rational number

[خالد سعد محمد سعد]

rational number
أسألكم الدعاء

[zizoamr2009]

مفيش حاجه يا مستر

[The Enterprise]

الموضوع عبارة عن صفحة نت؟؟ انا افتكرته ملف على العموم شكرا لحضرتك بس ياريت كنت نوهة للموضوع ده

[smsmstar75]

شكراااااااااااااااااااااااااااااااااااااااااااااا

[kiko1718]

طيب يعني ايه المقصود من الموضوع
خاصة وان الملف الملفات اللي فيه ملهاش علاقة بالعنوان

[bedy]

thankssssssssssssss

[هشام عبدالرؤف]

مشكوووووووووووور

[ziad_m]

شكرا جزيلا على المجهود

[islam eid hassan]

بارك الله فيك

[mosaadabd460]

RESTRICTED
THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
PART 2 - THE ALLIED INVASION
INTRODUCTION
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declara tion of war against the United States by Germany and Italy brought
this country into the world conflict.
Immediate action was necessary to coordinate with our allies, and
especially with Great Britain, the strategy that would.govern the
future conduct of the war and the control that should be exercised
over it. In a report to the Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, stated :
On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington to confer with the President and the American
Chiefs of Staff . Out of the series of discussions which then followed
resulted an agreement not only regarding the immediate strategy
for our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization of a method for the strategical command and control of British and American military resources. Probably no other Allied action, in the field or otherwise, has exerted as powerful an effect on the con
duct of this war as the prompt establishment of a prescribed pro cedure for achieving unity of effort through the medium of the Com
bined Chiefs of Staff acting under the direction of the leaders of their respective governments.
At this first conference the President and the Prime Minister,
with the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, made the decision
that Allied resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany,
the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan.
In discussions following the conference a tentative target date
for an operation across the English Channel was set for the summer of 1943. Some consideration was given to the possibility of an emergency diversionary assault at a much earlier date if this became
necessary to save the situation on the Russian front. As further
studies were made, shortage of landing craft for launching a cross
Channel operation, and shortage of supplies for maintaining one,
militated against putting the plan into effect. At the same time,
the reverses suffered by the British in North Africa and the con
1

[mosaadabd460]

4
try against Gibraltar. Undoubtedly the Axis would occupy the
whole of France to forestall an Allied landing on the French Medi
terranean coast and to attempt to gain control of the French fleet at Toulon. The Germans would probably try to seize Tunis and
Bizerte in order to retain control of the Sicilian channel, an opera tion that would be relatively easy for them because of the short supply lines from their bases in Sicily and southern Italy. Last,
but not least, because of other commitments throughout the world
Allied planners were faced with a critical shortage of trained troops
and vital supplies and equipment, particularly landing craft and shipping, which would definitely limit the size of the operation.
Quoting from an official report :
Thus the strategic conception of sweeping the Axis from North Africa, and establishing Allied control from the Atlantic to the Red
Sea, necessitated an operation on a scale of such magnitude that,
once initiated, it would have to be followed through with all the force and shipping that the situation demanded. It would be the major Allied operation of 1942 and 1943.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
No clear picture of the military operations in French North Africa can be obtained without some understanding of the political events that accompanied, and sometimes even overshadowed, the military aspects of the campaign. In general, Frenchmen were divided into three groups :
1. General Charles de Gaulle, in London, was the rallying point
for the French National Committee. His group was also known as
the " Free French " and later as the " Fighting French . ” It comprised
French refugees who had escaped to England, America, or the
French colonies rather than accept German oppression at home and
those patriots who remained in France and took part in the activities
of the resistance groups. One of de Gaulle's followers, General
Leclerc, had organized a small force in French Equatorial Africa
that conducted raids against Italian outposts in the Fezzan (South
ern Libya ) and later crowned its activities with a campaign which
in thirty - nine days carried it 1600 miles from Fort Lamy, near Lake
Chad, to join with General Montgomery's Eighth Army at Tripoli
on 25 January 1943.
2. A second group, Frenchmen living in North Africa, where open resistance would have brought sudden German occupation, succeeded in establishing an underground " French Liberation Movement.”
Although the aim of this group, like the Free French, was to liberate

[mosaadabd460]

8
In addition to the naval escort forces, the Royal Navy would have
Force H, consisting of two battleships, four cruisers, two aircraft
carriers, and fifteen destroyers, to keep watch over the Italian and
Vichy French fleets in the Mediterranean.
As for air support, the initial assaults were to be supported by
carrier-based aircraft of the escort forces. The American Twelfth
Air Force was to form the Western Command, with headquarters
at Oran. One hundred and sixty fighters were to be flown from
Gibraltar to each of the Casablanca and Oran areas within three
days of the attack. Similarly the Royal Air Force squadrons were to
form the Eastern Command, with headquarters at Algiers. Ninety
of their planes were to arrive from Gibraltar by D plus 8.
An addition to the plan, developed early in October, provided for
the 2d Battalion of the American 503d Parachute Infantry to seize
the airfields of Tafaraoui and La Senia, south of Oran. This operaï؟¾tion would entail a flight from England of some twelve hours for
thirty-nine unarmed aircraft of the American 60th Troop-Carrier
Group.
In the endeavor to secure surprise, information as to the sites of
the proposed landings was, of course, carefully guarded. It was
realized that the Germans would probably learn that preparations
were being made for some kind of an operation; but even if they
should conclude that an amphibious assault was to be made someï؟¾where, it was hoped that in their thinking they would lean towards
Norway, western France, or Dakar. After the Central and Eastern
Task Forces had passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, the apparent
capabilities of the Allies would be more limited; but it was planned
that the convoy should, by the route followed, create the impression
it was headed for Malta or the Suez. During the hours of darkness
just preceding the landings, it would turn sharply to the south and
make for Algiers and Oran.
Allied Force Headquarters would remain at Gibraltar until adeï؟¾quate communications were established near Algiers. Because of
the amphibious nature of the operation, weather conditions would
have a most important bearing on its success. D-day was to be
8 November 1942.
THE LANDINGS, 8-11 November 1942 (Map 2)
By the afternoon of 7 November Operation Torch was ready to
be launched. The Western Task Force had successfully crossed
3,000 miles of submarine-infested ocean to arrive off its landing
area, and the Center and Eastern Task Forces were steaming past

[mosaadabd460]

9
Oran and Algiers toward “bomb alley,” where the Luftwaffe was
expectantly waiting to make the kill. In each of the three landing
areas the tactics were to be generally the same, landings on both
sides of each main objective as a means of subsequent encirclement.
At Oran and Algiers these were to be supplemented by frontal asï؟¾saults on the ports in order to seize shipping and harbor facilities
before they could be sabotaged.
Western Task Force.—French forces in Morocco, principally Seneï؟¾galese, Moroccan, and Algerian colonial troops, were located along
the Atlantic coast in the Casablanca area from Safi to Port Lyautey.
American forces were divided into three groups, as indicated on the
map. H-hour was to be at 0515, 8 November.
Landings were made at Fedala, fourteen miles to the northeast of
Casablanca, where the purpose was to initiate operations for the
capture of the latter-named city from the east; in the harbor of Safi,
125 miles to the southwest of Casablanca, where the immediate aim
was to land armor and to prevent reinforcements at Marrakech from
reaching Casablanca; and, finally, at Mehdia, seventy miles to the
northeast of Casablanca, where the object was to seize the Port
Lyautey airfields and protect the north flank of the entire operation.
All three landings achieved considerable surprise, and by 1015
hours Safi had been captured, following a successful rushing of the
harbor by two destroyers. At Fedala and Port Lyautey, however,
strong opposition was met, both from aircraft and from shore batï؟¾teries. The latter were silenced by naval gunfire, and by 1500 hours
Fedala had fallen. At Port Lyautey fierce fighting continued
throughout the day, but at nightfall the airfield was still in French
hands.
Meanwhile our naval forces off Casablanca had their share of
activity on 8 November. Early in the forenoon two French deï؟¾stroyer-leaders and five destroyers sortied and made as if to attack
our transports. They were taken under fire and forced to retire.
Shortly afterward the French light cruiser Primaguet joined the
destroyers outside the harbor. As it moved out again, the group
was promptly engaged by the Augusta and Brooklyn and vessels of
the covering force. With the exception of one vessel, which managed
to get back to the harbor, all French ships were either sunk or
beached. While it was assisting in this operation, the covering
force, consisting of the Massachusetts, Wichita, Tuscaloosa, and four
destroyers, was also exchanging fire with the shore batteries and
the French battleship Jean Bart, which was moored in the harbor.
In order to end this distressing bloodshed, several attempts were

[mosaadabd460]

10
made by American officers to contact the French authorities in Casaï؟¾blanca for the arrangement of an armistice, but Admiral Michelier
refused to receive them.
Fighting continued throughout the next two days. The American
forces steadily enlarged their beachheads and unloaded equipment
despite a heavy surf which took toll of the landing craft. On 10
November the airfield at Port Lyautey was captured, the first Amerï؟¾ican planes landing on the field at 1100 hours. This completed the
primary mission of the Mehdia force.
In the south, after the capture of Safi on 8 November, elements
of the 2d Armored Division moved eastward to intercept French
reinforcements that were advancing from Marrakech to Casablanca.
These French forces were dispersed on the 10th, and that night the
armor began the march to Casablanca. The 47th Regimental Comï؟¾bat Team remained at Safi to protect the port. When the armored
force received word of the surrender on 11 November, General Harï؟¾mon had obtained the surrender of Mazagan and was continuing
the advance to Casablanca, fifty miles to the north.
The 3d Division troops advancing on Casablanca from Fedala
were held up by stiff resistance, but by the afternoon of the 10th
they had reached an assembly area northeast of Casablanca. That
night they made an encircling movement to the southeast in preparaï؟¾tion for a concerted attack on the city at 0730 hours, 11 November,
but at 0700 the French, acting upon orders from Admiral Darlan,
capitulated.
Center Task Force.—Changing course abruptly during the night,
the Center Task Force arrived off Oran and began its landings at
Arzeu and Les Andalouses at 0135 hours on 8 November. The initial
objectives were airports and the highway system paralleling the
coast. The French commander of the area, after deciding to coï؟¾operate with the American forces, changed his mind and ordered
full resistance. Landing barges were fired on, and some were sunk
as they neared the shore, but the landings were carried out at all
points that had been selected.
A Ranger battalion captured Arzeu, about thirty miles northeast
of Oran, and shortly afterward Allied supply ships commenced unï؟¾loading cargo. Several miles east of Arzeu, Combat Command B,
1st Armored Division, landed and moved southwest to seize the airï؟¾fields at Tafaraoui and La Senia. The 16th and 18th Regimental
Combat Teams from the 1st Infantry Division were brought ashore
near Arzeu and started an advance toward Oran.

[mosaadabd460]

11
To the west the 26th Regimental Combat, Team (1st Infantry
Division) landed at Les Andalouses and struck eastward toward
Oran under orders to seize the dominating heights west of the city.
An armored detachment came ashore northwest of Lourmel and
moved to take the airfield at that place.
In an attempted frontal assault, two cutters carrying two comï؟¾panies of American troops and special antisabotage parties broke
through the booms and dashed into the harbor of Oran. Here they
came under an overwhelming fire from shore batteries and French
warcraft. They reached their objective, but were set ablaze and
disabled. Most of the crews and the troops aboard became casualï؟¾ties; the survivors were captured.
Initially the only other serious opposition to these operations came
from a coastal battery above Arzeu, but resistance developed apace
during the day as our troops began to advance on Oran.
By nightfall of the 8th, Combat Command B had captured the
airfield at Tafaraoui and had moved northward toward La Senia.
The 16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams had advanced a disï؟¾tance of eighteen miles from Arzeu, meeting increasing resistance
as they neared Oran. The 26th Regimental Combat Team from Les
Andalouses had moved eastward to the vicinity of Oran after overï؟¾coming some opposition. The airfield at Lourmel had been occupied.
The plans for the paratroop mission went largely astray. The
formation became partially scattered by a storm, and those planes
that did get through landed at widely separated points on the Sebkra,
a dried-up salt marsh. About 300 paratroopers were finally assemï؟¾bled in the vicinity of Tafaraoui, where they ably assisted the ground
troops in securing that airfield.
During 9 November enemy resistance continued to slow the adï؟¾vance at almost all points. La Senia airfield held out until after dark.
However, Tafaraoui airfield, which had fallen on the 8th, was being
used by aircraft from the Twelfth Air Force as the build-up of the
forces ashore continued.
Early on the 10th the converging infantry colums were in position
around the outskirts of Oran, and elements of the armored combat
command were close to the southern edge of the city. Following a
coordinated attack by all units at 0737 hours, the armored troops
penetrated into the city, and at 1230 General Fredendall received
the formal capitulation of the French commander.
Eastern Task Force.—As events developed, the Algiers area, the
most important of the three major objectives, proved to be the easiest
to secure. The sea was calm, and surprise was achieved. There