rational number

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was some opposition from naval and coast-defense guns, which conï؟¾tinued to fire until silenced by Allied naval and air units, but for the
most part the landings were unopposed.
As had the other two forces, the Eastern Task Force arrived off
its objective on schedule during the night of 7-8 November, and landï؟¾ings proceeded at three beaches. West of Algiers the 168th Regiï؟¾mental Combat Team made the initial landing at Cape Ferruch.
Friendly French officers, who were prepared to cooperate with the
American forces, surrendered Fort Sidi Ferruch at 0300 hours withï؟¾out firing a shot. Armored cars and tanks were landed, and the
advance eastward toward Algiers commenced. Three miles from
the city some opposition from Vichy sympathizers was encountered,
but by early afternoon the Americans were able to continue their
movement toward the city.
Meanwhile a landing was made near Castiglione by British Comï؟¾mando troops, who advanced southward and quickly occupied the
airfield at Blida. Soon fighters from the British naval air force
arrived and began to use the airfield. The Commandos then moved
eastward to cut off the city of Algiers from land communication to
the southwest.
While the landings west of Algiers were being accomplished, the
American 39th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced by a battalion
of British Commandos, landed on beaches near Ain Taya, fifteen
miles east of the city. One column immediately headed for the chief
objective, the big Maison Blanche airdrome, while another moved
on Algiers. The airdrome was taken at 0830 hours, after some slight
resistance was overcome at Fort de l’Eau and after a brush with
French tanks near the airfield. A little later a squadron of Hurriï؟¾canes, which had left Gibraltar at dawn, landed safely.
In the meantime, as at Oran, a direct attack on the harbor to gain
control of harbor equipment and prevent sabotage met with violent
opposition. Two British destroyers and two American coastal loadï؟¾ers were severly damaged, and although a few Commandos were put
ashore, the attempt to take Algiers by frontal assault failed.
By the afternoon of the 8th the converging American columns had
completed the encirclement of Algiers and the rail, highway, and air
communications were in Allied hands. During the day the task force
commander, Major General Charles W. Ryder, went ashore to confer
with a representative of Admiral Darlan. They reached an agreeï؟¾ment that all resistance should cease and that our forces should
occupy the city at 1900 hours, 8 November.
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COMMENTS
The surrender of Casablanca ended the initial (landing) phase of
the operations. Months of preparation and three days of fighting
had placed almost all French North Africa in Allied hands. Amerï؟¾ican casualties totaled about 770 killed or missing and 1050 wounded.
The British lost 240 killed or missing and sixty wounded.
Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of the operation
was the organization of a combined force of American and British
ground, air, and naval forces under one combined staff and the moveï؟¾ment of this force thousands of miles to make simultaneous combat
landings at widely separated points on a hostile shore. The landings,
involving over 100,000 troops, hundreds of airplanes, and 258 ships
and war vessels, had truly written a new chapter in amphibious
warfare.
The political aspects of the landings, particularly the recognition
of Darlan, became a subject of much discussion. The comments of
General Marshall in an official report are most pertinent:
General Eisenhower had announced that General Giraud would
be responsible for civil and military affairs in North Africa, but
the French military officials on the ground were found to be loyal
to Marshal Petain’s government. President Roosevelt’s note to the
French Chief of State had assured Marshal Petain of our desire for
a liberated France, but the Vichy answer was disappointing. Our
ambassador was handed his passport on 9 November, and orders
were dis*****ed from Vichy to French African units to resist our
forces, which by then had already accomplished their missions exï؟¾cept on the Casablanca front.
Unexpectedly, Admiral Jean Darlan, Petain’s designated sucï؟¾cessor and commander in chief of all French forces, was found to be
in Algiers. ... He was taken into protective custody, and when it
was found that the French leaders stood loyal to the Vichy governï؟¾ment, a series of conferences immediately followed with the purpose
of calling a halt to the French resistance against General Patton’s
task force in the vicinity of Casablanca. When, on the morning of
11 November, the Germans invaded unoccupied France, Admiral
Darlan rejected the pseudo-independent Vichy government, assumed
authority in North Africa in the name of Marshal Petain, and proï؟¾mulgated an order to all French commanders in North Africa to
cease hostilities. This order reached Casablanca a few minutes beï؟¾fore the final American assault was to be launched on the early
morning of 11 November.
These events, which transpired subsequent to the actual landings
on 8 November, required quick decisions, and the results finally
achieved fully vindicated the American military leaders. Throughï؟¾out the North African campaign the problem of welding the French
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General Eisenhower in addition to his purely military duties. The
gist of the commitment signed by Admiral Darlan was that the
French were to give the Allies immediately as much active assistance
in the seizure of Tunisia as lay within their powers. They were to
organize the government of North Africa, under Darlan, for effecï؟¾tive cooperation and, under General Giraud’s leadership, were to
begin the reorganization of selected military forces for active parï؟¾ticipation in the fighting. The way was now paved toward attaining
the principal objective, the occupation of Tunisia and the annihilaï؟¾tion of German forces in Africa.
The principal factors that contributed to the success of the landï؟¾ings in French North Africa were: (1) strategic surprise, (2) lack
of organized French resistance, and (3) effective joint militaryï؟¾naval planning and execution. Errors were made in the execution
of the plans, but these were to be expected from green troops. The
experience was to serve them in good stead in the future.
By the end of November there had been a definite turning point
in the Allied military situation as a whole. General Montgomery
had commenced the pursuit of the remnants of Rommel’s army
across Egypt and Libya, the Americans and British had landed
successfully in French North Africa and had started the invasion
of Tunisia, and the Russians had begun their winter offensive at
Stalingrad. All of these offensive steps gathered momentum with
each passing month. The initiative had passed to the Allies, and
for the first time during the war the German military situation had
deteriorated to an enforced strategic defensive. The tide*had likeï؟¾wise turned in the Pacific. Americans had invaded the Solomons
at Guadalcanal and had secured the lifeline to Australia. The Japï؟¾anese were being forced from southeastern New Guinea, and the
Allies had started on the long road back to the Philippines.
TUNISIAN CAMPAIGN
The conclusion of the landing phase paved the way for the next
operation, the Tunisian campaign (Map 3). This campaign, which
was to last six months, will be divided into three phases. The first
will cover the race between the Allies and the Axis to build up a
force in the Bizerte-Tunis area strong enough to deny the loser this
key terrain. The Germans were to win this race by a narrow marï؟¾gin. The second phase will comprise the period of Axis initiative,
during which time the Germans were to develop and expand a strong
perimeter defense around their holdings in Tunisia. The third phase

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will include the decisive period of the campaign: the Allied victory
at Mareth, the capture of Bizerte and Tunis, and the subsequent
surrender of all Axis forces in North Africa.
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Over its whole length and breadth Tunisia varies greatly both in
terrain and climate. Five hundred miles long from north to south
and 150 miles wide from east to west, its surface consists of a conï؟¾fused mountainous zone in the north, an area of lower plateaus in
the center, and broad plains in the south gradually merging into the
sands of the Sahara Desert.
The mountains in the north are the eastern extremity of that chain
of the Atlas Mountains that begins in southern Morocco and runs
entirely across French North Africa in a northeasterly direction.
They are rocky and steep and near Souk Ahras reach an altitude of
over 4200 feet.
The extreme eastern spurs of these mountains, known as the
Grand Dorsal, extend to the south of Tunis in the shape of an inï؟¾verted “V”. From the apex of the “V”, near Pont du Fahs, the
eastern arm, called the Eastern Dorsal, runs south 125 miles to Makï؟¾nassy, thence southwest to the vicinity of El Guettar. Crossed by
few passes—Fondouk, Faid, Maknassy, and El Guettar—this Eastï؟¾ern Dorsal would, with Chott Djerid (a large salt lake), provide a
natural defense of the Allied right flank against any attacker from
the east or south. This terrain was to be the scene of much bitter
fighting during the Tunisian campaign.
The western arm of the “V”, the Western Dorsal, extends southï؟¾west from Pont du Fahs and forms a secondary barrier against
attack from the east or south. The important passes through this
range are Maktar, Sbiba, Kasserine, Dernia, and El Abiod. Tebessa,
on the western slope of the dorsal, is an important communications
center and a key to the southern front.
In the north the Medjerda River, the most important stream, winds
northeast from the mountains to the Gulf of Tunis. Medjez el Bab
is the key to this corridor to Tunis. It was to become an important
defensive position covering Allied lines of communication to the west.
There are few good roads in Tunisia. The main roads are usually
hard-surfaced (tarred) but narrow. Secondary roads are sometimes
well metalled, but more often are little more than dirt tracks. After
a few hours of rain many so-called roads become practically impassï؟¾able for motor transport, while in prolonged dry weather they deï؟¾teriorate rapidly. Where they pass through the hills, the roads often
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become defiles for long distances. During military operations they
can be blocked with mine fields and covered by fire from the high
ground commanding them oh either side. Thus the defiles and passes
were to become important objectives during the Tunisian campaign.
There are three routes of entry into Tunisia from Algeria. First
is the coast road through Bone. Another route, through Souk Ahras,
some forty miles inland, leads to the Tunis-Bizerte area either
by way of Souk el Arba or by the more southerly road through Le
Kef. Access to central and southern Tunisia is through Tebessa,
from which point roads lead northeastward to Medjez el Bab and
Tunis, eastward through Kasserine to the passes at Fondouk and
Faid, and southeastward through Gafsa to Sfax and Gabes.
The railroads are of especial importance in this region of few
good highways. However, the deterioration of the roadbeds and
the French rolling stock was to make even this form of transportaï؟¾tion extremely unreliable. Operating in the level coastal plains of
Tunis and southern Tunisia, the enemy was to have the definite
advantage of shorter and better communications.
The period of heaviest rains begins in late November and continues
through February. During this season the lowlands, particularly,
become a glutinous sea of mud.
THE RACE FOR TUNISIA, November-December 1942
Having secured the initial objectives of Casablanca, Oran, and
Algiers, the Allies turned immediately to the next phase, the concenï؟¾tration of the bulk of American and French Moroccan and Algerian
forces in the Casablanca-Oran area and the advance of the British
First Army to Tunisia. According to General Eisenhower:
Our chief hope of anticipating the Axis in Tunisia lay in our actï؟¾ing with utmost speed. Indeed, we were involved in a race not only
against the building up of enemy forces at Tunis and Bizerte, but
against the weather as well. There was less than a month of fair
weather ahead, and Axis air and ground forces were within easy
striking distance of Tunis and Bizerte, less than 100 miles away
from these places across the Sicilian narrows. All the same, our
easternmost force was at Algiers, 560 miles west of Tunis. Necesï؟¾sarily, therefore, we had to rely on a rapid advance of very light
forces, understrength in both personnel and equipment.
To make matters worse, the enemy lost no time in meeting the
Allied invasion. On 9 November German air transports began flyï؟¾ing troops into the Bizerte-Tunis area. Here again the French
reaction exasperated the Allies. Admiral Esteva, the French Resiï؟¾dent, listened to Vichy and, despite Darlan’s armistice directive, preï؟¾Digitized byGoogle

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17
pared the way for the German entry. French troops under General
Barre, who was pro-Ally, were ordered out of Tunis, and the city
was left defenseless. Later General Barre’s forces joined the Allies,
but in the meantime the Germans found airfield and dock facilities
ready for their use.
On 9 November General Anderson arrived at Algiers to take over
command of the British First Army. His plan was to seize all ports
and airfields to the east (Bougie, Djidjelli, Philippeville, Bone, and
La Calle) as rapidly as possible and then to rush his forces forward
by motor transport, landing craft, and troop-carrying aircraft. The
port of Bougie and the airfield at Djidjelli were the first objectives.
The floating reserve of the Eastern Task Force, part of the British
78th Division, was still aboard ships at Algiers. It sailed on the
evening of 10 November to take the first objectives of the eastward
drive. The capture of Bougie on 11 November was unopposed, but
because of bad surf conditions the force was unable to take the Djidï؟¾jelli airfield until the 13th. During this interim lack of adequate
land-based air cover permitted the Germans to bomb Bougie harbor,
where they damaged a British aircraft carrier.
Bone was occupied on 12 November by two companies of a British
parachute battalion dropped from C-47’s of the American 65th Carï؟¾rier Command and a British Commando battalion brought in by
water. The only Axis opposition to this move was a heavy raid on
the airfield that night. The build-up of troops in the Bone area conï؟¾tinued as rapidly as possible, air, sea, rail, and vehicular transporï؟¾tation being utilized. The advance to the east was pressed, and by
15 November leading elements of the 36th Brigade of the 78th Diviï؟¾sion had occupied Tabarka, only eighty miles from Tunis. A British
paratroop battalion which had been dropped at Souk el Arba on the
16th had moved beyond Beja by the 17th, and the troops at Tabarka
had advanced to Djebel Abiod.
At the same time the Allies were securing airfields to the south.
On 15 November Colonel Edson D. Raff’s 503d Parachute Battalion,
an American unit, dropped at Youks les Bains and two days later
occupied the Gafsa airfield, far to the south. It sent patrols over
the entire southern area, meeting only small Italian forces. Raff
Force, as it came to be known, established cordial relations with
the French garrison at Tebessa, which promptly began cooperating
with the Americans in patrolling the area.
Evidence of French cooperation appeared on 16 November, when
reports were received of French and German patrols clashing in the
Beja-Debjel Abiod-Mateur area. Although General Barre had been
negotiating with the Germans since their arrival, the advance of the

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Allies into Tunisia had won the support of the French forces, and
Barre now agreed that his troops would cover the concentration of
the 78th Division in the Tabarka-Souk el Arba area. On 17 Novemï؟¾ber General Anderson issued orders to the 78th to complete its conï؟¾centration and prepare for an advance on Tunis.
About this time the Axis fighting strength was estimated at 500
to 1000 in the Tunis area and about 4000 at Bizerte, with some tanks
and aircraft at each place. At the same time JU-52,
s were averaging
more than fifty landings a day at Bizerte. The enemy had occupied
Mateur and had pushed out west and south.
The Allied expeditionary force that had rushed into Tunisia was
formed principally of two brigades of the British 78th Infantry Diï؟¾vision and one battalion of the 17th Lancers, reinforced by light
tanks from the American 1st Armored Division. It was realized
that such a small force, only a few thousand men in all, could not
hope to take Tunis and Bizerte if the Germans succeeded in bringing
in heavy reinforcements. Yet at the time it was the largest force
that could be supplied over the long and difficult line of communicaï؟¾tion.
Follow-up convoys arrived at Bone as rapidly as possible, and as
soon as transportation was unloaded, the newly arrived elements of
the British First Army continued overland to the east (Map 4a). By
20 November British armor, known as Blade Force, was established
in the Souk el Arba area, and by 22 November the 11th Brigade
Group * of the 78th Division was concentrated in the Beja area.
Operations in the north were now to take place along three clearly
defined axes: (1) the road from Tabarka to Mateur, (2) the Bejaï؟¾Mateur road, and (3) the main highway running from Beja through
Medjez el Bab and Tebourba to Tunis.
While the Allies were desperately trying to build up their advance
units and bring up supplies, the enemy seized the initiative by atï؟¾tacking the French at Medjez el Bab on 18 and 19 November. The
ill-equipped French were assailed three times by infantry supported
by artillery, tanks, and dive bombers, which inflicted casualties of
25 per cent on the defenders. The French retired until reinforced
by British and American armor and artillery, when they counterï؟¾attacked. At the same time another Axis attack at Djebel Abiod
was stopped by the leading battalion of the 36th Brigade.
Although the British had been able to hold the enemy in check,
they were themselves unable to advance, and were ordered to delay
temporarily until their strength was sufficient to insure a reasonable
* A British brigade group is similar to our regimental combat team.

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19
chance of success in the drive to Tunis. Also, the intermixture of
French and British units that had occurred as a result of improvisaï؟¾tion following the French decision to act with the Allies had to be
straightened out. By 23 November a verbal agreement had been
reached whereby all troops north of the line Le Kef-Zaghouan
should be under command of the British First Army, while all units
south of that line should be subject to French command. This was
unsatisfactory, but it was the best that could be achieved at the
moment, since the French had refused to serve under a British
commander.
On 24 November General Anderson had completed the forward
concentration of the 78th Division and Blade Force, with the British
6th Armored Division en route to Teboursouk and Combat Comï؟¾mand B of the American 1st Armored Division en route to Souk el
Arba as follow-up troops. The advance was resumed, Blade Force
penetrating the enemy outpost position to a point midway between
Tebourba and Mateur and the 11th Brigade, on the right, advancing
down the Medjerda valley, where it captured Medjez el Bab on the
25th. Progress was steady for the next three days, with the 11th
Brigade, reinforced by American and British armor, moving astride
the river to take Tebourba the night of 26-27 November. On 28 Noï؟¾vember our forces reached Djedeida, less than sixteen miles from
Tunis. This proved to be the farthest advance toward Tunis until
the final drive of the campaign, six months later.
To the north the 36th Brigade, although advancing about ten
miles toward Mateur, met increasing resistance from enemy mings
and booby traps. At the same time Blade Force, in the plains south
of Mateur, began to meet supply difficulties, which were aggravated
by the first rains. In all sections the enemy’s dive bombers were an
important factor in stopping our advance, since our airfields were
too far to the rear to provide the necessary cover.
The forward positions were held until 1 December, when von Arï؟¾nim, the German commander, launched an attack with dive bombers,
tanks, and infantry against Blade Force near Tebourba. After losï؟¾ing forty tanks, Blade Force was withdrawn, and the sector was
taken over by Combat Command B and the 11th Brigade. On 3
December the enemy attacked again, the 11th Brigade suffering
heavily both in men and equipment. By this time several battalions
of the 78th Division had less than 350 men.
On 8 December General Eisenhower approved General Anderson’s
proposal to withdraw his forces to more defensible ground. Howï؟¾ever, the important center of Medjez el Bab was to be held at all
costs. The weather proved a serious handicap to this withdrawal.

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Combat Command B became badly mired and was finally forced to
abandon the larger part of its equipment, retrieving only three of
its eighteen 105-mm. howitzers, twelve of its sixty-two medium
tanks, and thirty-eight of its 122 light tanks. This was a serious
loss, since the continual fighting and serious attrition, together with
the inadequate rail and highway communications, had hindered the
build-up of reserves. The weather was turning our few available
airfields into quagmires while the Axis planes, operating from paved
fields, maintained air supremacy over the forward areas, compoundï؟¾ing the confusion and handicaps confronting the Allies. It was
estimated that on 30 November the Germans had 15,500 combat
troops, 130 tanks, sixty field guns, and thirty antitank guns in the
Tunis-Bizerte area. By 18 December this force had grown to a total
of 42,000 men, of whom about 25,000 were Germans, and reinforceï؟¾ments were still arriving.
During November and early December southern Tunisia was alï؟¾most a no man's land, but several hundred Germans arrived in Gabes,
Sfax, and Sousse by troop-carrier planes and garrisoned those towns.
Enemy patrols of armored cars and light tanks pressed westward
and occupied Pont du Fahs.
Farther .south the American paratroops, who had dropped at Youks
les Bains and had joined with French forces in that area, patrolled
actively. The mission of the few hundred American and French
troops in central and southern Tunisia was to make the enemy beï؟¾lieve that they were a whole division. They rushed up and down
their hundred-mile front, appearing here and there to threaten the
Germans along the coast. They fought numerous skirmishes with
enemy patrols and effectively protected the southern flank of the
First Army.
Unwilling to give up the race for Tunisia, General Eisenhower
decided to launch another attack in the north about 20 December
with Tunis as the objective. But the weather continued to be a most
formidable enemy. Vehicular movement off paved roads was imï؟¾possible, and two thirds of the Allied aircraft at the principal field,
at Souk el Arba, were inoperative because of mud. The supply lines
were inadequate to meet the needs for steel matting and equipment
to place the airfields in condition or, for that matter, to provide
the required build-up of general supplies, particularly ammunition.
Since the Allied hope in this last planned offensive lay in air power
and artillery, the operation was postponed and then, on 24 Decemï؟¾ber, finally abandoned.

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General Eisenhower has expressed his feelings on the situation
in these words:
The abandonment of our immediate offensive plans was the bitï؟¾terest disappointment that I had yet suffered, but I was convinced
that to attempt a major attack under prevailing conditions in
northern Tunisia would be merely to court disaster. We could not
hope to resume major operations in the north until the middle of
March, and we had to set about the slow business of building up
for an attack at the end of that period. The logistic marathon,
which I had desperately tried to avoid, had begun.
During these last two months of 1942 other events which had some
bearing on the military situation were transpiring. When the Gerï؟¾mans moved into unoccupied France and toward the naval base at
Toulon on 11 November, Admiral Darlan ordered the French fleet
to sail for Africa. But in the confusion of the situation the fleet was
scuttled instead, only a few submarines getting through to North
Africa. Darlan was more successful in his next attempt to aid the
Allies. He was able to persuade M. Boisson, the governor of French
West Africa, to join the Liberation Movement and to open Dakar
for use as an Allied base. When Admiral Darlan was assassinated
on 24 December, General Giraud took his place. General Juin beï؟¾came the commander of the French military forces. ,
At this time the bulk of the American forces (the Fifth Army*),
along with two divisions of French troops from Morocco and the
French division in Oran, were being held in the Casablanca-Oran
area to guard communications, to counter any drive the Germans
might make through Spanish Morocco, and to conduct training in
preparation for future missions.
Comments.—The Allied move to seize Tunisia was a necessary
step in the continuation of the strategic offensive in North Africa.
Axis efforts to thwart the attempt were an equally essential step in
carrying out the strategic defensive to which they had been reduced
by their defeat in the Battle of El Alamein.
Two main reasons impelled the Axis command to an all-out defense
of Tunisia. The first was that only by holding that area could they
hope to extricate the troops and equipment of Rommel’s army from
their serious predicament. The second was that it was imperative
to delay the Allied attack against Europe for as long a period as
possible in order to gain time to prepare the necessary defenses.
* The Fifth Army, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark commanding, was actiï؟¾vated on 6 January 1943. Its headquarters was at Oujda, Morocco. The troops
assigned included the 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored
Division.

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Allied strategy in North Africa ceased to be a mystery to the Ger￾mans the moment they were advised that the landings had taken
place, and from that time on the element of strategic surprise ceased
to weigh against them. Surprise had contributed greatly to the
success of the initial operations, but was lacking entirely during
the early period of the Allied thrust into Tunisia.
In this connection it is interesting to note the reply of a high￾ranking German officer, Field Marshal Kesselring, to an American
interrogation in May 1946. Kesselring was asked what intelligence
the Germans had of our landings in North Africa. He replied:
We were, in fact, in possession of very exact information con￾cerning activity in the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and were already
fully prepared for a possible landing. I myself was the only person
who believed in the possibility of a landing in Algiers. The German
and Italian high command, however, did not share this view. Your
radio broadcast service functioned faultlessly in this respect. It
kept us constantly in a state of excitement and carried on an ad￾mirable form of nerve war, so that we were forced to expect some
sort of invasion at any time and yet did not know from which direc￾tion it was to be expected.
Once the facts were appraised by the Germans, they acted with
speed and efficiency. In so doing they won the race for Tunisia,
succeeded in postponing the invasion of Italy for six months, and
gained time in which to strengthen their Continental defenses. But
we shall see later what price they paid for this.
The Allied command recognized the strategic importance of Tu￾nisia. From the very beginning it was known that once Tunis and
Bizerte were captured, all Tunisia would fall. We have seen why
initial landing points farther to the east than Algiers were not
selected. There remain then only two questions to be answered:
(1) Why was only a small force sent to Tunisia? (2) Why was it
unable to win the race to Tunis? Both questions have the same
answer: the lack of supply facilities for larger forces either on the
ground or in the air. Handicapped by lack of transport and slowed
by long supply routes, the Allied commander could send only a small
combat force into Tunisia. When this force was stopped and then
driven back by the enemy, it became necessary to enter the “logistical
marathon” referred to by. General Eisenhower.
PERIOD OF AXIS INITIATIVE-, January-March 1943
Allied Plans and Build-up (Map 4b).—In early January the Tuni￾sian front extended from the Chott Djerid in the south to the Medi￾terranean in the north, a distance of some 250 miles. Through the
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Sahara, south of the area shown on the map, roamed small patrols
of the French Camel Corps. The American paratroops held the
desert and wasteland area around Gafsa and up to Faid Pass. Eleï؟¾ments of the American 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions were
beginning to arrive in this area.
Around Pichon and Fondouk and farther north the French XIX
Corps held positions in the hills and controlled the Ousseltia valley.*
These forces were lightly armed with obsolete weapons and had
neither the transport nor the administrative machinery for offensive
operations. But under the able leadership of Generals Juin and
Koeltz they maintained high morale, and by the end of the campaign
cooperation with the other Allies was excellent.
The remainder of the front, north to the sea at Cape Serrat, was
held by the British First Army, as yet an army in name only. At
this time it consisted of only the V Corps, which was composed of
the 6th Armored and the 78th Infantry Divisions and the 139th
Brigade. Thus during early January a front of 250 miles was held
by the *****alent of three British, part of one American, and three
weak French divisions.
To oppose the Allies at this time, General von Arnim appears to
have had three German and three Italian divisions. In approxiï؟¾mately two months he had expanded the beachheads of Sousse, Sfax,
and Gabes into a more or less continuous coastal corridor in order
to insure communication and close cooperation between his own
forces and those of Rommel, then approaching the Mareth position.
With the abandonment for the time being of offensive plans in the
north, the situation on the long stretch of front from Pont du Fahs
to Gafsa deserved close attention. A successful Axis attack through
our weakly held positions there could carry through to the Mediterï؟¾ranean coast in the Bone area and completely isolate the British
First Army. As a coimterplan the Allies developed the “Sfax
Project/’ a plan for an Allied offensive against Gabes and Sfax which
would be mounted in the Tebessa-Kasserine area. Besides regainï؟¾ing the initiative, this operation, if successful, would interrupt the
line of communication between Rommel and von Arnim and secure
the south flank of the British First Army. The prospects of better
weather in this area were encouraging, but it would be difficult to
find the troops for the operation and more difficult to supply them.
* Commanded by General Koeltz, this corps contained most of the available
French forces from Tunisia and Algeria—about three divisions that consisted
mostly of native troops.
As previously stated, General Juin had command of all the French forces.

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On 1 January 1943 the American II Corps, Major General Fredenï؟¾dall commanding, was detached from the Center Task Force at Oran
and sent to Tunisia. The II Corps, which had as a nucleus the
American 1st Armored Division, completed its concentration in the
Kasserine-Tebessa area on 15 January and proceeded with plans
for the attack to be launched on the 23d. However, information
was received on 15 January that it would be impossible to coordinate
this attack with the advance of General Montgomery’s army, since
Montgomery would not reach Tripoli until the last week in January.
This caused General Eisenhower to abandon the Sfax offensive altoï؟¾gether, it now being considered too risky. After this change of plan
the 1st Infantry Division, less the 18th and 26th Regimental Combat
Teams, was attached to the French XIX Corps, farther north.
The approach of the British Eighth Army made it necessary to
plan an extensive reorganization to achieve unity of command in
the Allied land, sea, and air forces. At the Casablanca conference
in mid-January President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and
the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that such a reorganization
should take place when the campaign had reached the proper stage
and when the necessary preparations had been completed. General
Eisenhower was placed in command of the new North African Theï؟¾ater of Operations and relieved of responsibility for the European
Theater. General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, British commanï؟¾der in chief in the Middle East, was to become Eisenhower’s deputy
and was to command the Eighteenth Army Group, consisting of the
British First and Eighth Armies, the American II Corps, and the
French troops on the Tunisian front. Air units were to be organized
into the Mediterranean Air Command, under Air Chief Marshal Sir
Arthur Tedder. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was to become
naval commander in chief in the Mediterranean. As we shall see,
it was to be another month before these arrangements could be put
into effect.
By late January von Arnim’s army of 65,000 was receiving about
750 men per day and large quantities of supplies. Therefore, to
build up the Allied forces and to interdict the enemy’s build-up beï؟¾came the guiding and virtually the sole aim of Allied strategy in
Tunisia. Steps were taken to improve the Allied supply setup and
to develop air strength over Tunisia.
All port and transportation facilities were geared to maximum
capacity (Map 3). The First Army was based at Bone and used the
supply roads through La Calle and Souk Ahras. The supplies for
the American II Corps were moved from Oran and Algiers by rail
to the new Eastern Base Section depots at Constantine and from

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25
there to advanced supply points in the vicinity of Tebessa. The
American Twelfth Air Force was supplied by rail and road from
Philippeville.
Air and naval forces cooperated in the twofold task of protecting
our supply lines and disrupting the enemy’s. Fighter elements of
the Eastern Air Command were based at Souk el Arba as air support
for the First Army. Similarly the XII Air Support Command was
brought up to the Thelepte and Youks les Bains airfields for the
support of the II Corps. B-17’s were grouped near Biskra, and the
mediums were based on Constantine. Both American and British
planes concentrated primarily on Tunisian targets but began to
range as far as Sicily and Sardinia. Malta-based Beaufighters and
Spitfires aided Allied efforts by striking at Tripolitania and Tunisia
and at Axis air trains over the Sicilian channel. During the first
week of January 520 operational planes of the Twelfth Air Force
and 250 of the Royal Air Force were in Northwest Africa.
Contrary to popular impression, it was estimated that 90 per cent
of the flow of men and supplies across the Sicilian narrows was sea￾borne and that only 10 per cent was sent in by air. This Axis water
route with its excellent air cover was much less vulnerable than the
long coastal route of the Allies between Bone and Algiers.. More￾over, during the first three months of operations the Allied ports,
particularly Bone, were subject to constant and sometimes heavy
air raids.
Operations, 1 January-14 February 1943 (Map 4b).—While the
Allies were “cleaning up their administrative tail” (a phrase coined
by General Montgomery), the Germans held undisputed possession
of the initiative. That they appreciated the precarious position of
the Allies is indicated by the following extract from an Allied Force
Headquarters report:
In a raptured German document, dated December 16th, we found
set forth Field Marshal Rommel’s “Appreciation of Situation,”
which underlined all our weaknesses of communication and supply,
stressed the conglomerate nature of our forces by a shrewd observa￾tion that such a force “probably lacks cohesion and suffers from the
inherent weakness of an Allied command,” and succinctly sum￾marized our problem in the French sector: “Facing Gabes and
Sousse are the elements of three French divisions, all ill-equipped
and of doubtful morale.”
Operating from the Kairouan area, the enemy on 2 January
launched an attack on the French position at Fondouk. The garri￾son was surrounded and Fondouk captured. Although the Pinchon
gap into the Ousseltia valley was threatened, the enemy did not
exploit his success.
Digitized byGoogle

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26
The next German thrust came on 18 January at the junction point
of the British and French sectors in the Bou Arada-Pont du Fahs
area. The initial attacks, in which the new Mark VI (“Tiger”)
tank made its debut, were stopped by the British, but not before
Bou Arada was threatened. The same day the enemy attacked from
Pont du Fahs southwest toward Robaa in a drive that if successful
would isolate the French in the mountains to the east.
During the next thirty-six hours Allied forces moved to meet the
Axis advance. The British 6th Armored Division regrouped in the
Bou Arada area and sent a squadron of tanks and some artillery to
help the French troops while Combat Command B of the American
1st Armored Division moved up to Maktar. The American II Corps,
to the south, was assembling elements of the 1st Infantry and 1st
Armored Divisions in the vicinity of Sbeitla for use as a reserve.
On 19 January the British counterattacked, advancing nine miles
east of Bou Arada and clearing the road north of that town. Neverï؟¾theless, the enemy drive to the southwest continued, and Robaa was
occupied. This forced the French forces to withdraw to the west,
the British V Corps conforming by pulling back its right flank. Axis
troops attacked again on 20 January, reaching Ousseltia that night
and isolating French units that'had been holding out in the Eastern
Dorsal.
During the next few days the Allied forces began to restore the
situation. Elements of the British 6th Armored Division advanced
on the Robaa-Pont du Fahs road, and Combat Command B moved
into positions at the south end of the Ousseltia valley, where it was
able to extricate the isolated French units. At this time additional
American forces from the 1st Infantry Division arrived to strengthen
the Allied lines.
By 25 January the enemy's attack had spent its force, and the
positions became stabilized. On that date General Eisenhower, with
the concurrence of the French, appointed General Anderson of the
British First Army commander of all Allied ground forces in Tuï؟¾nisia. General Anderson assigned the American II Corps the reï؟¾sponsibility for the sector south of Fondouk—where it had been
operating.
The enemy did not remain quiet for long. On 30 January he
shifted his main effort and attacked the French troops that were
holding Faid Pass, a position that screened the American 1st Arï؟¾mored Division. Supported by sixty tanks, the Axis force captured
the town of Faid and made further penetrations to the south and
west, although the French retained the road junction at Sidi Bou