درس خصوصي ((اللغة الانجليزية -4ب -ت2))عزيزي الطالب ضع سؤالك هنا "واحناعلينا الباقي"

[mosaadabd460]

120
The United States and Nortb Africa
statement. This is almost, but not completely, true, and it may
be getting less so very recendy. But it is often hard to separate
the two, and although Tunisia is not in any sense a one-party
state with cocalitarian harshness, it does have the unexciting air
of a country in which one party is very dominant indeed. Aside
from the neo-Destour today, there are only the Communists
with a minuscule following, some young independents of the
left, and the unorganized conservative remnants of the old
Destour. Individuals sometirnes quarrel with Bourguiba per-
sonally or break with party doctrine, but they have almost al-
ways returned to the fold, and no real foyer of opposition has
developed since the ben Youssef split in 1955 and early 1956.
Once again the smooch social contours of Tunisia must be given
credit. The party owes much of its success, frankly speaking, co
the quality of the men who make up its top and medium leader-
ship. The advancages of the age of civilization in the country
begin to be seen; the relative richness of human resources in
Tunisia compared to many new countries is something it can be
proud of and an asset which has been a leading factor in the
country's successful adjustment to the modern world. The
backbone of the neo-Destour has come from the hard-headed
merchants of the Sahel, dour and practical peasant individual-
ises, artisans and craftsmen, the brightest lights among the pro-
fessional classes in the cities, with a dosage of intellectuals to
give it sauce. Its comerstone has been, rather than the brilliant
verbosity of many political movements, a quiet, pragmatic flex-
ibility, and it has followed the rule that the art of politics is to
know what is possible. From this spirit emerged the gradualist
techniques of Bourguiba, to advance step-by-step, never to
break contact with the interlocutor, to continue negotiating at
all times, and to compromise tactically but never on principles.
The top party leadership is homogeneous, too; some might
almost say inbred. Most of the high officials are graduates of
the Sadiqi College, and there is a nucleus from the specialized
schools in Paris, particularly the Ecole Libre des Sciences Poli-

[mosaadabd460]

The United States and North Africa
If it is hard to see the party breaking apart from within,
another danger faces it, that of withering away through indir
ference. To qualify this, it should be said that this is not an
immediate danger and that the neo-Destour, more successfully
than most parties, has crossed the bridge from being a revolu-
tionary force directing national energies toward a clearly de-
fined goal to playing the role of a formally organized political
party supporting a government which overshadows it and has
pre-empted many of its functions. There are at least three prob-
lems here: one is the difficulty the party has in recruiting new
members and maintaining interest at local cell levels; a second is
the diffuse nature of the party structure, which was desirable
when flexibility and the capacity to survive political repression
was important but is not now adequate to the needs of a state
which feels it must control and direct a complex socioeconomic
battle on many fronts; and a third is the result of having many
talented party members in government jobs which inevitably
take all their energy. Certainly a crisis in party-government
relations has been smoldering for several years, and now there
is an incipient crisis in the popular response to the party. Efforts
to solve the first by reinforcing central authority over regional
party federations do not seem to have been too successful, and
as to the second, it is notorious that the party is unable to sumn-
mon up mass enthusiasm; that is a task which has to be left
to the magic of the presidential appeal. It is too early to say
that there is a crisis of generations in Tunisia, but it looks as if
the next five years or so will determine whether the elan that
has so far carried the country along can be maintained as power
moves into the hands of another age group.
It is not easy to sum up political nuances in Tunisia. The
state is paternalistic and verges on authoritarianism without
openly espousing totalitarian methods. Up to now it has been
a relatively free country without much sense of oppression;
almost anything could be criticized save Bourguiba, and if
criticism did not gec. vary for neither did it bring dowo more

[mosaadabd460]

121
Independent North Africa
biques. A clubby and familial atmosphere prevails among them.
They see much of each other; it is not uncommon to come
across half a dozen important government figures lunching to-
gecher for de special reason ocher than that Tunis is small and
their society is limited. (The extraordinary difference between
che school-cie government of a very little country like Tunisia
and the normally impersonal administration of a large country
like the United States may not at first strike most Americans
but it is a vimal political reality.) Bourguiba's place at the top
of this intimate hierarchy has never been disputed since the
early 1930's, and he is now consecrated as the first citizen of the
country, even though criticism of some of his actions is heard
on a rising scale. His popularity with the average Tunisian-
maintained by a boundless energy, numerous public appear.
ances regular radio ulls, and a fine popular touch-is still
great, although it has somewhat declined since the Bizerte
Fasco in 1961. The ill-conceived plor against the life of the
President at the end of 1963 is les symptomatic of this than
is the vague popular discontent owing to the slowness of
economic progress and the growing realization that Bourguiba
is not infallible. Sail, there is a general recognition, even among
intellectuals who often show impatience, that it was he who
firse lit the lamp in Tunisia and kept it burning at all times.
Around him is a group of distinguished men couching fifty
years of age Mongi Slim, now Foreign Minister after having
served as President of the United Nations Assembly; Bahi
Ledgham, in theory the second man in the country; and a half
a dozen other old companions-in-arms. But they are aging and
a new generation is behind then, men arriving at forty, of
whom the able Minister of the Interior, Taieb Mehiri, is an
example. With others like Masnoudi, Bourguiba has quarreled
over religious and personal issues, or like ben Selah, over the
degree of socialization in the economy, but most of these dis-
putes have ended in reconciliation, that word which always
comes back in a discussion of Tunisian affairs.

[mosaadabd460]

*33
Independene North Africa
than minor sanctions. Quite recently there has been noticeable
tightening of authority and an increased severity in punishments. Whether this is a temporary phenomenon or nor will be
more clearly seen when the present tern of the President comes
o an end in 1969--- time when many of the problems men
tioned above: anthorinarianism, the conflict of age and power
groups, and the results of economic sacrifices, seem likely to
come to a head. The present paternalism can be justified, and
seems to be accepted by the people, on the grounds that the
President's energy and vision have pushed and cajoled the
country into progress which it would not have made on it
own. The people tend to be inert, something which is at once a
strength and weakness, but the danger is that continuing
paternalism will make them more inert. On the other hand,
Tunisia has been buttressed by other mure values. los long-
standing social cohesion has been translated into political unity,
and, as the result of long and patient indoctrination since the
mid-1930's by a highly organized political formation, national
values have permeated all important sectors of the country,
Time has also been useful; Tunisia had a generation to ripen
before plunging into independent life and this maturity now
shows. For these reasons, although it is likely that a period of
uncertainty is ahead in the not-too-distant future, when one
considers the proved Tunisian capacity for accommodation and
the ability to subordinate perty problems of the moment to the
pursuit of the principal goal, there is much reason to be hopeful.
In Morocco, a large and more complex country than Tunisia,
the transition period just after independence was more unser-
cled but since then there has been more variety and movement
in the texture of political life. Until 1953 two forces had shared
the leadership of the nationalist movement: the palace and the
Istiqlal Party. After their rempomry effacement, a third force
came on the scene, the so-called "resistance," made up by the
various terrorist groups in the cities and the Liberation Army
in the countryside. The story of independent Morocco reduced

[mosaadabd460]

114
The United States and North Africa
to its simplest political terins has been the sorting out of rela-
tions berween these forces and the search for a system in which
each will have its proper place. This was first exemplified by
the problem of incorporating all the undercover elements of
the struggle into the national political structure, and later by
the growing polarity between the throne and various political
groups, with each seeking a mandate from the Moroccan peo-
ple for the eventual shaping of a new framework. After the
King had become the symbol of national resistance in 1953,
there was an assumption in many quarters that he would on
his retum stay aloof from any political involvement, that he
would reign and not rule, and that he would remain the repre-
sentative of precious but precarious national unity. The
prestige of the monarchy was overwhelming and its latent
power immense, as it still is. But between 1956 and 1960 that
prestige was transformed into active political power as well
,
although the step was not taken until the inability of the
normal political organizations of the country to produce a
needed stability had been demonstrated.
At the beginning of 1956 Morocco faced a host of problems,
but none was more pressing than the insecurity and turbulence
which reigned in both town and country. The several resist-
ance movements which had come into being after 1953 had
grown up, as it were, on the streets without proper guidance.
They had siphoned off, especially toward the end of the under-
ground period, most of the active and aggressive young men
in the country. With the return of normalcy many of these
were unwilling to return to ordinary jobs or, in many cases,
unemployment and dreary poverty, and they turned to gang-
sterism, extortion, and various kinds of illegal activities. The
field was almost clear because Morocco was dependent on
French security forces, which were reluctant to intervene in
purely Moroccan affairs, until the national police was formed
in May 1956. Even as late as that summer, however, the police
had to fight pitched battles in Casablanca with the Black

[mosaadabd460]

125
Independen North Africa
Crescent
, one of the underground groups that had Communist
affiliations Individually the resitants were heroes, however,
and the movements were judiciously signaled out for praise in
royal speeches although less favorably viewed by the Istiqlal,
which did not intend to lose the fruits of its generation-long
campaign. Only gradually
was urban order restored as the
police got the upper hand, and as some of the resistants them-
selves were incorporated into the police while others drifted
back to their ordinary occupations with the assurance that
they would be given a gamut of veterans' benefits and special
consideration
The reintegration of the Liberation Army in the countryside
was more delicate
. In the spring of 1956 it was continuing attacks on French outposts and government offices, and presented
3 serious threat to order in rural areas where dissidence was an
old habit. If the new state was unable to control all its territory,
there could be serious consequences. A Royal Army was created, mainly with volunteers who had served with French forces
and on the basis of personal and tribal loyalty to the King. It was
possible to integrare some of the rank-and-file of the Liberation
Army, who themselves came from rural backgrounds, into the
Royal Army afrer careful screening. But the Liberation Army
had also recruited urban resistants and political leaders whose
ideas did not seem suitable to the force the palace was building
up, and so good parts of it were never incorporated. Regrouped
in the far south of the country, they were patronized for a time
by Allal Al Fassi and his wing of the Istiqlal, which began
making claims to large parts of the Sahara in French and
Spanish hands, and they unsuccessfully tried to seize Ifni from
the Spanish in November 1957, a move which was meant to
emphasize the intransigence of their outlook--for they had
originally considered themselves part of a unified force meant
to liberate all North Africa and had close ties with the Algerian
rebels--and embarrass the government. Although this was the
last major enterprise of the Liberation Army, it lingered on in

[mosaadabd460]

126
The United States and North Africa
the southern border regions and caused minor incidents until
French troops were withdrawn a year later. Late in 1957,
however, ex-leaders of the Liberation Army formed a new
political party, the Popular Movement, which stressed a vague
doctrine of "Islamic socialism," and has shown strength in rural
and Berber areas in which the Army had previously operated.
After the restoration of public order, which was completed
by the end of 1956, Moroccan political life blossomed. Since
independence there have been six governments, four of them
political cabinets and the last two formed and presided over
by the King. The
first government of Si Bekkai lasted until
October 1956, but was under constant attack by the Istiqlal,
which wanted all the cabinet posts instead of a mere majority.
In fact, the cabinet was a govering institution in name only at
this time because of the unlimited nature of royal power, and
the separate political activity which flourished in the palace
with all its ramifications, plus royal control of the Army and
the police. When the second, all-Istiqlal government was
formed, the King recained Si Bekkai, personally loyal to him,
as head of government and fomed a crown council to handle
certain matters that he did not want to go through the cabinet.
Thus, the Istiqlal did not ever have full power and it was,
moreover, beginning to show signs of internal strain. The
enthusiastic support it had received from a majority of the
people just after independence was giving way to disillusion-
ment as the economy slowed down and the standard of living
dipped. Also there was a basic cleavage between the old-guard
leadership which had come from and represented more con-
servative circles and a minority group headed by Mehdi ben
Barka, Abdallah Ibrahim, and Abderrahim Bouabid, which ac-
cused the party of having lost conect with popular reality
and which turned to the urban proletariat for support. The
quarrel was noticeable in 1957, when the tone of party publi-
cations controlled by each faction started to clash. After the
Istiqlal ministers had resigned and brought down the second

[mosaadabd460]

8
8
Independent North Africa
127
Bekkai government, the conservative wing of the party formed
* government
under the stewardship of Balafrej. This lasted
from May to December 1958, and made an indifferent record.
It was a period when events in the Middle East like the Iraqi
Revolution made the palace sensitive, while labor disorders
increased in the cities. Late in the year an uprising in the Rif
,
stemming from both economic and political discontent, was
forcefully put down by the Royal Army led by Crown Prince
(now King) Mulay Hassan. It was also a time when intra-
party disharmony came to open rupture. The government was
forced to resign and, after three weeks of consultations, the
King chose a cabinet directed by one of the leaders of the op-
posing faction, Ibrahim, although members were to serve,
according to royal decision, on a personal and not party basis.
The purpose of this cabinet was to prepare for elections and
resign, but in fact it lingered in office well over a year, during
which time political confusion reached a climax. The Istiqlal
split into two segments, and in the summer of 1959 the
"progressive" wing, as it cermed itself, organized a new party,
the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), which united
Istiqlal secessionists, dissidents from minor parties, and leaders
of the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT). Chaos was the only
description of the events of early 1960. The government re-
fused to resign voluntarily and signs of impatience and hostility
multiplied from the palace, particularly from the Crown
Prince, who was politically very active. To compensate for the
defection of the UMT, the Istiqlal had formed a rival labor
union which did not attract a large clientele, but private po-
litical and union strong-arm squads brought a return of vio-
lence to the cities. The government was powerless since the
palace had control of the security forces, and it refused to
intervene. The situation was such that in fact the leaders of the
government were the chiefs of the opposition, and an uprising
in the Atlas was attempted not against but in favor of the
government. To check further degradation, the King stepped

[mosaadabd460]

128
The United States and North Africa
in to end the mandate of the Ibrahim government. He an-
nounced in a nationwide speech that he was assuming control
of the government himself with the Crown Prince as Vice-
premier, and asked individuals of all tendencies to help him
form a cabinet of national union. All groups except the UNFP
agreed to participate in this stabilization effort.
Since 1960 Morocco has been governed as well as reigned
over by its monarchs, Muhammad V until his sudden death in
February 1961, and Hassan II thereafter. In chat interval, al-
though there have been few changes in political structure, a
clear division has emerged between the palace and its sup-
porters in groups representing conservative and rural elements,
and the opposition entrenched in the industrial cities along the
Atlantic coast, where in municipal elections in 1960 (the only
eleccions yet held in Morocco) its candidates won a majority.
The monarchy is the point of departure for any under-
standing of modern Morocco, and it is more than just one of
many political ingredients. The 'Alawite family has ruled for
three centuries and has by now forged a strong affective bond
between itself and the people, which makes the throne as close
to the heart of the continuing tradition of the nation as possi-
ble. Thus the King, who wields power not only as the malik,
or temporal executive, but also as imam, the spiritual leader of
the Moroccan Muslim community, is the evocation of the
national personality. His popularity among simple and rural
people approaches adulation and if in the cities there is a
newer, sophisticated view of him as a political figure, he can
still never really be looked on by any Moroccan as an ordinary
individual. The decision of the royal family to step into the
arena of politics was a fateful one. It raised cries of arbitrari-
ness and personal power" from the UNFP opposition, and
caused discussion in many circles, but until now there has been
no sign that any other force in the country is capable of as-
suring national solidarity.
Until the end of 1962 Morocco was an absolute monarchy in

[mosaadabd460]

a
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
If we look at the problems of government in the independent
countries of North Africa in an order of ascending difficulties,
we find that Tunisia made the transition from dependence to
independence with a minimum of shock and discontinuity, and
has functioned since with remarkable smoothness. Arrange-
ments had already been made during the autonomous period
for elections to a Constituent Assembly and these were held on
March 25, 1956, only five days after Franco-Tunisian protocol
recognizing Tunisia as an independent state had been signed.
The neo-Destour ticket, a national union front grouping to-
gether labor, commercial and agricultural organization, won
an overwhelming victory (97 per cent of the vote). The As-
sembly was convened and Bourguiba elected presiding officer,
but he resigned shortly to become Premier of the first Tunisian
government.
The principal task of the Assembly was to draft a constitu-
tion, but as it got down to work it became evident that there
was strong sentiment among the deputies and throughout the
country to change the regime from a monarchy to a republic.
In fact, the eventual disappearance of the Beylical system hed
long been planned by Destourians and taken for granted by
most Tunisians. There had never been any deep feeling among
the people for it, although it had been accepted without rancor.
But the whole political evolution of Tunisia, from the earliest

[mosaadabd460]

116

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
If we look at the problems of government in the independent
countries of North Africa in an order of ascending difficulties,
we find that Tunisia made the transition from dependence to
independence with a minimum of shock and discontinuity, and
has functioned since with remarkable smoothness. Arrange-
ments had already been made during the autonomous period
for elections to a Constituent Assembly and these were held on
March 25, 1956, only five days after Franco-Tunisian protocol
recognizing Tunisia as an independent state had been signed.
The neo-Destour ticket, a national union front grouping to-
gether labor, commercial and agricultural organization, won
an overwhelming victory (97 per cent of the vote). The As-
sembly was convened and Bourguiba elected presiding officer,
but he resigned shortly to become Premier of the first Tunisian
government.
The principal task of the Assembly was to draft a constitu-
tion, but as it got down to work it became evident that there
was strong sentiment among the deputies and throughout the
country to change the regime from a monarchy to a republic.
In fact, the eventual disappearance of the Beylical system hed
long been planned by Destourians and taken for granted by
most Tunisians. There had never been any deep feeling among
the people for it, although it had been accepted without rancor.
But the whole political evolution of Tunisia, from the earliest

117

days of the nationalist struggle, had taken place outside the monarchy, which had remained a fossil instirution incapable of inspiring affection or admiraion. Tihe neo-Destour had been the focus of national life and Bourguiba the national hero.

Accordingly on July 25, 1057, the Assembly unanimously passed a resolution abolishing the monarchy and proclaiming Tunisia a repablic Premier Bouguiba was entrusted with the duties of head of state until the constiution was ready. That was not undl June 1oso, and nacional elections were not held until November that vear, so that for two years Tunisia functioned provisionally with Bourguiba as head of state and head of goverment without a legislative assembly in cxistence. This meant a heavy concentration of power in the hands of one man, and it is significant that almost all the social refomm legislation was promulgated in che period between 1956 and 1959 by executive decree and bears the stamp of the presidential personality.

The constinion as adopted stablished Tunisia as a republican state, with islam its religioa end Arabic is language, which forms a part of the "Greater Maghrib." The choice of regine was infuenced both by American ideas-Bourguiba has always been an admirer of Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he resembles

in many ways-and, negaively, by the example of the Fourch Republic in France, the wealness of which was fully demonstrated while the document was under study. Thus a presidential regime was chosen which gives much power to the executive but provides a legislative check as well. The President is elected directly by uriversal adult sufrage for a period of fve years and can hold office for three terons. Like the Aunerican president, he appoints his cabinet (whose menbers are tidled Secretaries of Sate rather than Ministers), is Commander-inchief of the armed forces, declares war and makes peace, and ratifes treaties with the agreement of the Assembly, The President can introduce legislation which then takes precedence, can issue orders in council while the assembly is not in session,


118

The Unired Snes ond Nortb Africa

subject to certain restrictions, and, finelly, can take exceptional measuras if the safery and independence of the Republic are threatened.

Compared to that, the prerogatives of the Assembly are somewhat restricted. Ies members are elected at the same time as the President for five years, and all deputes represent the country as a whole instead of a purticular discrict. The Assenbly can pass bills over presidential veto by a rwo-thirds majority on second reading, bur is most relling power is char of firing the finai figures of the budget Ia practice the legislature has been overshadowed during the seven years of Tunisin independence by the execuaive, but that is not too unusual in the first stages of a new counay which is tempted to dramapze the national will in one personaliry, especially when the magnetism of that individual is such that it is impossible to imagine the country wichout him.

Grouped around the presidency is the executive office, beginning with the cabinet which bas been staffed with little change by members of the neo-Destour. The Secretary of State to the Presidency functions as a vice-president and is also responsible for national defense. The forces under his command include a smmall ammy of about 20,o00 men, which has enhanced its reputation in the Congo, a naval concingent for coastal defense, a parachutist elice unit, a few officer pilots, and the gendarmerie.

Military service is compusory, but the rate of rejection is high and many trainees are enrolled in a civil corps which has done excellent work in the economic development program.

On the regional level, the country is divided into thirteen governorates, with each governor assisted by an elected advisory council. These have limited powers but provide a useful testing ground of local opinion. It is in the competence of its regional administration that Tunisia has particularly disinguished itself. On the whole the governors have been able and conscientious younger Destourians, and a neat balance berween centralization and decentralizaion has been kept. The governor
119


has wide laitude to make decisions on the spot-something which has been capital in handling the large public works unemployment program-but he cannot get too much out of hand because the smallness of Tunisia, and its facile communications allow for frequent consultation with the capital and the shadow of the central goverument is kept at just about optimum intensity.

All the governments of the new Maghrib states could legitimately be considered refom govemments, for each has made significant changes in the legal, judicial, and social structure of

its countries, but in Tunisia reform has been perhaps the mos notable among many accomplishments. Many of the details are discussed later under the heading of social change, but ment…
[ظ،:ظ،ظ£ ص, ظ،ظ¢‏/ظ§‏/ظ،ظ¤ظ¤ظ£ هـ] Mr.mossaad: The Unied States and Nortb Africa statemerc. This is almost, but not completely, true, and it may be getting less so very recently. But it is often hard to separate the two, and although Tunisia is not in any sense a one-party state with totalicarian harshness, it does have the unexciting air of a country in which one party is very dominant indeed. Aside from the neo-Destour today, there are only the Communists with a minuscule following, some young independents of the left, and the unorganized conservative remnants of the old Destour. Individuals sometirnes quarrel with Bourgwiba personally or break with party docurine, but they have almost always returned to the fold, and no real foyer of opposition has developed since the ben Youssef split in 1955 and early 1956.120

Once again the smooch social contours of Tunisia must be given credit. The party owes much of its success, frankly speaking, to the quality of the men who make up its top and medium leadership. The advancages of the age of civilization in the country begin to be seen; the relacive richness of human resources in Tunisia compared to many new countries is something it can be proud of and an asset which has been a leading facror in the country's successful adjustment to the modem world. The backbone of the neo-Destour hes come from the hard-headed merchants of the Sahel, dour and practical peasant individualists, artisans and craftsmen, the brightest lights among the professional classes in the cities, with a dosage of intellectuals to give it sauce. Its cormerstone has been, rather than the brillianc verbosity of many polirical movements, a quiet, pragrnatic flexibiliry, and it has folowed the rule that the art of politics is to know what is possible. From this spirit emerged the gradualist techniques of Bourguiba, to advance step-by-step, never to break contact with the interlocutor, to concinue negotiating at all times, and to compromise tactically but never on principles.

The top party leadership is honogeneous, too; some might almost say inbred. Most of the high officials are graduates of the Sadiqi College, and there is a nucleus from the specialized

schools in Paris, parricularly che Ecole Libre des Sciences Poli
120

120
The United States and Nortb Africa
statement. This is almost, but not completely, true, and it may
be getting less so very recendy. But it is often hard to separate
the two, and although Tunisia is not in any sense a one-party
state with cocalitarian harshness, it does have the unexciting air
of a country in which one party is very dominant indeed. Aside
from the neo-Destour today, there are only the Communists
with a minuscule following, some young independents of the
left, and the unorganized conservative remnants of the old
Destour. Individuals sometirnes quarrel with Bourguiba per-
sonally or break with party doctrine, but they have almost al-
ways returned to the fold, and no real foyer of opposition has
developed since the ben Youssef split in 1955 and early 1956.
Once again the smooch social contours of Tunisia must be given
credit. The party owes much of its success, frankly speaking, co
the quality of the men who make up its top and medium leader-
ship. The advancages of the age of civilization in the country
begin to be seen; the relative richness of human resources in



Tunisia compared to many new countries is something it can be
proud of and an asset which has been a leading factor in the
country's successful adjustment to the modern world. The
backbone of the neo-Destour has come from the hard-headed
merchants of the Sahel, dour and practical peasant individual-
ises, artisans and craftsmen, the brightest lights among the pro-
fessional classes in the cities, with a dosage of intellectuals to
give it sauce. Its comerstone has been, rather than the brilliant
verbosity of many political movements, a quiet, pragmatic flex-
ibility, and it has followed the rule that the art of politics is to
know what is possible. From this spirit emerged the gradualist
techniques of Bourguiba, to advance step-by-step, never to
break contact with the interlocutor, to continue negotiating at
all times, and to compromise tactically but never on principles.
The top party leadership is homogeneous, too; some might
almost say inbred. Most of the high officials are graduates of
the Sadiqi College, and there is a nucleus from the specialized
schools in Paris, particularly the Ecole Libre des Sciences Poli-




121
tiques. A clubby and familial atmosphere prevails smong them.

They see much of each other; it is not uncommon to come across half a dozen important govermunent fgures lanchأ؛ng together for no special reason other than that Tunis is small and their society is limired. (The exttaordinary difference berween the school-tie goverument of a very lirde county like Tanisia and the normally impersonal administration of a large country like the United States may not at first strike most Americans but it is a vital political reality.) Bourguiba's place at the top of this intimate hierarchy has never been disputed since the early 193o's, and he is now consecrated as the first citizen of the country, even though criticismn of some of his acrions is heard on a rising scale. His popularicy with the average Tunisianmaintained by a boundless energy, numerous public appearances, regular radio calks, and a fine popular touch-is gill great, although it has somewhat declined since the Bizerte fiasco in 1961. The ill-conceived plor against the life of the President at the end of 1962 is les symptomatic of this than is the vague popular discontent owing to the slowness of economic progress and the growing realization thar Bourguiba is not infallible. Still, there is a general recognition, even among intellectuals who often show impatience, that it was he who first lit the lamp in Tunisia and kept it buning at all times.

Around him is a group of distinguished men touching fifcy years of age: Mongi Slim, now Foreign Minister after having served as President of the United Nations Assembly; Bahi Ladgham, in theory the second man in the country; and a half a dozen other old comparions-in-arms. But they are aging and a new generation is behind them, men ariving at forty, of whom the able Minister of the Interior, Taicb Mehiri, is an example. With others, like Masؤ±noudi, Bourguiba has quarreled over religious and personal issues, or like ben Salah, over the degree of socialization in che economy, but most of these disputes have ended in reconcilietion, that word which always comes back in a discusion of Tonisian affairs.
122

The United States and Nortb Africa

If it is hard to see the pary breaking aparr from wichin, another danger faces it, that of withering away through indif.

ference. To qualify this, it should be said that this is nor an immediate danger and thar the neo-Destour, more successfully than most perties, has crossed the bridge from being a revolucionary force directing natonel energies toward a clearly defined goal to playing the role of a formally organized poliical party supporting a govermment which overshadows it and has pre-empted many of its funcions. There are at least three problems here: one is the diffculty the party has in recruing new members and maintaining interest at local cell levels: a second is the diffuse narure of the party structure, which was desirable when fexibility and the capecity to survive poliaical repression was important but is not now adequate to che needs of a state which feels it must control and direct a complex socioeconomic battle on many fronts; and a third is the result of having many talented party members in government jobs which inevitably take all their energy. Certainly a crisis in party-government relations has been smoldering for several years, and now there is an incipient crisis in the popular response to the party. Eforts to solve the first by reinforcing central authority over regional party federations do not seern to have been too successful, and as to the second, it is notorious that the party is unable to summon up mass enthusiasm; that is a task which has to be left to the magic of the presidenial appeal. It is too early to say that there is a crisis of generaions in Tunisia, but it looks as if the next five years or so will determine whether the elan that has so far caried the country along can be maintained as power moves into the hands of another age group.

It is not easy to sum up political nuances in Turisia: The state is paternalistic and verges on authoritarianism without openly espousing totalitarian methods. Up to now it has been a relatively free country without much sense of oppression;

almost anything could be ciicized save Bourguiba, and if criticism did nor get.vary far neither did it bring down more

123

than tinor mnctions. Quite reoanty there has been a noiceable cightening of suthority and an increased severity in punishments. Whether this is a temporary phenomenon or not will be more clearly som when the praent tern of tbhe Prewident comes to an end in 1g6s--a time when mary of the problens mentioned above: authoritarianism, the conflicr of age and power groups, and the results of economic facrifces, scem likely to come to a head. The present paternalisrn can be justifed, and seems to be accepted by the people, on the grounds thar the President's enesgy and vision have pushed and cajoled the country into progres which it would not have made on is own. The people tend to be inert, something which is at once a strength and a weakness, bur the danger is that continoing paternalism will make them more inert. On the other hand Tunisia has been burressed by other rare values. Its longstanding social cohesion has been translated into political unity, and, as the result of long and petient indoctrinatioa since the mid-1930's by a highly organized policical formation, national values have permeated all important sectors of the country.

Time has also been useful; Tunisia had a generation to ripen before plunging into independenr life and this maturity now shows. For these reasots, although it is likely that a period of uncertainty is ahead in the not-too-distant future, when one considers the proved Tunisian capacity for accomnodation and the ability to subordinate petty problems of the nomnent to the pursuit of the principal goal, there is much reason to be hopefu.

In Morocco, a large and more complez country than Tunisia, the transition period just after independence was more unsettled but since then there has been rnore variety and movement in the texture of political life. Uncil 1953 two forces had shared che leadership of the nationalist movenent: the palace and the Istiglal Party. After their temporary efacement, a third force came on the scene, the so-called "resistance," made up by the various terrorist groups in the cicies and the Liberation Army in the countryside. The story of independent Morocco reduced

124

The United States and Nortb Africa

to its simplest political terms has been the sorting out of relations between these forces and the search for a system in which each will have its proper place. This was first exemplified by124

the struggle into the national political structure, and later by the growing polarity berween the throne and various political groups, with cach seeking a mandate from the Moroccan people for the eventual shaping of a new framework. After the King had become the syrnbol of national resistance in 1953, there was an assumption in many quarters that he woud on his rerurn stay aloof from any political involvenent, that he would reign and not rule, and that he would remain che represencative of a precious but precarious national unity. The prestige of the monarchy was overwhelming and its latent power immense, as it still is. But berween 1956 and i96o that prestige was transfomed into active political power as well, although the step was not taken until the inability of the normal political organizations of the country to produce a needed stability had been demonstrated.the problem of incoporating all the undercover elements of

At the beginning of 1956 Morocco faced a host of problems, but none was more pressing than the insecurity and turbulence which reigned in both town and country. The several resistance movements which had come into being after 1953 had grown up, as it were, on the streets without proper guidance.

They had siphoned off, especially toward the end of the underground period, most of the active and aggressive young men in the country. With the return of normalcy many of these were unwilling to return to ordinary jobs or, in many cases, unemployment and dreary poverty, and they tumed to gangsterism, extortion, and various kinds of illegal activities. The field was almost clear because Morocco was dependent on French security forces, which were reluctant to intervene in purely Moroccan affairs, until the national police was formed in May 1956. Even as late as that summer, however, the police had to fight pitched battiles in Casablarica with the Black
125
125

Crescent, one of the underground groups that had Communist afiliacions. Individually che resistants were heros, however, and the movemens were judiciously signaled out for praise in royal speeches although less favorably viewed by the Istiqlal, which did not intend to lose the fruis of its generarion-long campaign. Only gradually was urban order restored as the police got the upper hand, and as some of the resistants themselves were incorporaced into the police while others drifted back to their ordinary occupagions wich the assurance that chey would be given a ganut of veterans' benefits and special consideration.

The reintegration of the Liberacion Army in che countryside

was more delicate. In the spring of 19s6 it was continuing attacks on French outposts and government offices, and presented

a serious threat to order in nural areas where dissidence was an

old habit. If the new state was unable to control all its territory, there could be serious consequences. A Royal Army was created, mainly with volunteers who had served with French forces and on the basis of personal and tribal loyalty to the King. It was possible to integrate some of the rank-and-fle of the Liberation Army, who themselves came from rural backgrounds, into the Royal Army after careful screening. But the Liberation Army had also recruited arban resistants and political leaders whose ideas did not seem suitable to the force the palace was building up, and so good parts of it were never incorporated. Regrouped in the far south of the country, they were patronized for a time by Allal Al Fassi and his wing of the Istiqlal, which began making claims to large pars of the Sahara in French and Spanish hands, and they unsuccessfully tried to seize Ifni from the Spanish in November 1957, a move which was meant to emphasize the intransigence of their outlook-for they had originally considered themselves part of a unifed force meant to liberate all North Africa and had close ties with the Algerian rebels-and embarrass the government. Although this was the last major enterprise of the Liberation Army, it lingered on in
126

The United States and North Africa

the southern border regions and caused minor incidents until French troops were withdrawn a year later. Late in 1957, however, ex-leaders of the Liberation Army formed a new political party, the Popular Movement, which stressed a vague doctrine of "Islamic socialism," and has shown strength in rural and Berber areas in which the Army had previously operated.

After the restoration of public order, which was completed by the end of 1956, Moroccan political life blossomed. Since independence there have been six goveroments, four of them polircal cabinets and the last two formed and presided over by the King. The first government of Si Bekkai lasted until October 1956, bat was under constant attack by the Istiqlal, which wanted all the cabinet posts instead of a mere majority.

In fact, the cabinet was a governing instiution in name only a0 this time because of the unlimited nature of royal power, and the separate political activity which flourished in the palace with all its ramifications, plus royal control of the Army and the police. When the second, all-Istiqlal government was formed, the King recained Si Bekkai, personally loyal to him, as head of governmeat and formned a crown council to handle certain matters thar he did not want to go through the cabinet.

Thus, the Istiqlal did not ever have full power and it was, moreover, beginning to show signs of intemal strein. The enthusiastic support ic had received from a majority of the people just after independence was giving way to disillusionment as the economy slowed down and the standard of living dipped. Also there was a basic cleavage berween the old-guard leadership which had come from and represented more conservative circles and a minoricy group headed by Mehdi ben

cused the party of having lost contact with popular realicy and which turned to the urban proletariat for support. The quarrel was noticeable in 1957, when the tone of party publications controlled by each faction started to clash. After the Itiglal ministars had resigned and brought down the second
127

Bekkai government, the conservaive wing of the party formed a government under the stewardship of Balafrej. This lasted from May to December 1958, and made an indifferent record.Independent Nortb'Africa

It was:a period when events in the Middle East like the Iraqi Revolution made the palace sensitive, while labor disorders increased in thecities. Late in the year an uprising in the Rif.

stemming from both economic and political discontent, was forcefully put down by the Royal Arny led by Crown Prince (now King) Mulay Hassan. It was also a time when intraparty disharmony came to open rupture. The govemment was forced to resign and, after three weeks of consultations, the King chose a cabinet directed by one of the leaders of the opposing faction, Ibrahim, athough members were to serve, according to royal decision, on a personal and not party basis.

The purpose of this cabinet was to prepare for elections and resign, but in fact it lingered in office well over a year, during which time political confusion reached a climax. The Istiqlal split into two segments, and in the sunmer of 19s9 the "progressive" wing, as it terned itself, organized a new party, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), which united Istiglal secessionists, dissidents from minor parties, and leaders of the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT). Chaos was the only description of the events of early 196o. The government refused to resign voluntarily and signs of impatience and hostility multiplied from the palace, particularly from the Crowr Prince, who was politically very active. To compensate for the defection of the UMT, the Istiglal had formed 2 rival labor union which did not attract a large clientele, but private political and union strong-arm squads brought a return of viokence to the ciries. The government was powerless since the palace had control of the security forces, and it refused to intervene. The situation was such that in fact the leaders of the govermment were the chiefs of the opposition, and an uprising in the Atlas was attempted not against bur in favor of the government. To check further degradation, the King stepped
128

in to end the mandate of the Ibrahim government. He announced in a nationwide speech that he was assuming control of the government hinself with the Crown Prince as Vicepremier, and asked individuals of all tendencies to help him form a cabinet of national union. All groups except the UNFP agreed to participate in this stabilization effort.128The Unired States TNU

Since 196o Morocco has been governed as well as reigned over by its monarchs, Muhammad V until his sudden death in February 1961, and Hassan II thereafter. In thar interval, although there have been few changes in political srucrure, a clear division has emerged between the palace and its supporters in groups representing conservative and nural elements, and the opposition entrenched in the industrial cities along the Atlantic coast, where in municipal elections in 196o (the only elections yet held in Morocco) its candidates won a majoriry.

The monarchy is the point of departure for any understanding of modern Morocco, and it is more than just one of many political ingredients. The 'Alawite fanily has ruled for three centuries and has by now fonged a strong affective bond between itself and the people, which makes the throne as close to the heart of the continuing tradition of the nation as possible. Thus the King, who wields power not only as the malik, or temporal executive, but also as inam, the spiritual leader of the Moroccan Muslim communiry, is the evocaion of the national personality. His popularicy among simple and rural people approaches adulation and if in the ciries there is a newer, sophiscicated view of him as a polirical figure, he can still never really be looked on by any Moroccan as an ordinary individual. The decision of the royal family to step into the arena of politics was a fateful one. It raised cries of arbitrariness and "personal power" from the UNFP opposicion, and caused discussion in many circles, but until now there has been no sign that any other force in the country is capable of assuring national solidaricy.

Until the end of 1962 Morocco was an absolute monarchy in

[mosaadabd460]

has wide laitude to make decisions on the spot-something which has been capital in handling the large public works unemployment program-but he cannot get too much out of hand because the smallness of Tunisia, and its facile communications allow for frequent consultation with the capital and the shadow of the central goverument is kept at just about optimum intensity.

All the governments of the new Maghrib states could legitimately be considered refom govemments, for each has made significant changes in the legal, judicial, and social structure of

its countries, but in Tunisia reform has been perhaps the mos notable among many accomplishments. Many of the details are discussed later under the heading of social change, but mention should be made here that Tunisia has made a sweeping renovation of the legal basis of society which far exceeds that

of any other North African or Arab country. When the Personal Status Code went into effect in 1os7 Tunisia became the only Arab state in which polygany was unconditionally abolished and women granted full equality with men in all domains. Marriage and divorce were reformed and regulated by new civil laws, while summary repudiation of the wife by the husband was terminated. Religious tribunals for Muslirns and Rabbinical courts for Jews were abolished, placing everyone under the same secular jurisdiction. These reforns were completed by a Civil Status Law which made registration of births and deaths obligatory for the first time and insisted on a specific identity for each individual to replace the anarchic anonymity which prevails in many Arab countries where people do not have surnames. All things considered, the reform of justice, the secularizaion of the law, and the removal of inequality between citizens were probably the mosc important steps taken by the Tunisian stare along the path to becoming an integrated,

moderm nation.

In Tunisia it is comnon to hear it said that the government is the party, and vice versa. "We are all Destourians" is a standard

[mosaadabd460]

Independens Nortb Africa

125

Crescent, one of the underground groups that had Communist affiliations. Individually the resistants were heroes, however, and the movemens were judiciously signaled out for praise in royal speeches although less favorably viewed by the Istiqlal, which did not intend to lose the fruits of its generarion-long campaign. Only gradually was urban order restored as the police got the upper hand, and as some of the resistants themselves were incorporated into the police while others drifted back to their ordinary occupagions wich the assurance that they would be given a ganut of veterans' benefits and special consideration.

The reintegration of the Liberation Army in che countryside

was more delicate. In the spring of 1956 it was continuing attacks on French outposts and government offices, and presented

a serious threat to order in rural areas where dissidence was an

old habit. If the new state was unable to control all its territory, there could be serious consequences. A Royal Army was created, mainly with volunteers who had served with French forces and on the basis of personal and tribal loyalty to the King. It was possible to integrate some of the rank-and-file of the Liberation Army, who themselves came from rural backgrounds, into the Royal Army after careful screening. But the Liberation Army had also recruited urban resistants and political leaders whose ideas did not seem suitable to the force the palace was building up, and so good parts of it were never incorporated. Regrouped in the far south of the country, they were patronized for a time by Allal Al Fassi and his wing of the Istiqlal, which began making claims to large pars of the Sahara in French and Spanish hands, and they unsuccessfully tried to seize Ifni from the Spanish in November 1957, a move which was meant to emphasize the intransigence of their outlook-for they had originally considered themselves part of a unifed force meant to liberate all North Africa and had close ties with the Algerian rebels-and embarrass the government. Although this was the last major enterprise of the Liberation Army, it lingered on in

[mosaadabd460]

إندبندنس نورتب أفريكا

125

الهلال ، إحدى الجماعات السرية التي كان لها انتماءات شيوعية. كان المقاومون على المستوى الفردي أبطالًا ، ومع ذلك ، تم التنبيه إلى السعاة بحكمة من أجل الثناء في الخطب الملكية على الرغم من أن حزب الاستقلال لم يكن ينوي خسارة ثمار حملته التي استمرت لجيل طويل. تم استعادة النظام الحضري بشكل تدريجي فقط حيث حصلت الشرطة على اليد العليا ، وبما أن بعض المقاومين أنفسهم قد تم دمجهم في الشرطة بينما عاد الآخرون إلى وظائفهم العادية ، مما يضمن حصولهم على مجموعة من مزايا المحاربين القدامى والمزايا الخاصة. الاعتبار.

إعادة دمج جيش التحرير في ريف تشي

كان أكثر حساسية. في ربيع عام 1956 كانت الهجمات مستمرة على البؤر الاستيطانية الفرنسية والمكاتب الحكومية ، وشكلت

تهديدًا خطيرًا للنظام في المناطق الريفية حيث كان الانشقاق

عادة قديمة. إذا كانت الدولة الجديدة غير قادرة على السيطرة على كل أراضيها ، فقد تكون هناك عواقب وخيمة. تم إنشاء الجيش الملكي ، بشكل أساسي مع المتطوعين الذين خدموا مع القوات الفرنسية وعلى أساس الولاء الشخصي والقبلي للملك. كان من الممكن دمج بعض الرتب والملفات من جيش التحرير ، الذين جاءوا هم أنفسهم من خلفيات ريفية ، في الجيش الملكي بعد فحص دقيق. لكن جيش التحرير جند أيضًا مقاومين حضريين وقادة سياسيين لا تبدو أفكارهم مناسبة للقوة التي كان القصر يبنيها ، وبالتالي لم يتم دمج أجزاء جيدة منه أبدًا. تم إعادة تجميعهم في أقصى جنوب البلاد ، وقد رعاهم علال الفاسي وجناحه في حزب الاستقلال ، الذين بدأوا يطالبون بفروع كبيرة من الصحراء في الأيدي الفرنسية والإسبانية ، وقد حاولوا دون جدوى الاستيلاء على إفني من الإسبان في نوفمبر 1957 ، وهي خطوة كان من المفترض أن تؤكد على تعنت نظرتهم لأنهم كانوا يعتبرون أنفسهم في الأصل جزءًا من قوة موحدة تهدف إلى تحرير شمال إفريقيا بالكامل ولديهم علاقات وثيقة مع المتمردون الجزائريون - ويحرجون الحكومة. على الرغم من أن هذا كان آخر مشروع كبير لجيش التحرير ، إلا أنه استمر

[mosaadabd460]

116

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
If we look at the problems of government in the independent
countries of North Africa in an order of ascending difficulties,
We find that Tunisia made the transition from dependence to
independence with a minimum of shock and discontinuity, and
has functioned since with remarkable smoothness.
Arrangements had already been made during the autonomous period

for elections to a Constituent Assembly and these were held on
March 25, 1956, only five days after Franco-Tunisian protocol
recognizing Tunisia as an independent state had been signed.
The neo-Destour ticket, a national union front grouping
together labor, commercial and agricultural organization, won
an overwhelming victory (97 per cent of the vote). The AS-
but he resigned shortly to become Premier of the first Tunisian
assembly was convened and Bourguiba elected presiding officer,
government.
The principal task of the Assembly was to draft
a constitution, but as it got down to work it became evident that there

was strong sentiment among the deputies and throughout the
country to change the regime from a monarchy to a republic.
In fact, the eventual disappearance of the Beylical system had
long been planned by Destourians and taken for granted by
most Tunisians. There had never been any deep feeling among
the people for it, although it had been accepted without rancor.
But the whole political evolution of Tunisia, from the earliest
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORMA

117

days of the nationalist struggle, had taken place outside the monarchy, which had remained a fossil institution incapable of inspiring affection or admiration. The neo-Destour had been the focus of national life and Bourguiba the national hero.

Accordingly on July 25, 1057, the Assembly unanimously passed a resolution abolishing the monarchy and proclaiming Tunisia a republic Premier Bouguiba was entrusted with the duties of head of state until the constitution was ready. That was not until June 1950, and national elections were not held until November that year, so that for two years Tunisia functioned provisionally with Bourguiba as head of state and head of government without a legislative assembly in existence. This meant a heavy concentration of power in the hands of one man, and it is significant that almost all the social reform legislation was promulgated in the period between 1956 and 1959 by executive decree and bears the stamp of the presidential personality.

The constitution as adopted established Tunisia as a republican state, with Islam its religion end Arabic is language, which forms a part of the "Greater Maghrib." The choice of regime was influenced both by American ideas-Bourguiba has always been an admirer of Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he resembles

in many ways-and, negatively, by the example of the Fourth Republic in France, the weakness of which was fully demonstrated while the document was under study. Thus a presidential regime was chosen which gives much power to the executive but provides a legislative check as well. The President is elected directly by universal adult suffrage for a period of five years and can hold office for three terms. Like the American president, he appoints his cabinet (whose members are tided Secretaries of Sate rather than Ministers), is Commander-in chief of the armed forces, declares war and makes peace, and ratifies treaties with the agreement of the Assembly, The President can introduce legislation which then takes precedence, can issue orders in council while the assembly is not in session,


The United States and North Africa

subject to certain restrictions, and, finally, can take exceptional measures if the safety and independence of the Republic are threatened.

Compared to that, the prerogatives of the Assembly are somewhat restricted. Its members are elected at the same time as the President for five years, and all deputes represent the country as a whole instead of a particular district. The Assembly can pass bills over presidential veto by a two-thirds majority on second reading, bur is most telling power is that of fixing the final figures of the budget In practice the legislature has been overshadowed during the seven years of Tunisian independence by the executive, but that is not too unusual in the first stages of a new country which is tempted to dramatize the national will in one personality, especially when the magnetism of that individual is such that it is impossible to imagine the country without him.

Grouped around the presidency is the executive office, beginning with the cabinet which bas been staffed with little change by members of the neo-Destour. The Secretary of State to the Presidency functions as a vice-president and is also responsible for national defense. The forces under his command include a small army of about 20,000 men, which has enhanced its reputation in the Congo, a naval contingent for coastal defense, a parachutist police unit, a few officer pilots, and the gendarmerie.

Military service is compulsory, but the rate of rejection is high and many trainees are enrolled in a civil corps which has done excellent work in the economic development program.

On the regional level, the country is divided into thirteen governorates, with each governor assisted by an elected advisory council. These have limited powers but provide a useful testing ground of local opinion. It is in the competence of its regional administration that Tunisia has particularly distinguished itself. On the whole the governors have been able and conscientious younger Destourians, and a neat balance between centralization and decentralization has been kept. The governor


120

The United States and North Africa
Statement. This is almost, but not completely, true, and it may be getting less so very recently. But it is often hard to separate the two, and although Tunisia is not in any sense a one-party state with totalitarian harshness, it does have the unexciting air of a country in which one party is very dominant indeed. Aside from the neo-Destour today, there are only the Communists with a minuscule following, some young independents of the left, and the unorganized conservative remnants of the old Destour. Individuals sometimes quarrel with Bourgwiba personally or break with party doctrine, but they have almost always returned to the fold, and no real foyer of opposition has developed since the ben Youssef split in 1955 and early 1956.120

Once again the smooch social contours of Tunisia must be given credit. The party owes much of its success, frankly speaking, to the quality of the men who make up its top and medium leadership. The advantages of the age of civilization in the country begin to be seen; the relative richness of human resources in Tunisia compared to many new countries is something it can be proud of and an asset which has been a leading factor in the country's successful adjustment to the modem world. The backbone of the neo-Destour hes come from the hard-headed merchants of the Sahel, dour and practical peasant individualists, artisans and craftsmen, the brightest lights among the professional classes in the cities, with a dosage of intellectuals to give it sauce. Its cornerstone has been, rather than the brilliant verbosity of many political movements, a quiet, pragmatic flexibility, and it has followed the rule that the art of politics is to know what is possible. From this spirit emerged the gradualist techniques of Bourguiba, to advance step-by-step, never to break contact with the interlocutor, to continue negotiating at all times, and to compromise tactically but never on principles.

The top party leadership is homogeneous, too; some might almost say inbred. Most of the high officials are graduates of the Sadiqi College, and there is a nucleus from the specialized

schools in Paris, particularly che Ecole Libre des Sciences Poli



121
Independent Nortb Africa


tiques. A clubby and familial atmosphere prevails among them.

They see much of each other; it is not uncommon to come across half a dozen important government figures lunching together for no special reason other than that Tunis is small and their society is limited. (The extraordinary difference between the school-tie government of a very little county like Tunisia and the normally impersonal administration of a large country like the United States may not at first strike most Americans but it is a vital political reality.) Bourguiba's place at the top of this intimate hierarchy has never been disputed since the early 193o's, and he is now consecrated as the first citizen of the country, even though criticism of some of his actions is heard on a rising scale. His popularity with the average Tunisian maintained by a boundless energy, numerous public appearances, regular radio talks, and a fine popular touch-is still great, although it has somewhat declined since the Bizerte fiasco in 1961. The ill-conceived plot against the life of the President at the end of 1962 is less symptomatic of this than is the vague popular discontent owing to the slowness of economic progress and the growing realization that Bourguiba is not infallible. Still, there is a general recognition, even among intellectuals who often show impatience, that it was he who first lit the lamp in Tunisia and kept it burning at all times.

Around him is a group of distinguished men touching fifty years of age: Mongi Slim, now Foreign Minister after having served as President of the United Nations Assembly; Bahi Ladgham, in theory the second man in the country; and a half a dozen other old companions-in-arms. But they are aging and a new generation is behind them, men arriving at forty, of whom the able Minister of the Interior, Taieb Mehiri, is an example. With others, like Masؤ±noudi, Bourguiba has quarreled over religious and personal issues, or like ben Salah, over the degree of socialization in the economy, but most of these disputes have ended in reconciliation, that word which always comes back in a discussion of Tunisian affairs.

122

The United States and North Africa

If it is hard to see the party breaking apart from within, another danger faces it, that of withering away through indifference.
To qualify this, it should be said that this is nor an immediate danger and that the neo-Destour, more successfully than most parties, has crossed the bridge from being a revolutionary force directing national energies toward a clearly defined goal to playing the role of a formally organized political party supporting a government which overshadows it and has pre-empted many of its functions. There are at least three problems here: one is the difficulty the party has in recruiting new members and maintaining interest at local cell levels: a second is the diffuse nature of the party structure, which was desirable when flexibility and the capacity to survive political repression was important but is not now adequate to the needs of a state which feels it must control and direct a complex socioeconomic battle on many fronts; and a third is the result of having many talented party members in government jobs which inevitably take all their energy. Certainly a crisis in party-government relations has been smoldering for several years, and now there is an incipient crisis in the popular response to the party. Efforts to solve the first by reinforcing central authority over regional party federations do not seem to have been too successful, and as to the second, it is notorious that the party is unable to summon up mass enthusiasm; that is a task which has to be left to the magic of the presidential appeal. It is too early to say that there is a crisis of generations in Tunisia, but it looks as if the next five years or so will determine whether the élan that has so far carried the country along can be maintained as power moves into the hands of another age group.

It is not easy to sum up political nuances in Tunisia: The state is paternalistic and verges on authoritarianism without openly espousing totalitarian methods. Up to now it has been a relatively free country without much sense of oppression;

almost anything could be criticized save Bourguiba, and if criticism did nor get very far neither did it bring down more



Independent North Africa

123

than minor sanctions. Quite recently there has been a noticeable tightening of authority and an increased severity in punishments. Whether this is a temporary phenomenon or not will be more clearly seen when the present term of he President comes to an end in 1g65s--a time when many of the problems mentioned above: authoritarianism, the conflict of age and power groups, and the results of economic sacrifices, seem likely to come to a head. The present paternalism can be justified, and seems to be accepted by the people, on the grounds that the President's energy and vision have pushed and cajoled the country into progress which it would not have made on is own. The people tend to be inert, something which is at once a strength and a weakness, bur the danger is that continuing paternalism will make them more inert. On the other hand Tunisia has been buttressed by other rare values. Its longstanding social cohesion has been translated into political unity, and, as the result of long and patient indoctrination since the mid-1930's by a highly organized political formation, national values have permeated all important sectors of the country.

Time has also been useful; Tunisia had a generation to ripen before plunging into independent life and this maturity now shows. For these reasons, although it is likely that a period of uncertainty is ahead in the not-too-distant future, when one considers the proved Tunisian capacity for accommodation and the ability to subordinate petty problems of the moment to the pursuit of the principal goal, there is much reason to be hopeful.

In Morocco, a large and more complex country than Tunisia, the transition period just after independence was more unsettled but since then there has been more variety and movement in the texture of political life. Until 1953 two forces had shared the leadership of the nationalist movement: the palace and the Istiglal Party. After their temporary effacement, a third force came on the scene, the so-called "resistance," made up by the various terrorist groups in the cities and the Liberation Army in the countryside. The story of independent Morocco reduced

124
The United States and North Africa

to its simplest political terms has been the sorting out of relations between these forces and the search for a system in which each will have its proper place. This was first exemplified by

the struggle into the national political structure, and later by the growing polarity between the throne and various political groups, with each seeking a mandate from the Moroccan people for the eventual shaping of a new framework. After the King had become the symbol of national resistance in 1953, there was an assumption in many quarters that he would on his return stay aloof from any political involvement, that he would reign and not rule, and that he would remain the representative of a precious but precarious national unity. The prestige of the monarchy was overwhelming and its latent power immense, as it still is. But between 1956 and i96o that prestige was transformed into active political power as well, although the step was not taken until the inability of the normal political organizations of the country to produce a needed stability had been demonstrated. the problem of incorporating all the undercover elements of

At the beginning of 1956 Morocco faced a host of problems, but none was more pressing than the insecurity and turbulence which reigned in both town and country. The several resistance movements which had come into being after 1953 had grown up, as it were, on the streets without proper guidance.

They had siphoned off, especially toward the end of the underground period, most of the active and aggressive young men in the country. With the return of normalcy many of these were unwilling to return to ordinary jobs or, in many cases, unemployment and dreary poverty, and they turned to gangsterism, extortion, and various kinds of illegal activities. The field was almost clear because Morocco was dependent on French security forces, which were reluctant to intervene in purely Moroccan affairs, until the national police was formed in May 1956. Even as late as that summer, however, the police had to fight pitched battles in Casablarica with the Black


Independens Nortb Africa

125

Crescent, one of the underground groups that had Communist affiliations. Individually the resistants were heroes, however, and the movements were judiciously signaled out for praise in royal speeches although less favorably viewed by the Istiqlal, which did not intend to lose the fruits of its generation-long campaign. Only gradually was urban order restored as the police got the upper hand, and as some of the resistants themselves were incorporated into the police while others drifted back to their ordinary occupations which the assurance that they would be given a gamut of veterans' benefits and special consideration.

The reintegration of the Liberation Army in the countryside

was more delicate. In the spring of 1956 it was continuing attacks on French outposts and government offices, and presented

a serious threat to order in rural areas where dissidence was an

old habit. If the new state was unable to control all its territory, there could be serious consequences. A Royal Army was created, mainly with volunteers who had served with French forces and on the basis of personal and tribal loyalty to the King. It was possible to integrate some of the rank-and-file of the Liberation Army, who themselves came from rural backgrounds, into the Royal Army after careful screening. But the Liberation Army had also recruited urban resistants and political leaders whose ideas did not seem suitable to the force the palace was building up, and so good parts of it were never incorporated. Regrouped in the far south of the country, they were patronized for a time by Allal Al Fassi and his wing of the Istiqlal, which began making claims to large pars of the Sahara in French and Spanish hands, and they unsuccessfully tried to seize Ifni from the Spanish in November 1957, a move which was meant to emphasize the intransigence of their outlook-for they had originally considered themselves part of a unified force meant to liberate all North Africa and had close ties with the Algerian rebels-and embarrass the government. Although this was the last major enterprise of the Liberation Army, it lingered on in

126
The United States and North Africa

the southern border regions and caused minor incidents until French troops were withdrawn a year later. Late in 1957, however, ex-leaders of the Liberation Army formed a new political party, the Popular Movement, which stressed a vague doctrine of "Islamic socialism," and has shown strength in rural and Berber areas in which the Army had previously operated.

After the restoration of public order, which was completed by the end of 1956, Moroccan political life blossomed. Since independence there have been six governments, four of them political cabinets and the last two formed and presided over by the King. The first government of Si Bekkai lasted until October 1956, bat was under constant attack by the Istiqlal, which wanted all the cabinet posts instead of a mere majority.

In fact, the cabinet was a governing institution in name only at this time because of the unlimited nature of royal power, and the separate political activity which flourished in the palace with all its ramifications, plus royal control of the Army and the police. When the second, all-Istiqlal government was formed, the King retained Si Bekkai, personally loyal to him, as head of government and formed a crown council to handle certain matters that he did not want to go through the cabinet.

Thus, the Istiqlal did not ever have full power and it was, moreover, beginning to show signs of internal strain. The enthusiastic support it had received from a majority of the people just after independence was giving way to disillusionment as the economy slowed down and the standard of living dipped. Also there was a basic cleavage between the old-guard leadership which had come from and represented more conservative circles and a minority group headed by Mehdi ben

accused the party of having lost contact with popular reality and which turned to the urban proletariat for support. The quarrel was noticeable in 1957, when the tone of party publications controlled by each faction started to clash. After the Istiqlal ministers had resigned and brought down the second
127

Bekkai government, the conservative wing of the party formed a government under the stewardship of Balafrej. This lasted from May to December 1958, and made an indifferent record.

It was: a period when events in the Middle East like the Iraqi Revolution made the palace sensitive, while labor disorders increased in the cities. Late in the year an uprising in the Rif.

Stemming from both economic and political discontent was forcefully put down by the Royal Army led by Crown Prince (now King) Mulay Hassan. It was also a time when intra-party disharmony came to open rupture. The movement was forced to resign and, after three weeks of consultations, the King chose a cabinet directed by one of the leaders of the opposing faction, Ibrahim, although members were to serve, according to royal decision, on a personal and not party basis.

The purpose of this cabinet was to prepare for elections and resign, but in fact it lingered in office well over a year, during which time political confusion reached a climax. The Istiqlal split into two segments, and in the summer of 19s9 the "progressive" wing, as it turned itself, organized a new party, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), which united Istiglal secessionists, dissidents from minor parties, and leaders of the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT). Chaos was the only description of the events of early 196o. The government refused to resign voluntarily and signs of impatience and hostility multiplied from the palace, particularly from the Crown Prince, who was politically very active. To compensate for the defection of the UMT, the Istiglal had formed 2 rival labor union which did not attract a large clientele, but private political and union strong-arm squads brought a return of violence to the cities. The government was powerless since the palace had control of the security forces, and it refused to intervene. The situation was such that in fact the leaders of the government were the chiefs of the opposition, and an uprising in the Atlas was attempted not against bur in favor of the government. To check further degradation, the King stepped

128
in to end the mandate of the Ibrahim government. He announced in a nationwide speech that he was assuming control of the government hinself with the Crown Prince as Vice premier, and asked individuals of all tendencies to help him form a cabinet of national union. All groups except the UNFP agreed to participate in this stabilization effort.

Since 196o Morocco has been governed as well as reigned over by its monarchs, Muhammad V until his sudden death in February 1961, and Hassan II thereafter. In that interval, although there have been few changes in political structure, a clear division has emerged between the palace and its supporters in groups representing conservative and rural elements, and the opposition entrenched in the industrial cities along the Atlantic coast, where in municipal elections in 196o (the only elections yet held in Morocco) its candidates won a majority.

The monarchy is the point of departure for any understanding of modern Morocco, and it is more than just one of many political ingredients. The 'Alawite family has ruled for three centuries and has by now forged a strong affective bond between itself and the people, which makes the throne as close to the heart of the continuing tradition of the nation as possible. Thus the King, who wields power not only as the malik, or temporal executive, but also as imam, the spiritual leader of the Moroccan Muslim community, is the evocation of the national personality,. His popularity among simple and rural people approaches adulation and if in the cities there is a newer, sophisticated view of him as a political figure, he can still never really be looked on by any Moroccan as an ordinary individual. The decision of the royal family to step into the arena of politics was a fateful one. It raised cries of arbitrariness and "personal power" from the UNFP opposition, and caused discussion in many circles, but until now there has been no sign that any other force in the country is capable of assuring national solidarity.

Until the end of 1962 Morocco was an absolute monarchy in