rational number

[mosaadabd460]

23
Sahara, south of the area shown on the map, roamed small patrols
of the French Camel Corps. The American paratroops held the
desert and wasteland area around Gafsa and up to Faid Pass. Eleï؟¾ments of the American 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions were
beginning to arrive in this area.
Around Pichon and Fondouk and farther north the French XIX
Corps held positions in the hills and controlled the Ousseltia valley.*
These forces were lightly armed with obsolete weapons and had
neither the transport nor the administrative machinery for offensive
operations. But under the able leadership of Generals Juin and
Koeltz they maintained high morale, and by the end of the campaign
cooperation with the other Allies was excellent.
The remainder of the front, north to the sea at Cape Serrat, was
held by the British First Army, as yet an army in name only. At
this time it consisted of only the V Corps, which was composed of
the 6th Armored and the 78th Infantry Divisions and the 139th
Brigade. Thus during early January a front of 250 miles was held
by the *****alent of three British, part of one American, and three
weak French divisions.
To oppose the Allies at this time, General von Arnim appears to
have had three German and three Italian divisions. In approxiï؟¾mately two months he had expanded the beachheads of Sousse, Sfax,
and Gabes into a more or less continuous coastal corridor in order
to insure communication and close cooperation between his own
forces and those of Rommel, then approaching the Mareth position.
With the abandonment for the time being of offensive plans in the
north, the situation on the long stretch of front from Pont du Fahs
to Gafsa deserved close attention. A successful Axis attack through
our weakly held positions there could carry through to the Mediterï؟¾ranean coast in the Bone area and completely isolate the British
First Army. As a coimterplan the Allies developed the “Sfax
Project/’ a plan for an Allied offensive against Gabes and Sfax which
would be mounted in the Tebessa-Kasserine area. Besides regainï؟¾ing the initiative, this operation, if successful, would interrupt the
line of communication between Rommel and von Arnim and secure
the south flank of the British First Army. The prospects of better
weather in this area were encouraging, but it would be difficult to
find the troops for the operation and more difficult to supply them.
* Commanded by General Koeltz, this corps contained most of the available
French forces from Tunisia and Algeria—about three divisions that consisted
mostly of native troops.
As previously stated, General Juin had command of all the French forces.