درس خصوصي ((اللغة الانجليزية -4ب -ت2))عزيزي الطالب ضع سؤالك هنا "واحناعلينا الباقي"

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The Unired Snes ond Nortb Africa

subject to certain restrictions, and, finelly, can take exceptional measuras if the safery and independence of the Republic are threatened.

Compared to that, the prerogatives of the Assembly are somewhat restricted. Ies members are elected at the same time as the President for five years, and all deputes represent the country as a whole instead of a purticular discrict. The Assenbly can pass bills over presidential veto by a rwo-thirds majority on second reading, bur is most relling power is char of firing the finai figures of the budget Ia practice the legislature has been overshadowed during the seven years of Tunisin independence by the execuaive, but that is not too unusual in the first stages of a new counay which is tempted to dramapze the national will in one personaliry, especially when the magnetism of that individual is such that it is impossible to imagine the country wichout him.

Grouped around the presidency is the executive office, beginning with the cabinet which bas been staffed with little change by members of the neo-Destour. The Secretary of State to the Presidency functions as a vice-president and is also responsible for national defense. The forces under his command include a smmall ammy of about 20,o00 men, which has enhanced its reputation in the Congo, a naval concingent for coastal defense, a parachutist elice unit, a few officer pilots, and the gendarmerie.

Military service is compusory, but the rate of rejection is high and many trainees are enrolled in a civil corps which has done excellent work in the economic development program.

On the regional level, the country is divided into thirteen governorates, with each governor assisted by an elected advisory council. These have limited powers but provide a useful testing ground of local opinion. It is in the competence of its regional administration that Tunisia has particularly disinguished itself. On the whole the governors have been able and conscientious younger Destourians, and a neat balance berween centralization and decentralizaion has been kept. The governor

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[ظ،:ظ،ظ، ص, ظ،ظ¢‏/ظ§‏/ظ،ظ¤ظ¤ظ£ هـ] Mr.mossaad: Independeni Nortb Africa

119

has wide laitude to make decisions on the spot-something which has been capital in handling the large public works unemployment program-but he cannot get too much out of hand because the smallness of Tunisia, and its facile communications allow for frequent consultation with the capital and the shadow of the central goverument is kept at just about optimum intensity.

All the governments of the new Maghrib states could legitimately be considered refom govemments, for each has made significant changes in the legal, judicial, and social structure of

its countries, but in Tunisia reform has been perhaps the mos notable among many accomplishments. Many of the details are discussed later under the heading of social change, but ment…
[ظ،:ظ،ظ£ ص, ظ،ظ¢‏/ظ§‏/ظ،ظ¤ظ¤ظ£ هـ] Mr.mossaad: The Unied States and Nortb Africa statemerc. This is almost, but not completely, true, and it may be getting less so very recently. But it is often hard to separate the two, and although Tunisia is not in any sense a one-party state with totalicarian harshness, it does have the unexciting air of a country in which one party is very dominant indeed. Aside from the neo-Destour today, there are only the Communists with a minuscule following, some young independents of the left, and the unorganized conservative remnants of the old Destour. Individuals sometirnes quarrel with Bourgwiba personally or break with party docurine, but they have almost always returned to the fold, and no real foyer of opposition has developed since the ben Youssef split in 1955 and early 1956.120

Once again the smooch social contours of Tunisia must be given credit. The party owes much of its success, frankly speaking, to the quality of the men who make up its top and medium leadership. The advancages of the age of civilization in the country begin to be seen; the relacive richness of human resources in Tunisia compared to many new countries is something it can be proud of and an asset which has been a leading facror in the country's successful adjustment to the modem world. The backbone of the neo-Destour hes come from the hard-headed merchants of the Sahel, dour and practical peasant individualists, artisans and craftsmen, the brightest lights among the professional classes in the cities, with a dosage of intellectuals to give it sauce. Its cormerstone has been, rather than the brillianc verbosity of many polirical movements, a quiet, pragrnatic flexibiliry, and it has folowed the rule that the art of politics is to know what is possible. From this spirit emerged the gradualist techniques of Bourguiba, to advance step-by-step, never to break contact with the interlocutor, to concinue negotiating at all times, and to compromise tactically but never on principles.

The top party leadership is honogeneous, too; some might almost say inbred. Most of the high officials are graduates of the Sadiqi College, and there is a nucleus from the specialized

schools in Paris, parricularly che Ecole Libre des Sciences Poli

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tiques. A clubby and familial atmosphere prevails smong them.

They see much of each other; it is not uncommon to come across half a dozen important govermunent fgures lanchأ؛ng together for no special reason other than that Tunis is small and their society is limired. (The exttaordinary difference berween the school-tie goverument of a very lirde county like Tanisia and the normally impersonal administration of a large country like the United States may not at first strike most Americans but it is a vital political reality.) Bourguiba's place at the top of this intimate hierarchy has never been disputed since the early 193o's, and he is now consecrated as the first citizen of the country, even though criticismn of some of his acrions is heard on a rising scale. His popularicy with the average Tunisianmaintained by a boundless energy, numerous public appearances, regular radio calks, and a fine popular touch-is gill great, although it has somewhat declined since the Bizerte fiasco in 1961. The ill-conceived plor against the life of the President at the end of 1962 is les symptomatic of this than is the vague popular discontent owing to the slowness of economic progress and the growing realization thar Bourguiba is not infallible. Still, there is a general recognition, even among intellectuals who often show impatience, that it was he who first lit the lamp in Tunisia and kept it buning at all times.

Around him is a group of distinguished men touching fifcy years of age: Mongi Slim, now Foreign Minister after having served as President of the United Nations Assembly; Bahi Ladgham, in theory the second man in the country; and a half a dozen other old comparions-in-arms. But they are aging and a new generation is behind them, men ariving at forty, of whom the able Minister of the Interior, Taicb Mehiri, is an example. With others, like Masؤ±noudi, Bourguiba has quarreled over religious and personal issues, or like ben Salah, over the degree of socialization in che economy, but most of these disputes have ended in reconcilietion, that word which always comes back in a discusion of Tonisian affairs.

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The United States and Nortb Africa

If it is hard to see the pary breaking aparr from wichin, another danger faces it, that of withering away through indif.

ference. To qualify this, it should be said that this is nor an immediate danger and thar the neo-Destour, more successfully than most perties, has crossed the bridge from being a revolucionary force directing natonel energies toward a clearly defined goal to playing the role of a formally organized poliical party supporting a govermment which overshadows it and has pre-empted many of its funcions. There are at least three problems here: one is the diffculty the party has in recruing new members and maintaining interest at local cell levels: a second is the diffuse narure of the party structure, which was desirable when fexibility and the capecity to survive poliaical repression was important but is not now adequate to che needs of a state which feels it must control and direct a complex socioeconomic battle on many fronts; and a third is the result of having many talented party members in government jobs which inevitably take all their energy. Certainly a crisis in party-government relations has been smoldering for several years, and now there is an incipient crisis in the popular response to the party. Eforts to solve the first by reinforcing central authority over regional party federations do not seern to have been too successful, and as to the second, it is notorious that the party is unable to summon up mass enthusiasm; that is a task which has to be left to the magic of the presidenial appeal. It is too early to say that there is a crisis of generaions in Tunisia, but it looks as if the next five years or so will determine whether the elan that has so far caried the country along can be maintained as power moves into the hands of another age group.

It is not easy to sum up political nuances in Turisia: The state is paternalistic and verges on authoritarianism without openly espousing totalitarian methods. Up to now it has been a relatively free country without much sense of oppression;

almost anything could be ciicized save Bourguiba, and if criticism did nor get.vary far neicher did it bring down more

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than tinor mnctions. Quite reoanty there has been a noiceable cightening of suthority and an increased severity in punishments. Whether this is a temporary phenomenon or not will be more clearly som when the praent tern of tbhe Prewident comes to an end in 1g6s--a time when mary of the problens mentioned above: authoritarianism, the conflicr of age and power groups, and the results of economic facrifces, scem likely to come to a head. The present paternalisrn can be justifed, and seems to be accepted by the people, on the grounds thar the President's enesgy and vision have pushed and cajoled the country into progres which it would not have made on is own. The people tend to be inert, something which is at once a strength and a weakness, bur the danger is that continoing paternalism will make them more inert. On the other hand Tunisia has been burressed by other rare values. Its longstanding social cohesion has been translated into political unity, and, as the result of long and petient indoctrinatioa since the mid-1930's by a highly organized policical formation, national values have permeated all important sectors of the country.

Time has also been useful; Tunisia had a generation to ripen before plunging into independenr life and this maturity now shows. For these reasots, although it is likely that a period of uncertainty is ahead in the not-too-distant future, when one considers the proved Tunisian capacity for accomnodation and the ability to subordinate petty problems of the nomnent to the pursuit of the principal goal, there is much reason to be hopefu.

In Morocco, a large and more complez country than Tunisia, the transition period just after independence was more unsettled but since then there has been rnore variety and movement in the texture of political life. Uncil 1953 two forces had shared che leadership of the nationalist movenent: the palace and the Istiglal Party. After their temporary efacement, a third force came on the scene, the so-called "resistance," made up by the various terrorist groups in the cicies and the Liberation Army in the countryside. The story of independent Morocco reduced

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124 The United States and Nortb Africa

to its simplest political terms has been the sorting out of relations between these forces and the search for a system in which each will have its proper place. This was first exemplified by124

the struggle into the national political structure, and later by the growing polarity berween the throne and various political groups, with cach seeking a mandate from the Moroccan people for the eventual shaping of a new framework. After the King had become the syrnbol of national resistance in 1953, there was an assumption in many quarters that he woud on his rerurn stay aloof from any political involvenent, that he would reign and not rule, and that he would remain che represencative of a precious but precarious national unity. The prestige of the monarchy was overwhelming and its latent power immense, as it still is. But berween 1956 and i96o that prestige was transfomed into active political power as well, although the step was not taken until the inability of the normal political organizations of the country to produce a needed stability had been demonstrated.the problem of incoporating all the undercover elements of

At the beginning of 1956 Morocco faced a host of problems, but none was more pressing than the insecurity and turbulence which reigned in both town and country. The several resistance movements which had come into being after 1953 had grown up, as it were, on the streets without proper guidance.

They had siphoned off, especially toward the end of the underground period, most of the active and aggressive young men in the country. With the return of normalcy many of these were unwilling to return to ordinary jobs or, in many cases, unemployment and dreary poverty, and they tumed to gangsterism, extortion, and various kinds of illegal activities. The field was almost clear because Morocco was dependent on French security forces, which were reluctant to intervene in purely Moroccan affairs, until the national police was formed in May 1956. Even as late as that summer, however, the police had to fight pitched battiles in Casablarica with the Black

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Crescent, one of the underground groups that had Communist afiliacions. Individually che resistants were heros, however, and the movemens were judiciously signaled out for praise in royal speeches although less favorably viewed by the Istiqlal, which did not intend to lose the fruis of its generarion-long campaign. Only gradually was urban order restored as the police got the upper hand, and as some of the resistants themselves were incorporaced into the police while others drifted back to their ordinary occupagions wich the assurance that chey would be given a ganut of veterans' benefits and special consideration.

The reintegration of the Liberacion Army in che countryside

was more delicate. In the spring of 19s6 it was continuing attacks on French outposts and government offices, and presented

a serious threat to order in nural areas where dissidence was an

old habit. If the new state was unable to control all its territory, there could be serious consequences. A Royal Army was created, mainly with volunteers who had served with French forces and on the basis of personal and tribal loyalty to the King. It was possible to integrate some of the rank-and-fle of the Liberation Army, who themselves came from rural backgrounds, into the Royal Army after careful screening. But the Liberation Army had also recruited arban resistants and political leaders whose ideas did not seem suitable to the force the palace was building up, and so good parts of it were never incorporated. Regrouped in the far south of the country, they were patronized for a time by Allal Al Fassi and his wing of the Istiqlal, which began making claims to large pars of the Sahara in French and Spanish hands, and they unsuccessfully tried to seize Ifni from the Spanish in November 1957, a move which was meant to emphasize the intransigence of their outlook-for they had originally considered themselves part of a unifed force meant to liberate all North Africa and had close ties with the Algerian rebels-and embarrass the government. Although this was the last major enterprise of the Liberation Army, it lingered on in

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126 The United States and North Africa

the southern border regions and caused minor incidents until French troops were withdrawn a year later. Late in 1957, however, ex-leaders of the Liberation Army formed a new political party, the Popular Movement, which stressed a vague doctrine of "Islamic socialism," and has shown strength in rural and Berber areas in which the Army had previously operated.

After the restoration of public order, which was completed by the end of 1956, Moroccan political life blossomed. Since independence there have been six goveroments, four of them polircal cabinets and the last two formed and presided over by the King. The first government of Si Bekkai lasted until October 1956, bat was under constant attack by the Istiqlal, which wanted all the cabinet posts instead of a mere majority.

In fact, the cabinet was a governing instiution in name only a0 this time because of the unlimited nature of royal power, and the separate political activity which flourished in the palace with all its ramifications, plus royal control of the Army and the police. When the second, all-Istiqlal government was formed, the King recained Si Bekkai, personally loyal to him, as head of governmeat and formned a crown council to handle certain matters thar he did not want to go through the cabinet.

Thus, the Istiqlal did not ever have full power and it was, moreover, beginning to show signs of intemal strein. The enthusiastic support ic had received from a majority of the people just after independence was giving way to disillusionment as the economy slowed down and the standard of living dipped. Also there was a basic cleavage berween the old-guard leadership which had come from and represented more conservative circles and a minoricy group headed by Mehdi ben

cused the party of having lost contact with popular realicy and which turned to the urban proletariat for support. The quarrel was noticeable in 1957, when the tone of party publications controlled by each faction started to clash. After the Itiglal ministars had resigned and brought down the second

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Bekkai government, the conservaive wing of the party formed a government under the stewardship of Balafrej. This lasted from May to December 1958, and made an indifferent record.Independent Nortb'Africa

It was:a period when events in the Middle East like the Iraqi Revolution made the palace sensitive, while labor disorders increased in thecities. Late in the year an uprising in the Rif.

stemming from both economic and political discontent, was forcefully put down by the Royal Arny led by Crown Prince (now King) Mulay Hassan. It was also a time when intraparty disharmony came to open rupture. The govemment was forced to resign and, after three weeks of consultations, the King chose a cabinet directed by one of the leaders of the opposing faction, Ibrahim, athough members were to serve, according to royal decision, on a personal and not party basis.

The purpose of this cabinet was to prepare for elections and resign, but in fact it lingered in office well over a year, during which time political confusion reached a climax. The Istiqlal split into two segments, and in the sunmer of 19s9 the "progressive" wing, as it terned itself, organized a new party, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), which united Istiglal secessionists, dissidents from minor parties, and leaders of the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT). Chaos was the only description of the events of early 196o. The government refused to resign voluntarily and signs of impatience and hostility multiplied from the palace, particularly from the Crowr Prince, who was politically very active. To compensate for the defection of the UMT, the Istiglal had formed 2 rival labor union which did not attract a large clientele, but private political and union strong-arm squads brought a return of viokence to the ciries. The government was powerless since the palace had control of the security forces, and it refused to intervene. The situation was such that in fact the leaders of the govermment were the chiefs of the opposition, and an uprising in the Atlas was attempted not against bur in favor of the government. To check further degradation, the King stepped

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in to end the mandate of the Ibrahim government. He announced in a nationwide speech that he was assuming control of the government hinself with the Crown Prince as Vicepremier, and asked individuals of all tendencies to help him form a cabinet of national union. All groups except the UNFP agreed to participate in this stabilization effort.128The Unired States TNU

Since 196o Morocco has been governed as well as reigned over by its monarchs, Muhammad V until his sudden death in February 1961, and Hassan II thereafter. In thar interval, although there have been few changes in political srucrure, a clear division has emerged between the palace and its supporters in groups representing conservative and nural elements, and the opposition entrenched in the industrial cities along the Atlantic coast, where in municipal elections in 196o (the only elections yet held in Morocco) its candidates won a majoriry.

The monarchy is the point of departure for any understanding of modern Morocco, and it is more than just one of many political ingredients. The 'Alawite fanily has ruled for three centuries and has by now fonged a strong affective bond between itself and the people, which makes the throne as close to the heart of the continuing tradition of the nation as possible. Thus the King, who wields power not only as the malik, or temporal executive, but also as inam, the spiritual leader of the Moroccan Muslim communiry, is the evocaion of the national personality. His popularicy among simple and rural people approaches adulation and if in the ciries there is a newer, sophiscicated view of him as a polirical figure, he can still never really be looked on by any Moroccan as an ordinary individual. The decision of the royal family to step into the arena of politics was a fateful one. It raised cries of arbitrariness and "personal power" from the UNFP opposicion, and caused discussion in many circles, but until now there has been no sign that any other force in the country is capable of assuring national solidaricy.

Until the end of 1962 Morocco was an absolute monarchy in

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Unitcd Nations, N.Y., July 29- F'o]lowing is a partial text of the sintement on Fortagnese territorics nau Tride, July 26 by Anbassedor Adlai Stevenscn, U.s. Reprusuntatie, in th .i. Security Council:

oe. Stalemtes are of sourse a dangerons ccnditicn in human affairs.

They are the potder kogs of hist.oiy and unless thoy ru resolved they may exmlorle nt nny time into violence with inpredictable conscquences for the peace of the worla. Change vill ccme in the Portugucse colcnies; the present bemporary stalenate of forces will be broken onc way or another in the not, too disteus future.

Tie pace of' decolonization in the lest 18 yenrs has been phenomenal.

When Worla Wer II cnded there were just cver 50 independent nations in the world. Todey less than a generation later -- herdly 2 percent of tho worli's poprlation still live in depcndent territories. Mcre independent neticns hare been created in that period than cxisted in al] the worla at the close of World War II. Here is a racord to setisfy the most impatisnt of us, No one: cen conplaii that cherc nes noi been action and progress--indeed ection and prcgress fnr h.yord whai the icst optimistic coud have expected in 1945.

Most of this erent cchiev:ment, was accomplished with very little

or no bloodshed. This, I think is olsc scmthing which 21l of us, liberated and liberators alike, prticularly we the members of this grett peacckecping organizntion can bo proud. We havo achieved frcedcm and we hnve kept the peace, and wo heve meny ncmbers of this Orgenivaticn, both liberotcd and libcratcrs, to than!.

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The Unired Stmes cnd North Africa
subject to certain restrictions, and, finally, can take exceptional
measures if the safety and independence of the Republic are
threatened.
Compared to that, the prerogatives of the Assembly are
somewhat restricted. Its members are elected at the same time
es the President for five years, and all deputies represent the
country as a whole instead of a particular district. The Assem-
bly can pass bills over presidential veto by a two-thirds major-
ity on second reading, but its most telling power is that of
fixing the final figures of the budget. In practice the legislature
has been overshadowed during the seven years of Tunisian
independence by the execuoive, but that is not too unusual in
the first stages of a new country which is tempted to dramatize
the national will in one personality, especially when the mag-
netism of that individual is such that it is impossible to imagine
the country without him.
Grouped around the presidency is the executive office, begin-
ning with the cabinet which has been staffed with little change
by members of the neo-Destour. The Secretary of State to the
Presidency functions as a vice-president and is also responsible
for national defense. The forces under his command include a
small army of about 20,00o men, which has enhanced its repu-
tation in the Congo, a naval contingent for coastal defense, a
parachutist elite unit, a few offcer pilots, and the gendarmerie.
Military service is compulsory, but the rate of rejection is high
and many trainees are enrolled in a civil corps which has done
excellent work in the economic development program.
On the regional level, the country is divided into thirteen
governorates, with each governor assisted by an elected ad-
visory council. These have limited powers but provide a useful
testing ground of local opinion. It is in the competence of its
regional administration that Tunisia has particularly distin-
guished itself. On the whole the governors have been able and
conscientious younger Destourians, and a neat balance between
centralization and decentralizAtion has been kept. The
corps
governor

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Independens North Africa
has wide latitude to make decisions on the spot 4omething
which has been capital in Ihandling the large publie workn n
employment program-but he cunnot get too much out of
hand because the smallness of Tunisia, and its facile communi-
cations allow for frequent consultation with the capital and the
shadow of the central governinent is kept at just about opti-
mum intensity.
All the governments of the now Maghrib states could legiti
mately be considcred reform governments, for cach has made
significant changes in the legnl, judicial, and social structure of
its countries, but in Tunisia reform has been perhaps the most
notable among many accomplishments. Many of the details arO
discussed later under the hending of social change, but men-
tion should be made herc that Tunisia has made a sweeping
renovation of the legal basis of society which far exceeds that
of other North African or Arnb country. Whecn the Per-
any
sonal Status Code went into effect in 1957 Tunisia became the
only Arab stare in which polygany was unconditionally abol-
ished and women granted full equality with men in all do-
mains. Marriage and divorce were reformed and regulated by
new civil laws, while suminary repudintion of the wife by the
husband was terminated. Religious tribunals for Muslims and
Rabbinical courts for Jews were abolishcd, placing everyone
under the same secular jurisdiction. These reforms werc com-
pleted by a Civil Status Law which made registration of births
and deaths obligatory for the first time and insisted on a specific
identity for each individual to replace the anarchic anonymity
which prevails in many Arab countrics where people do not
have surnames. All things considered, the reform of justice,
the secularization of the law, and the removal of inequality
between citizens were probably the most important steps taken
by the Tunisian state along the path to becoming an integrated,
modern nation.
In Tunisia it is common to hear it said that the government is
party, and vice versa. “We are all Destourians" is a standard

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Independens North Africa
has wide latitude to make decisions on the spot 4omething
which has been capital in Ihandling the large publie workn n
employment program-but he cunnot get too much out of
hand because the smallness of Tunisia, and its facile communi-
cations allow for frequent consultation with the capital and the
shadow of the central governinent is kept at just about opti-
mum intensity.
All the governments of the now Maghrib states could legiti
mately be considcred reform governments, for cach has made
significant changes in the legnl, judicial, and social structure of
its countries, but in Tunisia reform has been perhaps the most
notable among many accomplishments. Many of the details arO
discussed later under the hending of social change, but men-
tion should be made herc that Tunisia has made a sweeping
renovation of the legal basis of society which far exceeds that
of other North African or Arnb country. Whecn the Per-
any
sonal Status Code went into effect in 1957 Tunisia became the
only Arab stare in which polygany was unconditionally abol-
ished and women granted full equality with men in all do-
mains. Marriage and divorce were reformed and regulated by
new civil laws, while suminary repudintion of the wife by the
husband was terminated. Religious tribunals for Muslims and
Rabbinical courts for Jews were abolishcd, placing everyone
under the same secular jurisdiction. These reforms werc com-
pleted by a Civil Status Law which made registration of births
and deaths obligatory for the first time and insisted on a specific
identity for each individual to replace the anarchic anonymity
which prevails in many Arab countrics where people do not
have surnames. All things considered, the reform of justice,
the secularization of the law, and the removal of inequality
between citizens were probably the most important steps taken
by the Tunisian state along the path to becoming an integrated,
modern nation.
In Tunisia it is common to hear it said that the government is
party, and vice versa. “We are all Destourians" is a standard

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119
Independent North Africa
has wide latitude to make decisions on the spot--something
which has been capital in handling the large public works un
employment program--but he cannot get too much our of
hand because the smallness of Tunisia, and its facile communi.
cations allow for frequent consultation with the capital and the
shadow of the central government is kept at just about opti-
mum intensity.
All the governments of the new Maghrib states could legiti-
mately be considered reform governments, for each has made
significant changes in the legal, judicial, and social structure of
its countries, buc in Tunisia reform has been perhaps the most
notable among many accomplishments. Many of the details are
discussed later under the heading of social change, but men-
tion should be made here that Tunisia has made a sweeping
renovation of the legal basis of society which far exceeds that
of any other North African or Arab country. When the Per-
sonal Status Code went into effect in 1957 Tunisia became the
only Arab state in which polygamy was unconditionally abol-
ished and women granted full equality with men in all do
mains. Marriage and divorce were reformed and regulated by
new civil laws, while summary repudiation of the wife by the
husband was terminated. Religious tribunals for Muslims and
Rabbinical courts for Jews were abolished, placing everyone
under the same secular jurisdiction. These reforms were com-
pleted by a Civil Status Law which made registration of births
and deaths obligatory for the first time and insisted on a specific
identity for each individual to replace the anarchic anonymity
which prevails in many Arab countries where people do not
have surnames. All things considered, the reform of justice,
the secularization of the law, and the removal of inequality
between citizens were probably the most important steps taken
by the Tunisian state along the path to becoming an integrated,
modern nation.

In Tunisia it is common to hear it said that the government is
party, and vice versa. "We are all Destourians' is a standard