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there to advanced supply points in the vicinity of Tebessa. The
American Twelfth Air Force was supplied by rail and road from
Philippeville.
Air and naval forces cooperated in the twofold task of protecting
our supply lines and disrupting the enemy’s. Fighter elements of
the Eastern Air Command were based at Souk el Arba as air support
for the First Army. Similarly the XII Air Support Command was
brought up to the Thelepte and Youks les Bains airfields for the
support of the II Corps. B-17’s were grouped near Biskra, and the
mediums were based on Constantine. Both American and British
planes concentrated primarily on Tunisian targets but began to
range as far as Sicily and Sardinia. Malta-based Beaufighters and
Spitfires aided Allied efforts by striking at Tripolitania and Tunisia
and at Axis air trains over the Sicilian channel. During the first
week of January 520 operational planes of the Twelfth Air Force
and 250 of the Royal Air Force were in Northwest Africa.
Contrary to popular impression, it was estimated that 90 per cent
of the flow of men and supplies across the Sicilian narrows was seaborne and that only 10 per cent was sent in by air. This Axis water
route with its excellent air cover was much less vulnerable than the
long coastal route of the Allies between Bone and Algiers.. Moreover, during the first three months of operations the Allied ports,
particularly Bone, were subject to constant and sometimes heavy
air raids.
Operations, 1 January-14 February 1943 (Map 4b).—While the
Allies were “cleaning up their administrative tail” (a phrase coined
by General Montgomery), the Germans held undisputed possession
of the initiative. That they appreciated the precarious position of
the Allies is indicated by the following extract from an Allied Force
Headquarters report:
In a raptured German document, dated December 16th, we found
set forth Field Marshal Rommel’s “Appreciation of Situation,”
which underlined all our weaknesses of communication and supply,
stressed the conglomerate nature of our forces by a shrewd observation that such a force “probably lacks cohesion and suffers from the
inherent weakness of an Allied command,” and succinctly summarized our problem in the French sector: “Facing Gabes and
Sousse are the elements of three French divisions, all ill-equipped
and of doubtful morale.”
Operating from the Kairouan area, the enemy on 2 January
launched an attack on the French position at Fondouk. The garrison was surrounded and Fondouk captured. Although the Pinchon
gap into the Ousseltia valley was threatened, the enemy did not
exploit his success.
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