rational number

[mosaadabd460]

of the widening responsibility being assumed by other na
tions-a trend entirely consistent
with overall AID policy.
Algeria
The United States has enjoyed
15 years of very close relations
with Tunisia and has contributed
a very significant amount of eco
nomic assistance - well over $600
million since 1956. We have no
alliance with Tunisia , no bases
there, and no real strategic inter
est in that country. U.S. invest
ment is minimal ( approximately
$ 12.9 million in FY 1970 ) . Yet
U.S. policy over the years has
been marked by strong support
for Tunisia's economic and polit
ical independence.
The United States was one of
the first governments to recog
nize Tunisia in 1956. Our assist
ance followed the 1961 decision
that Tunisia should be one of the
countries to receive a long-term
commitment since it possessed
the infrastructure, sufficient
economic potential , and political
will to serve as a model for other
developing countries .
was entirely a Tunisian determi
nation.
As a result of the farsighted
reforms of President Bourguiba ,
Tunisia is , in social terms, still
the most advanced of the Arab
states . Its human resources are its
greatest wealth and we will con
tinue to be interested in its de
velopment and well - being.
Tunisia has always had an in
dependent foreign policy. It con
tinues to do so . As its leadership
passes into other hands, we look
for a continuation of our close
relationship, one based essen
tially on a common interest in
Tunisia's development.
In both Morocco and Tunisia ,
however, the basic U.S. role has
changed in the past ten years.
Economic assistance is flowing to
both countries from more
sources and the overall U.S. share
has declined . Tunisia has been
one of the models of the multi
lateral approach in which a Con
sultative Group, under the aegis
of the World Bank , has, for a
number of years , coordinated the
international effort.
French aid to Tunisia has held
Steady in real terms and aid to
Morocco has increased in both
real and proportionate terms.
U.S. aid has declined absolutely
and proportionately in both
countries.
Between 1960 and 1964 , the
U.S. provided two- thirds of all
non-Communist economic aid to
Morocco and Tunisia. Between
1965 and 1969 , this proportion
declined to 42 percent of the aid
flowing to each . In 1970, the
U.S. share dropped still further
as other donors have increased
their share . Our decreasing share
is a reflection of the progress
these countries are making, and
Despite this commitment and
interest in Tunisia's success , we
did not attempt to determine
the path Tunisia chose for de
velopment. It is difficult to con
ceive of a leader of President
Bourguiba's character permitting
such interference if it had been
tried . Tunisian successes and
errors are their own. There were
misgivings within the U.S. Gov
ernment in 1966-1969 during the
period of accelerated expansion
of agricultural cooperatives and
increased state control over the
Tunisian economy. It was agreed ,
however, that the Tunisian ex
periment was worthy of our con
tinued support. Tunisia's ensuing
decision in 1969 to reverse the
course of its economic policy to
give greater emphasis to private
enterprise and free market forces
Our relations with independ
ent Algeria have been quite dif
ferent from those with Morocco
and Tunisia .
If we go back to 1962, U.S.
expectations about the potential
benefits of bilateral relations
with Algeria were probably
higher than with most other
newly independent countries.
They were probably unrealistic
at that time given our inexperi
ence in dealing with each other.
President Kennedy had felt a
special interest in Algeria dating
from his 1957 speech urging that
country's independence. The
Algerian leader, Ben Bella, had
flown back to North Africa, fol
lowing his release by the French ,
in a U.S. Air Force plane. His
first foreign visit as President
after Algerian independence was
to the United Nations and Wash
ington where he was received by
President Kennedy. The fact that
Ben Bella chose to proceed di
rectly from Washington to Cuba
was perhaps an omen of what
was to come.
The Algerians for their part
always held a strong ideological
bias against the United States.
They identified the United States
with France through NATO.
Conversely, they felt a deep
bond of sympathy with those
states which had endorsed and
supported the long, bitter Alger
ian war of independence against
France: North Viet- Nam, Egypt,
the People's Republic of China,
and Cuba-all countries with
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