20
Combat Command B became badly mired and was finally forced to
abandon the larger part of its equipment, retrieving only three of
its eighteen 105-mm. howitzers, twelve of its sixty-two medium
tanks, and thirty-eight of its 122 light tanks. This was a serious
loss, since the continual fighting and serious attrition, together with
the inadequate rail and highway communications, had hindered the
build-up of reserves. The weather was turning our few available
airfields into quagmires while the Axis planes, operating from paved
fields, maintained air supremacy over the forward areas, compoundï؟¾ing the confusion and handicaps confronting the Allies. It was
estimated that on 30 November the Germans had 15,500 combat
troops, 130 tanks, sixty field guns, and thirty antitank guns in the
Tunis-Bizerte area. By 18 December this force had grown to a total
of 42,000 men, of whom about 25,000 were Germans, and reinforceï؟¾ments were still arriving.
During November and early December southern Tunisia was alï؟¾most a no man's land, but several hundred Germans arrived in Gabes,
Sfax, and Sousse by troop-carrier planes and garrisoned those towns.
Enemy patrols of armored cars and light tanks pressed westward
and occupied Pont du Fahs.
Farther .south the American paratroops, who had dropped at Youks
les Bains and had joined with French forces in that area, patrolled
actively. The mission of the few hundred American and French
troops in central and southern Tunisia was to make the enemy beï؟¾lieve that they were a whole division. They rushed up and down
their hundred-mile front, appearing here and there to threaten the
Germans along the coast. They fought numerous skirmishes with
enemy patrols and effectively protected the southern flank of the
First Army.
Unwilling to give up the race for Tunisia, General Eisenhower
decided to launch another attack in the north about 20 December
with Tunis as the objective. But the weather continued to be a most
formidable enemy. Vehicular movement off paved roads was imï؟¾possible, and two thirds of the Allied aircraft at the principal field,
at Souk el Arba, were inoperative because of mud. The supply lines
were inadequate to meet the needs for steel matting and equipment
to place the airfields in condition or, for that matter, to provide
the required build-up of general supplies, particularly ammunition.
Since the Allied hope in this last planned offensive lay in air power
and artillery, the operation was postponed and then, on 24 Decemï؟¾ber, finally abandoned.
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