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chance of success in the drive to Tunis. Also, the intermixture of
French and British units that had occurred as a result of improvisaï؟¾tion following the French decision to act with the Allies had to be
straightened out. By 23 November a verbal agreement had been
reached whereby all troops north of the line Le Kef-Zaghouan
should be under command of the British First Army, while all units
south of that line should be subject to French command. This was
unsatisfactory, but it was the best that could be achieved at the
moment, since the French had refused to serve under a British
commander.
On 24 November General Anderson had completed the forward
concentration of the 78th Division and Blade Force, with the British
6th Armored Division en route to Teboursouk and Combat Comï؟¾mand B of the American 1st Armored Division en route to Souk el
Arba as follow-up troops. The advance was resumed, Blade Force
penetrating the enemy outpost position to a point midway between
Tebourba and Mateur and the 11th Brigade, on the right, advancing
down the Medjerda valley, where it captured Medjez el Bab on the
25th. Progress was steady for the next three days, with the 11th
Brigade, reinforced by American and British armor, moving astride
the river to take Tebourba the night of 26-27 November. On 28 Noï؟¾vember our forces reached Djedeida, less than sixteen miles from
Tunis. This proved to be the farthest advance toward Tunis until
the final drive of the campaign, six months later.
To the north the 36th Brigade, although advancing about ten
miles toward Mateur, met increasing resistance from enemy mings
and booby traps. At the same time Blade Force, in the plains south
of Mateur, began to meet supply difficulties, which were aggravated
by the first rains. In all sections the enemy’s dive bombers were an
important factor in stopping our advance, since our airfields were
too far to the rear to provide the necessary cover.
The forward positions were held until 1 December, when von Arï؟¾nim, the German commander, launched an attack with dive bombers,
tanks, and infantry against Blade Force near Tebourba. After losï؟¾ing forty tanks, Blade Force was withdrawn, and the sector was
taken over by Combat Command B and the 11th Brigade. On 3
December the enemy attacked again, the 11th Brigade suffering
heavily both in men and equipment. By this time several battalions
of the 78th Division had less than 350 men.
On 8 December General Eisenhower approved General Anderson’s
proposal to withdraw his forces to more defensible ground. Howï؟¾ever, the important center of Medjez el Bab was to be held at all
costs. The weather proved a serious handicap to this withdrawal.
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