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factors: (1) confusion in all ranks resulting from divided units
and an improvised chain of command; (2) inexperience of troops
engaged; (3) dispersion of forces over a wide front and lack of
sufficient troops to provide adequate local reserves for the forward
elements; (4) unskillful use of terrain and available forces in the
defense.
Many lessons were learned during the Faid-Kasserine operations,
but probably the most valuable one was the age-old principle of the
necessity for concentration of combat power. Once again it was
demonstrated that so long as reserves remain available for employï؟¾ment in time and at the proper place, no situation is beyond repair,
regardless of initial setbacks or the necessity for surrendering some
ground.
Rommel failed in his objectives in spite of the piecemeal nature
of the early resistance offered, particularly on the part of the very
considerable armor we had in the Kasserine area. If he had thought
he could exploit his breakthrough as far as Le Kef and seriously
threaten the Allied communication lines, that quickly proved to be
beyond his strength. If he intended merely a spoiling attack to do
maximum damage to our equipment, he had succeeded in inflicting
serious wounds without, however, affecting Allied strength more
than temporarily. In any event, his sands were running out, and
the turn of the tide at Kasserine proved to be the turn of the tide in
all of Tunisia as well.
PERIOD OF ALLIED INITIATIVE, March-May 1943
General.—The French political situation was no longer a serious
factor in military operations, and the diminishing threat of an Axis
drive through Spanish Morocco released additional Allied troops for
the Tunisian front. In spite of the reverses suffered during January
and February, the Allied supply and troop build-up had continued.
The supply installations in the Tebessa area had been augmented
to support the II Corps and the approaching British Eighth Army.
The rains had ceased, roads had been improved, railroads had been
rehabilitated, and gasoline pipelines had been constructed. Amerï؟¾ican troops had received their baptism of fire, and in spite of the
initial reverses suffered in clashing with the best the Germans had
to offer, they had come out of the campaign battle-wise and tactiï؟¾cally efficient.
To go back for a moment, the projected reorganization of the
Allied command took place just at the time of the unsuccessful deï؟¾fense of Kasserine Pass. Air Chief Marshal Tedder's Mediterra-
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