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Sfax. Although the bulk of Rommel’s forces had been able to escape
the trap, the remnants of nine Italian battalions were rounded up.
The Eighth Army continued the pursuit and on 20 April drove
into Enfidaville against increasing Axis resistance. Further attacks
against the strong enemy position in the hills north of Enfidaville
were met by determined counterattacks which convinced Montï؟¾gomery that a regrouping of his army would be necessary before
further progress could be made.
During this period the V Corps, in accordance with its mission,
started local attacks in the vicinity of Medjez el Bab on 7 April to
secure advantageous positions from which to launch future operaï؟¾tions. The fighting in this northern area was continuous for almost
two weeks, and although a breakthrough was not achieved, some
progress was made. This placed the V Corps in a position to strike
at Longstop Hill, which together with the circle of hills east of
Medjez blocked further progress. All of these dominating heights
were strongly held by the enemy and would have to be cleared before
any breakthrough down the valley toward Tunis could be made.
At this time the V Corps did not have the strength for such an
operation.
Comments.—General Montgomery says of the Eighth Army opï؟¾erations at this time:
The Battle of the Mareth Line was our toughest fight since El Alaï؟¾mein, and whereas the latter was a hard slogging match, at Mareth
there had been greater scope for strategems and subtlety ... As
at El Alamein, Rommel cast in his reserves piecemeal; and when
the battle started, his armour was spread-eagled—with 10 Panzer
Division in the Gafsa sector, 15 Panzer Division soon involved on
the coast, and 21 Panzer Division arriving in the west to back up
the switch line . . .
The outstanding feature of the battle was the air action in coï؟¾operation with the outflanking forces ...
We retained the initiative throughout. Even when we lost our
gains on the coastal flank, Rommel was kept on the move by the
speedy development of the western outflanking movement . . .
Vital considerations (governing the decision to shift strength to
the enveloping force) were, first, the speed with which the decisive
blow could be mounted and delivered and, secondly, the necessity to
hold the German reserves on the eastern flank long enough to preï؟¾vent their assisting the defenders of the switch lines west of El
Hamma.
Montgomery clearly proved that an early setback—such as the
failure of the XXX Corps to penetrate the Mareth Line—need not
necessarily cause a loss of the initiative provided the plan is flexible
and reserves are available.
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