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no breakthrough. The action might have continued along the same
line, with additional small advances that would have gradually comï؟¾pressed von Arnim’s forces into a smaller perimeter, until finally
the Axis troops would have successfully withdrawn to defensive
positions along the base of the Cape Bon Peninsula. It may be
that at no time did the Axis command hope to execute a Dunkirk in
the face of the Allied control of the sea and complete mastery of the
air, but it is quite clear that they fully expected to make a Bataan
out of Cape Bon.
The first attempt to break through having failed, Alexander again
regrouped his forces. This time he achieved a concentration of
combat power sufficient not only to penetrate the Axis position, but
also to exploit the success most effectively. The actual breakthrough
took place so rapidly that the Axis troops were completely surprised
and thrown off balance. Von Arnim was caught just as the French
had been caught in 1940, by an attack launched by an overwhelming
striking force moving at great speed.
For use in the event of an attempted evacuation, the Allied navy
had drawn up a plan in close collaboration with the air force. Grimly
looking back to Norway, Dunkirk, Greece, and Crete, the plan was
named Operation Retribution. All possible means, both in the air
and on the sea, were organized to forestall any enemy escape from
Tunisia. It was certain that an evacuation could only be attempted
under cover of the Italian fleet, which at long last might be compelled
to stand and fight. Since, as it turned out, the Axis high command
did not dare join issue at sea at a time when its forces on land were
in a desperate situation, it was compelled to sacrifice a large army
and immense quantities of stores and equipment. From the purely
military standpoint, the Axis proved the folly of flouting the age-old
strategic axiom that to commit large ground forces across a sea withï؟¾out assured and continuing control of that sea is to court disaster.
The excellence of the plan is also evidenced by the fact that von
Arnim miscalculated the location of the main attack and as a result
made a faulty distribution of his forces. Lack of aerial reconnaisï؟¾sance was largely responsible for this error, but Montgomery’s realï؟¾istic diversion was likewise an important factor.
The German high command made the same error in Tunisia that
it had made in Russia in November 1942: there were no reserves
behind the front. When, therefore, the British armored troops
arrived in Axis rear areas, they met but slight opposition and were
able to disorganize the entire defense by cutting lines of communicaï؟¾tion, destroying command posts, and disrupting supply facilities.
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