rational number

[mosaadabd460]

24
On 1 January 1943 the American II Corps, Major General Fredenï؟¾dall commanding, was detached from the Center Task Force at Oran
and sent to Tunisia. The II Corps, which had as a nucleus the
American 1st Armored Division, completed its concentration in the
Kasserine-Tebessa area on 15 January and proceeded with plans
for the attack to be launched on the 23d. However, information
was received on 15 January that it would be impossible to coordinate
this attack with the advance of General Montgomery’s army, since
Montgomery would not reach Tripoli until the last week in January.
This caused General Eisenhower to abandon the Sfax offensive altoï؟¾gether, it now being considered too risky. After this change of plan
the 1st Infantry Division, less the 18th and 26th Regimental Combat
Teams, was attached to the French XIX Corps, farther north.
The approach of the British Eighth Army made it necessary to
plan an extensive reorganization to achieve unity of command in
the Allied land, sea, and air forces. At the Casablanca conference
in mid-January President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and
the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that such a reorganization
should take place when the campaign had reached the proper stage
and when the necessary preparations had been completed. General
Eisenhower was placed in command of the new North African Theï؟¾ater of Operations and relieved of responsibility for the European
Theater. General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, British commanï؟¾der in chief in the Middle East, was to become Eisenhower’s deputy
and was to command the Eighteenth Army Group, consisting of the
British First and Eighth Armies, the American II Corps, and the
French troops on the Tunisian front. Air units were to be organized
into the Mediterranean Air Command, under Air Chief Marshal Sir
Arthur Tedder. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was to become
naval commander in chief in the Mediterranean. As we shall see,
it was to be another month before these arrangements could be put
into effect.
By late January von Arnim’s army of 65,000 was receiving about
750 men per day and large quantities of supplies. Therefore, to
build up the Allied forces and to interdict the enemy’s build-up beï؟¾came the guiding and virtually the sole aim of Allied strategy in
Tunisia. Steps were taken to improve the Allied supply setup and
to develop air strength over Tunisia.
All port and transportation facilities were geared to maximum
capacity (Map 3). The First Army was based at Bone and used the
supply roads through La Calle and Souk Ahras. The supplies for
the American II Corps were moved from Oran and Algiers by rail
to the new Eastern Base Section depots at Constantine and from