rational number

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In its simplest outline the Allied plan provided for a powerful
thrust in the center, heavily supported by armor, with secondary
attacks on the flanks to hold the enemy in position and to prevent
him from concentrating to meet the main attack. The principal
effort was to be made by the two corps of the British First Army
in the direction Medjez el Bab-Tunis. In their zone of attack lay
two natural corridors into the Tunis plain: the valleys of the Medï؟¾jerda and the Miliane. This was terrain where armored units could
best maneuver. The American II Corps, with the Corps Franc
d’Afrique * on its north flank, was to attack on the left of the First
Army, its principal objectives being the high ground southeast of
Mateur and the heights in the area north of Jefna and west of Lake
Achkel. It was expected that the American attack would endanger
the right flank and the rear of the enemy forces facing General
Anderson’s divisions. The British Eighth Army, on the eastern
end of the front, had the role of maintaining pressure on the Axis
forces facing it and of advancing against the enemy's route of escape
into the Cape Bon Peninsula. The gap between the First and Eighth
Armies was filled by the French XIX Corps, in the Pont du Fahs
area. For this final phase of the campaign General Alexander had
more than twenty divisions. The line of battle was about 140 miles
long.
As the Tunisian campaign developed, the attacks of the Strategic
Air Force were switched to the transportation facilities and ports
of Sicily and southern Italy. At the same time medium bombers
and fighters were striking at surface ships and air transports in
and over the Sicilian strait. The Tactical Air Force was prepared
to support the field armies by bombing and strafing enemy rear
installations, roads, and convoys. By the opening date of the battle,
22 April, the Allied air forces had won mastery of the air from the
Luftwaffe.
Early Operations.—The offensive was launched when the V Corps
commenced its drive on the night of 21-22 April. The initial attack
was directed at Longstop Hill, which was captured on the 26th after
a series of bloody assaults. South of the Medjerda River progress
was made in the direction of Djebel Bou Aoukaz.
The French XIX Corps did not take part in these attacks, but on
its left the British IX Corps pushed east from the Bou Aradaï؟¾Goubellat road in an effort to clear a passage for its 1st and 6th
Armored Divisions through the mountain gaps that lead to the
* A provisional force that consisted principally of two regiments of “Gowns,”
fierce Moroccan highlanders who were expert mountain and night fighters.

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Goubellat plain. Only partial success had been achieved when Axis
antitank guns, strongly posted in the rocky hills, brought the adï؟¾vance to a definite halt.
While the Eighth Army was attacking north from Enfidaville and
the First Army northeast from Medjez el Bab, the II Corps, on 23
April, launched its attack. The main effort was on the right, where
it could best support the First Army's drive.
The II Corps held a front of about forty miles from Cape Serrat
to the heights bordering the left side of the Medjerda valley. A belt
of rugged hills, fifteen to twenty miles in depth, lay between the
Americans and their initial objective, Mateur, a center of enemy
communications as well as the key to Bizerte. The hills and ridges
in this area form a jumbled maze, providing no broad corridors for
an advance.
In the II Corps zone the 1st * and 34th ** Infantry Divisions and
the 1st Armored Division*** made the main attack. The Tine
River valley seemed to offer the only suitable avenue of advance for
an armored striking force, but before it could be used, the high
ground on both sides had to be taken. Hence the 1st Infantry Diviï؟¾sion attacked into the hills north of the Tine River while the 6th
Armored Infantry of the 1st Armored Division (temporarily atï؟¾tached to the 1st Infantry Division) attacked the enemy in the hills
on the southern rim of the valley. The flank north of the Bejaï؟¾Mateur road was covered by a combat team of the 34th Division.
The remaining units of the 1st Armored and 34th Divisions were
held initially in reserve.
By 26 April the 1st Infantry Division had driven five miles into
the positions southeast of Sidi Nsir, wresting the hills from the
enemy in bloody fighting marked by effective use of artillery and
successful night attacks. A strong coordinated attack was then
launched by the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions with the object of
capturing Hill 609 (Djebel Tahent), the key enemy stronghold that
dominated the highway and railroad from Beja to Mateur. The
34th attacked into the hills overlooking Sidi Nsir, and the 1st conï؟¾tinued its offensive to the northeast. The attack of the 34th was
launched against one of the enemy's strongest centers of resistance.
The Germans had held this ground for months and had organized
the many outlying hills covering the approaches to Hill 609 into a
series of mutually supporting strong points. One by one, these hill
positions were taken, despite heavy and frequent enemy counter-
* Major General Terry de la M. Allen.
** Major General Charles W. Ryder.
*** Major General Ernest N. Harmon.

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attacks, until on 28 April the advance had carried to the base of
Hill 609. During the 30th General Ryder strengthened the force
attacking the hill, and with the support of some medium tanks it
succeeded in gaining the summit. At dawn on the following day
the Germans counterattacked from positions on the northeastern
slope. They were allowed to advance to within 200 yards of the
American position before a devastating surprise fire repulsed their
effort to retake the summit. This action firmly established the 34th
Division's hold on Hill 609. Tersely summarizing these operations,
General Bradley wrote: “A strong enemy attack was repulsed.
Fighting was intense and bloody. The enemy was engaged with
bayonet and grenade, and there were many cases of outstanding
bravery." The great effort made by the Germans to hold and then
recapture Hill 609 clearly evidenced its importance in the battle
for the entire area.
While the 34th Division was making its attack, the 1st Infantry
Division, on its right, advanced another five miles. With the fall
of Hill 609 the 1st Division's initial hill objectives were made un￾tenable for the enemy, and both divisions progressed more rapidly,
both on the north and south sides of the Tine River.
By 1 May these joint efforts had resulted in the capture of all the
key hill positions in the southern half of the II Corps zone, and the
Tine valley was open for an armored thrust.
In the meantime an attack in the northern part of the corps zone
was being made by the 9th Division * and the attached Corps Franc
d'Afrique. The main objective of this attack was the high ground
generally north of Jefna, where the Germans held hill positions
dominating the approach to Mateur through the Sedjenane valley.
In executing this mission, the 9th Division had to meet difficulties
imposed by both the terrain and the very broad front involved. Re￾connaissance troops were assigned the task of patrolling vigorously
in the nine-mile interval between the 9th and 34th Divisions, since
the nature of the ground was such that it was considered imprac￾ticable to send large units through this area. The plan provided
that one regimental combat team should make a secondary attack
on the enemy defenses west of Jefna, while another (the main effort)
was to strike at the strong points on the high ground to the north
of the town and thus outflank its defenses. The third regimental
combat team and the French were to drive eastward against the
more lightly held positions on both sides of the Sedjenane River.
The operations of the 9th Division and the French units took place
in scrub-covered mountains that continuously tested the energy,
* Major General Manton S. Eddy.

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perseverance, and fortitude of the troops. Communications were
so poor that food and ammunition had to be carried by burros over
difficult winding trails. However, the attacks were successful, and
by 1 May the Germans had been driven back to the eastern slopes
of the last hills—those that overlook the Mateur plain and Lake
Achkel.
By this date it was evident that the Germans opposite the II Corps
were in a critical situation. In the south the main effort had opened
the Tine valley corridor to Mateur, while in the north the enemy
was threatened with an envelopment of his right flank.
To avoid disaster, the Germans made a general withdrawal on the
night of 1-2 May and the following day. South of Lake Achkel they
took up a position that, if held, would protect Tebourba and the
Tunis plain. North of the lake they prepared for a last-ditch stand
in the hills bordering the main road to Bizerte.
No time was lost by the II Corps in following the retreating Gerï؟¾mans. The 1st Armored Division was ordered to advance northï؟¾eastward from the Tine valley, and it entered Mateur at 1100 hours
on 3 May. This rapid movement threatened to disrupt all the Gerï؟¾man plans. Now an American attack to the east or northeast from
Mateur might effect a breakthrough that would cut off the Axis
/ forces in the Bizerte area from those in the vicinity of Tunis. Enemy
planes, armor, infantry, and artillery were rushed to the threatened
sector in an effort to prevent the 1st Armored Division from adï؟¾vancing beyond Mateur.
In the fighting through 3 May the II Corps had taken Mateur, its
first major prize of the campaign, had prevented von Arnim from
concentrating to meet the British drive down the Medjerda valley,
and, in addition, had threatened the disruption of the entire Axis
right wing. The stage was set in the north for the final battle of
the campaign.
Final Drive, 3-13 May 1943.—Since 22 April the Allied forces had
made limited advances on all fronts, but at no point had a breakï؟¾through been achieved. Therefore, it was clear to General Alexï؟¾ander that additional large-scale infantry attacks would have to be
made. The best prospects seemed to be offered in the Medjez area,
where the successful attacks on Longstop Hill had resulted in clearï؟¾ing enemy strong points north of the Medjerda River. So it was
decided not to continue with the armored attack in the Goubellat
area, but rather to concentrate all available forces for a final decisive
drive on Tunis from Medjez el Bab.

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Regrouping had started as early as 28 April. Only the British
1st Armored Division and the 46th Infantry Division were left to
contain the enemy armor east of Goubellat, while the remaining
division of the IX Corps (the 6th Armored) together with the 7th
Armored and 4th Indian Divisions from the Eighth Army, was
moved to the V Corps zone of action. At the same time an extensive
plan of deception was put into operation to conceal these moves from
the enemy and to lead him to believe that the next major attack was
to be made in the south by the Eighth Army. Most of the artillery
of its detached divisions was left on the Eighth Army front, and
general activity in that sector was increased greatly. These decepï؟¾tions achieved their object of holding a considerable portion of the
enemy's tanks and antitank guns away from the area selected for
the Allied main attack.
In accordance with the new plan, General Anderson instructed
the V Corps to attack on a narrow front and ordered the IX Corps
to be prepared to pass through the V Corps and capture the inner
defenses of Tunis (Map 8). After taking that city, the First Army
would exploit to the southeast in order to cut off the Cape Bon Penï؟¾insula. On the right and left, respectively, the Eighth Army and
the II Corps were to exert maximum pressure to prevent the enemy
from reinforcing his units facing the First Army. The objective of
the II Corps would be Bizerte, and the Eighth Army was to advance
along the coast so as to assist First Army troops in their effort to
cut off the Axis retreat to Cape Bon.
The First Army's attack was spearheaded by the V Corps. Djebel
Bou Aoukaz was captured on 5 May, and a good line of departure
was established for the drive by the IX Corps toward Tunis. The
attack of the IX Corps was launched at 0300 hours on the 6th. It
was made on a 3000-yard front by two infantry divisions, supported
by tanks and the concentrated fire of 600 guns. Behind the attackï؟¾ing infantry divisions the 6th Armored Division, on the right, and
the 7th Armored Division, on the left, moved out slowly, waiting for
the moment to strike. With continuous sorties for over two hours,
the Northwest African Air Force provided an important addition
to the fire support of the ground troops. By 1100 hours the infantry
attack had broken through the enemy defenses and had opened a
gap for the armored divisions, which by evening reached the Massiï؟¾cault area. On the following morning the armored troops resumed
the advance toward Tunis. Armored cars of both divisions, followed
closely by the remainder of the 7th Armored Division, entered the
city in the afternoon (7 May). The 7th then turned northward
from Tunis and swept on toward Protville, taking large numbers of

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46
prisoners, while the 6th Armored Division, followed by the British
4th Infantry Division in motors, was directed southeast toward the
neck of the Cape Bon Peninsula.
In the south the French XIX Corps was still encountering strong
resistance, but the opposition in the Goubellat area relaxed slightly.
At this point, after a determined attack, the British 1st Armored
Division broke through and advanced northeast.
On the 8th the 6th Armored Division continued its movement to
the southeast. By afternoon it was in contact with an enemy rear
guard, strong in antitank guns, that was covering the town of Ham￾man Lif—in a narrow defile between the steep hills south of the
town and the sea. After a night attack up the precipitous slopes
by the infantry regiment of the division, the armor broke through
the town on the 10th, some of the tanks having moved along the
beach to outflank the defenses. This victory of Hamman Lif was
undoubtedly a major factor in bringing about the quick disintegra￾tion of the remaining resistance, for the 6th Armored could now
cut the Axis routes of escape to the Cape Bon Peninsula, which it
proceeded to do. Hammamet, the southern gateway to the peninsula,
was also reached on 10 May.
Meanwhile the II Corps continued its offensive operations in the
north with the mission of preventing the enemy from reinforcing
his units facing the British First Army. The high ground east and
west of Chouigui and the city of Bizerte were the objectives set for
the corps. General Bradley planned to isolate Axis troops in the
areas generally northeast and southeast of Mateur by means of in￾fantry attacks from both flanks of the corps and an armored drive
from the center. To accomplish this task, the 9th Infantry Division
and the French attacked north of Lake Achkel while the 1st and
34th Infantry Divisions attacked toward Chouigui, and the 1st Ar￾mored Division drove northeast and east from the vicinity of Mateur.
The attacks by the II Corps were well under way by 5 May. In
the southern zone of action the 1st Division met strong resistance
and was unable to hold the slight gains that it made. The 34th
Division enveloped Eddekhila from the southwest and moved on to
Chouigui, which it occupied by the afternoon of the 7th. Thanks
to the breakthrough by the British First Army farther south, enemy
resistance in the southern part of the II Corps zone slackened
materially.
North of Lake Achkel the only key position remaining to the
enemy was Djebel Cheniti. General Eddy employed here tactics
similar to those used so successfully in capturing Jefna. The Corps
Franc d’Afrique and a part of the 9th Division made a secondary
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attack while the remainder of the division enveloped Djebel Cheniti.
The operation was entirely successful, and by 7 May the enemy was
in full retreat to Bizerte. His north flank had collapsed. Units of
the 9th Division entered Bizerte during the afternoon of the 7th and
that night occupied the city's airport.
The attack by the 1st Armored Division struck the German line
where two roads lead into the Tunis plain—one from Mateur through
Ferryville to the Tunis-Bizerte highway and the other due east from
Mateur. General Harmon ordered Combat Command A to attack
toward Ferryville and Combat Command B to push eastward along
the Mateur-Protville road. On 6 May Combat Command A made
initial gains into the hills south of Ferryville, but lost them during
the night as a result of determined German counterattacks. The
next day an attack was launched that completely routed the Germans
along the Mateur-Ferryville road. By noon armored units of Com￾bat Command A had entered Ferryville, where they found the enemy
in full retreat to the east. The advance was continued on the 8th,
and at dawn on the 9th the main Tunis-Bizerte highway was cut.
While Combat Command A was engaged in these operations, Com￾bat Command B moved due east toward the Tunis-Bizerte highway.
It reached Protville on the 9th, where contact was made with the
British 7th Armored Division. Following this, a part of the combat
command turned north on the Bizerte road and then swung north￾east to occupy Porto Farina.
German forces in the II Corps zone were in a hopeless situation
as a result of the American operations from 6 to 9 May. The offen￾sive actions conducted by the 9th Division and Combat Command A
of the 1st Armored Division left only minor enemy groups to be
mopped up. When Combat Command B met the British 7th Ar￾mored Division at Protville, a large group of disorganized Germans
was caught stranded in the Tebourba area. Pressed from the west
by the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions and their retreat eastward
cut off by American and British armored troops, the German com￾mand in the II Corps area asked for terms of surrender on 9 May.
General Bradley's terms of unconditional surrender were accepted.
During the final phase of the campaign the II Corps took 42,000
prisoners, among whom were the commanding generals of the Fifth
Panzer Army, the 15th Panzer Division, and two German infantry
divisions. The artillery commander of the Afrika Korps and the
commanding general of the air forces at Bizerte were also captured.
In the meantime the final roundup of enemy forces still holding
out in the Cape Bon Peninsula was being effected. Mobile British
detachments raced up each side of the peninsula and completed the

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circuit by 11 May. On the 12th the British 1st Armored Division
and the 4th Indian Division joined the French XIX Corps in capï؟¾turing the remaining elements of the German 10th and 21st Panzer
Divisions southwest of Grombalia. Von Arnim was captured in
the vicinity of Zaghouan the same day.*
The last isolated enemy resistance, mainly by Italian troops and
remnants of the German Panzer Army of Africa, who were facing
the Eighth Army, ceased on the morning of 13 May as Allied forces
converged on them from all directions. In all, some 248,000 Axis
prisoners were taken, together with large quantities of materiel and
supplies. These included 1000 guns, 520 airplanes, and 250 tanks.
The combined action of the Allied naval and air forces prevented
the escape by sea or air of other than a few small detachments.
During the first two days of the Battle of Tunis the Tactical Air
Force made 1500 sorties. Although weather conditions grounded
most of the Allied planes from 25 April to 5 May, they were most
active during the remainder of the battle, particularly on 6 and 7
May, when they blasted the enemy in the Medjerda valley and conï؟¾tributed greatly to the breakthrough operations of the First Army.
In a special order of the day General Alexander addressed the
Allied forces in these words:
Today you stand as the conquerors and heroes of the North Afï؟¾rican shores. The world acknowledges your victory; history will
acclaim your deeds. British, French, and American arms have
swept from these lands the last of the German and Italian invaders.
As your commander in the field, I add my admiration and gratitude
to those of the United Nations for this great victory, which will go
down in history as one of the decisive battles of all times.
Comments.—The final defeat of the Axis in Tunisia was brought
about by the coordinated action (teamwork) of superior Allied
forces on the ground, in the air, and on the sea. But superior forces,
even though properly coordinated, are not enough for a decisive
victory; there must be a well-conceived plan. Since such is the
case, it is worth our while to review the plan for the final phase and
the effective execution of that plan.
It will be recalled that the first regrouping of General Alexander's
forces was accomplished by 22 April. At that time the main attack
was to be launched along the entire front of the First Army, with
the major effort by the V Corps down the Medjerda valley. In the
Goubellat sector the IX Corps was to force its way through the
mountains in order to pass its two armored divisions into the open
plain to the east. Both corps made some progress, but there was
* Rommel had returned to Germany some time before.
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no breakthrough. The action might have continued along the same
line, with additional small advances that would have gradually comï؟¾pressed von Arnim’s forces into a smaller perimeter, until finally
the Axis troops would have successfully withdrawn to defensive
positions along the base of the Cape Bon Peninsula. It may be
that at no time did the Axis command hope to execute a Dunkirk in
the face of the Allied control of the sea and complete mastery of the
air, but it is quite clear that they fully expected to make a Bataan
out of Cape Bon.
The first attempt to break through having failed, Alexander again
regrouped his forces. This time he achieved a concentration of
combat power sufficient not only to penetrate the Axis position, but
also to exploit the success most effectively. The actual breakthrough
took place so rapidly that the Axis troops were completely surprised
and thrown off balance. Von Arnim was caught just as the French
had been caught in 1940, by an attack launched by an overwhelming
striking force moving at great speed.
For use in the event of an attempted evacuation, the Allied navy
had drawn up a plan in close collaboration with the air force. Grimly
looking back to Norway, Dunkirk, Greece, and Crete, the plan was
named Operation Retribution. All possible means, both in the air
and on the sea, were organized to forestall any enemy escape from
Tunisia. It was certain that an evacuation could only be attempted
under cover of the Italian fleet, which at long last might be compelled
to stand and fight. Since, as it turned out, the Axis high command
did not dare join issue at sea at a time when its forces on land were
in a desperate situation, it was compelled to sacrifice a large army
and immense quantities of stores and equipment. From the purely
military standpoint, the Axis proved the folly of flouting the age-old
strategic axiom that to commit large ground forces across a sea withï؟¾out assured and continuing control of that sea is to court disaster.
The excellence of the plan is also evidenced by the fact that von
Arnim miscalculated the location of the main attack and as a result
made a faulty distribution of his forces. Lack of aerial reconnaisï؟¾sance was largely responsible for this error, but Montgomery’s realï؟¾istic diversion was likewise an important factor.
The German high command made the same error in Tunisia that
it had made in Russia in November 1942: there were no reserves
behind the front. When, therefore, the British armored troops
arrived in Axis rear areas, they met but slight opposition and were
able to disorganize the entire defense by cutting lines of communicaï؟¾tion, destroying command posts, and disrupting supply facilities.

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The mission of the American II Corps during the final phase had
been threefold: to protect the left flank of the Eighteenth Army
Group, to keep the enemy from concentrating in front of the First
Army, and to capture Bizerte. This mission was accomplished in
a brilliant manner. During a period of seventeen days its four divi￾sions made advances of from twenty-five to fifty miles. At the
beginning of the final phase of the campaign only 12,000 front-line
troops opposed the advance of the corps, but toward the close of the
operation over 40,000 of the enemy were on its front. It showed
that its divisions were composed of fighting men with the will and
ability to win. It was well supplied, well equipped, and well led.
Its losses during the final phase of the campaign were 421 killed,
3136 wounded, and 877 missing, while it is estimated that 3000 of
the enemy were killed on the corps front. The American divisions
took 36,000 German and 5900 Italian prisoners.
The following is an extract from General Bradley’s report on the
operations:
French units under their efficient commander, General Magnan,
fought with courage and determination ... in mountainous ter￾rain and suffered many casualties. Some of the II Corps, namely,
the 1st Infantry Division and elements of the 1st Armored and 34th
Infantry Divisions, have been fighting in North Africa almost con￾tinuously since they landed at Oran on 8 November. Other units
have been in action in Tunisia for varying periods from 18 January
onward. Practically all units have fought the enemy both in the
desert and in the mountains. The II Corps fought with and without
air superiority. It has suffered reverses, and it has known victory.
Officers and men alike understand our enemy and his methods. They
no longer underestimate or overestimate his abilities. With the com-*
mon sense that is characteristic of Americans, they have learned that
the surest way of living is to outmaneuver and outsmart those who
oppose us. With their practical sense, their understanding of the
enemy, their firsthand knowledge of the hardships and dangers of
war, and, above all else, their courage and loyalty, soldiers of the
II Corps have played a major role in the winning of a great Allied
victory.
GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE OPERATIONS
IN NORTH AFRICA
On 17 May the first through convoy passed the Strait of Gibraltar
and nine days later reached Alexandria; the first unopposed convoy
since 1940 reached Malta on 24 May. After three years of varying
fortune Africa had been cleared of all Axis forces; the ports of
North Africa were ready to receive the ships, equipment, and men
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who two months later were to invade enemy soil; and from bases
in Tunisia Allied air forces were pounding the airfields and ports of
southern Europe.
General Eisenhower had originally hoped to achieve these results
six months earlier. Had he been successful, perhaps subsequent
operations could have been speeded up so that the Allied invasion
of Italy could have been launched in the spring of 1943 rather than
in the fall. With a full summer of good weather Allied forces might
have advanced to the Po River by the time winter set in. But be
that as it may, the means were just not available to seize Tunis and
Bizerte in 1942.
In addition to the material advantages achieved, one other accomï؟¾plishment warrants particular note. This was the successful estabï؟¾lishment of a combined headquarters and the development of the
combined-force idea. In an official report General Eisenhower
stated:
In the North African Theater, even under the stresses imposed
by alternate partial victory and stinging tactical defeat, there was
achieved among the principal officers of the whole expedition a
coordination of purpose and a constant objectivity of viewpoint that
gradually permeated to lower ranks and clearly established the fact
that British and American forces of all arms could unite and work
together effectively.
As for the Americans, although they suffered early reverses and
even tactical defeats, they were able to profit from the experience.
New types of equipment, more realistic and practical methods of
training, and more efficient tactical organizations were developed.
These were lessons that could only be learned in the school of actual
combat, and that they were learned quickly is proved by the superior
performance of the II Corps during the final phase of the campaign.
The initial failures of the campaign had the unforeseen effect of
enhancing the magnitude of the ultimate Allied success because the
Axis was encouraged to make what proved to be an excessive investï؟¾ment in the Tunisian beachhead. An Axis army of some 320,000
men was destroyed rather than only the remnants of Rommel’s
original Afrika Korps. At the same time, American, British, and
French forces were given needed experience and in the end won a
confidence inspired by overwhelming victory.
After almost three years of fighting, North Africa ceased to be
one .of the active theaters of operations of World War II. The Axis
hopes for glory and profit here had vanished, and with them an estiï؟¾mated 620,000 soldiers, one third of whom were Germans. British
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Empire losses in North Africa since Italy's entry into the war in
June 1940 had numbered some 220,000—killed, wounded, and prisï؟¾oners. In the period November 1942 to May 1943 the French had
lost about 20,000, while American casualties had been about 18,500.
By June of 1943 Allied might was beginning to be felt throughout
the world. American production was pouring the materials of war
into all Allied armies at an increasing rate. Allied air power was
striking at strategic targets in Europe and pounding Japanese bases
in the Pacific. The Mediterranean area and the Middle East were
again secure in Allied hands. Operation Husky, the invasion of
Sicily, had been planned and would shortly be launched. The Rusï؟¾sians had driven the Germans from the Caucasus oil fields and the
Don River bend and were ready to launch a great summer offensive.
In the Pacific the Japanese had been driven from the Aleutians,
Guadalcanal was an Allied base, the drive up the Solomons was under
way, and General Mac Arthur had begun his march up the New
Guinea coast toward the Philippines. Everywhere the Axis was on
the defensive, and, even more important, in the hills of Tunisia an
Allied force had been born which would ultimately advance across
western Europe to the heart of Germany.
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^-H Cm J')
RESTRICTED
FOREWORD
This account of the operations in North Africa from 8 November
1942 to 13 May 1943 has been written for use in the instruction of
cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is based for the
most part on material furnished by the Historical Division, War
Department Special Staff, and other War Department agencies.
Valuable information has also been obtained from the publications
of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
However, in acknowledging indebtedness to others it is not deï؟¾sired to place on them the responsibility for any factual errors or
for any conclusions drawn.
This and other pamphlets on World War II are constantly being
revised as additional information becomes available. It will be
appreciated if military personnel who note any apparent errors or
discrepancies, or who have comments or suggestions for the imï؟¾provement of the subject matter, will communicate them to:
The Professor of Military Art and Engineering,
U. S. Military Academy,
West Point, N. Y.
March 19 U7
U.S.M.A. PRINTING OFFICE—3-25*47—2500
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RESTRICTED
THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
PART 2—THE ALLIED INVASION
INTRODUCTION
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declara￾tion of war against the United States by Germany and Italy brought
this country into the world conflict.
Immediate action was necessary to coordinate with our allies, and
especially with Great Britain, the strategy that would .govern the
future conduct of the war and the control that should be exercised
over it. In a report to the Secretary of War, General George C.
Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, stated:
On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of
Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived
in Washington to confer with the President and the American
Chiefs of Staff. Out of the series of discussions which then followed
resulted an agreement not only regarding the immediate strategy
for our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization
of a method for the strategical command and control of British and
American military resources. Probably no other Allied action, in
the field or otherwise, has exerted as powerful an effect on the con￾duct of this war as the prompt establishment of a prescribed pro￾cedure for achieving unity of effort through the medium of the Com￾bined Chiefs of Staff acting under the direction of the leaders of
their respective governments.
At this first conference the President and the Prime Minister,
with the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, made the decision
that Allied resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany,
the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan.
In discussions following the conference a tentative target date
for an operation across the English Channel was set for the summer
of 1943. Some consideration was given to the possibility of an
emergency diversionary assault at a much earlier date if this became
necessary to save the situation on the Russian front. As further
studies were made, shortage of landing craft for launching a cross￾Channel operation, and shortage of supplies for maintaining one,
militated against putting the plan into effect. At the same time,
the reverses suffered by the British in North Africa and the con*
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tinued need for some diversion to assist the Russians brought under
consideration the possibility of mounting an assault against the
French territory in North Africa in 1942, with consequent postponeï؟¾ment of a major cross-Channel operation until a later date.
Despite considerable American military opinion in favor of adï؟¾hering to the original plan, the final decision in favor of the invasion
of North Africa, as an alternative to an attack across the English
Channel, was made in July 1942, following Prime Minister Churchï؟¾ill’s second visit to Washington. The date for the landings was fixed
in September; they were to take place in November. Lieutenant
General Dwight D. Eisenhower* had been sent to London in June
1942 as Commanding General, European Theater of Operations,
United States Army (ETOUSA). On 14 August 1942 he received
a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff which appointed him
Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force. His mission
under this assignment was to direct combined military operations
against French North Africa—Operation Torch—as early as pracï؟¾ticable with a view to gaining, in conjunction with Allied forces in
the Middle East, complete control of North Africa from the Atlantic
to the Red Sea. At the same time he retained command of ETOUSA
(until 4 February 1943).
Meanwhile Rommel was making the drive that took him to El
Alamein and the gates of Alexandria, and other Axis forces were
driving across the Don River toward the Caucasus Mountains and
the rich oil fields near the Caspian Sea. The Middle East seemed
clearly within Hitler’s grasp, and the situation in the Mediterranean
was exceedingly dark. In the Pacific, Japanese forces had reached
what was to be the high-water mark of their advance. Attu and
Kiska in the Aleutian Islands had been occupied; Port Moresby in
New Guinea, the jumping-off point for Australia, was threatened;
Burma had been overruji; and India was under sea and air attack.
The tide of Axis aggression was at its height, and the Allies were
everywhere on the defensive, struggling to hold open their important
sea routes of communication.
But the Allied high command knew that large convoys were on
the way to Egypt and should arrive in time. These reinforcements
for General Montgomery were expected to provide him not only
with the means with which to stop Rommel but also to carry out
his part of a great Allied pincers operation, the western jaw of
which would be the British and American forces to be landed in
French North Africa. Thus the Battle of El Alamein was expected
* The ranks of officers as given throughout this narrative were those held at
the time.
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