rational number

[mosaadabd460]

their attitudes toward the Soviets
and the Chinese. We, perhaps,
underestimated their ability even
then to stand up against external
influences-from all directions.
Today, this has changed . We
and they have adjusted to radi
cally new circumstances.
PRESENT SITUATION
Its first annual budget was only
$6 million , and few knew where
that would be found .
In the other three countries ,
France played a dominant role,
largely to the exclusion of other
outside influences. Americans in
both government and the private
sector, nevertheless, were be
ginning to learn about North
Africa . They were beginning to
be aware of its peoples and their
quest for freedom . We realized
earlier than most that independ
ence was coming and coming
rapidly .
But these were , at that time,
side issues . Our concern as a
nation then was the relationship
of this area to the emerging
position of the Soviet Union and
to its containment. Before mis
siles and long- range bombers, our
Strategic Air Command bases
in Morocco were considered vital
for our national security . In
1951 , also, we made the decision
to seek to retain , in Libya, an
important training base for our
Air Forces in Europe. We ulti
mately reached agreement and
committed ourselves initially to
pay Libya $4 million a year in
economic assistance.
Ten years later, the situation
had changed dramatically, and
we had changed with it . Morocco
and Tunisia were independent.
General De Gaulle had stood in
Algiers and had spoken one of
history's great ambiguities, " Je
vous ai compris." ( " I have under
stood you ." ) Libya had begun to
realize that its deserts covered
vast resources of oil .
In those ten years, U.S. poli
cies had moved, too. President
Eisenhower had agreed to the
evacuation of our air bases in
Morocco . Our earlier interest and
confidence in Tunisia was fol
lowed by a pledge of long- term
development aid-without condi
tions or demands for facilities . In
1964, we agreed in principle with
the Government of Libya to the
evacuation of our military facili
ties whenever they were not
wanted. We were preparing to
help independent Algeria with
substantial food and technical
aid .
Each of these countries, as
they became independent,
looked to us in a special way.
They sought alternatives to full
dependence upon the former
metropole . It was not yet fash
ionable to turn massively to the
Soviets or the Chinese.
Morocco , because of early
links with the United States ,
encouragement by individual
Americans, and the presence of
our bases, expected special help.
Algeria, despite harboring a
resentment because of our sup
port for the French , looked to us
as an early sympathizer and
benefactor.
Tunisia , under the leadership
of Habib Bourguiba , remem
bered earlier help and encourage
ment and looked to us.
Libya saw in us and the British
the primary sources of critical financial help. The Libyan King
felt both an indebtedness to us
for our support at the United
Nations for Libyan independence
and territorial unity despite
Soviet opposition, and a depend
ence upon us .
Ten years ago , we were deeply
involved . These nations had ex
pectations of us. We expected to
find friends and support, particu
larly against growing inroads of
Soviet influence . We did tend to
judge nations in those days by
Each of the four countries is
now fully independent.
Each has, further, demon
strated its independence in poli
cies toward the former metro
poles and toward other coun
tries. Each country has diversi
fied its relationships. None is any
longer dependent predominantly
upon a single power, politically
or economically. Each in its par
ticular way has sought to qualify
as " nonaligned ."
The area has seen major politi
cal upheavals which have
changed the leadership and, in
the case of Libya , the basic
reorientation of the country .
There has been a dramatic
discovery and development of
resources, primarily oil and gas,
in the last ten years . The direct
importance of the area economi
cally to Europe has expanded .
All of this has brought a very
basic change in the relationship
between North Africa and the
United States .
Except for the use of com
munications facilities at one
Moroccan base, we no longer
have any military facilities in
North Africa.
The proposition of economic
assistance provided by the United
States has steadily declined as
European countries have assumed a larger share .
U.S. grant military assistance
2