies were at the same time attacking von Arnim's holding forces in the moun tains west of the coastal corridor. At El Guettar, at Maknassy, and at Fondouk the Allied forces threatened to break through the passes of the Eastern Dorsal and drive to the sea across Rommel's line of retreat. If von Arnim's men gave way too soon, Rommel would be trapped ; if they stayed too long, they would be cut off by the Eighth Army. From the course of events we must conclude that once again the German commanders executed a skillful withdrawal under diffi cult circumstances.
Battle of Tunis, 22 April - 13 May 1943. — It was now evident that the Axis forces intended to defend on the line Enfidaville - Bou Arada -Medjez el Bab - Sedjenane, and General Alexander imme diately commenced preparations for a general offensive to break through this perimeter.
Plans and Preparations. A large - scale regrouping of the Allied divisions was decided upon. In the space of two weeks the entire American II Corps, over 100,000 men, was moved some 150 miles over difficult country—and across the First Army's lines of com munication — to take over from the British V Corps the sector along the coast in the north. In this regrouping the American 34th In fantry Division and the British 6th Armored Division moved from the vicinity of Fondouk and Kairouan to rejoin their respective corps. At the same time the British 1st Armored Division was transferred from the Eighth Army to the IX Corps.
These moves were completed about 22 April , and at this time Major General Omar N. Bradley took over the command of the II Corps ( Map 7 ) .

41
In its simplest outline the Allied plan provided for a powerful thrust in the center, heavily supported by armor, with secondary attacks on the flanks to hold the enemy in position and to prevent him from concentrating to meet the main attack . The principal effort was to be made by the two corps of the British First Army in the direction Medjez el Bab - Tunis. In their zone of attack lay two natural corridors into the Tunis plain : the valleys of the Med jerda and the Miliane. This was terrain where armored units could best maneuver . The American II Corps, with the Corps Franc d'Afrique * on its north flank, was to attack on the left of the First Army, its principal objectives being the high ground southeast of Mateur and the heights in the area north of Jefna and west of Lake Achkel. It was expected that the American attack would endanger the right flank and the rear of the enemy forces facing General Anderson's divisions. The British Eighth Army, on the eastern end of the front, had the role of maintaining pressure on the Axis forces facing it and of advancing against the enemy's route of escape into the Cape Bon Peninsula. The gap between the First and Eighth Armies was filled by the French XIX Corps, in the Pont du Fahs area. For this final phase of the campaign General Alexander had more than twenty divisions. The line of battle was about 140 miles long.
As the Tunisian campaign developed, the attacks of the Strategic Air Force were switched to the transportation facilities and ports of Sicily and southern Italy. At the same time medium bombers and fighters were striking at surface ships and air transports in and over the Sicilian strait. The Tactical Air Force was prepared to support the field armies by bombing and strafing enemy rear installations, roads, and convoys. By the opening date of the battle, 22 April, the Allied air forces had won mastery of the air from the Luftwaffe .
Early Operations. The offensive was launched when the V Corps commenced its drive on the night of 21-22 April. The initial attack was directed at Longstop Hill, which was captured on the 26th after a series of bloody assaults. South of the Medjerda River progress was made in the direction of Djebel Bou Aoukaz.
The French XIX Corps did not take part in these attacks, but on its left the British IX Corps pushed east from the Bou Arada Goubellat road in an effort to clear a passage for its 1st and 6th Armored Divisions through the mountain gaps that lead to the
* A provisional force that consisted principally of two regiments of “ Goums, " fierce Moroccan highlanders who were expert mountain and night fighters.

42
Goubellat plain . Only partial success had been achieved when Axis antitank guns, strongly posted in the rocky hills, brought the ad vance to a definite halt.
While the Eighth Army was attacking north from Enfidaville and the First Army northeast from Medjez el Bab, the II Corps, on 23 April, launched its attack. The main effort was on the right, where it could best support the First Army's drive.
The II Corps held a front of about forty miles from Cape Serrat to the heights bordering the left side of the Medjerda valley. A belt of rugged hills, fifteen to twenty miles in depth , lay between the Americans and their initial objective, Mateur, a center of enemy communications as well as the key to Bizerte. The hills and ridges in this area form a jumbled maze, providing no broad corridors for an advance.
In the II Corps zone the 1st * and 34th ** Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division *** made the main attack . The Tine River valley seemed to offer the only suitable avenue of advance for an armored striking force, but before it could be used, the high ground on both sides had to be taken. Hence the 1st Infantry Divi sion attacked into the hills north of the Tine River while the 6th Armored Infantry of the 1st Armored Division ( temporarily at tached to the 1st Infantry Division ) attacked the enemy in the hills on the southern rim of the valley. The flank north of the Beja Mateur road was covered by a combat team of the 34th Division. The remaining units of the 1st Armored and 34th Divisions were held initially in reserve.
By 26 April the 1st Infantry Division had driven five miles into the positions southeast of Sidi Nsir, wresting the hills from the nemy in bloody fighting marked by effective use of artillery and successful night attacks. A strong coordinated attack was then launched by the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions with the object of capturing Hill 609 ( Djebel Tahent), the key enemy stronghold that dominated the highway and railroad from Beja to Mateur. The 34th attacked into the hills overlooking Sidi Nsir, and the 1st con tinued its offensive to the northeast. The attack of the 34th was launched against one of the enemy's strongest centers of resistance. The Germans had held this ground for months and had organized the many outlying hills covering the approaches to Hill 609 into a series of mutually supporting strong points. One by one, these hill positions were taken, despite heavy and frequent enemy counter
* Major General Terry de la M. Allen.
** Major General Charles W. Ryder.
*** Major General Ernest N. Harmon.

43
attacks, until on 28 April the advance had carried to the base of Hill 609. During the 30th General Ryder strengthened the force attacking the hill, and with the support of some medium tanks it succeeded in gaining the summit. At dawn on the following day the Germans counterattacked from positions on the northeastern slope. They were allowed to advance to within 200 yards of the American position before a devastating surprise fire repulsed their effort to retake the summit. This action firmly established the 34th Division's hold on Hill 609. Tersely summarizing these operations, General Bradley wrote : " A strong enemy attack was repulsed . Fighting was intense and bloody. The enemy was engaged with bayonet and grenade, and there were many cases of outstanding bravery .” The great effort made by the Germans to hold and then recapture Hill 609 clearly evidenced its importance in the battle for the entire area.
While the 34th Division was making its attack, the 1st Infantry Division, on its right, advanced another five miles. With the fall of Hill 609 the 1st Division's initial hill objectives were made un tenable for the enemy, and both divisions progressed more rapidly, both on the north and south sides of the Tine River.
By 1 May these joint efforts had resulted in the capture of all the key hill positions in the southern half of the II Corps zone, and the Tine valley was open for an armored thrust.
In the meantime an attack in the northern part of the corps zone was being made by the 9th Division * and the attached Corps Franc d'Afrique. The main objective of this attack was the high ground generally north of Jefna, where the Germans held hill positions dominating the approach to Mateur through the Sedjenane valley.
In executing this mission, the 9th Division had to meet difficulties imposed by both the terrain and the very broad front involved . Re connaissance troops were assigned the task of patrolling vigorously in the nine-mile interval between the 9th and 34th Divisions, since the nature of the ground was such that it was considered imprac ticable to send large units through this area. The plan provided that one regimental combat team should make a secondary attack on the enemy defenses west of Jefna, while another ( the main effort ) was to strike at the strong points on the high ground to the north of the town and thus outflank its defenses. The third regimental combat team and the French were to drive eastward against the more lightly held positions on both sides of the Sedjenane River. The operations of the 9th Division and the French units took place in scrub-covered mountains that continuously tested the energy,
* Major General Manton S. Eddy.

44
perseverance, and fortitude of the troops. Communications were so poor that food and ammunition had to be carried by burros over difficult winding trails. However, the attacks were successful, and by 1 May the Germans had been driven back to the eastern slopes of the last hills — those that overlook the Mateur plain and Lake Achkel.
By this date it was evident that the Germans opposite the II Corps were in a critical situation . In the south the main effort had opened the Tine valley corridor to Mateur, while in the north the enemy was threatened with an envelopment of his right flank .
To avoid disaster, the Germans made a general withdrawal on the night of 1-2 May and the following day. South of Lake Achkel they took up a position that, if held, would protect Tebourba and the Tunis plain. North of the lake they prepared for a last-ditch stand in the hills bordering the main road to Bizerte.
No time was lost by the II Corps in following the retreating Ger mans. The 1st Armored Division was ordered to advance north eastward from the Tine valley, and it entered Mateur at 1100 hours on 3 May. This rapid movement threatened to disrupt all the Ger man plans. Now an American attack to the east or northeast from Mateur might effect a breakthrough that would cut off the Axis
, forces in the Bizerte area from those in the vicinity of Tunis. Enemy planes, armor, infantry, and artillery were rushed to the threatened sector in an effort to prevent the 1st Armored Division from ad vancing beyond Mateur.
In the fighting through 3 May the II Corps had taken Mateur, its first major prize of the campaign, had prevented von Arnim from concentrating to meet the British drive down the Medjerda valley, and, in addition, had threatened the disruption of the entire Axis
right wing. The stage was set in the north for the final battle of the campaign.
Final Drive, 3-13 May 1943.- Since 22 April the Allied forces had made limited advances on all fronts, but at no point had a break through been achieved. Therefore, it was clear to General Alex ander that additional large- scale infantry attacks would have to be made. The best prospects seemed to be offered in the Medjez area, where the successful attacks on Longstop Hill had resulted in clear ing enemy strong points north of the Medjerda River. So it was decided not to continue with the armored attack in the Goubellat area, but rather to concentrate all available forces for a final decisive drive on Tunis from Medjez el Bab.

45
Regrouping had started as early as 28 April. Only the British 1st Armored Division and the 46th Infantry Division were left to contain the enemy armor east of Goubellat, while the remaining division of the IX Corps ( the 6th Armored) together with the 7th Armored and 4th Indian Divisions from the Eighth Army, was moved to the V Corps zone of action. At the same time an extensive plan of deception was put into operation to conceal these moves from the enemy and to lead him to believe that the next major attack was to be made in the south by the Eighth Army. Most of the artillery of its detached divisions was left on the Eighth Army front, and general activity in that sector was increased greatly. These decep tions achieved their object of holding a considerable portion of the enemy's tanks and antitank guns away from the area selected for the Allied main attack .
In accordance with the new plan, General Anderson instructed the V Corps to attack on a narrow front and ordered the IX Corps to be prepared to pass through the V Corps and capture the inner defenses of Tunis ( Map 8 ) . After taking that city, the First Army would exploit to the southeast in order to cut off the Cape Bon Pen insula. On the right and left, respectively, the Eighth Army and the II Corps were to exert maximum pressure to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his units facing the First Army. The objective of the II Corps would be Bizerte, and the Eighth Army was to advance along the coast so as to assist First Army troops in their effort to cut off the Axis retreat to Cape Bon.
The First Army's attack was spearheaded by the V Corps. Djebel Bou Aoukaz was captured on 5 May, and a good line of departure was established for the drive by the IX Corps toward Tunis. The attack of the IX Corps was launched at 0300 hours on the 6th . It was made on a 3000-yard front by two infantry divisions, supported by tanks and the concentrated fire of 600 guns. Behind the attack ing infantry divisions the 6th Armored Division, on the right, and the 7th Armored Division, on the left, moved out slowly, waiting for the moment to strike. With continuous sorties for over two hours, the Northwest African Air Force provided an important addition to the fire support of the ground troops. By 1100 hours the infantry attack had broken through the enemy defenses and had opened a gap for the armored divisions, which by evening reached the Massi cault area. On the following morning the armored troops resumed the advance toward Tunis. Armored cars of both divisions, followed closely by the remainder of the 7th Armored Division, entered the city in the afternoon ( 7 May) . The 7th then turned northward from Tunis and swept on toward Protville, taking large numbers of

46
prisoners, while the 6th Armored Division, followed by the British 4th Infantry Division in motors, was directed southeast toward the neck of the Cape Bon Peninsula.
In the south the French XIX Corps was still encountering strong resistance, but the opposition in the Goubellat area relaxed slightly . At this point, after a determined attack , the British 1st Armored Division broke through and advanced northeast.
On the 8th the 6th Armored Division continued its movement to the southeast. By afternoon it was in contact with an enemy rear guard, strong in antitank guns, that was covering the town of Ham man Lif — in a narrow defile between the steep hills south of the town and the sea. After a night attack up the precipitous slopes by the infantry regiment of the division, the armor broke through the town on the 10th, some of the tanks having moved along the beach to outflank the defenses. This victory of Hamman Lif was undoubtedly a major factor in bringing about the quick disintegra tion of the remaining resistance, for the 6th Armored could now cut the Axis routes of escape to the Cape Bon Peninsula, which it proceeded to do. Hammamet, the southern gateway to the peninsula, was also reached on 10 May.
Meanwhile the II Corps continued its offensive operations in the north with the mission of preventing the enemy from reinforcing his units facing the British First Army. The high ground east and west of Chouigui and the city of Bizerte were the objectives set for the corps. General Bradley planned to isolate Axis troops in the areas generally northeast and southeast of Mateur by means of in fantry attacks from both flanks of the corps and an armored drive from the center. To accomplish this task, the 9th Infantry Division and the French attacked north of Lake Achkel while the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions attacked toward Chouigui, and the 1st Ar mored Division drove northeast and east from the vicinity of Mateur.
The attacks by the II Corps were well under way by 5 May. In the southern zone of action the 1st Division met strong resistance and was unable to hold the slight gains that it made. The 34th Division enveloped Eddekhila from the southwest and moved on to Chouigui, which it occupied by the afternoon of the 7th. Thanks to the breakthrough by the British First Army farther south, enemy resistance in the southern part of the II Corps zone slackened materially.
North of Lake Achkel the only key position remaining to the enemy was Djebel Cheniti . General Eddy employed here tactics similar to those used so successfully in capturing Jefna. The Corps Franc d'Afrique and a part of the 9th Division made a secondary

47
attack while the remainder of the division enveloped Djebel Cheniti. The operation was entirely successful, and by 7 May the enemy was in full retreat to Bizerte. His north flank had collapsed. Units of the 9th Division entered Bizerte during the afternoon of the 7th and that night occupied the city's airport.
The attack by the 1st Armored Division struck the German line where two roads lead into the Tunis plain - one from Mateur through Ferryville to the Tunis - Bizerte highway and the other due east from Mateur. General Harmon ordered Combat Command A to attack toward Ferryville and Combat Command B to push eastward along the Mateur - Protville road. On 6 May Combat Command A made initial gains into the hills south of Ferryville, but lost them during the night as a result of determined German counterattacks. The next day an attack was launched that completely routed the Germans along the Mateur - Ferryville road. By noon armored units of Com bat Command A had entered Ferryville, where they found the enemy in full retreat to the east. The advance was continued on the 8th, and at dawn on the 9th the main Tunis - Bizerte highway was cut.
While Combat Command A was engaged in these operations, Com bat Command B moved due east toward the Tunis - Bizerte highway. It reached Protville on the 9th, where contact was made with the British 7th Armored Division. Following this, a part of the combat command turned north on the Bizerte road and then swung north east to occupy Porto Farina.
German forces in the II Corps zone were in a hopeless situation as a result of the American operations from 6 to 9 May. The offen sive actions conducted by the 9th Division and Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division left only minor enemy groups to be mopped up. When Combat Command B met the British 7th Ar mored Division at Protville, a large group of disorganized Germans was caught stranded in the Tebourba area. Pressed from the west by the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions and their retreat eastward cut off by American and British armored troops, the German com mand in the II Corps area asked for terms of surrender on 9 May. General Bradley's terms of unconditional surrender were accepted. During the final phase of the campaign the II Corps took 42,000 prisoners, among whom were the commanding generals of the Fifth Panzer Army, the 15th Panzer Division, and two German infantry divisions . The artillery commander of the Afrika Korps and the commanding general of the air forces at Bizerte were also captured.
In the meantime the final roundup of enemy forces still holding out in the Cape Bon Peninsula was being effected. Mobile British detachments raced up each side of the peninsula and completed the

48
circuit by 11 May. On the 12th the British 1st Armored Division and the 4th Indian Division joined the French XIX Corps in cap turing the remaining elements of the German 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions southwest of Grombalia. Von Arnim was captured in the vicinity of Zaghouan the same day. *
The last isolated enemy resistance, mainly by Italian troops and remnants of the German Panzer Army of Africa, who were facing the Eighth Army, ceased on the morning of 13 May as Allied forces converged on them from all directions. In all, some 248,000 Axis prisoners were taken, together with large quantities of matériel and supplies. These included 1000 guns, 520 airplanes, and 250 tanks.
The combined action of the Allied naval and air forces prevented the escape by sea or air of other than a few small detachments.
During the first two days of the Battle of Tunis the Tactical Air Force made 1500 sorties. Although weather conditions grounded most of the Allied planes from 25 April to 5 May, they were most active during the remainder of the battle, particularly on 6 and 7 May, when they blasted the enemy in the Medjerda valley and con tributed greatly to the breakthrough operations of the First Army.
In a special order of the day General Alexander addressed the Allied forces in these words :
Today you stand as the conquerors and heroes of the North Af
rican shores. The world acknowledges your victory ; history will
acclaim your deeds. British, French, and American arms have
swept from these lands the last of the German and Italian invaders.
As your commander in the field, I add my admiration and gratitude
to those of the United Nations for this great victory, which will go
down in history as one of the decisive battles of all times.
Comments . — The final defeat of the Axis in Tunisia was brought about by the coordinated action (teamwork ) of superior Allied forces on the ground, in the air, and on the sea. But superior forces, even though properly coordinated, are not enough for a decisive victory ; there must be a well-conceived plan. Since such is the case , it is worth our while to review the plan for the final phase and the effective execution of that plan.
It will be recalled that the first regrouping of General Alexander's forces was accomplished by 22 April. At that time the main attack was to be launched along the entire front of the First Army, with the major effort by the V Corps down the Medjerda valley. In the Goubellat sector the IX Corps was to force its way through the mountains in order to pass its two armored divisions into the open plain to the east. Both corps made some progress, but there was
* Rommel had returned to Germany some time before.

49
no breakthrough. The action might have continued along the same line, with additional small advances that would have gradually com pressed von Arnim's forces into a smaller perimeter, until finally the Axis troops would have successfully withdrawn to defensive positions along the base of the Cape Bon Peninsula. It may be that at no time did the Axis command hope to execute a Dunkirk in the face of the Allied control of the sea and complete mastery of the air, but it is quite clear that they fully expected to make a Bataan out of Cape Bon.
The first attempt to break through having failed, Alexander again regrouped his forces. This time he achieved a concentration of combat power sufficient not only to penetrate the Axis position, but also to exploit the success most effectively . The actual breakthrough took place so rapidly that the Axis troops were completely surprised and thrown off balance. Von Arnim was caught just as the French had been caught in 1940 , by an attack launched by an overwhelming striking force moving at great speed .
For use in the event of an attempted evacuation, the Allied navy had drawn up a plan in close collaboration with the air force. Grimly looking back to Norway, Dunkirk, Greece, and Crete, the plan was named Operation Retribution. All possible means, both in the air and on the sea, were organized to forestall any enemy escape from Tunisia. It was certain that an evacuation could only be attempted under cover of the Italian fleet, which at long last might be compelled to stand and fight. Since, as it turned out, the Axis high command did not dare join issue at sea at a time when its forces on land were in a desperate situation, it was compelled to sacrifice a large army and immense quantities of stores and equipment. From the purely military standpoint, the Axis proved the folly of flouting the age -old strategic axiom that to commit large ground forces across a sea with out assured and continuing control of that sea is to court disaster. The excellence of the plan is also evidenced by the fact that von Arnim miscalculated the location of the main attack and as a result made a faulty distribution of his forces. Lack of aerial reconnais sance was largely responsible for this error, but Montgomery's real istic diversion was likewise an important factor.
The German high command made the same error in Tunisia that it had made in Russia in November 1942 : there were no reserves behind the front. When, therefore, the British armored troops arrived in Axis rear areas, they met but slight opposition and were able to disorganize the entire defense by cutting lines of communica tion, destroying command posts, and disrupting supply facilities.

50
The mission of the American II Corps during the final phase had been threefold : to protect the left flank of the Eighteenth Army Group, to keep the enemy from concentrating in front of the First Army, and to capture Bizerte . This mission was accomplished in a brilliant manner. During a period of seventeen days its four divi sions made advances of from twenty - five to fifty miles. At the beginning of the final phase of the campaign only 12,000 front-line troops opposed the advance of the corps, but toward the close of the operation over 40,000 of the enemy were on its front. It showed that its divisions were composed of fighting men with the will and ability to win. It was well supplied, well equipped, and well led. Its losses during the final phase of the campaign were 421 killed, 3136 wounded, and 877 missing, while it is estimated that 3000 of the enemy were killed on the corps front. The American divisions took 36,000 German and 5900 Italian prisoners.
The following is an extract from General Bradley's report on the operations :
French units under their efficient commander, General Magnan,
fought with courage and determination ... in mountainous ter
rain and suffered many casualties. Some of the II Corps, namely,
the 1st Infantry Division and elements of the 1st Armored and 34th
Infantry Divisions, have been fighting in North Africa almost con
tinuously since they landed at Oran on 8 November. Other units
have been in action in Tunisia for varying periods from 18 January
onward. Practically all units have fought the enemy both in the
desert and in the mountains. The II Corps fought with and without
air superiority. It has suffered reverses, and it has known victory.
Officers and men alike understand our enemy and his methods. They
no longer underestimate or overestimate his abilities. With the com mon sense that is characteristic of Americans, they have learned that the surest way of living is to outmaneuver and outsmart those who
oppose us. With their practical sense, their understanding of the
enemy, their firsthand knowledge of the hardships and dangers of war, and, above all else, their courage and loyalty, soldiers of the
II Corps have played a major role in the winning of a great Allied
victory.
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE OPERATIONS
IN NORTH AFRICA
On 17 May the first through convoy passed the Strait of Gibraltar and nine days later reached Alexandria ; the first unopposed convoy since 1940 reached Malta on 24 May. After three years of varying fortune Africa had been cleared of all Axis forces ; the ports of North Africa were ready to receive the ships, equipment, and men

51
who two months later were to invade enemy soil ; and from bases in Tunisia Allied air forces were pounding the airfields and ports of southern Europe. General Eisenhower had originally hoped to achieve these results six months earlier. Had he been successful, perhaps subsequent operations could have been speeded up so that the Allied invasion of Italy could have been launched in the spring of 1943 rather than in the fall. With a full summer of good weather Allied forces might have advanced to the Po River by the time winter set in. But be that as it may, the means were just not available to seize Tunis and Bizerte in 1942.
In addition to the material advantages achieved, one other accom plishment warrants particular note. This was the successful estab lishment of a combined headquarters and the development of the combined-force idea. In an official report General Eisenhower stated :
In the North African Theater, even under the stresses imposed
by alternate partial victory and stinging tactical defeat, there was
achieved among the principal officers of the whole expedition a
coordination of purpose and a constant objectivity of viewpoint that
gradually permeated to lower ranks and clearly established the fact
that British and American forces of all arms could unite and work
together effectively .
As for the Americans, although they suffered early reverses and even tactical defeats, they were able to profit from the experience. New types of equipment, more realistic and practical methods of training, and more efficient tactical organizations were developed. These were lessons that could only be learned in the school of actual combat, and that they were learned quickly is proved by the superior performance of the II Corps during the final phase of the campaign.
The initial failures of the campaign had the unforeseen effect of enhancing the magnitude of the ultimate Allied success because the Axis was encouraged to make what proved to be an excessive invest ment in the Tunisian beachhead. An Axis army of some 320,000 men was destroyed rather than only the remnants of Rommel's original Afrika Korps. At the same time, American, British, and French forces were given needed experience and in the end won a confidence inspired by overwhelming victory.
After almost three years of fighting, North Africa ceased to be one of the active theaters of operations of World War II . The Axis hopes for glory and profit here had vanished, and with them an esti mated 620,000 soldiers, one third of whom were Germans. British

52
Empire losses in North Africa since Italy's entry into the war in June 1940 had numbered some 220,000 – killed , wounded, and pris

oners.
In the period November 1942 to May 1943 the French had

lost about 20,000, while American casualties had been about 18,500.
By June of 1943 Allied might was beginning to be felt throughout the world. American production was pouring the materials of war into all Allied armies at an increasing rate. Allied air power was striking at strategic targets in Europe and pounding Japanese bases in the Pacific. The Mediterranean area and the Middle East were again secure in Allied hands. Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, had been planned and would shortly be launched. The Rus sians had driven the Germans from the Caucasus oil fields and the Don River bend and were ready to launch a great summer offensive. In the Pacific the Japanese had been driven from the Aleutians,
Guadalcanal was an Allied base, the drive up the Solomons was under way, and General MacArthur had begun his march up the New Guinea coast toward the Philippines. Everywhere the Axis was on the defensive, and, even more important, in the hills of Tunisia an Allied force had been born which would ultimately advance across western Europe to the heart of Germany.


53
APPENDIX I
ORGANIZATION OF THE ASSAULT FORCE
WESTERN TASK FORCE
Troops ( U. S.) Naval Escort ( U. S. )
MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE S. PATTON REAR ADMIRAL HENRY K. HEWITT
3d Inf. Div. ( reinf. ) 3 battleships
CCB plus 1 armd. bn. , 2d Armd. Div. 5 cruisers
47th RCT, 9th Inf. Div. 1 aircraft carrier
60th RCT, 9th Inf. Div. 3 auxiliary carriers
( 35,000 men in 29 ships ) 1 antiaircraft cruiser
34 destroyers
CENTER TASK FORCE
Troops ( U. S. ) Naval Escort ( Br. )
MAJOR GENERAL LLOYD R. FREDENDALL COMMODORE THOMAS H. TROUBRIDGE
1st Inf. Div. 1 battleship
CCB, 1st Armd. Div. 2 cruisers
1st Ranger Bn. 1 aircraft carrier
Corps troops ( II Corps) 2 auxiliary carriers
( 39,000 men in 47 ships ) 2 antiaircraft ships
13 destroyers
EASTERN TASK FORCE

Troops
*
Naval Escort ( Br. )

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES W. RYDER 39th RCT, 9th Inf. Div.
168th RCT, 34th Inf. Div.
11th Brig. Group, Br. 78th Div. 36th Brig. Group, Br. 78th Div. 1st Commando Bn. *
6th Commando Bn. *
( 33,000 men in 34 ships )
* Composite American and British .
VICE ADMIRAL SIR HAROLD M. BURROUGH 4 cruisers
1 aircraft carrier
1 auxiliary carrier
3 antiaircraft ships
13 destroyers

RESTRICTED


A
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THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA R A N EE
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S1116 : 51 UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTALIBRARY

S 1.1 16:51 CURRENT JAN 31'72 DOCUMENTS
FOREIGN POLICY
The United States
and North Africa

INTRODUCTION
Recently in the Congress of the United States, a crucial de bate has been raging. That debate is concerned with some of the fundamentals of our foreign pol icy over the last three decades, including the question of foreign aid .
In this debate, three charges have been leveled against the foreign aid program and our pol icies in the developing world :
- that we have looked at the world solely in Cold War terms; -that we have sought to sup port only certain kinds of re gimes; and
-that we have not kept up with changing world circum stances.
U.S. POLICY IN AREA
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate, using North Africa
This pamphlet is based on a speech by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David D. Newsom at Princeton University, November 18 , 1971.
as an example, that these asser tions are not substantiated . North Africa is , in many ways, a microcosm of the developing world . Among the four nations of this area-Morocco, Algeria , Tunisia , and Libya-we find char acteristics, problems, reactions and issues common to most of the “ Third World ."
The history of our relationship to this area over the past two decades demonstrates that our policies have moved and are moving with the changing tides.
They are policies which accept change and accept nations as they are .
These states have many char acteristics in common : a strong sense of national pride, an under lying belief that the West has obligations to make up for earlier exploitation, and a keen sensitiv ity to outside interference . At the same time, they are diverse in their national characteristics, their forms of government, and their resources .
Let us go back 20 years - to 1951. Only Libya was moving toward independence, but its prospects for viability were poor.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES


Its first annual budget was only $6 million , and few knew where that would be found .
In the other three countries , France played a dominant role, largely to the exclusion of other outside influences. Americans in both government and the private sector, nevertheless, were be ginning to learn about North Africa . They were beginning to be aware of its peoples and their quest for freedom . We realized earlier than most that independ ence was coming and coming rapidly .
But these were , at that time, side issues . Our concern as a nation then was the relationship of this area to the emerging position of the Soviet Union and
to its containment. Before mis siles and long- range bombers, our Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco were considered vital for our national security . In 1951 , also, we made the decision to seek to retain , in Libya, an important training base for our Air Forces in Europe. We ulti mately reached agreement and committed ourselves initially to pay Libya $4 million a year in economic assistance.
Ten years later, the situation had changed dramatically, and we had changed with it . Morocco and Tunisia were independent.
General De Gaulle had stood in Algiers and had spoken one of history's great ambiguities, " Je vous ai compris." ( " I have under stood you ." ) Libya had begun to realize that its deserts covered vast resources of oil .
In those ten years, U.S. poli cies had moved, too. President Eisenhower had agreed to the evacuation of our air bases in Morocco . Our earlier interest and
2
confidence in Tunisia was fol lowed by a pledge of long- term development aid-without condi tions or demands for facilities . In 1964, we agreed in principle with the Government of Libya to the evacuation of our military facili ties whenever they were not wanted. We were preparing to help independent Algeria with substantial food and technical aid .
Each of these countries, as they became independent, looked to us in a special way. They sought alternatives to full dependence upon the former metropole . It was not yet fash ionable to turn massively to the Soviets or the Chinese.
Morocco , because of early links with the United States , encouragement by individual Americans, and the presence of our bases, expected special help.
Algeria, despite harboring a resentment because of our sup port for the French , looked to us as an early sympathizer and benefactor.
Tunisia , under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba , remem bered earlier help and encourage ment and looked to us.
Libya saw in us and the British the primary sources of critical financial help. The Libyan King felt both an indebtedness to us for our support at the United Nations for Libyan independence and territorial unity despite Soviet opposition, and a depend ence upon us .
Ten years ago , we were deeply involved . These nations had ex pectations of us. We expected to find friends and support, particu larly against growing inroads of Soviet influence . We did tend to judge nations in those days by
their attitudes toward the Soviets and the Chinese. We, perhaps, underestimated their ability even then to stand up against external influences-from all directions.
Today, this has changed . We and they have adjusted to radi cally new circumstances.
PRESENT SITUATION
Each of the four countries is now fully independent.
Each has, further, demon strated its independence in poli cies toward the former metro poles and toward other coun tries. Each country has diversi fied its relationships. None is any longer dependent predominantly upon a single power, politically or economically. Each in its par ticular way has sought to qualify as " nonaligned ."
The area has seen major politi cal upheavals which have changed the leadership and, in the case of Libya , the basic reorientation of the country .
There has been a dramatic discovery and development of resources, primarily oil and gas, in the last ten years . The direct importance of the area economi cally to Europe has expanded .
All of this has brought a very basic change in the relationship between North Africa and the United States .
Except for the use of com munications facilities at one Moroccan base, we no longer have any military facilities in North Africa.
The proposition of economic assistance provided by the United States has steadily declined as European countries have assumed a larger share .
U.S. grant military assistance


T

and military involvement have de clined substantially .
Our relationship with the
leadership is changing. The gen eration has passed or is passing which recalls our initial help to the newly independent countries.
This change happened early in Algeria where the original leaders of the FLN ( National Liberation Front ) whom we had known
were replaced by those we did not know . In Libya , those who recognized and welcomed our help to that country in its early years have been replaced ; both the present prosperity and the changed circumstances have ob
literated recollections of that earlier relationship.
Where there has been an ab
rupt change in a country in which we had close relations with the previous regime, we
have had the added element of suspicions regarding our inten tions on the part of the new leaders. Only time can overcome such feelings .
The last decade, further, has seen climactic events in the Near East which have affected our own relationships. Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us; rela tions with the other three na tions of the area became difficult in the months immediately fol lowing the 1967 war. The belief that we had helped Israel to win the six -day war died hard . While these nations may not have been directly involved in the fighting , they were committed as Arabs and shared the feelings of humili ation and bitterness over these events . The Near Eastern issues remain a serious, but not insur mountable , problem in our rela
tions with North African coun tries.
In 1971 , we have new interests and requirements. For the first time in our peacetime history , we face shortages of significant resources. One of them is natural
gas . In Washington, D.C. , early in November 1971 , the local gas utility announced it could take no more new commercial customers;
there was simply not enough gas. North Africa-and particularly Algeria- has large gas reserves.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD
NORTH AFRICA
Our approach to North Africa in these circumstances is based on certain clear assumptions :
- First, North Africa remains important to us as an area . We

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3


have a keen interest in the free dom of the Mediterranean and in the continued access for all to that sea and to the nations around it . The establishment of dominant foreign influences ad versely affecting these interests on the southern shore of the Mediterranean would be a matter of grave concern to us.
-Secondly, the orderly de velopment of these nations and their resources is important to them, to Europe, and to us.
While there are, and will con tinue to be, differing views on what constitutes a reasonable basis for access to these re sources, there is agreement that such access is important to all .
- Thirdly, we shall remain an important source of the capital and technology required for the development of this area . The nature of arrangements may change, but the U.S. private role is likely to continue.
- Fourthly, the nations of North Africa , despite policies shaped by different histories and influences, will all stoutly resist domination byby any outside power. They will defy simple categorization in any East -West lineup.
- Finally, events in North Africa , as in many other parts of the world , will move today with far less concern over the role of the United States and reference to us than in years past. If we have interests there, it is our task to preserve them, whether it be in investment, in trade, or in security. We cannot assume that others will do it for us.
Against the background of these assumptions, what is our approach to these nations today ? We regard them, first , not as
4
pawns in an international game, but as independent, sovereign nations. We seek relations with them based on mutual interest, independent of their relations with others. We recognize and respect the variety among the nations. The Cold War is over unless others choose to continue it . As the President said in his report to the Congress on foreign policy in February 1970, “ United States Foreign Policy for the 70's ," one of our two major concerns in Africa is " that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict in any form. This is even more in Africa's interest than ours."
BILATERAL RELATIONS
Morocco
We have had particularly close ties with Morocco and Tunisia . Despite the withdrawal of mil itary facilities from Morocco, our economic and strategic interests there remain substantial. We re tain important Voice of America facilities. We have growing trade with Morocco and our invest ment there is also increasing . We value the presence of this friend at the southern side of the gate
way to the Mediterranean . Morocco has , since independ ence, faced severe economic problems. We have helped in the development of its agriculture and in meeting problems of em ployment.
King Hassan, thrust suddenly into power in 1961 , has led Morocco skillfully through criti cal years and critical problems.
We have both benefited from cooperation . Our relationship with Morocco, however, has
given us neither the right nor the capability to determine the course of Moroccan political or economic life, even if we had desired to do so .
In foreign policy, too , King Hassan has followed an inde pendent course . He has , over the years, improved his relations with Europe and has established friendly relations with the Soviet Union . He has taken an active role in Arab affairs and has fre quently used his relationship with us to bring to our attention Arab concerns.
Neither in Morocco-nor in any other developing country do we seek to further or support any particular system or foreign policy. We feel that both are the responsibility of the peoples of the country.
We have established a mutual ly beneficial relationship with Morocco, despite the different nature of our systems of govern ment. We find a common interest in continuing Moroccan eco nomic growth and the continued absence in Morocco of influences hostile to our basic concerns. In the area of economic develop ment, we have no magic formu lae to guarantee growth either for ourselves or for the Moroc cans. Only the Moroccans, them selves, can assure their own progress - political, economic, and social . We believe, however, that our assistance has improved their ability to make such progress.
Tunisia
Tunisia exemplifies a smaller country , ably governed by re sponsible leadership possessing influence beyond its borders, but endowed with modest natural
resources.



The United States has enjoyed 15 years of very close relations with Tunisia and has contributed a very significant amount of eco nomic assistance - well over $600 million since 1956. We have no alliance with Tunisia , no bases there, and no real strategic inter est in that country. U.S. invest ment is minimal ( approximately $ 12.9 million in FY 1970 ) . Yet U.S. policy over the years has been marked by strong support for Tunisia's economic and polit ical independence.
The United States was one of the first governments to recog nize Tunisia in 1956. Our assist ance followed the 1961 decision that Tunisia should be one of the countries to receive a long-term commitment since it possessed the infrastructure, sufficient economic potential , and political will to serve as a model for other developing countries .
Despite this commitment and interest in Tunisia's success , we did not attempt to determine the path Tunisia chose for de velopment. It is difficult to con ceive of a leader of President Bourguiba's character permitting such interference if it had been tried . Tunisian successes and errors are their own. There were misgivings within the U.S. Gov ernment in 1966-1969 during the period of accelerated expansion of agricultural cooperatives and increased state control over the Tunisian economy. It was agreed ,
however, that the Tunisian ex periment was worthy of our con tinued support. Tunisia's ensuing decision in 1969 to reverse the course of its economic policy to give greater emphasis to private enterprise and free market forces
was entirely a Tunisian determi nation.
As a result of the farsighted reforms of President Bourguiba , Tunisia is , in social terms, still the most advanced of the Arab states . Its human resources are its greatest wealth and we will con tinue to be interested in its de velopment and well - being.
Tunisia has always had an in dependent foreign policy. It con tinues to do so . As its leadership passes into other hands, we look for a continuation of our close relationship, one based essen tially on a common interest in Tunisia's development.
In both Morocco and Tunisia , however, the basic U.S. role has changed in the past ten years. Economic assistance is flowing to both countries from more sources and the overall U.S. share has declined . Tunisia has been one of the models of the multi lateral approach in which a Con sultative Group, under the aegis of the World Bank , has, for a number of years , coordinated the international effort.
French aid to Tunisia has held Steady in real terms and aid to Morocco has increased in both real and proportionate terms.
U.S. aid has declined absolutely and proportionately in both countries.
Between 1960 and 1964 , the U.S. provided two- thirds of all non-Communist economic aid to Morocco and Tunisia. Between 1965 and 1969 , this proportion declined to 42 percent of the aid flowing to each . In 1970, the U.S. share dropped still further as other donors have increased their share . Our decreasing share is a reflection of the progress these countries are making, and
of the widening responsibility being assumed by other na tions-a trend entirely consistent with overall AID policy.
Algeria
Our relations with independ ent Algeria have been quite dif ferent from those with Morocco and Tunisia .
If we go back to 1962, U.S. expectations about the potential benefits of bilateral relations with Algeria were probably higher than with most other newly independent countries.
They were probably unrealistic at that time given our inexperi ence in dealing with each other. President Kennedy had felt a special interest in Algeria dating from his 1957 speech urging that country's independence. The Algerian leader, Ben Bella, had flown back to North Africa, fol lowing his release by the French , in a U.S. Air Force plane. His first foreign visit as President after Algerian independence was to the United Nations and Wash ington where he was received by President Kennedy. The fact that Ben Bella chose to proceed di rectly from Washington to Cuba was perhaps an omen of what was to come.
The Algerians for their part always held a strong ideological bias against the United States. They identified the United States with France through NATO. Conversely, they felt a deep bond of sympathy with those states which had endorsed and supported the long, bitter Alger ian war of independence against France: North Viet- Nam, Egypt, the People's Republic of China, and Cuba-all countries with
5



which , in varying degrees, the United States was at odds. In this environment of suspicion and hostility , and given the instabil ity and rivalries of the Ben Bella period , it is not difficult to un derstand the lack of rapport. Even the fact that the United States supplied some $ 165 mil lion of PL-480 foodstuffs be tween 1962 and 1967 was re garded by the Algerians as a minor recompense for the devas tation suffered during their in dependence struggle.
The overthrow of Ben Bella on June 19, 1965 , by Minister of Defense Houari Boumedienne re vived briefly U.S. hopes that satisfactory relations might be possible. Boumedienne's serious approach and his announced in tention to concentrate on his country's problems seemed to augur well for such a develop ment.
With the six- day war, however, Algeria broke diplomatic rela tions, and all U.S. aid to Algeria ceased by law. At the same time , Algeria seized almost all U.S. firms operating there , principally oil companies.
In retrospect, the break in relations proved to have had some benefits. For one thing it cleared the air . The romantic view of the prospects for U.S. Algerian relations vanished over night. We recognized that mutual confidence would not be based solely on aid programs, however well- intentioned , nor on public gestures of support, however sin cere.
The subsequent upturn in U.S. - Algerian relations has been
marked by several turning points. One was the emergence of Presi dent Boumedienne as the undis
6
puted leader of Algeria . He focused his government's efforts on domestic economic develop ment and , in the pursuit of rapid industrialization the Algerians found they wanted the expertise and technology that private American enterprise could sup ply. Many U.S. firms responded to the indication that they would be welcome.
Another major turning point was the October 1969 agreement between SONATRACH, the State oil company, and the El Paso Natural Gas Company for the sale of one billion cubic feet- per- day of natural gas in liquefied form for importation to the U.S. east coast. This project and others like it represent a natural arrangement between the United States , with its estimated annual shortfall in gas supply of 35 trillion cubic feet by 1980 , and Algeria with the fourth largest proven, and largely un committed , gas reserves in the world- 130 trillion cubic feet.
But given the past history of U.S.- Algerian relations, and Algeria's treatment of U.S. petro leum companies, the huge amounts of capital needed , and the respective government au thorizations required , it was clear even in 1969 that to bring these projects to fruition would be no easy task . If they could be imple mented, however-and there is cause for optimism that they will be - they would create the most significant long- term economic links between the United States and North Africa in history . They would make a substantial contribution to Algeria's eco nomic development and reduce Algeria's dependence on foreign
governments for t development financing.
During the past two years both governments have, in a spirit of businesslike coopera tion , taken actions to enhance the possibilities for an early reali zation of these Liquefied Natural Gas ( LNG ) projects. Algeria has upgraded and strengthened its diplomatic representation in Washington-still under the flag of Guinea-and we have done likewise in Algiers under the Swiss flag . Algeria has resolved all but one of its expropriation disputes with U.S. companies.
The Export- Import Bank has in formed SONATRACH that it is prepared to consider favorably the financing of several hundred million dollars of U.S. exports for the construction of the neces sary facilities in Algeria for this project. The American com panies will make no investment in Algeria, but they will finance the Liquefied Natural Gas tankers. The final authorization by the U.S. Federal Power Com mission-which will set impor tant precedents for the LNG industry-is the one remaining requirement.
Libya
U.S. relations with Libya over the past 29 years have gone through the same radical trans formations as the country itself .
In the pre - oil , pre- military - coup period , Libya was considered one of the most disinherited of the developing countries and showed little promise of economic viabil ity . In the early 1950's, Libya was dependent on U.S. , U.K. ,
and other foreign aid for its economic development and mili



tary assistance. Libya concluded a defense agreement with the United Kingdom , and agreed to the establishment of Wheelus Air Force Base outside Tripoli and a British air base near Tobruk.
Wheelus, because of its ideal cli matic conditions, became the principal training base for U.S. fighter aircraft stationed in Western Europe .
This close relationship , which was clearly one of Libyan eco nomic dependence on the United States and the United Kingdom,
was obviously headed for change when, in December 1957 , Esso became the first oil company to announce it had struck oil . By 1968 , Libya had become one of the world's leading oil producers and the per capita GNP of its 1.6 million inhabitants had increased from about $ 100 at independ
ence to $ 1,640. Reflecting this transformation, assistance
our
program was ended in 1965 .
In Libya, the United States faced in a very special way the problem of identification with a regime. We had provided substan tial financial support in the early days of the kingdom. We enjoyed the benefits of military facilities.
There was a widespread-but un founded - belief that the British and American Ambassadors dic tated policies to Libyan Govern ments.
There was much less awareness of the growing concern of Ameri can representatives in Libya at the increasing detachment of the King from events in the country, the influence of some of those around the King on policies and ,
what was particularly serious, the disenchantment of many of the best young men in the country
with the lack of progress in the building of modern institutions. It is conceivable that the United States could have had a significant influence on the course of events in Libya , but this must remain in the realm of speculation. Our aid had helped launch the country. The King and many of its leaders felt an indebtedness to the United
States. Yet, it was clear to American officials serving in Libya during those years that the course of events was in Libyan hands and would be determined by Libyans. Neither an earlier withdrawal of our facilities from Libya nor the exercise of any extraordinary influence in that country could likely have changed the basic direction of events.
It was particularly regrettable, but not at all surprising , that the leaders of the coup of September 1969 , under Lieutenant ( now Colonel ) Qadhafi , took power with deep suspicions of the United States and with serious expectations that we would try to oppose their coup. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the new regime , deeply influenced by the frustration of the young Arab military officers over the course of the six - day war, made the Arab struggle against Israel a principal tenet of its foreign policy. Their belief in our unqualified support for Israel remains today the chief obstacle to better relations. Other suspi cions have, in all probability ,
been modified .
We adapted quickly to the change in Libya. It was never our intention to do otherwise . We agreed to the evacuation of our air base near Tripoli and our
Coast Guard navigation station in the Gulf of Sirte . We modified the nature of our relationship to meet the new situation .
In Libya today, the greatest U.S. interests are, in a sense, beyond the government domain. The investment and activities of private American companies in the development and production of Libya's vast oil reserves are essentially matters between the companies and Libya. Our role when we have a role-is to seek to explain wider aspects of inter national relations which may bear on oil policy . In the 1970 negotiations, for example, our official effort was confined to
explaining our primary concerns as a government over the conse quences for the consuming na tions of any break down in nego tiations, and to explaining actions taken by the U.S. Gov ernment in permitting the com panies to concert on negotia tions.
Today the 11 - nation Organiza tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( OPEC ) , consisting of Algeria , Iran , Iraq , Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Venezuela , Libya , Qatar, Abu Dhabi , Indonesia , and
Nigeria , are in a strong position as a result of the world energy outlook . Demand for oil and gas by the developed world is ex panding by leaps and bounds.
The OPEC countries have that oil and gas, far in excess of their own needs. A great amount of creative diplomacy by govern ments and business alike is going to be required if the demands of the producing countries for in creasing revenues and for control of the companies are to be met without disrupting the industry,
the consumers, and the econo 7


mies of the producing countries themselves. Libya will be a major driving force among the OPEC countries.
It can be asked , in retrospect, what were the benefits we gained from our substantial assistance to Libya in its early days ?
First , we must recall the strong efforts made by the Soviet Union in those days to have established a Soviet trusteeship over the former Italian colony of Tripolitania . Our help to Libya enabled it to emerge and survive as an independent nation . This gave us advantages in access to and the utilization of key facili ties during critical years fol lowing World War II . It provided a base on which the Libyans and private American firms could build the important petroleum industry that exists in that country today.
8
Events have moved. Circum stances have changed. We have changed with them . We should not regret what has gone before,
for that was important to where we are today . And today's Libya has a leadership with which we still have problems, but it is an independent leadership providing no more of an opportunity to other non - Arab forces than it provides to us.
LONG- RANGE VIEW
North Africa is a significant area of the world, at the hub where Europe, Africa , and the Middle East meet. It lies on our route of access to southern Europe and the eastern Mediter ranean . It is a significant source of energy for Europe and will increasingly become so for us. It
UNIVERSITY OFMINNESOTA
31951D03563264 J
is an example of the trends and problems of the developing world generally.
We have, without forgetting our friends, adapted to change in North Africa . We see its nations as individual entities, each with unique characteristics, deter mining its own future and its own policies. We see our rela tions with them as important to our own interests . We can pre serve those interests so long as we are prepared to continue an active role in the area and to find foundations for our relationships built genuinely on common in terests.
Department of State Publication 8622 African Series 51
Released January 1972
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20420 - Price 10 cents
# U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1972 486-391 / 13

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