rational number

[mosaadabd460]

27
Zid, a few miles west of Faid. Combat Command A of the 1st
Armored Division, at Sbeitla, was at once ordered east in support.
Combat Command D * was ordered to relieve enemy pressure on
the French by attacks eastward from Gafsa. This force of Amer￾ican armor and infantry attacked Sened, where it was contained by
the enemy. Meanwhile Combat Command C moved northeast to cut
the Sidi bou Zid-Maknassy road. After reaching Sidi bou Zid on
the afternoon of the 31st, it turned south toward Maknassy.
Although the Allies succeeded in denying the enemy further gains,
the ground lost could not be retaken. Combat Command A attacked
Faid on the morning of 1 February, but after fruitless assaults that
continued during the next day the action was broken off. To the
south the armored units captured Sened but during 3 and 4 February
were withdrawn from the Gafsa area and concentrated with other
II Corps units near Sbeitla. This move was ordered by General
Anderson because of the situation at Faid and exaggerated reports
of enemy concentrations between Ousseltia and Kairouan.
As a result of the enemy attacks from the middle of January to
the early days of February the Allied defensive barrier along the
Eastern Dorsal had been seriously weakened, and the arrival of
Rommel’s forces in southern Tunisia had made the situation even
less secure. There was no other alternative but to withdraw the
poorly equipped French units from the line so that they could be
issued modern weapons and trained in their use. Troops of the
American 34th Infantry Division began to take over portions of the
French sector. The front remained quiet from 5 to 14 February,
during which time both sides made strenuous efforts to bring up
additional supplies and reinforcements.
During the period from early November 1942 to the end of Jan￾uary 1943 the British Eighth Army, it will be recalled, had pursued
Rommel’s army across most of Egypt and Libya. On 23 January
the Eighth Army had entered Tripoli, and that fine port was at last
in Allied hands. Rommel continued his retreat toward the Tunisian
frontier, which he crossed on 4 February. In exactly three months
the Eighth Army had advanced 1400 miles from El Alamein, and
as a result its administrative services were stretched to the limit.
Before offensive operation could be resumed, the port of Tripoli had
to be placed in service so that reserves of supplies could be built up.
Eight weeks were to pass after the entry into Tripoli before Mont￾gomery’s army was ready for the opening phase of the Battle of
* A provisional force made up principally of the 1st Armored Division’s artil￾lery headquarters, a battalion of the 168th Infantry (34th Division), an armored
battalion, and a battalion of armored artillery.
Digitized byGoogle

[mosaadabd460]

28
Mareth. This was to be a period of some anxiety to the Allied comï؟¾manders, for while the Eighth Army was making its preparations
and the remainder of the Allied forces were building up their
strength, the enemy troops in Tunisia were free to devote their full
attention to the British First Army and the American II Corps,
thinly stretched out over a wide front. With Rommel’s divisions
available, the total Axis strength in Tunisia had increased to approxiï؟¾mately 200,000 combat troops.
Battle of Kasserine Pass, 14-26 February 1943 (Map 5).—During
the first two weeks of February an extensive regrouping of Allied
forces took place. In the II Corps sector the 1st Armored Division,
less detachments, was assigned a front of about fifty miles from
Djebel Trozza, near Fondouk, to Djebel Ksaira, south of Faid Pass.
Combat Command B was attached to the British at Maktar. Comï؟¾bat Command A and the 168th Regimental Combat Team of the 34th
Division moved into the Sidi Bou Zid area, where the 168th was
placed in defensive positions on Djebel Ksaira and Djebel Lessouda
(positions that jvere not mutually supporting) to cover Faid Pass.
Combat Command C was concentrated at Hadjeb el Aioun, and the
remainder of the 1st Armored Division was at Sbeitla. The 26th
Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division was in the
Feriana area.
The Germans did not remain passive for long, for at dawn on
14 February they launched a determined attack from Faid in the
direction of Sbeitla-Kasserine and made a secondary attack from
Maknassy, in the south. The enemy forces involved in these initial
attacks were the entire 21st Panzer Division, which had been withï؟¾drawn from Rommel’s army in Tripolitania, and elements of the
10th Panzer Division, which had recently been re-equipped at Sfax.
The immediate objective of the main attack, which was supported
by artillery, motorized infantry, Stuka dive bombers, and fighter
planes, was the road junction about five miles north of Sidi Bou Zid.
The enemy first overran a battalion of armored artillery on the
slopes of Djebel Lessouda, near the road junction, and by 0715 hours
had occupied the road junction itself with a force that included some
twenty tanks. Allied forces on Djebels Lessouda and Ksaira were
threatened with complete encirclement. One battalion of tanks of
Combat Command A, supported by a battalion of artillery, launched
a counterattack against the enemy south of Djebel Lessouda while
the remainder of Combat Command A withdrew to the west to take
up a defensive position at a road junction about ten miles northwest
of Sidi Bou Zid.

[mosaadabd460]

29
Axis armor continued to pour through the pass. One column of
about fifty tanks and some infantry flanked Djebel Lessouda from
the north and west and drove on Sidi Bou Zid. After suffering very
heavy losses, the American armored battalion and its artillery broke
off the engagement and, reduced to the point of ineffectiveness, es￾caped to the west. The troops on Djebels Lessouda and Ksaira,
although still in fighting condition, were practically isolated by
1300 hours. Throughout the day the highways in the quadrangle
Faid-Maknassy-Gafsa-Sbeitla swarmed with German armor and
infantry. In the south one force of about thirty tanks had advanced
northwest from Maknassy and by evening wag threatening Sidi Bou
Zid from the southwest. Another column was advancing along the
Sened-Gafsa road. Gafsa, in danger of being cut off entirely, was
evacuated in the evening, the troops there withdrawing to Feriana
to protect the important airfields near Thelepte. A new defensive
line was planned for the protection of Feriana and Sbeitla. During
the night of 14-15 February Combat Command B was ordered south
from Maktar to support the remainder of the 1st Armored Division.
General Fredendall ordered the 1st Armored Division to counter￾attack on the morning of 15 February. Accordingly Coiribat Com￾mand C moved south from Hadjeb el Aioun and with elements of
Combat Command A and a British armored infantry battalion at￾tacked about 1600 hours on 15 February. As the leading battalion’s
armor approached the enemy defensive position, running north￾south through Sidi Bou Zid, a formation of German tanks was
sighted, and within an hour a fierce running battle was in progress.
Although the combat command reported the situation under control,
appearances proved deceptive, for the frontal action of the enemy’s
tanks merely served to divert attention from a sweeping flanking
maneuver already under way. The British battalion was following
Combat Command C to exploit such success as the counterattack
might achieve when suddenly it found both its right flank and rear
under the deadly fire of a large German tank force. The Allied
troops were then ordered to extricate themselves, and all units fell
back rapidly except the leading armored battalion, which had not
received the order. It was engulfed by the enemy. As the British
had done at Knightsbridge, our tanks had charged blindly into an
ambuscade. The units on Djebels Lessouda and Ksaira were now
completely cut off, and any thought of going to their relief had to
be abandoned.
Confused fighting continued east and southeast of Sbeitla during
16 February, dive bombers inflicting heavy personnel casualties on
Combat Command A. By this time the II Corps had suffered serious

[mosaadabd460]

30
losses in equipment, ninety-eight medium tanks, fifty-seven halfï؟¾tracks, twelve 155-mm. howitzers, and seventeen 105-mm. howitzers
having been lost. There was now no possibility of further counterï؟¾attacks to hold the four armored divisions * that the enemy was
employing, much less to restore the Allied strategic position.
Since this Axis drive endangered the position of the French XIX
Corps on the Eastern Dorsal, the First Army commander ordered
the withdrawal of all forces to the high ground of the Western Dor^
sal and the line Feriana-Kasserine-Sbeitla. A battalion of infantry
from the 1st Infantry Division and a regiment of combat engineers
were assigned the task of organizing a defensive position in Kasï؟¾serine Pass, about six miles northwest of the town of Kasserine.
On 16 February General Fredendall directed the 1st Armored
Division to hold Sbeitla at all costs until 1100 hours, 17 February,
in order to secure time to establish the position at Kasserine. In
compliance with this order the remnants of Combat Commands A
and C were disposed south and east of the town. They were attacked
by the enemy at 0900 hours on the 17th, but held their ground until
1500 houi^s, when Combat Command A moved north to the vicinity
of Sbiba and C withdrew along the Sbeitla-Kasserine road. Combat
Command B, having completed its movement from Maktar, covered
the withdrawal. The entire 1st Armored Division was now ordered
to concentrate about ten miles southeast of Tebessa as a reserve to
meet any enemy drive through the defenses of the passes in the
Western Dorsal—El Abiod, Dernia, and Kasserine.
By nightfall the Axis forces had occupied Sbeitla, Kasserine, and
the Thelepte airfield and had infiltrated into the hills toward Kasï؟¾serine Pass. The loss of the airfield was a serious blow to the Allies,
but they had managed to evacuate most of the planes and stores and
had destroyed what could not be moved.
By daylight of 18 February the American 34th Infantry Division
(less the 168th RCT) arrived at Sbiba to take over the defense of
that pass and relieve Combat Command A, which was to join the
rest of the 1st Armored Division southeast of Tebessa. Supported
by the 18th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division
and a British Guards brigade, the 34th Division sustained attacks
by tanks and infantry during 18, 19, and 20 February in what was
actually a strong diversionary maneuver to prevent reinforcements
being sent south to Kasserine, where the enemy planned to make
his major attack.
* The 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions and the Italian 131st Centauro
Division.
Digitized byGoogle

[mosaadabd460]

31
In Kasserine Pass the highway forks. One branch leads north
to Thala, the loss of which would open the road to Le Kef and effecï؟¾tively cut off the II Corps from other Allied forces to the north; the
other branch leads northwest to Tebessa, which was the key comï؟¾munications center of the Allied southern front and the location of
large supply installations.
Rommel consolidated his position and strengthened his forces in
the Kasserine area on 18 February. On the 19th he made a reconï؟¾naissance in force with a battalion of infantry supported by tanks,
but the attack was not pressed when it met stout resistance, includï؟¾ing accurate American artillery fire. During the night, however,
enemy units successfully infiltrated to high ground on both the northï؟¾ern and southern sides of the pass and from these vantage points
brought effective mortar and small-arms fire on the defenders. At
daybreak on the 20th a determined attack carried the pass, forcing
the defending troops back toward Tebessa.
Fortunately the Allies had also been active during the night of
19-20 February. Brigadier Dumphie, commander of the British
26th Armored Brigade, organized a special task force of one comï؟¾pany of motorized infantry, one armored squadron, one troop of
antitank guns, a troop of motorized artillery, and a battalion of
infantry and took position astride the Thala road about ten miles
north of Kasserine Pass. It was this force that bore the brunt of
the Axis attack on the 20th. The armored squadron lost all of its
tanks, and the infantry battalion also suffered severe losses, but the
force held grimly to its position.
During the night of 20-21 February some additional British forces
moved up behind the task force to cover the Thala road, and others
were posted astride the road three miles south of Thala. Combat
Command B was moved from the 1st Armored Division concentraï؟¾tion area to a position on Djebel Hainra to cover the road to Tebessa.
On the 21st about forty enemy tanks attacked this position, but they
were repulsed.
On the 21st a strong German force renewed the attack on the
Thala road. The British continued to suffer heavy losses but held
the enemy ten miles from Thala. Two field artillery battalions from
the American 9th Division and part of the 16th Infantry Regiment
(1st Infantry Division) lent material assistance to the defense.*
During the night of 21-22 February the commanding general of
the American 1st Armored Division was placed in command of all
* The 9th Division artillery made a spectacular forced march from west of
Algiers to Tunisia. In less than 100 hours it covered 735 miles, despite narrow,
congested roads and bitter weather.

[mosaadabd460]

31
In Kasserine Pass the highway forks. One branch leads north
to Thala, the loss of which would open the road to Le Kef and effec￾tively cut off the II Corps from other Allied forces to the north; the
other branch leads northwest to Tebessa, which was the key com￾munications center of the Allied southern front and the location of
large supply installations.
Rommel consolidated his position and strengthened his forces in
the Kasserine area on 18 February. On the 19th he made a recon￾naissance in force with a battalion of infantry supported by tanks,
but the attack was not pressed when it met stout resistance, includ￾ing accurate American artillery fire. During the night, however,
enemy units successfully infiltrated to high ground on both the north￾ern and southern sides of the pass and from these vantage points
brought effective mortar and small-arms fire on the defenders. At
daybreak on the 20th a determined attack carried the pass, forcing
the defending troops back toward Tebessa.
Fortunately the Allies had also been active during the night of
19-20 February. Brigadier Dumphie, commander of the British
26th Armored Brigade, organized a special task force of one com￾pany of motorized infantry, one armored squadron, one troop of
antitank guns, a troop of motorized artillery, and a battalion of
infantry and took position astride the Thala road about ten miles
north of Kasserine Pass. It was this force that bore the brunt of
the Axis attack on the 20th. The armored squadron lost all of its
tanks, and the infantry battalion also suffered severe losses, but the
force held grimly to its position.
During the night of 20-21 February some additional British forces
moved up behind the task force to cover the Thala road, and others
were posted astride the road three miles south of Thala. Combat
Command B was moved from the 1st Armored Division concentra￾tion area to a position on Djebel Hainra to cover the road to Tebessa.
On the 21st about forty enemy tanks attacked this position, but they
were repulsed.
On the 21st a strong German force renewed the attack on the
Thala road. The British continued to suffer heavy losses but held
the enemy ten miles from Thala. Two field artillery battalions from
the American 9th Division and part of the 16th Infantry Regiment
(1st Infantry Division) lent material assistance to the defense.*
During the night of 21-22 February the commanding general of
the American 1st Armored Division was placed in command of all
* The 9th Division artillery made a spectacular forced march from west of
Algiers to Tunisia. In less than 100 hours it covered 735 miles, despite narrow,
congested roads and bitter weather.

[mosaadabd460]

32
operations in the Thala-Kasserine-Djebel el Hainra sector. During
the preceding few days command of the Allied troops in this area
had changed several times, with much resultant confusion.
On 22 February the enemy again attacked north, the,British on
the Thala road being engaged by about fifty tanks. Some ground
was yielded, but counterattacks restored the former positions. Durï؟¾ing the afternoon one battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, which
had been attached to Combat Command B in the Djebel el Hainra
sector, counterattacked against the German left flank. Launched
from the vicinity of Ain Bou Dries and supported by some artillery
from the 9th Division, this attack was completely successful, about
400 prisoners being captured. In large measure it was the cause of
the enemy’s decision to withdraw through the pass.
During the early phases of the fighting bad weather had hampered
air operations, but at this time the skies cleared and the Allies were
able to strike telling blows on the enemy columns. Aircraft of the
XII Air Support Command flew most of the missions, but other eleï؟¾ments of the air forces, reorganized during this period for closer
coordination with the ground troops, were also of great assistance.
Early on the morning of 23 February the Germans began to withT
draw through Kasserine Pass. Mine fields and well-fought delaying
actions prevented the Allies from doing them much damage during
the pursuit. By 26 February they had reached the general line
Hadjeb el Aioun-Sidi Bou Zid-Gafsa, where they remained.
Comments.—The specific purposes of the Axis attacks during Janï؟¾uary and February were: (1) to capture the areas commanding the
mountain passes and thus broaden the long coastal corridor in order
to safeguard the communications between von Arnim’s and Romï؟¾mel’s armies; (2) to make their airfields in the coastal areas safer
from Allied interference; and (3) to throw the Allied forces off
balance before any coordinated attack could be launched. The Gerï؟¾man high command felt that Tunisia could be held and during this
phase continued to pour in men until 200,000 combat troops, three
fifths of them German, were available by 1 March.
By mid-February over 500,000 Allied troops were in North Africa,
and plans were being made for a large-scale offensive. Reinforceï؟¾ments for the British First Army and the American II Corps were
moving up, and Montgomery’s Eighth Army was preparing to apï؟¾proach the Mareth Line in full force. But before the Allies were
ready to strike, Rommel made his only really dangerous effort of the
campaign when he struck at Faid Pass on 14 February. The initial
reverses suffered by the American troops can be attributed to several

[mosaadabd460]

33
factors: (1) confusion in all ranks resulting from divided units
and an improvised chain of command; (2) inexperience of troops
engaged; (3) dispersion of forces over a wide front and lack of
sufficient troops to provide adequate local reserves for the forward
elements; (4) unskillful use of terrain and available forces in the
defense.
Many lessons were learned during the Faid-Kasserine operations,
but probably the most valuable one was the age-old principle of the
necessity for concentration of combat power. Once again it was
demonstrated that so long as reserves remain available for employï؟¾ment in time and at the proper place, no situation is beyond repair,
regardless of initial setbacks or the necessity for surrendering some
ground.
Rommel failed in his objectives in spite of the piecemeal nature
of the early resistance offered, particularly on the part of the very
considerable armor we had in the Kasserine area. If he had thought
he could exploit his breakthrough as far as Le Kef and seriously
threaten the Allied communication lines, that quickly proved to be
beyond his strength. If he intended merely a spoiling attack to do
maximum damage to our equipment, he had succeeded in inflicting
serious wounds without, however, affecting Allied strength more
than temporarily. In any event, his sands were running out, and
the turn of the tide at Kasserine proved to be the turn of the tide in
all of Tunisia as well.
PERIOD OF ALLIED INITIATIVE, March-May 1943
General.—The French political situation was no longer a serious
factor in military operations, and the diminishing threat of an Axis
drive through Spanish Morocco released additional Allied troops for
the Tunisian front. In spite of the reverses suffered during January
and February, the Allied supply and troop build-up had continued.
The supply installations in the Tebessa area had been augmented
to support the II Corps and the approaching British Eighth Army.
The rains had ceased, roads had been improved, railroads had been
rehabilitated, and gasoline pipelines had been constructed. Amerï؟¾ican troops had received their baptism of fire, and in spite of the
initial reverses suffered in clashing with the best the Germans had
to offer, they had come out of the campaign battle-wise and tactiï؟¾cally efficient.
To go back for a moment, the projected reorganization of the
Allied command took place just at the time of the unsuccessful deï؟¾fense of Kasserine Pass. Air Chief Marshal Tedder's Mediterra-

[mosaadabd460]

34
nean Air Command became operational on 19 February, with Major
General Carl Spaatz as commander of the subordinate Northwest
African Air Force.* On the 20th Admiral Cunningham was anï؟¾nounced as Commander in Chief, Mediterranean,** and on the same
day General Alexander assumed command of the Eighteenth Army
Group.
General Alexander’s first order regrouped the Tunisian forces and
returned detached brigades, regiments, and combat teams to their
original formations. The battle area was divided into three national
sectors: the British First Army in the north, the French XIX Corps
in the center, and the American II Corps toward the south. Prior
to this reorganization units had of necessity been sent forward pieceï؟¾meal to take positions on a shifting front, and the resulting confusion
had been increased by the hasty improvisation of battle groups to
meet the demands of a rapidly changing situation. Under these
circumstances it had been impossible to avoid the separation of
units from their parent commands, and troops of all three nationï؟¾alities had become intermingled.
The wisdom of the Allied command revisions had already been
apparent in the increased effectiveness of Allied air power during
the final stages of the Battle of Kasserine Pass and in closer cooperaï؟¾tion of the ground forces. One example of this effective coordinaï؟¾tion is of special interest. As Rommel’s columns advanced toward
Tebessa and Thala after breaking through Kasserine Pass, Alexï؟¾ander ordered a strong diversion by the Eighth Army. Montgomery
was not ready to attack at Mareth, but he staged a mock preparation
for a large assault. This, together with mounting Allied resistance
as he pushed westward, caused the German commander to make a
hasty withdrawal. He pulled his tanks out of contact and rushed
them back to the south toward what he thought was the most threatï؟¾ened part of his front.
Early in March Lieutenant General Patton, whom we have met
before as a major general, took over command of the American II
Corps.
After the Battle of Kasserine Pass; the enemy directed his main
pressure against the British V Corps (Map 6a). During the first
week in March, Medjez el Bab was the chief objective, but the Axis
attacks at this point were a failure, as were the attempts to take
* The Northwest African Air Force was organized as follows:
Strategic Air Force—Major General James H. Doolittle.
Tactical Air Force—Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham.
Coastal Air Force—Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd.
** This gave him command of all Allied naval forces in this area.

[mosaadabd460]

35
Bou Arada, farther south. To the north, on the coastal road, von
Arnim met with some local success and after a fierce struggle forced
the V Corps to evacuate Sedjenane. He then made an unsuccessful
attempt to drive down the road to Beja. By 17 March these attacks
had forced back the British line in the sector northwest of that town,
but further advances were then definitely halted by the V Corps.
Battle of Mareth, 21-29 March 1943.—During the first week in
March the Axis command undoubtedly knew that General Mont￾gomery’s Eighth Army would shortly stage a full-scale attack upon
Mareth. In order to disrupt the British preparations and postpone
the attack, Rommel took the initiative and on 6 March attacked from
the vicinity of Toujane (southwest of Mareth) toward Medenine.
This attack was delivered by a strong armored force—elements of
the 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. The British were on the
alert and, having over 500 antitank guns in position around Mede￾nine, knocked out fifty-two enemy tanks during the day while com￾mitting only one squadron of their own armor, which lost no tanks.
This unsuccessful engagement cost Rommel over half the armor in
his attacking force. He had thrown his armored troops against
defended localities without adequate reconnaissance and before the
supporting infantry had cleared a path. The time when even Rom￾mel could lightly disregard basic principles had passed, and the
disaster that he courted was inevitable.
From the 6th until the 20th the Eighth Army continued to gain
strength as its rear units came up. By the latter date its main
components were as follows:
X Corps: 1st and 7th Armored Divisions and 4th Indian Di￾vision.
XXX Corps: 50th and 51st Infantry Divisions and one armored
brigade.
New Zealand Corps (especially formed for this operation) : 2d
New Zealand Division, an armored brigade, an ar￾mored car regiment, a medium artillery regiment,
and Leclerc’s French force.
At this time General Montgomery had 600 tanks to Rommel’s 140.
The Axis foot troops at Mareth were estimated at 120,000, and these
too were outnumbered by the British.
The original plan was for the XXX Corps to penetrate the left of
the enemy’s Mareth position and capture Gabes. The X Corps was
to be held in army reserve ready to exploit the anticipated break￾through. Meanwhile the New Zealand Corps, screened by General
Leclerc’s French Desert Force, was to make a wide.swing around
the right flank of the position and was then to move north and east
Digitized byGoogle

[mosaadabd460]

36
to cut the Axis line of retreat. The American II Corps was to secure
Maknassy and contain enemy armor which would otherwise be availï؟¾able for use against the Eighth Army. All available air power in
North Africa would be used to support the attack.
The Americans started first. At dawn on 16 March operations
were launched by the II Corps in order to carry out its part of the
plan. The attacking force consisted of the 1st Armored Division
and the 1st and 9th * Infantry Divisions. Gafsa was occupied withï؟¾out opposition on 17 March, and supply points were established for
the later use of the Eighth Army. The American troops pushed on
and occupied El Guettar. So far the Italians, who were holding this
part of the front, had offered little opposition and had executed a
planned withdrawal, but east of El Guettar they took up a strong
defensive position to halt any further advance of the Americans.
Farther north, rains immobilized the 1st Armored Division and
delayed its attack on Maknassy.
The battle began at Mareth on the night of 20-21 March. The
XXX Corps’ attack against the north sector of the Mareth Line was
at first successful. The 50th Division began the assault and during
21 March gained a foothold in the Mareth defenses, a bridgehead
two miles wide beyond the deep Wadi Zigzaou, which was the chief
antitank obstacle. Axis counterattacks were held off for the next
two days, but in the face of increasing pressure the British had to
withdraw to their original positions on the night of 23-24 March.
Meanwhile the New Zealand Corps had moved out during the
night of 19-20 March. After completing a 150-mile march across
trackless mountains and deserts, it made contact with the enemy
southwest of El Hamma on 24 March.
In view of the failure to penetrate the left of the enemy line, Genï؟¾eral Montgomery decided to reinforce the New Zealand Corps; so
the X Corps headquarters and the British 1st Armored Division
were sent to join the New Zealanders on the night of the 23d. The
combined forces were then designated the X Corps.
This increasing threat to Rommel’s line of retreat forced him to
transfer most of his German troops from the Mareth position to El
Hamma, leaving the Italian divisions and a few Germans to face
the XXX Corps. General Montgomery immediately took advantage
of this weakening of the Axis line and ordered the 4th Indian Diviï؟¾sion to drive to the west to open up the Medenine-Bir Soltane road.
The 7th Armored Division was held behind the south flank of the
* One regimental combat team of the 9th was attached to the 1st Armored
Division.
Digitized by Google

[mosaadabd460]

37
Mareth Line so as to be in position to go around the enemy's right
flank and cut the Mareth-Gabes road.
On 26 March the 2d New Zealand Division attacked and broke
through the strongly held defile southwest of El Hamma. Heavy
fighting continued throughout the night. In the noise and confusion,
and aided by the darkness, the British 1st Armored Division passed
straight through the enemy. By the 27th the British were at the
outskirts of El Hamma, their advance having been strongly supï؟¾ported by twenty-two squadrons of the Royal Air Force. About the
same time the 4th Indian Division opened the Medenine-Bir Soltane
road, which greatly shortened the line of communication to the El
Hamma sector. Rommel now saw that the Mareth position was
untenable and commenced a general withdrawal.
In the meantime Patton's advance eastward from Gafsa was makï؟¾ing slow progress. On 21 March his 1st Armored Division captured
Sened against only slight opposition and on the following day Makï؟¾nassy was taken, but beyond there the armor was unable to peneï؟¾trate. Farther south the American 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions,
with the help of a Ranger unit, broke through the defensive position
of an Italian division east of El Guettar, but heavy counterattacks
by the German 10th Panzer Division barred further advance to the
east.* However, the Americans materially aided the Eighth Army
by containing the 10th Panzer Division in the El Guettar-Maknassy
sector.
Farther north an attack by the American 34th Division on 25
March failed to break through the strong German position southï؟¾west of Fondouk.
When Montgomery's maneuvers caused Rommel to withdraw from
the Mareth Line, the XXX Corps advanced along the coast. The
2d New Zealand and British 1st Armored Divisions, after their sucï؟¾cess in the El Hamma area, pushed on to Gabes, which they entered
on 29 March.
In the extreme northern sector the British V Corps counterï؟¾attacked on 28 March. It recaptured Sedjenane on 30 March and
penetrated beyond to Cape Serrat. The enemy withdrew from the
salient south of Bou Arada under pressure of other British forces.
Pursuit to Enfidaville (Map 6b).—Rommel's next stand was on
the Wadi Akarit, an excellent defensive position with the flanks
protected by the salt marshes and the sea. At this time Alexander's
general plan was for the Eighth Army to break the Wadi Akarit
position and the American II Corps to assist by threatening Rom-
* The series of actions in this area is known as the Battle of El Guettar.
Digitized by Google

[mosaadabd460]

38
mePs rear. A part of the British IX Corps, supported by the Amerï؟¾ican 34th Infantry Division, would launch an attack eastward
through Fondouk with the mission of capturing Kairouan and
threatening the enemy's line of retreat. Farther north the British
V Corps was to secure positions from which a future drive could be
made-on Tunis.
By 6 April General Montgomery had regrouped his army and was
ready to attack the enemy at Wadi Akarit. The main assault, deï؟¾livered by the XXX Corps and directed at the center of the enemy
line, opened with a 500-gun artillery bombardment. It began at
0415 hours—in total darkness. The Axis troops, in spite of their
desperate counterattacks, could not prevent the collapse of their
line on the following day, and another withdrawal commenced. The
2d New Zealand Division and the British 1st Armored Division
passed through the gap created by the XXX Corps and closely purï؟¾sued the retreating Axis troops. Sfax was occupied on 10 April
and Sousse two days later. Rommel had clearly been surprised by
the speed with which the Eighth Army had concentrated for this
attack, for a considerable portion of his armor had been dis*****ed
to contain the American forces farther north. Prisoners taken since
21 March numbered 20,000.
Meanwhile Axis troops had held off all attempts by the II Corps
to break through their defenses in the Maknassy-Sened-El Guettar
area. However, after the collapse of the Wadi Akarit position on
7 April they were forced to withdraw, and American patrols made
contact with Eighth Army patrols on the Gafsa-Gabes road, forty
miles east of El Guettar. .
While the enemy was retreating from the Wadi Akarit, the 6th
Armored Division (plus an infantry brigade group) of the British
IX Corps moved to the Fondouk area and with the American 34th
Division attacked Fondouk Pass, as planned. This pass, about 1000
yards wide, is dominated by the hills to the north and south. Infanï؟¾try attacks were launched during the night of the 7th against the
controlling positions of the enemy in an effort to clear a route for
the 6th Armored Division. Very little progress was made, but in
view of the enemy retreat up the coast the 6th Armored was ordered,
on the 9th, to force its way through the gap. The leading regiment
encountered an extensive mine field protected by antitank guns
posted on the flanking hill. A narrow passage was secured by
nightfall at a cost of seventy-six Sherman tanks (sixty of which
were later recovered), and on the next day armored elements
reached Kairouan. On the 11th contact was made with the Eighth
Army, which meanwhile had made rapid progress after occupying

[mosaadabd460]

39
Sfax. Although the bulk of Rommel’s forces had been able to escape
the trap, the remnants of nine Italian battalions were rounded up.
The Eighth Army continued the pursuit and on 20 April drove
into Enfidaville against increasing Axis resistance. Further attacks
against the strong enemy position in the hills north of Enfidaville
were met by determined counterattacks which convinced Montï؟¾gomery that a regrouping of his army would be necessary before
further progress could be made.
During this period the V Corps, in accordance with its mission,
started local attacks in the vicinity of Medjez el Bab on 7 April to
secure advantageous positions from which to launch future operaï؟¾tions. The fighting in this northern area was continuous for almost
two weeks, and although a breakthrough was not achieved, some
progress was made. This placed the V Corps in a position to strike
at Longstop Hill, which together with the circle of hills east of
Medjez blocked further progress. All of these dominating heights
were strongly held by the enemy and would have to be cleared before
any breakthrough down the valley toward Tunis could be made.
At this time the V Corps did not have the strength for such an
operation.
Comments.—General Montgomery says of the Eighth Army opï؟¾erations at this time:
The Battle of the Mareth Line was our toughest fight since El Alaï؟¾mein, and whereas the latter was a hard slogging match, at Mareth
there had been greater scope for strategems and subtlety ... As
at El Alamein, Rommel cast in his reserves piecemeal; and when
the battle started, his armour was spread-eagled—with 10 Panzer
Division in the Gafsa sector, 15 Panzer Division soon involved on
the coast, and 21 Panzer Division arriving in the west to back up
the switch line . . .
The outstanding feature of the battle was the air action in coï؟¾operation with the outflanking forces ...
We retained the initiative throughout. Even when we lost our
gains on the coastal flank, Rommel was kept on the move by the
speedy development of the western outflanking movement . . .
Vital considerations (governing the decision to shift strength to
the enveloping force) were, first, the speed with which the decisive
blow could be mounted and delivered and, secondly, the necessity to
hold the German reserves on the eastern flank long enough to preï؟¾vent their assisting the defenders of the switch lines west of El
Hamma.
Montgomery clearly proved that an early setback—such as the
failure of the XXX Corps to penetrate the Mareth Line—need not
necessarily cause a loss of the initiative provided the plan is flexible
and reserves are available.

[mosaadabd460]

40
After Mareth, Rommel planned to continue hi? delaying action
and to defend only when the terrain favored the defense. Although
he probably realized that the days of the Axis forces in North Africa
were numbered, his mission was to delay the final outcome as long
as possible. While still fighting the Battle of Mareth, he had preï؟¾pared a strong position behind the Wadi Akarit in the Gabes gap.
Finding that it could not be enveloped by forces advancing from the
south, Montgomery quickly penetrated it—much to the surprise of
the Germans.
After the action at the Wadi Akarit, Rommel lacked defensive
terrain until he reached Enfidaville. During the retreat to this
place the Germans were faced with the difficult problem of withï؟¾drawing under pressure from the west as well as from the south.
While the Eighth Army was pursuing Rommel, the Allies were at
the same time attacking von Arnim’s holding forces in the mounï؟¾tains west of the coastal corridor. At El Guettar, at Maknassy, and
at Fondouk the Allied forces threatened to break through the passes
of the Eastern Dorsal and drive to the sea across Rommel’s line of
retreat. If von Arnim’s men gave way too soon, Rommel would be
trapped; if they stayed too long, they would be cut off by the Eighth
Army. From the course of events we must conclude that once again
the German commanders executed a skillful withdrawal under diffiï؟¾cult circumstances.
Battle of Tunis, 22 April-13 May 1943.—It was now evident that
the Axis forces intended to defend on the line Enfidaville-Bou
Arada-Medjez el Bab-Sedjenane, and General Alexander immeï؟¾diately commenced preparations for a general offensive to break
through this perimeter.
Plans and Preparations.—A large-scale regrouping of the Allied
divisions was decided upon. In the space of two weeks the entire
American II Corps, over 100,000 men, was moved some 150 miles
over difficult country—and across the First Army’s lines of comï؟¾munication—to take over from the British V Corps the sector along
the coast in the north. In this regrouping the American 34th Inï؟¾fantry Division and the British 6th Armored Division moved from
the vicinity of Fondouk and Kairouan to rejoin their respective
corps. At the same time the British 1st Armored Division was
transferred from the Eighth Army to the IX Corps.
These moves were completed about 22 April, and at this time
Major General Omar N. Bradley took over the command of the II
Corps (Map 7).
Digitized by Google