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General Eisenhower has expressed his feelings on the situation
in these words:
The abandonment of our immediate offensive plans was the bitï؟¾terest disappointment that I had yet suffered, but I was convinced
that to attempt a major attack under prevailing conditions in
northern Tunisia would be merely to court disaster. We could not
hope to resume major operations in the north until the middle of
March, and we had to set about the slow business of building up
for an attack at the end of that period. The logistic marathon,
which I had desperately tried to avoid, had begun.
During these last two months of 1942 other events which had some
bearing on the military situation were transpiring. When the Gerï؟¾mans moved into unoccupied France and toward the naval base at
Toulon on 11 November, Admiral Darlan ordered the French fleet
to sail for Africa. But in the confusion of the situation the fleet was
scuttled instead, only a few submarines getting through to North
Africa. Darlan was more successful in his next attempt to aid the
Allies. He was able to persuade M. Boisson, the governor of French
West Africa, to join the Liberation Movement and to open Dakar
for use as an Allied base. When Admiral Darlan was assassinated
on 24 December, General Giraud took his place. General Juin beï؟¾came the commander of the French military forces. ,
At this time the bulk of the American forces (the Fifth Army*),
along with two divisions of French troops from Morocco and the
French division in Oran, were being held in the Casablanca-Oran
area to guard communications, to counter any drive the Germans
might make through Spanish Morocco, and to conduct training in
preparation for future missions.
Comments.—The Allied move to seize Tunisia was a necessary
step in the continuation of the strategic offensive in North Africa.
Axis efforts to thwart the attempt were an equally essential step in
carrying out the strategic defensive to which they had been reduced
by their defeat in the Battle of El Alamein.
Two main reasons impelled the Axis command to an all-out defense
of Tunisia. The first was that only by holding that area could they
hope to extricate the troops and equipment of Rommel’s army from
their serious predicament. The second was that it was imperative
to delay the Allied attack against Europe for as long a period as
possible in order to gain time to prepare the necessary defenses.
* The Fifth Army, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark commanding, was actiï؟¾vated on 6 January 1943. Its headquarters was at Oujda, Morocco. The troops
assigned included the 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored
Division.
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