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there to advanced supply points in the vicinity of Tebessa. The American Twelfth Air Force was supplied by rail and road from Philippeville. Air and naval forces cooperated in the twofold task of protecting our supply lines and disrupting the enemy’s. Fighter elements of the Eastern Air Command were based at Souk el Arba as air support for the First Army. Similarly the XII Air Support Command was brought up to the Thelepte and Youks les Bains airfields for the support of the II Corps. B-17’s were grouped near Biskra, and the mediums were based on Constantine. Both American and British planes concentrated primarily on Tunisian targets but began to range as far as Sicily and Sardinia. Malta-based Beaufighters and Spitfires aided Allied efforts by striking at Tripolitania and Tunisia and at Axis air trains over the Sicilian channel. During the first week of January 520 operational planes of the Twelfth Air Force and 250 of the Royal Air Force were in Northwest Africa. Contrary to popular impression, it was estimated that 90 per cent of the flow of men and supplies across the Sicilian narrows was seaborne and that only 10 per cent was sent in by air. This Axis water route with its excellent air cover was much less vulnerable than the long coastal route of the Allies between Bone and Algiers.. Moreover, during the first three months of operations the Allied ports, particularly Bone, were subject to constant and sometimes heavy air raids. Operations, 1 January-14 February 1943 (Map 4b).—While the Allies were “cleaning up their administrative tail” (a phrase coined by General Montgomery), the Germans held undisputed possession of the initiative. That they appreciated the precarious position of the Allies is indicated by the following extract from an Allied Force Headquarters report: In a raptured German document, dated December 16th, we found set forth Field Marshal Rommel’s “Appreciation of Situation,” which underlined all our weaknesses of communication and supply, stressed the conglomerate nature of our forces by a shrewd observation that such a force “probably lacks cohesion and suffers from the inherent weakness of an Allied command,” and succinctly summarized our problem in the French sector: “Facing Gabes and Sousse are the elements of three French divisions, all ill-equipped and of doubtful morale.” Operating from the Kairouan area, the enemy on 2 January launched an attack on the French position at Fondouk. The garrison was surrounded and Fondouk captured. Although the Pinchon gap into the Ousseltia valley was threatened, the enemy did not exploit his success. Digitized byGoogle |
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