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become defiles for long distances. During military operations they
can be blocked with mine fields and covered by fire from the high
ground commanding them oh either side. Thus the defiles and passes
were to become important objectives during the Tunisian campaign.
There are three routes of entry into Tunisia from Algeria. First
is the coast road through Bone. Another route, through Souk Ahras,
some forty miles inland, leads to the Tunis-Bizerte area either
by way of Souk el Arba or by the more southerly road through Le
Kef. Access to central and southern Tunisia is through Tebessa,
from which point roads lead northeastward to Medjez el Bab and
Tunis, eastward through Kasserine to the passes at Fondouk and
Faid, and southeastward through Gafsa to Sfax and Gabes.
The railroads are of especial importance in this region of few
good highways. However, the deterioration of the roadbeds and
the French rolling stock was to make even this form of transportaï؟¾tion extremely unreliable. Operating in the level coastal plains of
Tunis and southern Tunisia, the enemy was to have the definite
advantage of shorter and better communications.
The period of heaviest rains begins in late November and continues
through February. During this season the lowlands, particularly,
become a glutinous sea of mud.
THE RACE FOR TUNISIA, November-December 1942
Having secured the initial objectives of Casablanca, Oran, and
Algiers, the Allies turned immediately to the next phase, the concenï؟¾tration of the bulk of American and French Moroccan and Algerian
forces in the Casablanca-Oran area and the advance of the British
First Army to Tunisia. According to General Eisenhower:
Our chief hope of anticipating the Axis in Tunisia lay in our actï؟¾ing with utmost speed. Indeed, we were involved in a race not only
against the building up of enemy forces at Tunis and Bizerte, but
against the weather as well. There was less than a month of fair
weather ahead, and Axis air and ground forces were within easy
striking distance of Tunis and Bizerte, less than 100 miles away
from these places across the Sicilian narrows. All the same, our
easternmost force was at Algiers, 560 miles west of Tunis. Necesï؟¾sarily, therefore, we had to rely on a rapid advance of very light
forces, understrength in both personnel and equipment.
To make matters worse, the enemy lost no time in meeting the
Allied invasion. On 9 November German air transports began flyï؟¾ing troops into the Bizerte-Tunis area. Here again the French
reaction exasperated the Allies. Admiral Esteva, the French Resiï؟¾dent, listened to Vichy and, despite Darlan’s armistice directive, preï؟¾Digitized byGoogle
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