rational number

[mosaadabd460]

43
attacks, until on 28 April the advance had carried to the base of
Hill 609. During the 30th General Ryder strengthened the force
attacking the hill, and with the support of some medium tanks it
succeeded in gaining the summit. At dawn on the following day
the Germans counterattacked from positions on the northeastern
slope. They were allowed to advance to within 200 yards of the
American position before a devastating surprise fire repulsed their
effort to retake the summit. This action firmly established the 34th
Division's hold on Hill 609. Tersely summarizing these operations,
General Bradley wrote: “A strong enemy attack was repulsed.
Fighting was intense and bloody. The enemy was engaged with
bayonet and grenade, and there were many cases of outstanding
bravery." The great effort made by the Germans to hold and then
recapture Hill 609 clearly evidenced its importance in the battle
for the entire area.
While the 34th Division was making its attack, the 1st Infantry
Division, on its right, advanced another five miles. With the fall
of Hill 609 the 1st Division's initial hill objectives were made un￾tenable for the enemy, and both divisions progressed more rapidly,
both on the north and south sides of the Tine River.
By 1 May these joint efforts had resulted in the capture of all the
key hill positions in the southern half of the II Corps zone, and the
Tine valley was open for an armored thrust.
In the meantime an attack in the northern part of the corps zone
was being made by the 9th Division * and the attached Corps Franc
d'Afrique. The main objective of this attack was the high ground
generally north of Jefna, where the Germans held hill positions
dominating the approach to Mateur through the Sedjenane valley.
In executing this mission, the 9th Division had to meet difficulties
imposed by both the terrain and the very broad front involved. Re￾connaissance troops were assigned the task of patrolling vigorously
in the nine-mile interval between the 9th and 34th Divisions, since
the nature of the ground was such that it was considered imprac￾ticable to send large units through this area. The plan provided
that one regimental combat team should make a secondary attack
on the enemy defenses west of Jefna, while another (the main effort)
was to strike at the strong points on the high ground to the north
of the town and thus outflank its defenses. The third regimental
combat team and the French were to drive eastward against the
more lightly held positions on both sides of the Sedjenane River.
The operations of the 9th Division and the French units took place
in scrub-covered mountains that continuously tested the energy,
* Major General Manton S. Eddy.