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operations in the Thala-Kasserine-Djebel el Hainra sector. During
the preceding few days command of the Allied troops in this area
had changed several times, with much resultant confusion.
On 22 February the enemy again attacked north, the,British on
the Thala road being engaged by about fifty tanks. Some ground
was yielded, but counterattacks restored the former positions. Durï؟¾ing the afternoon one battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment, which
had been attached to Combat Command B in the Djebel el Hainra
sector, counterattacked against the German left flank. Launched
from the vicinity of Ain Bou Dries and supported by some artillery
from the 9th Division, this attack was completely successful, about
400 prisoners being captured. In large measure it was the cause of
the enemy’s decision to withdraw through the pass.
During the early phases of the fighting bad weather had hampered
air operations, but at this time the skies cleared and the Allies were
able to strike telling blows on the enemy columns. Aircraft of the
XII Air Support Command flew most of the missions, but other eleï؟¾ments of the air forces, reorganized during this period for closer
coordination with the ground troops, were also of great assistance.
Early on the morning of 23 February the Germans began to withT
draw through Kasserine Pass. Mine fields and well-fought delaying
actions prevented the Allies from doing them much damage during
the pursuit. By 26 February they had reached the general line
Hadjeb el Aioun-Sidi Bou Zid-Gafsa, where they remained.
Comments.—The specific purposes of the Axis attacks during Janï؟¾uary and February were: (1) to capture the areas commanding the
mountain passes and thus broaden the long coastal corridor in order
to safeguard the communications between von Arnim’s and Romï؟¾mel’s armies; (2) to make their airfields in the coastal areas safer
from Allied interference; and (3) to throw the Allied forces off
balance before any coordinated attack could be launched. The Gerï؟¾man high command felt that Tunisia could be held and during this
phase continued to pour in men until 200,000 combat troops, three
fifths of them German, were available by 1 March.
By mid-February over 500,000 Allied troops were in North Africa,
and plans were being made for a large-scale offensive. Reinforceï؟¾ments for the British First Army and the American II Corps were
moving up, and Montgomery’s Eighth Army was preparing to apï؟¾proach the Mareth Line in full force. But before the Allies were
ready to strike, Rommel made his only really dangerous effort of the
campaign when he struck at Faid Pass on 14 February. The initial
reverses suffered by the American troops can be attributed to several
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