#16
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12 was some opposition from naval and coast-defense guns, which conï؟¾tinued to fire until silenced by Allied naval and air units, but for the most part the landings were unopposed. As had the other two forces, the Eastern Task Force arrived off its objective on schedule during the night of 7-8 November, and landï؟¾ings proceeded at three beaches. West of Algiers the 168th Regiï؟¾mental Combat Team made the initial landing at Cape Ferruch. Friendly French officers, who were prepared to cooperate with the American forces, surrendered Fort Sidi Ferruch at 0300 hours withï؟¾out firing a shot. Armored cars and tanks were landed, and the advance eastward toward Algiers commenced. Three miles from the city some opposition from Vichy sympathizers was encountered, but by early afternoon the Americans were able to continue their movement toward the city. Meanwhile a landing was made near Castiglione by British Comï؟¾mando troops, who advanced southward and quickly occupied the airfield at Blida. Soon fighters from the British naval air force arrived and began to use the airfield. The Commandos then moved eastward to cut off the city of Algiers from land communication to the southwest. While the landings west of Algiers were being accomplished, the American 39th Regimental Combat Team, reinforced by a battalion of British Commandos, landed on beaches near Ain Taya, fifteen miles east of the city. One column immediately headed for the chief objective, the big Maison Blanche airdrome, while another moved on Algiers. The airdrome was taken at 0830 hours, after some slight resistance was overcome at Fort de l’Eau and after a brush with French tanks near the airfield. A little later a squadron of Hurriï؟¾canes, which had left Gibraltar at dawn, landed safely. In the meantime, as at Oran, a direct attack on the harbor to gain control of harbor equipment and prevent sabotage met with violent opposition. Two British destroyers and two American coastal loadï؟¾ers were severly damaged, and although a few Commandos were put ashore, the attempt to take Algiers by frontal assault failed. By the afternoon of the 8th the converging American columns had completed the encirclement of Algiers and the rail, highway, and air communications were in Allied hands. During the day the task force commander, Major General Charles W. Ryder, went ashore to confer with a representative of Admiral Darlan. They reached an agreeï؟¾ment that all resistance should cease and that our forces should occupy the city at 1900 hours, 8 November. Digitized by Google |
#17
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COMMENTS The surrender of Casablanca ended the initial (landing) phase of the operations. Months of preparation and three days of fighting had placed almost all French North Africa in Allied hands. Amerï؟¾ican casualties totaled about 770 killed or missing and 1050 wounded. The British lost 240 killed or missing and sixty wounded. Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of the operation was the organization of a combined force of American and British ground, air, and naval forces under one combined staff and the moveï؟¾ment of this force thousands of miles to make simultaneous combat landings at widely separated points on a hostile shore. The landings, involving over 100,000 troops, hundreds of airplanes, and 258 ships and war vessels, had truly written a new chapter in amphibious warfare. The political aspects of the landings, particularly the recognition of Darlan, became a subject of much discussion. The comments of General Marshall in an official report are most pertinent: General Eisenhower had announced that General Giraud would be responsible for civil and military affairs in North Africa, but the French military officials on the ground were found to be loyal to Marshal Petain’s government. President Roosevelt’s note to the French Chief of State had assured Marshal Petain of our desire for a liberated France, but the Vichy answer was disappointing. Our ambassador was handed his passport on 9 November, and orders were dis*****ed from Vichy to French African units to resist our forces, which by then had already accomplished their missions exï؟¾cept on the Casablanca front. Unexpectedly, Admiral Jean Darlan, Petain’s designated sucï؟¾cessor and commander in chief of all French forces, was found to be in Algiers. ... He was taken into protective custody, and when it was found that the French leaders stood loyal to the Vichy governï؟¾ment, a series of conferences immediately followed with the purpose of calling a halt to the French resistance against General Patton’s task force in the vicinity of Casablanca. When, on the morning of 11 November, the Germans invaded unoccupied France, Admiral Darlan rejected the pseudo-independent Vichy government, assumed authority in North Africa in the name of Marshal Petain, and proï؟¾mulgated an order to all French commanders in North Africa to cease hostilities. This order reached Casablanca a few minutes beï؟¾fore the final American assault was to be launched on the early morning of 11 November. These events, which transpired subsequent to the actual landings on 8 November, required quick decisions, and the results finally achieved fully vindicated the American military leaders. Throughï؟¾out the North African campaign the problem of welding the French into a united and cooperative ally was a heavy burden which fell to |
#18
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General Eisenhower in addition to his purely military duties. The gist of the commitment signed by Admiral Darlan was that the French were to give the Allies immediately as much active assistance in the seizure of Tunisia as lay within their powers. They were to organize the government of North Africa, under Darlan, for effecï؟¾tive cooperation and, under General Giraud’s leadership, were to begin the reorganization of selected military forces for active parï؟¾ticipation in the fighting. The way was now paved toward attaining the principal objective, the occupation of Tunisia and the annihilaï؟¾tion of German forces in Africa. The principal factors that contributed to the success of the landï؟¾ings in French North Africa were: (1) strategic surprise, (2) lack of organized French resistance, and (3) effective joint militaryï؟¾naval planning and execution. Errors were made in the execution of the plans, but these were to be expected from green troops. The experience was to serve them in good stead in the future. By the end of November there had been a definite turning point in the Allied military situation as a whole. General Montgomery had commenced the pursuit of the remnants of Rommel’s army across Egypt and Libya, the Americans and British had landed successfully in French North Africa and had started the invasion of Tunisia, and the Russians had begun their winter offensive at Stalingrad. All of these offensive steps gathered momentum with each passing month. The initiative had passed to the Allies, and for the first time during the war the German military situation had deteriorated to an enforced strategic defensive. The tide*had likeï؟¾wise turned in the Pacific. Americans had invaded the Solomons at Guadalcanal and had secured the lifeline to Australia. The Japï؟¾anese were being forced from southeastern New Guinea, and the Allies had started on the long road back to the Philippines. TUNISIAN CAMPAIGN The conclusion of the landing phase paved the way for the next operation, the Tunisian campaign (Map 3). This campaign, which was to last six months, will be divided into three phases. The first will cover the race between the Allies and the Axis to build up a force in the Bizerte-Tunis area strong enough to deny the loser this key terrain. The Germans were to win this race by a narrow marï؟¾gin. The second phase will comprise the period of Axis initiative, during which time the Germans were to develop and expand a strong perimeter defense around their holdings in Tunisia. The third phase |
#19
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will include the decisive period of the campaign: the Allied victory at Mareth, the capture of Bizerte and Tunis, and the subsequent surrender of all Axis forces in North Africa. THEATER OF OPERATIONS Over its whole length and breadth Tunisia varies greatly both in terrain and climate. Five hundred miles long from north to south and 150 miles wide from east to west, its surface consists of a conï؟¾fused mountainous zone in the north, an area of lower plateaus in the center, and broad plains in the south gradually merging into the sands of the Sahara Desert. The mountains in the north are the eastern extremity of that chain of the Atlas Mountains that begins in southern Morocco and runs entirely across French North Africa in a northeasterly direction. They are rocky and steep and near Souk Ahras reach an altitude of over 4200 feet. The extreme eastern spurs of these mountains, known as the Grand Dorsal, extend to the south of Tunis in the shape of an inï؟¾verted “V”. From the apex of the “V”, near Pont du Fahs, the eastern arm, called the Eastern Dorsal, runs south 125 miles to Makï؟¾nassy, thence southwest to the vicinity of El Guettar. Crossed by few passes—Fondouk, Faid, Maknassy, and El Guettar—this Eastï؟¾ern Dorsal would, with Chott Djerid (a large salt lake), provide a natural defense of the Allied right flank against any attacker from the east or south. This terrain was to be the scene of much bitter fighting during the Tunisian campaign. The western arm of the “V”, the Western Dorsal, extends southï؟¾west from Pont du Fahs and forms a secondary barrier against attack from the east or south. The important passes through this range are Maktar, Sbiba, Kasserine, Dernia, and El Abiod. Tebessa, on the western slope of the dorsal, is an important communications center and a key to the southern front. In the north the Medjerda River, the most important stream, winds northeast from the mountains to the Gulf of Tunis. Medjez el Bab is the key to this corridor to Tunis. It was to become an important defensive position covering Allied lines of communication to the west. There are few good roads in Tunisia. The main roads are usually hard-surfaced (tarred) but narrow. Secondary roads are sometimes well metalled, but more often are little more than dirt tracks. After a few hours of rain many so-called roads become practically impassï؟¾able for motor transport, while in prolonged dry weather they deï؟¾teriorate rapidly. Where they pass through the hills, the roads often Digitized by Google |
#20
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become defiles for long distances. During military operations they can be blocked with mine fields and covered by fire from the high ground commanding them oh either side. Thus the defiles and passes were to become important objectives during the Tunisian campaign. There are three routes of entry into Tunisia from Algeria. First is the coast road through Bone. Another route, through Souk Ahras, some forty miles inland, leads to the Tunis-Bizerte area either by way of Souk el Arba or by the more southerly road through Le Kef. Access to central and southern Tunisia is through Tebessa, from which point roads lead northeastward to Medjez el Bab and Tunis, eastward through Kasserine to the passes at Fondouk and Faid, and southeastward through Gafsa to Sfax and Gabes. The railroads are of especial importance in this region of few good highways. However, the deterioration of the roadbeds and the French rolling stock was to make even this form of transportaï؟¾tion extremely unreliable. Operating in the level coastal plains of Tunis and southern Tunisia, the enemy was to have the definite advantage of shorter and better communications. The period of heaviest rains begins in late November and continues through February. During this season the lowlands, particularly, become a glutinous sea of mud. THE RACE FOR TUNISIA, November-December 1942 Having secured the initial objectives of Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers, the Allies turned immediately to the next phase, the concenï؟¾tration of the bulk of American and French Moroccan and Algerian forces in the Casablanca-Oran area and the advance of the British First Army to Tunisia. According to General Eisenhower: Our chief hope of anticipating the Axis in Tunisia lay in our actï؟¾ing with utmost speed. Indeed, we were involved in a race not only against the building up of enemy forces at Tunis and Bizerte, but against the weather as well. There was less than a month of fair weather ahead, and Axis air and ground forces were within easy striking distance of Tunis and Bizerte, less than 100 miles away from these places across the Sicilian narrows. All the same, our easternmost force was at Algiers, 560 miles west of Tunis. Necesï؟¾sarily, therefore, we had to rely on a rapid advance of very light forces, understrength in both personnel and equipment. To make matters worse, the enemy lost no time in meeting the Allied invasion. On 9 November German air transports began flyï؟¾ing troops into the Bizerte-Tunis area. Here again the French reaction exasperated the Allies. Admiral Esteva, the French Resiï؟¾dent, listened to Vichy and, despite Darlan’s armistice directive, preï؟¾Digitized byGoogle |
#21
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pared the way for the German entry. French troops under General Barre, who was pro-Ally, were ordered out of Tunis, and the city was left defenseless. Later General Barre’s forces joined the Allies, but in the meantime the Germans found airfield and dock facilities ready for their use. On 9 November General Anderson arrived at Algiers to take over command of the British First Army. His plan was to seize all ports and airfields to the east (Bougie, Djidjelli, Philippeville, Bone, and La Calle) as rapidly as possible and then to rush his forces forward by motor transport, landing craft, and troop-carrying aircraft. The port of Bougie and the airfield at Djidjelli were the first objectives. The floating reserve of the Eastern Task Force, part of the British 78th Division, was still aboard ships at Algiers. It sailed on the evening of 10 November to take the first objectives of the eastward drive. The capture of Bougie on 11 November was unopposed, but because of bad surf conditions the force was unable to take the Djidï؟¾jelli airfield until the 13th. During this interim lack of adequate land-based air cover permitted the Germans to bomb Bougie harbor, where they damaged a British aircraft carrier. Bone was occupied on 12 November by two companies of a British parachute battalion dropped from C-47’s of the American 65th Carï؟¾rier Command and a British Commando battalion brought in by water. The only Axis opposition to this move was a heavy raid on the airfield that night. The build-up of troops in the Bone area conï؟¾tinued as rapidly as possible, air, sea, rail, and vehicular transporï؟¾tation being utilized. The advance to the east was pressed, and by 15 November leading elements of the 36th Brigade of the 78th Diviï؟¾sion had occupied Tabarka, only eighty miles from Tunis. A British paratroop battalion which had been dropped at Souk el Arba on the 16th had moved beyond Beja by the 17th, and the troops at Tabarka had advanced to Djebel Abiod. At the same time the Allies were securing airfields to the south. On 15 November Colonel Edson D. Raff’s 503d Parachute Battalion, an American unit, dropped at Youks les Bains and two days later occupied the Gafsa airfield, far to the south. It sent patrols over the entire southern area, meeting only small Italian forces. Raff Force, as it came to be known, established cordial relations with the French garrison at Tebessa, which promptly began cooperating with the Americans in patrolling the area. Evidence of French cooperation appeared on 16 November, when reports were received of French and German patrols clashing in the Beja-Debjel Abiod-Mateur area. Although General Barre had been negotiating with the Germans since their arrival, the advance of the |
#22
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Allies into Tunisia had won the support of the French forces, and Barre now agreed that his troops would cover the concentration of the 78th Division in the Tabarka-Souk el Arba area. On 17 Novemï؟¾ber General Anderson issued orders to the 78th to complete its conï؟¾centration and prepare for an advance on Tunis. About this time the Axis fighting strength was estimated at 500 to 1000 in the Tunis area and about 4000 at Bizerte, with some tanks and aircraft at each place. At the same time JU-52, s were averaging more than fifty landings a day at Bizerte. The enemy had occupied Mateur and had pushed out west and south. The Allied expeditionary force that had rushed into Tunisia was formed principally of two brigades of the British 78th Infantry Diï؟¾vision and one battalion of the 17th Lancers, reinforced by light tanks from the American 1st Armored Division. It was realized that such a small force, only a few thousand men in all, could not hope to take Tunis and Bizerte if the Germans succeeded in bringing in heavy reinforcements. Yet at the time it was the largest force that could be supplied over the long and difficult line of communicaï؟¾tion. Follow-up convoys arrived at Bone as rapidly as possible, and as soon as transportation was unloaded, the newly arrived elements of the British First Army continued overland to the east (Map 4a). By 20 November British armor, known as Blade Force, was established in the Souk el Arba area, and by 22 November the 11th Brigade Group * of the 78th Division was concentrated in the Beja area. Operations in the north were now to take place along three clearly defined axes: (1) the road from Tabarka to Mateur, (2) the Bejaï؟¾Mateur road, and (3) the main highway running from Beja through Medjez el Bab and Tebourba to Tunis. While the Allies were desperately trying to build up their advance units and bring up supplies, the enemy seized the initiative by atï؟¾tacking the French at Medjez el Bab on 18 and 19 November. The ill-equipped French were assailed three times by infantry supported by artillery, tanks, and dive bombers, which inflicted casualties of 25 per cent on the defenders. The French retired until reinforced by British and American armor and artillery, when they counterï؟¾attacked. At the same time another Axis attack at Djebel Abiod was stopped by the leading battalion of the 36th Brigade. Although the British had been able to hold the enemy in check, they were themselves unable to advance, and were ordered to delay temporarily until their strength was sufficient to insure a reasonable * A British brigade group is similar to our regimental combat team. |
#23
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chance of success in the drive to Tunis. Also, the intermixture of French and British units that had occurred as a result of improvisaï؟¾tion following the French decision to act with the Allies had to be straightened out. By 23 November a verbal agreement had been reached whereby all troops north of the line Le Kef-Zaghouan should be under command of the British First Army, while all units south of that line should be subject to French command. This was unsatisfactory, but it was the best that could be achieved at the moment, since the French had refused to serve under a British commander. On 24 November General Anderson had completed the forward concentration of the 78th Division and Blade Force, with the British 6th Armored Division en route to Teboursouk and Combat Comï؟¾mand B of the American 1st Armored Division en route to Souk el Arba as follow-up troops. The advance was resumed, Blade Force penetrating the enemy outpost position to a point midway between Tebourba and Mateur and the 11th Brigade, on the right, advancing down the Medjerda valley, where it captured Medjez el Bab on the 25th. Progress was steady for the next three days, with the 11th Brigade, reinforced by American and British armor, moving astride the river to take Tebourba the night of 26-27 November. On 28 Noï؟¾vember our forces reached Djedeida, less than sixteen miles from Tunis. This proved to be the farthest advance toward Tunis until the final drive of the campaign, six months later. To the north the 36th Brigade, although advancing about ten miles toward Mateur, met increasing resistance from enemy mings and booby traps. At the same time Blade Force, in the plains south of Mateur, began to meet supply difficulties, which were aggravated by the first rains. In all sections the enemy’s dive bombers were an important factor in stopping our advance, since our airfields were too far to the rear to provide the necessary cover. The forward positions were held until 1 December, when von Arï؟¾nim, the German commander, launched an attack with dive bombers, tanks, and infantry against Blade Force near Tebourba. After losï؟¾ing forty tanks, Blade Force was withdrawn, and the sector was taken over by Combat Command B and the 11th Brigade. On 3 December the enemy attacked again, the 11th Brigade suffering heavily both in men and equipment. By this time several battalions of the 78th Division had less than 350 men. On 8 December General Eisenhower approved General Anderson’s proposal to withdraw his forces to more defensible ground. Howï؟¾ever, the important center of Medjez el Bab was to be held at all costs. The weather proved a serious handicap to this withdrawal. |
#24
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Combat Command B became badly mired and was finally forced to abandon the larger part of its equipment, retrieving only three of its eighteen 105-mm. howitzers, twelve of its sixty-two medium tanks, and thirty-eight of its 122 light tanks. This was a serious loss, since the continual fighting and serious attrition, together with the inadequate rail and highway communications, had hindered the build-up of reserves. The weather was turning our few available airfields into quagmires while the Axis planes, operating from paved fields, maintained air supremacy over the forward areas, compoundï؟¾ing the confusion and handicaps confronting the Allies. It was estimated that on 30 November the Germans had 15,500 combat troops, 130 tanks, sixty field guns, and thirty antitank guns in the Tunis-Bizerte area. By 18 December this force had grown to a total of 42,000 men, of whom about 25,000 were Germans, and reinforceï؟¾ments were still arriving. During November and early December southern Tunisia was alï؟¾most a no man's land, but several hundred Germans arrived in Gabes, Sfax, and Sousse by troop-carrier planes and garrisoned those towns. Enemy patrols of armored cars and light tanks pressed westward and occupied Pont du Fahs. Farther .south the American paratroops, who had dropped at Youks les Bains and had joined with French forces in that area, patrolled actively. The mission of the few hundred American and French troops in central and southern Tunisia was to make the enemy beï؟¾lieve that they were a whole division. They rushed up and down their hundred-mile front, appearing here and there to threaten the Germans along the coast. They fought numerous skirmishes with enemy patrols and effectively protected the southern flank of the First Army. Unwilling to give up the race for Tunisia, General Eisenhower decided to launch another attack in the north about 20 December with Tunis as the objective. But the weather continued to be a most formidable enemy. Vehicular movement off paved roads was imï؟¾possible, and two thirds of the Allied aircraft at the principal field, at Souk el Arba, were inoperative because of mud. The supply lines were inadequate to meet the needs for steel matting and equipment to place the airfields in condition or, for that matter, to provide the required build-up of general supplies, particularly ammunition. Since the Allied hope in this last planned offensive lay in air power and artillery, the operation was postponed and then, on 24 Decemï؟¾ber, finally abandoned. |
#25
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General Eisenhower has expressed his feelings on the situation in these words: The abandonment of our immediate offensive plans was the bitï؟¾terest disappointment that I had yet suffered, but I was convinced that to attempt a major attack under prevailing conditions in northern Tunisia would be merely to court disaster. We could not hope to resume major operations in the north until the middle of March, and we had to set about the slow business of building up for an attack at the end of that period. The logistic marathon, which I had desperately tried to avoid, had begun. During these last two months of 1942 other events which had some bearing on the military situation were transpiring. When the Gerï؟¾mans moved into unoccupied France and toward the naval base at Toulon on 11 November, Admiral Darlan ordered the French fleet to sail for Africa. But in the confusion of the situation the fleet was scuttled instead, only a few submarines getting through to North Africa. Darlan was more successful in his next attempt to aid the Allies. He was able to persuade M. Boisson, the governor of French West Africa, to join the Liberation Movement and to open Dakar for use as an Allied base. When Admiral Darlan was assassinated on 24 December, General Giraud took his place. General Juin beï؟¾came the commander of the French military forces. , At this time the bulk of the American forces (the Fifth Army*), along with two divisions of French troops from Morocco and the French division in Oran, were being held in the Casablanca-Oran area to guard communications, to counter any drive the Germans might make through Spanish Morocco, and to conduct training in preparation for future missions. Comments.—The Allied move to seize Tunisia was a necessary step in the continuation of the strategic offensive in North Africa. Axis efforts to thwart the attempt were an equally essential step in carrying out the strategic defensive to which they had been reduced by their defeat in the Battle of El Alamein. Two main reasons impelled the Axis command to an all-out defense of Tunisia. The first was that only by holding that area could they hope to extricate the troops and equipment of Rommel’s army from their serious predicament. The second was that it was imperative to delay the Allied attack against Europe for as long a period as possible in order to gain time to prepare the necessary defenses. * The Fifth Army, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark commanding, was actiï؟¾vated on 6 January 1943. Its headquarters was at Oujda, Morocco. The troops assigned included the 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored Division. |
#26
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Allied strategy in North Africa ceased to be a mystery to the Germans the moment they were advised that the landings had taken place, and from that time on the element of strategic surprise ceased to weigh against them. Surprise had contributed greatly to the success of the initial operations, but was lacking entirely during the early period of the Allied thrust into Tunisia. In this connection it is interesting to note the reply of a highranking German officer, Field Marshal Kesselring, to an American interrogation in May 1946. Kesselring was asked what intelligence the Germans had of our landings in North Africa. He replied: We were, in fact, in possession of very exact information concerning activity in the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and were already fully prepared for a possible landing. I myself was the only person who believed in the possibility of a landing in Algiers. The German and Italian high command, however, did not share this view. Your radio broadcast service functioned faultlessly in this respect. It kept us constantly in a state of excitement and carried on an admirable form of nerve war, so that we were forced to expect some sort of invasion at any time and yet did not know from which direction it was to be expected. Once the facts were appraised by the Germans, they acted with speed and efficiency. In so doing they won the race for Tunisia, succeeded in postponing the invasion of Italy for six months, and gained time in which to strengthen their Continental defenses. But we shall see later what price they paid for this. The Allied command recognized the strategic importance of Tunisia. From the very beginning it was known that once Tunis and Bizerte were captured, all Tunisia would fall. We have seen why initial landing points farther to the east than Algiers were not selected. There remain then only two questions to be answered: (1) Why was only a small force sent to Tunisia? (2) Why was it unable to win the race to Tunis? Both questions have the same answer: the lack of supply facilities for larger forces either on the ground or in the air. Handicapped by lack of transport and slowed by long supply routes, the Allied commander could send only a small combat force into Tunisia. When this force was stopped and then driven back by the enemy, it became necessary to enter the “logistical marathon” referred to by. General Eisenhower. PERIOD OF AXIS INITIATIVE-, January-March 1943 Allied Plans and Build-up (Map 4b).—In early January the Tunisian front extended from the Chott Djerid in the south to the Mediterranean in the north, a distance of some 250 miles. Through the Digitized byGoogle |
#27
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Sahara, south of the area shown on the map, roamed small patrols of the French Camel Corps. The American paratroops held the desert and wasteland area around Gafsa and up to Faid Pass. Eleï؟¾ments of the American 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions were beginning to arrive in this area. Around Pichon and Fondouk and farther north the French XIX Corps held positions in the hills and controlled the Ousseltia valley.* These forces were lightly armed with obsolete weapons and had neither the transport nor the administrative machinery for offensive operations. But under the able leadership of Generals Juin and Koeltz they maintained high morale, and by the end of the campaign cooperation with the other Allies was excellent. The remainder of the front, north to the sea at Cape Serrat, was held by the British First Army, as yet an army in name only. At this time it consisted of only the V Corps, which was composed of the 6th Armored and the 78th Infantry Divisions and the 139th Brigade. Thus during early January a front of 250 miles was held by the *****alent of three British, part of one American, and three weak French divisions. To oppose the Allies at this time, General von Arnim appears to have had three German and three Italian divisions. In approxiï؟¾mately two months he had expanded the beachheads of Sousse, Sfax, and Gabes into a more or less continuous coastal corridor in order to insure communication and close cooperation between his own forces and those of Rommel, then approaching the Mareth position. With the abandonment for the time being of offensive plans in the north, the situation on the long stretch of front from Pont du Fahs to Gafsa deserved close attention. A successful Axis attack through our weakly held positions there could carry through to the Mediterï؟¾ranean coast in the Bone area and completely isolate the British First Army. As a coimterplan the Allies developed the “Sfax Project/’ a plan for an Allied offensive against Gabes and Sfax which would be mounted in the Tebessa-Kasserine area. Besides regainï؟¾ing the initiative, this operation, if successful, would interrupt the line of communication between Rommel and von Arnim and secure the south flank of the British First Army. The prospects of better weather in this area were encouraging, but it would be difficult to find the troops for the operation and more difficult to supply them. * Commanded by General Koeltz, this corps contained most of the available French forces from Tunisia and Algeria—about three divisions that consisted mostly of native troops. As previously stated, General Juin had command of all the French forces. |
#28
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On 1 January 1943 the American II Corps, Major General Fredenï؟¾dall commanding, was detached from the Center Task Force at Oran and sent to Tunisia. The II Corps, which had as a nucleus the American 1st Armored Division, completed its concentration in the Kasserine-Tebessa area on 15 January and proceeded with plans for the attack to be launched on the 23d. However, information was received on 15 January that it would be impossible to coordinate this attack with the advance of General Montgomery’s army, since Montgomery would not reach Tripoli until the last week in January. This caused General Eisenhower to abandon the Sfax offensive altoï؟¾gether, it now being considered too risky. After this change of plan the 1st Infantry Division, less the 18th and 26th Regimental Combat Teams, was attached to the French XIX Corps, farther north. The approach of the British Eighth Army made it necessary to plan an extensive reorganization to achieve unity of command in the Allied land, sea, and air forces. At the Casablanca conference in mid-January President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that such a reorganization should take place when the campaign had reached the proper stage and when the necessary preparations had been completed. General Eisenhower was placed in command of the new North African Theï؟¾ater of Operations and relieved of responsibility for the European Theater. General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, British commanï؟¾der in chief in the Middle East, was to become Eisenhower’s deputy and was to command the Eighteenth Army Group, consisting of the British First and Eighth Armies, the American II Corps, and the French troops on the Tunisian front. Air units were to be organized into the Mediterranean Air Command, under Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was to become naval commander in chief in the Mediterranean. As we shall see, it was to be another month before these arrangements could be put into effect. By late January von Arnim’s army of 65,000 was receiving about 750 men per day and large quantities of supplies. Therefore, to build up the Allied forces and to interdict the enemy’s build-up beï؟¾came the guiding and virtually the sole aim of Allied strategy in Tunisia. Steps were taken to improve the Allied supply setup and to develop air strength over Tunisia. All port and transportation facilities were geared to maximum capacity (Map 3). The First Army was based at Bone and used the supply roads through La Calle and Souk Ahras. The supplies for the American II Corps were moved from Oran and Algiers by rail to the new Eastern Base Section depots at Constantine and from |
#29
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there to advanced supply points in the vicinity of Tebessa. The American Twelfth Air Force was supplied by rail and road from Philippeville. Air and naval forces cooperated in the twofold task of protecting our supply lines and disrupting the enemy’s. Fighter elements of the Eastern Air Command were based at Souk el Arba as air support for the First Army. Similarly the XII Air Support Command was brought up to the Thelepte and Youks les Bains airfields for the support of the II Corps. B-17’s were grouped near Biskra, and the mediums were based on Constantine. Both American and British planes concentrated primarily on Tunisian targets but began to range as far as Sicily and Sardinia. Malta-based Beaufighters and Spitfires aided Allied efforts by striking at Tripolitania and Tunisia and at Axis air trains over the Sicilian channel. During the first week of January 520 operational planes of the Twelfth Air Force and 250 of the Royal Air Force were in Northwest Africa. Contrary to popular impression, it was estimated that 90 per cent of the flow of men and supplies across the Sicilian narrows was seaborne and that only 10 per cent was sent in by air. This Axis water route with its excellent air cover was much less vulnerable than the long coastal route of the Allies between Bone and Algiers.. Moreover, during the first three months of operations the Allied ports, particularly Bone, were subject to constant and sometimes heavy air raids. Operations, 1 January-14 February 1943 (Map 4b).—While the Allies were “cleaning up their administrative tail” (a phrase coined by General Montgomery), the Germans held undisputed possession of the initiative. That they appreciated the precarious position of the Allies is indicated by the following extract from an Allied Force Headquarters report: In a raptured German document, dated December 16th, we found set forth Field Marshal Rommel’s “Appreciation of Situation,” which underlined all our weaknesses of communication and supply, stressed the conglomerate nature of our forces by a shrewd observation that such a force “probably lacks cohesion and suffers from the inherent weakness of an Allied command,” and succinctly summarized our problem in the French sector: “Facing Gabes and Sousse are the elements of three French divisions, all ill-equipped and of doubtful morale.” Operating from the Kairouan area, the enemy on 2 January launched an attack on the French position at Fondouk. The garrison was surrounded and Fondouk captured. Although the Pinchon gap into the Ousseltia valley was threatened, the enemy did not exploit his success. Digitized byGoogle |
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The next German thrust came on 18 January at the junction point of the British and French sectors in the Bou Arada-Pont du Fahs area. The initial attacks, in which the new Mark VI (“Tiger”) tank made its debut, were stopped by the British, but not before Bou Arada was threatened. The same day the enemy attacked from Pont du Fahs southwest toward Robaa in a drive that if successful would isolate the French in the mountains to the east. During the next thirty-six hours Allied forces moved to meet the Axis advance. The British 6th Armored Division regrouped in the Bou Arada area and sent a squadron of tanks and some artillery to help the French troops while Combat Command B of the American 1st Armored Division moved up to Maktar. The American II Corps, to the south, was assembling elements of the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions in the vicinity of Sbeitla for use as a reserve. On 19 January the British counterattacked, advancing nine miles east of Bou Arada and clearing the road north of that town. Neverï؟¾theless, the enemy drive to the southwest continued, and Robaa was occupied. This forced the French forces to withdraw to the west, the British V Corps conforming by pulling back its right flank. Axis troops attacked again on 20 January, reaching Ousseltia that night and isolating French units that'had been holding out in the Eastern Dorsal. During the next few days the Allied forces began to restore the situation. Elements of the British 6th Armored Division advanced on the Robaa-Pont du Fahs road, and Combat Command B moved into positions at the south end of the Ousseltia valley, where it was able to extricate the isolated French units. At this time additional American forces from the 1st Infantry Division arrived to strengthen the Allied lines. By 25 January the enemy's attack had spent its force, and the positions became stabilized. On that date General Eisenhower, with the concurrence of the French, appointed General Anderson of the British First Army commander of all Allied ground forces in Tuï؟¾nisia. General Anderson assigned the American II Corps the reï؟¾sponsibility for the sector south of Fondouk—where it had been operating. The enemy did not remain quiet for long. On 30 January he shifted his main effort and attacked the French troops that were holding Faid Pass, a position that screened the American 1st Arï؟¾mored Division. Supported by sixty tanks, the Axis force captured the town of Faid and made further penetrations to the south and west, although the French retained the road junction at Sidi Bou |
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