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Sfax. Although the bulk of Rommel’s forces had been able to escape the trap, the remnants of nine Italian battalions were rounded up. The Eighth Army continued the pursuit and on 20 April drove into Enfidaville against increasing Axis resistance. Further attacks against the strong enemy position in the hills north of Enfidaville were met by determined counterattacks which convinced Montï؟¾gomery that a regrouping of his army would be necessary before further progress could be made. During this period the V Corps, in accordance with its mission, started local attacks in the vicinity of Medjez el Bab on 7 April to secure advantageous positions from which to launch future operaï؟¾tions. The fighting in this northern area was continuous for almost two weeks, and although a breakthrough was not achieved, some progress was made. This placed the V Corps in a position to strike at Longstop Hill, which together with the circle of hills east of Medjez blocked further progress. All of these dominating heights were strongly held by the enemy and would have to be cleared before any breakthrough down the valley toward Tunis could be made. At this time the V Corps did not have the strength for such an operation. Comments.—General Montgomery says of the Eighth Army opï؟¾erations at this time: The Battle of the Mareth Line was our toughest fight since El Alaï؟¾mein, and whereas the latter was a hard slogging match, at Mareth there had been greater scope for strategems and subtlety ... As at El Alamein, Rommel cast in his reserves piecemeal; and when the battle started, his armour was spread-eagled—with 10 Panzer Division in the Gafsa sector, 15 Panzer Division soon involved on the coast, and 21 Panzer Division arriving in the west to back up the switch line . . . The outstanding feature of the battle was the air action in coï؟¾operation with the outflanking forces ... We retained the initiative throughout. Even when we lost our gains on the coastal flank, Rommel was kept on the move by the speedy development of the western outflanking movement . . . Vital considerations (governing the decision to shift strength to the enveloping force) were, first, the speed with which the decisive blow could be mounted and delivered and, secondly, the necessity to hold the German reserves on the eastern flank long enough to preï؟¾vent their assisting the defenders of the switch lines west of El Hamma. Montgomery clearly proved that an early setback—such as the failure of the XXX Corps to penetrate the Mareth Line—need not necessarily cause a loss of the initiative provided the plan is flexible and reserves are available. |
العلامات المرجعية |
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