rational number

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3
to divert Axis attention from the newly selected theater of opera￾tions, and, subsequently, the British Eighth Army was to constitute
the eastern jaw of the pincers designed to crush all Axis opposition
in Africa. So the plans for the invasion were continued despite the
apparently adverse situation in Egypt.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
It appeared that the following strategic advantages would accrue
from the occupation of French North Africa:
1. The first advantage would be the clearing of the Mediterranean
supply route. Allied convoys would be able to move along it under
the protection of land-based aircraft. They could reach Egypt and
the Suez Canal by a sea route that is 2300 miles long (measured
from Gibraltar), or 10,000 miles less than that around the Cape of
Good Hope. The distance from the United Kingdom to India and
to our newly established Persian Gulf Command would also be
greatly shortened.
2. The occupation of French North Africa would make the block￾ade of the Axis powers virtually complete. All shipments of food
and other supplies from Africa to Germany and her satellites would
cease.
3. Another possible route for the invasion of continental Europe
would be secured, thereby forcing the Germans to withdraw troops
from the Russian front to defend this invasion route.
4. The control of French North Africa by the Allies would make
Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Middle East safe from an invasion
from the west.
5. Dakar would no longer be a threat to South America.
6. If the occupation of French North Africa could be carried out
without fatally embittering the French troops and authorities in
that region, it would make possible the reconstitution of the French
Army in preparation for its return in force to the homeland.
However, the Allied forces were faced with many problems which,
if aggravated, might seriously impair the success of the operation.
The reaction of Spain and Vichy France, and of French North Af￾rica itself, would have a vital bearing on coming events. Axis air￾fields in Sicily and Sardinia enabled the enemy to dominate that
section of the Mediterranean between Tunisia and Italy and pro￾hibited the successful movement of Allied convoys through this area,
known as “bomb alley.” Since Spain herself was pro-Axis, there
was a real danger that the Germans would strike through that coun-

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4
try against Gibraltar. Undoubtedly the Axis would occupy the
whole of France to forestall an Allied landing on the French Medi￾terranean coast and to attempt to gain control of the French fleet
at Toulon. The Germans would probably try to seize Tunis and
Bizerte in order to retain control of the Sicilian channel, an opera￾tion that would be relatively easy for them because of the short
supply lines from their bases in Sicily and southern Italy. Last,
but not least, because of other commitments throughout the world
Allied planners were faced with a critical shortage of trained troops
and vital supplies and equipment, particularly landing craft and
shipping, which would definitely limit the size of the operation.
Quoting from an official report:
Thus the strategic conception of sweeping the Axis from North
Africa, and establishing Allied control from the Atlantic to the Red
Sea, necessitated an operation on a scale of such magnitude that,
once initiated, it would have to be followed through with all the
force and shipping that the situation demanded. It would be the
major Allied operation of 1942 and 1943.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
No clear picture of the military operations in French North Africa
can be obtained without some understanding of the political events
that accompanied, and sometimes even overshadowed, the military
aspects of the campaign. In general, Frenchmen were divided into
three groups:
1. General Charles de Gaulle, in London, was the rallying point
for the French National Committee. His group was also known as
the “Free French” and later as the “Fighting French.” It comprised
French refugees who had escaped to England, America, or the
French colonies rather than accept German oppression at home and
those patriots who remained in France and took part in the activities
of the resistance groups. One of de Gaulle's followers, General
Leclerc, had organized a small force in French Equatorial Africa
that conducted raids against Italian outposts in the Fezzan (South￾ern Libya) and later crowned its activities with a campaign which
in thirty-nine days carried it 1600 miles from Fort Lamy, near Lake
Chad, to join with General Montgomery's Eighth Army at Tripoli
on 25 January 1943.
2. A second group, Frenchmen living in North Africa, where open
resistance would have brought sudden German occupation, succeeded
in establishing an underground “French Liberation Movement.”
Although the aim of this group, like the Free French, was to liberate

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5
France, its members were operating under German surveillance,
which to the outside world seemed to give a collaborationist tinge to
their activities. General Henri Giraud, who had recently escaped
from German custody, was to become the recognized leader of this
group, which included some of the French military leaders in North
Africa. The clash of personalities between de Gaulle and Giraud
was to prevent a union of the Free French and the French Liberation
groups during the North African campaign.
3. The third group was made up of pro-Vichy French—men cling￾ing with pathetic loyalty to old Marshal Petain. This group com￾prised those unfortunates in France and Axis-dominated territories
who believed that collaboration with the Germans was the best
method of insuring the future of their country. Admiral Jean Darlan,
who controlled the French fleet, was Petain’s designated successor.
In laying the groundwork for the North African invasion, the
American Government based its policy on the view that if the lead￾ing Frenchmen in North Africa were given armed support they
would be ready to seize the opportunity of liberating themselves
from the German yoke. This policy embarked the United States on
a course of detailed negotiations with the French Liberation Move￾ment in North Africa. Throughout the planning stage of the in￾vasion Mr. Robert Murphy, the American Consul General at Rabat,
maintained close liaison with Allied Force Headquarters from his
offices in North Africa. Since the British had previously committed
their support to de Gaulle's Free French, not only did negotiations
with the French Liberation Movement in North Africa have to be
conducted by Americans, but it was also deemed desirable to have
the initial landings made by American troops. Since, to maintain
secrecy, detailed Allied plans could not be communicated to the
French, and because their allegiances in North Africa were divided,
positive support from them could not be assured.
In a further effort to reach an understanding, a secret rendezvous
was arranged about fifty miles west of Algiers on the night of 22-23
October. Major General Mark W. Clark, Deputy Commander, Allied
Force, (who was put ashore from a submarine) met Mr. Murphy
and a delegation of French officers headed by General Mast, com￾mander of French military forces in the Algiers area. Mast rep￾resented the Liberation Movement in that part of North Africa.
The meeting was broken up by the local police, and the important
question of what Darlan and the French fleet would do was left un￾answered, although some progress was made with the Army leaders
in setting up a plan of command in North Africa.

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6
LANDING OPERATIONS
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS
The first of the many difficult problems facing the Allied comï؟¾mander was the establishment of what came to be krfown as Allied
Force Headquarters (AFHQ). This was made more difficult by
the fact that there was no historical precedent upon which to base
such an organization. In General Eisenhower’s words :
I was determined from the first to do all in my power to make this
a truly Allied Force, with real unity of command and centralization
of administrative responsibility. Alliances in the past have often
done no more than to name the common foe, and “unity of command”
has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies,
ambitions, and recriminations of high-ranking officers, unwilling
to subordinate themselves or their forces to a commander of differï؟¾ent nationality or different service.
Inherent differences in British and American administrative
and logistical systems and in nomenclature and equipment would
have to be preserved, although all plans and directives must evolve
from a single combined headquarters. The principle of complete
integration was applied throughout the general staff sections of
Allied Force Headquarters, with the best man, irrespective of naï؟¾tionality, being assigned to each job. In those sections where naï؟¾tional practices differed, a dual establishment was set up, one Amerï؟¾ican and one British, to handle the interests of each nation. Although
dual in the sense that there was in each of these sections an American
and a British assistant chief of staff, in reality they acted as single
sections, since no divided counsel or divergent decision ever emaï؟¾nated from them. Complete harmony between these American and
British “opposite numbers” was insisted upon by the Commander in
Chief. The wisdom of the combined-staff principle was proved durï؟¾ing the North African campaign and was successfully used in all
subsequent combined operations of the war.
By the end of the summer the organization of AFHQ was crystalï؟¾lizing. As stated, Lieutenant General Eisenhower (U.S.) was Comï؟¾mander in Chief; Major General Clark (U.S.) was Acting Deputy
Commander in Chief; Brigadier General Walter B. Smith (U.S.)
was appointed Chief of Staff; Major General Humfrey M. Gale
(Br.) was Chief Administrative Officer. Lieutenant General Kenï؟¾neth A. N. Anderson (Br.) was to be in command of British ground
forces; Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham (Br.) was appointed
Naval Commander in Chief; Brigadier General James H. Doolittle
was to command the American air units in the expedition, and Air
Marshal Sir William L, Welch was to command the British air units.
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7
With the organization of Allied Force Headquarters, plans for
the invasion progressed. The cities of Oran and Algiers on the
Mediterranean coast and Casablanca on the Atlantic were the cen￾ters of political control of the French possessions in North Africa
and were the key points of the system of rail, highway, and air com￾munications (Map 1). Tunis and Bizerte were keys to the Sicilian
channel, and control of these cities would place the Allies in such a
position that, in conjunction with the British Eighth Army advanc￾ing through Libya, annihilation of Rommel’s army might be possible.
However, as we have seen, the political situation required all initial
landings to be made by American units, and lack of shipping and
trained troops would prohibit the immediate attainment of all these
objectives.
Initially two plans were developed and studied: first, major as￾saults on Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers and small-scale assaults on
Philippeville and Bone (this plan was modified during its evolution
by eliminating a landing at Casablanca and substituting a westward
overland thrust from Oran) ; second, assaults on Casablanca and
Oran only. On 20 September 1942 the so-called “Outline Plan,” an
adaptation of the above plans, was issued. This plan abandoned
the Philippeville and Bone landings because shipping and other re￾sources were not available to support so ambitious an undertaking
and because such landings would carry the Allies within range of
Axis planes based in Sicily.
Under the adopted plan the Western Task Force was to sail direct
from the United States and capture Casablanca. The Center Task
Force, also entirely American, was to sail from the United Kingdom
and capture Oran. The Eastern Task Force, American and British,
was to sail from the United Kingdom and capture Algiers and nearby
airfields. The Center and Eastern Task Forces would make their
assaults simultaneously, while the Western Task Force would land
as near the same time as weather conditions permitted. After at￾taining their initial objectives, the Western and Center Task Forces
were to establish and maintain communication between Casablanca
and Oran and build up an American army and an air striking force
ready to occupy Spanish Morocco and repel a German attack through
Spain if this should be necessary. The Eastern Task Force, after
taking its initial objectives, would become the British First Army,
under the command of General Anderson, and would thrust rapidly
eastward to capture the airfield at Djidjelli and the port of Bougie.
It would ultimately advance into Tunisia. The organization of the
task forces is given in Appendix 1.

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8
In addition to the naval escort forces, the Royal Navy would have
Force H, consisting of two battleships, four cruisers, two aircraft
carriers, and fifteen destroyers, to keep watch over the Italian and
Vichy French fleets in the Mediterranean.
As for air support, the initial assaults were to be supported by
carrier-based aircraft of the escort forces. The American Twelfth
Air Force was to form the Western Command, with headquarters
at Oran. One hundred and sixty fighters were to be flown from
Gibraltar to each of the Casablanca and Oran areas within three
days of the attack. Similarly the Royal Air Force squadrons were to
form the Eastern Command, with headquarters at Algiers. Ninety
of their planes were to arrive from Gibraltar by D plus 8.
An addition to the plan, developed early in October, provided for
the 2d Battalion of the American 503d Parachute Infantry to seize
the airfields of Tafaraoui and La Senia, south of Oran. This operaï؟¾tion would entail a flight from England of some twelve hours for
thirty-nine unarmed aircraft of the American 60th Troop-Carrier
Group.
In the endeavor to secure surprise, information as to the sites of
the proposed landings was, of course, carefully guarded. It was
realized that the Germans would probably learn that preparations
were being made for some kind of an operation; but even if they
should conclude that an amphibious assault was to be made someï؟¾where, it was hoped that in their thinking they would lean towards
Norway, western France, or Dakar. After the Central and Eastern
Task Forces had passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, the apparent
capabilities of the Allies would be more limited; but it was planned
that the convoy should, by the route followed, create the impression
it was headed for Malta or the Suez. During the hours of darkness
just preceding the landings, it would turn sharply to the south and
make for Algiers and Oran.
Allied Force Headquarters would remain at Gibraltar until adeï؟¾quate communications were established near Algiers. Because of
the amphibious nature of the operation, weather conditions would
have a most important bearing on its success. D-day was to be
8 November 1942.
THE LANDINGS, 8-11 November 1942 (Map 2)
By the afternoon of 7 November Operation Torch was ready to
be launched. The Western Task Force had successfully crossed
3,000 miles of submarine-infested ocean to arrive off its landing
area, and the Center and Eastern Task Forces were steaming past

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9
Oran and Algiers toward “bomb alley,” where the Luftwaffe was
expectantly waiting to make the kill. In each of the three landing
areas the tactics were to be generally the same, landings on both
sides of each main objective as a means of subsequent encirclement.
At Oran and Algiers these were to be supplemented by frontal as￾saults on the ports in order to seize shipping and harbor facilities
before they could be sabotaged.
Western Task Force.—French forces in Morocco, principally Sene￾galese, Moroccan, and Algerian colonial troops, were located along
the Atlantic coast in the Casablanca area from Safi to Port Lyautey.
American forces were divided into three groups, as indicated on the
map. H-hour was to be at 0515, 8 November.
Landings were made at Fedala, fourteen miles to the northeast of
Casablanca, where the purpose was to initiate operations for the
capture of the latter-named city from the east; in the harbor of Safi,
125 miles to the southwest of Casablanca, where the immediate aim
was to land armor and to prevent reinforcements at Marrakech from
reaching Casablanca; and, finally, at Mehdia, seventy miles to the
northeast of Casablanca, where the object was to seize the Port
Lyautey airfields and protect the north flank of the entire operation.
All three landings achieved considerable surprise, and by 1015
hours Safi had been captured, following a successful rushing of the
harbor by two destroyers. At Fedala and Port Lyautey, however,
strong opposition was met, both from aircraft and from shore bat￾teries. The latter were silenced by naval gunfire, and by 1500 hours
Fedala had fallen. At Port Lyautey fierce fighting continued
throughout the day, but at nightfall the airfield was still in French
hands.
Meanwhile our naval forces off Casablanca had their share of
activity on 8 November. Early in the forenoon two French de￾stroyer-leaders and five destroyers sortied and made as if to attack
our transports. They were taken under fire and forced to retire.
Shortly afterward the French light cruiser Primaguet joined the
destroyers outside the harbor. As it moved out again, the group
was promptly engaged by the Augusta and Brooklyn and vessels of
the covering force. With the exception of one vessel, which managed
to get back to the harbor, all French ships were either sunk or
beached. While it was assisting in this operation, the covering
force, consisting of the Massachusetts, Wichita, Tuscaloosa, and four
destroyers, was also exchanging fire with the shore batteries and
the French battleship Jean Bart, which was moored in the harbor.
In order to end this distressing bloodshed, several attempts were

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10
made by American officers to contact the French authorities in Casaï؟¾blanca for the arrangement of an armistice, but Admiral Michelier
refused to receive them.
Fighting continued throughout the next two days. The American
forces steadily enlarged their beachheads and unloaded equipment
despite a heavy surf which took toll of the landing craft. On 10
November the airfield at Port Lyautey was captured, the first Amerï؟¾ican planes landing on the field at 1100 hours. This completed the
primary mission of the Mehdia force.
In the south, after the capture of Safi on 8 November, elements
of the 2d Armored Division moved eastward to intercept French
reinforcements that were advancing from Marrakech to Casablanca.
These French forces were dispersed on the 10th, and that night the
armor began the march to Casablanca. The 47th Regimental Comï؟¾bat Team remained at Safi to protect the port. When the armored
force received word of the surrender on 11 November, General Harï؟¾mon had obtained the surrender of Mazagan and was continuing
the advance to Casablanca, fifty miles to the north.
The 3d Division troops advancing on Casablanca from Fedala
were held up by stiff resistance, but by the afternoon of the 10th
they had reached an assembly area northeast of Casablanca. That
night they made an encircling movement to the southeast in preparaï؟¾tion for a concerted attack on the city at 0730 hours, 11 November,
but at 0700 the French, acting upon orders from Admiral Darlan,
capitulated.
Center Task Force.—Changing course abruptly during the night,
the Center Task Force arrived off Oran and began its landings at
Arzeu and Les Andalouses at 0135 hours on 8 November. The initial
objectives were airports and the highway system paralleling the
coast. The French commander of the area, after deciding to coï؟¾operate with the American forces, changed his mind and ordered
full resistance. Landing barges were fired on, and some were sunk
as they neared the shore, but the landings were carried out at all
points that had been selected.
A Ranger battalion captured Arzeu, about thirty miles northeast
of Oran, and shortly afterward Allied supply ships commenced unï؟¾loading cargo. Several miles east of Arzeu, Combat Command B,
1st Armored Division, landed and moved southwest to seize the airï؟¾fields at Tafaraoui and La Senia. The 16th and 18th Regimental
Combat Teams from the 1st Infantry Division were brought ashore
near Arzeu and started an advance toward Oran.

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11
To the west the 26th Regimental Combat, Team (1st Infantry
Division) landed at Les Andalouses and struck eastward toward
Oran under orders to seize the dominating heights west of the city.
An armored detachment came ashore northwest of Lourmel and
moved to take the airfield at that place.
In an attempted frontal assault, two cutters carrying two comï؟¾panies of American troops and special antisabotage parties broke
through the booms and dashed into the harbor of Oran. Here they
came under an overwhelming fire from shore batteries and French
warcraft. They reached their objective, but were set ablaze and
disabled. Most of the crews and the troops aboard became casualï؟¾ties; the survivors were captured.
Initially the only other serious opposition to these operations came
from a coastal battery above Arzeu, but resistance developed apace
during the day as our troops began to advance on Oran.
By nightfall of the 8th, Combat Command B had captured the
airfield at Tafaraoui and had moved northward toward La Senia.
The 16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams had advanced a disï؟¾tance of eighteen miles from Arzeu, meeting increasing resistance
as they neared Oran. The 26th Regimental Combat Team from Les
Andalouses had moved eastward to the vicinity of Oran after overï؟¾coming some opposition. The airfield at Lourmel had been occupied.
The plans for the paratroop mission went largely astray. The
formation became partially scattered by a storm, and those planes
that did get through landed at widely separated points on the Sebkra,
a dried-up salt marsh. About 300 paratroopers were finally assemï؟¾bled in the vicinity of Tafaraoui, where they ably assisted the ground
troops in securing that airfield.
During 9 November enemy resistance continued to slow the adï؟¾vance at almost all points. La Senia airfield held out until after dark.
However, Tafaraoui airfield, which had fallen on the 8th, was being
used by aircraft from the Twelfth Air Force as the build-up of the
forces ashore continued.
Early on the 10th the converging infantry colums were in position
around the outskirts of Oran, and elements of the armored combat
command were close to the southern edge of the city. Following a
coordinated attack by all units at 0737 hours, the armored troops
penetrated into the city, and at 1230 General Fredendall received
the formal capitulation of the French commander.
Eastern Task Force.—As events developed, the Algiers area, the
most important of the three major objectives, proved to be the easiest
to secure. The sea was calm, and surprise was achieved. There

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12
was some opposition from naval and coast-defense guns, which con￾tinued to fire until silenced by Allied naval and air units, but for the
most part the landings were unopposed.
As had the other two forces, the Eastern Task Force arrived off
its objective on schedule during the night of 7-8 November, and land￾ings proceeded at three beaches. West of Algiers the 168th Regi￾mental Combat Team made the initial landing at Cape Ferruch.
Friendly French officers, who were prepared to cooperate with the
American forces, surrendered Fort Sidi Ferruch at 0300 hours with￾out firing a shot. Armored cars and tanks were landed, and the
advance eastward toward Algiers commenced. Three miles from
the city some opposition from Vichy sympathizers was encountered,
but by early afternoon the Americans were able to continue their
movement toward the city.
Meanwhile a landing was made near Castiglione by British Com￾mando troops, who advanced southward and quickly occupied the
airfield at Blida. Soon fighters from the British naval air force
arrived and began to use the airfield. The Commandos then moved
eastward to cut off the city of Algiers from land communication to
the southwest.
While the landings west of Algiers were being accomplished, the
American 39th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced by a battalion
of British Commandos, landed on beaches near Ain Taya, fifteen
miles east of the city. One column immediately headed for the chief
objective, the big Maison Blanche airdrome, while another moved
on Algiers. The airdrome was taken at 0830 hours, after some slight
resistance was overcome at Fort de l’Eau and after a brush with
French tanks near the airfield. A little later a squadron of Hurri￾canes, which had left Gibraltar at dawn, landed safely.
In the meantime, as at Oran, a direct attack on the harbor to gain
control of harbor equipment and prevent sabotage met with violent
opposition. Two British destroyers and two American coastal load￾ers were severly damaged, and although a few Commandos were put
ashore, the attempt to take Algiers by frontal assault failed.
By the afternoon of the 8th the converging American columns had
completed the encirclement of Algiers and the rail, highway, and air
communications were in Allied hands. During the day the task force
commander, Major General Charles W. Ryder, went ashore to confer
with a representative of Admiral Darlan. They reached an agree￾ment that all resistance should cease and that our forces should
occupy the city at 1900 hours, 8 November.
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13
COMMENTS
The surrender of Casablanca ended the initial (landing) phase of
the operations. Months of preparation and three days of fighting
had placed almost all French North Africa in Allied hands. Amer￾ican casualties totaled about 770 killed or missing and 1050 wounded.
The British lost 240 killed or missing and sixty wounded.
Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of the operation
was the organization of a combined force of American and British
ground, air, and naval forces under one combined staff and the move￾ment of this force thousands of miles to make simultaneous combat
landings at widely separated points on a hostile shore. The landings,
involving over 100,000 troops, hundreds of airplanes, and 258 ships
and war vessels, had truly written a new chapter in amphibious
warfare.
The political aspects of the landings, particularly the recognition
of Darlan, became a subject of much discussion. The comments of
General Marshall in an official report are most pertinent:
General Eisenhower had announced that General Giraud would
be responsible for civil and military affairs in North Africa, but
the French military officials on the ground were found to be loyal
to Marshal Petain’s government. President Roosevelt’s note to the
French Chief of State had assured Marshal Petain of our desire for
a liberated France, but the Vichy answer was disappointing. Our
ambassador was handed his passport on 9 November, and orders
were dis*****ed from Vichy to French African units to resist our
forces, which by then had already accomplished their missions ex￾cept on the Casablanca front.
Unexpectedly, Admiral Jean Darlan, Petain’s designated suc￾cessor and commander in chief of all French forces, was found to be
in Algiers. ... He was taken into protective custody, and when it
was found that the French leaders stood loyal to the Vichy govern￾ment, a series of conferences immediately followed with the purpose
of calling a halt to the French resistance against General Patton’s
task force in the vicinity of Casablanca. When, on the morning of
11 November, the Germans invaded unoccupied France, Admiral
Darlan rejected the pseudo-independent Vichy government, assumed
authority in North Africa in the name of Marshal Petain, and pro￾mulgated an order to all French commanders in North Africa to
cease hostilities. This order reached Casablanca a few minutes be￾fore the final American assault was to be launched on the early
morning of 11 November.
These events, which transpired subsequent to the actual landings
on 8 November, required quick decisions, and the results finally
achieved fully vindicated the American military leaders. Through￾out the North African campaign the problem of welding the French
into a united and cooperative ally was a heavy burden which fell to

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S1116 : 51 UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA
LIBRARY
WILS
GOVU
S 1.1 16:51 CURRENT JAN 31'72
DOCUMENTS
FOREIGN POLICY
The United States
and North Africa
INTRODUCTION
Recently in the Congress of
the United States, a crucial de
bate has been raging. That debate
is concerned with some of the
fundamentals of our foreign pol icy over the last three decades,
including the question of foreign
aid .
In this debate, three charges
have been leveled against the
foreign aid program and our pol
icies in the developing world :
- that we have looked at the
world solely in Cold War terms;
-that we have sought to sup
port only certain kinds of re
gimes; and
-that we have not kept up
with changing world circum
stances.
as an example, that these asser
tions are not substantiated .
North Africa is , in many ways,
a microcosm of the developing
world . Among the four nations
of this area-Morocco, Algeria ,
Tunisia , and Libya-we find char
acteristics, problems, reactions
and issues common to most of
the “ Third World ."
The history of our relationship
to this area over the past two
decades demonstrates that our
policies have moved and are
moving with the changing tides.
They are policies which accept
change and accept nations as
they are .
These states have many char
acteristics in common : a strong
sense of national pride, an under
lying belief that the West has
obligations to make up for earlier
exploitation, and a keen sensitiv
ity to outside interference . At
the same time, they are diverse in
their national characteristics,
their forms of government, and
their resources .
Let us go back 20 years - to
1951. Only Libya was moving
toward independence, but its
prospects for viability were poor.
U.S. POLICY IN AREA
The purpose of this paper is to
demonstrate, using North Africa
This pamphlet is based on a speech
by Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs David D. Newsom at
Princeton University, November 18 ,
1971.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES

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their attitudes toward the Soviets
and the Chinese. We, perhaps,
underestimated their ability even
then to stand up against external
influences-from all directions.
Today, this has changed . We
and they have adjusted to radi
cally new circumstances.
PRESENT SITUATION
Its first annual budget was only
$6 million , and few knew where
that would be found .
In the other three countries ,
France played a dominant role,
largely to the exclusion of other
outside influences. Americans in
both government and the private
sector, nevertheless, were be
ginning to learn about North
Africa . They were beginning to
be aware of its peoples and their
quest for freedom . We realized
earlier than most that independ
ence was coming and coming
rapidly .
But these were , at that time,
side issues . Our concern as a
nation then was the relationship
of this area to the emerging
position of the Soviet Union and
to its containment. Before mis
siles and long- range bombers, our
Strategic Air Command bases
in Morocco were considered vital
for our national security . In
1951 , also, we made the decision
to seek to retain , in Libya, an
important training base for our
Air Forces in Europe. We ulti
mately reached agreement and
committed ourselves initially to
pay Libya $4 million a year in
economic assistance.
Ten years later, the situation
had changed dramatically, and
we had changed with it . Morocco
and Tunisia were independent.
General De Gaulle had stood in
Algiers and had spoken one of
history's great ambiguities, " Je
vous ai compris." ( " I have under
stood you ." ) Libya had begun to
realize that its deserts covered
vast resources of oil .
In those ten years, U.S. poli
cies had moved, too. President
Eisenhower had agreed to the
evacuation of our air bases in
Morocco . Our earlier interest and
confidence in Tunisia was fol
lowed by a pledge of long- term
development aid-without condi
tions or demands for facilities . In
1964, we agreed in principle with
the Government of Libya to the
evacuation of our military facili
ties whenever they were not
wanted. We were preparing to
help independent Algeria with
substantial food and technical
aid .
Each of these countries, as
they became independent,
looked to us in a special way.
They sought alternatives to full
dependence upon the former
metropole . It was not yet fash
ionable to turn massively to the
Soviets or the Chinese.
Morocco , because of early
links with the United States ,
encouragement by individual
Americans, and the presence of
our bases, expected special help.
Algeria, despite harboring a
resentment because of our sup
port for the French , looked to us
as an early sympathizer and
benefactor.
Tunisia , under the leadership
of Habib Bourguiba , remem
bered earlier help and encourage
ment and looked to us.
Libya saw in us and the British
the primary sources of critical financial help. The Libyan King
felt both an indebtedness to us
for our support at the United
Nations for Libyan independence
and territorial unity despite
Soviet opposition, and a depend
ence upon us .
Ten years ago , we were deeply
involved . These nations had ex
pectations of us. We expected to
find friends and support, particu
larly against growing inroads of
Soviet influence . We did tend to
judge nations in those days by
Each of the four countries is
now fully independent.
Each has, further, demon
strated its independence in poli
cies toward the former metro
poles and toward other coun
tries. Each country has diversi
fied its relationships. None is any
longer dependent predominantly
upon a single power, politically
or economically. Each in its par
ticular way has sought to qualify
as " nonaligned ."
The area has seen major politi
cal upheavals which have
changed the leadership and, in
the case of Libya , the basic
reorientation of the country .
There has been a dramatic
discovery and development of
resources, primarily oil and gas,
in the last ten years . The direct
importance of the area economi
cally to Europe has expanded .
All of this has brought a very
basic change in the relationship
between North Africa and the
United States .
Except for the use of com
munications facilities at one
Moroccan base, we no longer
have any military facilities in
North Africa.
The proposition of economic
assistance provided by the United
States has steadily declined as
European countries have assumed a larger share .
U.S. grant military assistance
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T
and military involvement have de
clined substantially .
Our relationship with the
leadership is changing. The gen
eration has passed or is passing
which recalls our initial help to
the newly independent countries.
This change happened early in
Algeria where the original leaders
of the FLN ( National Liberation
Front ) whom we had known
were replaced by those we did
not know . In Libya , those who
recognized and welcomed our
help to that country in its early
years have been replaced ; both
the present prosperity and the
changed circumstances have ob
literated recollections of that earlier relationship.
Where there has been an ab
rupt change in a country in
which we had close relations
with the previous regime, we
have had the added element of
suspicions regarding our inten
tions on the part of the new
leaders. Only time can overcome
such feelings .
The last decade, further, has
seen climactic events in the Near
East which have affected our
own relationships. Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us; rela
tions with the other three na
tions of the area became difficult
in the months immediately fol lowing the 1967 war. The belief
that we had helped Israel to win
the six -day war died hard . While
these nations may not have been
directly involved in the fighting ,
they were committed as Arabs and shared the feelings of humili
ation and bitterness over these
events . The Near Eastern issues
remain a serious, but not insur
mountable , problem in our rela
tions with North African coun
tries.
In 1971 , we have new interests
and requirements. For the first time in our peacetime history ,
we face shortages of significant
resources. One of them is natural
gas . In Washington, D.C. , early in
November 1971 , the local gas
utility announced it could take no
more new commercial customers;
there was simply not enough gas.
North Africa-and particularly
Algeria- has large gas reserves.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD
NORTH AFRICA
Our approach to North Africa
in these circumstances is based
on certain clear assumptions :
- First, North Africa remains
important to us as an area . We
20 °
0 °
209 ROMANIA 100
FRANCE YUGOSLAVIA U.S.S.R.
ITALY ATLANTIC BLACK SEA BULGARIA
OCEAN ALBANIAY
40
PORTUGAL SPAIN MED 1
GREECE Annaboo
TURKEY Skikdo Constantinelo
Bizerte €
ALGIERS TUNIS
Tangier Oran R
TUNISIA MALTA 9 Safaqis As
خ‌ .
خ•
خ‘
خ‌
CYPRUS SYRIA RABAT Fes Casablanca Meknes
MOROCCO
Marrakech Bechar
Leabsukhayrah LEBANON
TRIPOLI SE A MIRAQ Ghardaia
Ouargla ISRAEL BENGHAZI Tobruk GULF OF
SIDRA
Marsaal Burayqah JORDAN
CAIRO
ALGERIA Zillah Tindout In Amenas SAUDI
ARABIA PEL AAUN
SPANISH SAHARA
Sobha . LIBYA EGYPT
AlJawtآ؛
REDSEA
MAURITANIA MALI
NORTH AFRICA 202
Oil field A Gas field
Oil pipeline Gas pipeline NIGER CHAD
SUDAN 200
400
800
Oى‌¸
600 Miles 200 400 600 800
Kilometers
KHARTOUM Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative 200
3

[mosaadabd460]

pawns in an international game,
but as independent, sovereign
nations. We seek relations with
them based on mutual interest,
independent of their relations
with others. We recognize and
respect the variety among the
nations. The Cold War is over
unless others choose to continue
it . As the President said in his
report to the Congress on foreign policy in February 1970,
“ United States Foreign Policy
for the 70's ," one of our two
major concerns in Africa is " that
the continent be free of great
power rivalry or conflict in any
form. This is even more in
Africa's interest than ours."
given us neither the right nor the
capability to determine the
course of Moroccan political or
economic life, even if we had
desired to do so .
In foreign policy, too , King
Hassan has followed an inde
pendent course . He has , over the years, improved his relations
with Europe and has established
friendly relations with the Soviet
Union . He has taken an active
role in Arab affairs and has fre
quently used his relationship
with us to bring to our attention
Arab concerns.
Neither in Morocco-nor in
any other developing country
do we seek to further or support
any particular system or foreign
policy. We feel that both are the
responsibility of the peoples of the country.
We have established a mutual
ly beneficial relationship with
Morocco, despite the different
nature of our systems of govern
ment. We find a common interest
in continuing Moroccan eco
nomic growth and the continued
absence in Morocco of influences
hostile to our basic concerns. In
the area of economic develop
ment, we have no magic formu
lae to guarantee growth either
for ourselves or for the Moroc
cans. Only the Moroccans, them selves, can assure their own
progress - political, economic, and
social . We believe, however, that
our assistance has improved their
ability to make such progress.
BILATERAL RELATIONS
have a keen interest in the free
dom of the Mediterranean and in
the continued access for all to
that sea and to the nations
around it . The establishment of
dominant foreign influences ad
versely affecting these interests
on the southern shore of the
Mediterranean would be a matter
of grave concern to us.
-Secondly, the orderly de
velopment of these nations and
their resources is important to
them, to Europe, and to us.
While there are, and will con
tinue to be, differing views on
what constitutes a reasonable
basis for access to these re
sources, there is agreement that
such access is important to all .
- Thirdly, we shall remain an
important source of the capital
and technology required for the
development of this area . The
nature of arrangements may
change, but the U.S. private role
is likely to continue.
- Fourthly, the nations of
North Africa , despite policies
shaped by different histories and
influences, will all stoutly resist domination byby any outside
power. They will defy simple
categorization in any East -West
lineup.
- Finally, events in North
Africa , as in many other parts of
the world , will move today with
far less concern over the role of
the United States and reference
to us than in years past. If we
have interests there, it is our task
to preserve them, whether it be
in investment, in trade, or in
security. We cannot assume that
others will do it for us.
Against the background of
these assumptions, what is our
approach to these nations today ?
We regard them, first , not as
Morocco
We have had particularly close
ties with Morocco and Tunisia .
Despite the withdrawal of mil
itary facilities from Morocco, our
economic and strategic interests
there remain substantial. We re
tain important Voice of America
facilities. We have growing trade
with Morocco and our invest
ment there is also increasing . We value the presence of this friend
at the southern side of the gate
way to the Mediterranean .
Morocco has , since independ
ence, faced severe economic
problems. We have helped in the
development of its agriculture
and in meeting problems of em
ployment.
King Hassan, thrust suddenly into power in 1961 , has led
Morocco skillfully through criti cal years and critical problems.
We have both benefited from
cooperation . Our relationship
with Morocco, however, has
Tunisia
Tunisia exemplifies a smaller
country , ably governed by re
sponsible leadership possessing
influence beyond its borders, but
endowed with modest natural
resources.
4